The paper deals with a version of the principle that a belief source can be a knowledge source only if the subject knows that it is reliable. I argue that the principle can be saved from the main objections that motivate its widespread rejection: the claim that it leads to skepticism, the claim that it forces us to accept counterintuitive knowledge ascriptions and the claim that it is incompatible with reliabilist accounts of knowledge. I argue that naturalist epistemologists should reject (...) these claims. I introduce my treatment of the principle by considering the analogous situation posed by the closure principle. (shrink)

Tarski's 1936 paper, “On the concept of logical consequence”, is a rather philosophical, non-technical paper that leaves room for conflicting interpretations. My purpose is to review some important issues that explicitly or implicitly constitute its themes. My discussion contains four sections: terminological and conceptual preliminaries, Tarski's definition of the concept of logical consequence, Tarski's discussion of omega-incomplete theories, and concluding remarks concerning the kind of conception that Tarski's definition was intended to explicate. The third section involves subsidiary issues, such as (...) Tarski's discussion concerning the distinction between material and formal consequence and the important question ofthe criterion for distinguishing between logical and non-logical terms.§1. Preliminaries. In this paper an argument is a two-part system composed of a set of propositions P and a single proposition c. The expression ‘c is a [logical] consequence of P’ is used with the same meaning as the expression ‘c is [logically] implied by P’. The expressions ‘is a logical consequence of’ and the converse ‘implies’ are relational. Often, I shall be talking in the same sense of validity of an argument. Validity is a property of arguments; an argument with premise-set P and conclusion c is valid if and only if P implies c; i.e., c is a logical consequence of P. Notice that this notion of argument is strictly ontic; it does not involve any agent that thinks, determines or establishes that a given proposition is or is not a consequence of a given set of propositions. (shrink)

Este texto se escribió y se publicó como parte de las celebraciones del 80 aniversario del Departamento de Filosofía de la Universidad Iberoamericana, Ciudad de México.

In this paper I assess the two central ingredients of Laurence BonJour’s position on empirical knowledge that have survived the transition from his earlier coherentist views to his current endorsement of the doctrine of the given: his construal of the problem of the epistemic regress and his rejection of an internalist solution to the problem. The bulk of the paper is devoted to a critical assessment of BonJour’s arguments against externalism. I argue that they fail to put real pressure on (...) externalism, as they rely on a highly questionable conception of epistemic rationality and responsibility. Then, more briefly, I take issue with BonJour’s endorsement of the irrelevance thesis—the claim that even if externalism were true it would not offer a satisfactory solution to the epistemic regress problem. I contend that he is not entitled to subscribe this thesis unless he is prepared to abandon his construal of the problem. (shrink)

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion.

Replies to contributions to a symposium on the book, Scepticism and Reliable Belief.

Standard definitions of logical consequence for formal languages are atomistic. They take as their starting point a range of possible assignments of semantic values to the extralogical atomic constituents of the language, each of which generates a unique truth value for each sentence. In modal logic, these possible assignments of semantic values are generated by Kripke-style models involving possible worlds and an accessibility relation. In first-order logic, they involve the standard structures of model theory, as sets of objects from which (...) the extralogical symbols of the language receive their denotations. I argue that there is an alternative, holistic, approach to the task of defining logical consequence for a formal language. It specifies necessary and sufficient conditions for an assignment of truth values to all the sentences of the language to be compatible with the intended interpretation of its logical constants. It achieves this without invoking possible assignments of semantic values to the extralogical atomic constituents of the language, or the formal resources that are employed to generate these. I show how this approach can be successfully applied to modal propositional logic and to first-order logic, modal as well as nonmodal. I show that the holistic definitions of logical consequence that I supply for these languages are equivalent to the standard atomistic definitions. (shrink)

I consider the problem of reflective knowledge faced by views that treat sensitivity as a sufficient condition for knowledge, or as a major ingredient of the concept, as in the analysis I advance in Scepticism and Reliable Belief. I present the problem as concerning the correct analysis of SATs — beliefs to the effect that one of my current beliefs is true. I suggest that a plausible analysis of SATs should treat them as neither true nor false when they ascribe (...) truth to a non-existent belief. I argue that the problem is inescapable if we construe SATs as ascribing the property of truth to a belief. Deflationism manages to avoid the problem of reflective knowledge, but it does so by violating alethic priority — the principle that our account of representation must be built on our account of truth. I argue that we can avoid the problem of reflective knowledge while preserving alethic priority with a pragmatist account of truth — according to which truth is explicated in terms of the rules that govern the practice of assessing judgments and related items as true or false. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza la relación entre individuo y sociedad en Theodor W. Adorno. Para ello se centra en las tensiones y mediaciones entre teoría de la sociedad y psicoanálisis. Su punto de partida es el horizonte histórico concreto del vínculo que une a ambos: la conjunción de crisis e integración. Después presenta la constitución social de la subjetividad desde la perspectiva de teoría crítica, la economía psíquico-libidinal como matriz psicosocial de dicha constitución, la tesis de la debilitación del individuo en (...) un capitalismo monopolista autoritario, su expresión en el carácter autoritario y el narcisismo herido, para acabar señalando los límites históricos del sujeto neurótico y modelo edípico y los elementos de una posible actualización de las aportaciones de una psicología social psicoanalítica. (shrink)

The subject matter of this paper is the view that it is correct, in an absolute sense, to believe a proposition just in case the proposition is true. I take issue with arguments in support of this view put forward by Nishi Shah and David Velleman.

In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke rejects some of the most popular accounts of what meaning facts consist in on the grounds that they fail to accommodate the normative character of meaning. I argue that a widespread interpretation of Kripke's argument is incorrect. I contend that the argument does not rest on the contrast between descriptive and normative facts, but on the thought that speakers' uses of linguistic expressions have to be justified. I suggest that the line (...) of reasoning that I attribute to Kripke can be seen as putting pressure on the idea that predicate satisfaction is to be explained in terms of a relation between predicates and properties. (shrink)

Revised and enlarged edition. The first edition was in 1957.

We consider, from a physical perspective, the case where the interface between an organism and its environment becomes large enough that it acts as a buffer regulating their matter and energy exchanges. We illustrate the physiological and evolutionary role of buffers through the example of lungfish estivation. Then we ponder the relevance of buffers of this kind to the quest for a general definition of concepts like niche construction, the extended phenotype, and related ones, whose meaning is conveyed at present (...) mostly through particular examples. Finally, we comment on the potential significance of buffers to organism—environment codetermination in the sense originally suggested by Lewontin. (shrink)

I argue that Epistemic Disjunctivism doesn’t sustain a successful anti-sceptical strategy. I contend, in particular, that the treatment of scepticism that Duncan Pritchard puts forward on behalf of Epistemic Disjunctivism is unsatisfactory.

The paper deals with Hilary Putnam's model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism. It considers the objections to the argument raised by David Lewis, Mark Heller, James van Cleve, Anthony Brueckner and others, to the effect that Putnam's reasoning fails to undermine versions of metaphysical realism which construe reference along externalist lines. I argue that the version of Putnam's argument that his critics have attacked is indeed powerless against externalist accounts of reference, but that, on a different construal, the argument puts genuine (...) pressure on externalism. On the version of the argument that I develop, the thrust of the model-theoretic considerations is that an externalist construal of reference would make grasp of reference facts impossible. (shrink)

Social sustainability is in its early stages in hospitality and tourism supply chains, especially in developing countries. This research draws on institutional and stakeholder theories to identify the adopted social sustainability practices in Egypt and to determine the factors affecting their implementation. A mixed-method research approach is followed involving interviews of hotel managers and a literature-based questionnaire answered by a total of 187 practitioners from hospitality and tourism supply chains in Egypt. The interviews revealed that social sustainability practices in the (...) two hotels' supply chains are adopted but limited to legal requirements and brand policies. Statistical analysis indicated that local suppliers boost the adoption of social practices. All the studied barriers show very weak correlation with the adoption of social sustainability practices; according to the interviews, this does not imply barriers inexistence, but rather reflects lack of awareness regarding social rights in a culture that tend to preserve social conservatism. The enablers explained significant variations in many social sustainability practices (53 out of 62). This study is unique since it offers a novel approach by linking institutional and stakeholder theories to recognize weaknesses in tourism supply chain social sustainability, thereby providing directions for the future design of sustainable tourism policies. (shrink)

Evolutionary game theory and public goods games offer an important framework to understand cooperation during pandemics. From this perspective, the COVID-19 situation can be conceptualized as a dilemma where people who neglect safety precautions act as free riders, because they get to enjoy the benefits of decreased health risk from others’ compliance with policies despite not contributing to or even undermining public safety themselves. At the same time, humans appear to carry a suite of evolved psychological mechanisms aimed at curbing (...) free riding in order to ensure the continued provision of public goods, which can be leveraged to develop more effective measures to promote compliance with regulations. We also highlight factors beyond free riding that reduce compliance rates, such as the emergence of conspiratorial thinking, which seriously undermine the effectiveness of measures to suppress free riding. Together, the current paper outlines the social dynamics that occur in public goods dilemmas involving the spread of infectious disease, highlights the utility and limits of evolutionary game-theoretic approaches for COVID-19 management, and suggests novel directions based on emerging challenges to cooperation. (shrink)

In this article, we review the conceptions of Collective Effervescence (CE) –a state of intense shared emotional activation and sense of unison that emerges during instances of collective behavior, like demonstrations, rituals, ceremonies, celebrations, and others– and empirical approaches oriented at measuring it. The first section starts examining Émile Durkheim's classical conception on CE, and then, the integrative one proposed by the sociologist Randall Collins, leading to a multi-faceted experience of synchronization. Then, we analyze the construct as a process emerging (...) in collective encounters when individuals contact with social ideal and values, referring to the classical work of Serge Moscovici as well as those more recent empirical approaches. Third, we consider CE as a set of intense positive emotions linked to processes of group identification, as proposed by authors of the Social Identity Theory tradition. Finally, we describe CE from the perspective of self-transcendence (e.g., emotions, experiences), and propose a unified description of this construct. The second section shows the results of a meta-analytical integration (k= 50,N= 182,738) aimed at analyzing CE's proximal effects or construct validity (i.e., Individual Emotions and Communal Sharing) as well as its association with more distal variables, such as Collective Emotions, Social Integration, Social Values and Beliefs and Empowerment. Results indicate that CE strongly associates with Individual Emotions –in particular, Self-Transcendent Emotions– and Communal Sharing constructs (e.g., Group Identity, Fusion of Identity), providing construct validity. Among the distal effects of CE, it is associated with Collective Positive Emotions, long-term Social Integration (e.g., Ingroup Commitment), Social Values and Beliefs and Empowerment-related variables (e.g., Wellbeing, Collective Efficacy, Collective Self-Esteem). Among the moderation analyses carried out (e.g., study design, CE scale, type of collective gathering), the effects of CE in demonstrations are noticeable, where this variable is a factor that favors other variables that make collective action possible, such as Group Identity (rpooled= 0.52), Collective Efficacy (rpooled= 0.37), Negative and Self-Transcendent Emotions (rpooled= 0.14 and 0.58), and Morality-related beliefs (rpooled= 0.43). (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss an abductive argument for the existence of God from the experience of awe at natural beauty. If God's creative work is a viable explanation for why we experience awe at natural beauty, and there is no satisfactory naturalistic explanation for the origins of such experiences, then we have defeasible evidence that God exists. To evaluate the argument's tenability, we assess the merits of the two main theocentric frameworks that can be marshaled to answer the question (...) of why human beings experience awe at natural beauty: (1) taking the experience of natural beauty as resulting from God's design intentions and (2) conceiving experiences of natural beauty as religious experiences in themselves. We argue that the presence of phenomenological content the fine-grainedness of which exceeds our descriptive and conceptual capacities is better accounted for by the latter hypothesis: experiencing natural beauty amounts to experiencing divine attributes. We conclude that the argument's theological premise is tenable and, having previously argued for the empirical premise (Porcher & De Luca-Noronha, 2021), we conclude that awe at natural beauty is best explained by the existence of God. (shrink)

The publication of scientific papers has become increasingly problematic in the last decades. Even if we agree that a renewed model is needed for peer-reviewed scientific publication, we think the problem does not essentially lie in professional publishing—with economic incentives—but in the publish-or-perish culture that dominates the lives of researchers and academics.

This paper presents current trends in philosophy of mind and philosophy of neuroscience, with a special focus on neuroscientists dealing with some topics usually discussed by philosophers of mind. The aim is to detect the philosophical views of those scientists, such as Eccles, Gazzaniga, Damasio, Changeux, and others, which are not easy to classify according to the standard divisions of dualism, functionalism, emergentism, and others. As the variety of opinions in these fields is sometimes a source of confusion, it is (...) worth the effort to obtain an overall panorama of the topic. A general conclusion on epistemological and ontological issues, concerning the relationship between neurobiology and philosophy and the multi-level account of the embodied mind, is proposed. (shrink)

Regulatory science, which generates knowledge relevant for regulatory decision?making, is different from standard academic science in that it is oriented mainly towards the attainment of non?epistemic (practical) aims. The role of uncertainty and the limits to the relevance of academic science are being recognized more and more explicitly in regulatory decision?making. This has led to the introduction of regulation?specific scientific methodologies in order to generate decision?relevant data. However, recent practical experience with such non?standard methodologies indicates that they, too, may be (...) subject to important limitations. We argue that the attainment of non?epistemic values and aims (like the protection of human health and the environment) requires not only control of the quality of the data and the methodologies, but also the selection of the level of regulation deemed adequate in each specific case (including a decision about which of the two, under?regulation or over?regulation, would be more acceptable). (shrink)

Trata-se duma leitura do ensaio Experiência do Pensamento, em que Marilena Chaui analisa a maneira como Merleau-Ponty lê e se posiciona a respeito da tradição filosófica em que desenvolve o seu próprio pensamento. Unindo dois termos polarizados pela tradição como dois opostos irreconciliáveis, Chaui mostra como os dois termos se articulam no interior da reflexão de Merleau-Ponty. Nosso objetivo aqui é investigar como um pensamento filosófico se constitui enquanto diálogo, interrogação e combate entre sistemas e correntes de pensamento, confrontando a (...) ideia de que as grandes filosofias se comportariam como sistemas e correntes isolados. (shrink)