Articles on Sikh ethos, history, and philosophy.

This article presents the results of a study that investigated the roles that religiosity and ones money ethic play in determining consumer attitudes/beliefs in various situations regarding questionable consumer practices. One dimension of religiosity – intrinsic religiousness – was studied. Four separate dimensions of a money ethic scale were initially examined, but only one was used in the final analyses. Results indicated that both intrinsic religiousness and one’s money ethic were significant determinants of most types of consumer ethical beliefs.

Ethical review systems need to build on their experiences of COVID-19 research to enhance their preparedness for future pandemics. Recommendations from representatives from over twenty countries include: improving relationships across the research ecosystem; demonstrating willingness to reform and adapt systems and processes; and making the case robustly for better resourcing.

The concept of mental integrity is currently a significant topic in discussions concerning the regulation of neurotechnologies. Technologies such as deep brain stimulation and brain-computer interfaces are believed to pose a unique threat to mental integrity, and some authors have advocated for a legal right to protect it. Despite this, there remains uncertainty about what mental integrity entails and why it is important. Various interpretations of the concept have been proposed, but the literature on the subject is inconclusive. Here we (...) consider a number of possible interpretations and argue that the most plausible one concerns neurotechnologies that bypass one’s reasoning capacities, and do so specifically in ways that reliably lead to alienation from one’s mental states. This narrows the scope of what constitutes a threat to mental integrity and offers a more precise role for the concept to play in the ethical evaluation of neurotechnologies. (shrink)

In this article, I examine children's reported experiences with stimulant drug treatments for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder in light of bioethical arguments about the potential threats of psychotropic drugs to authenticity and moral agency. Drawing on a study that involved over 150 families in the USA and the UK, I show that children are able to report threats to authenticity, but that the majority of children are not concerned with such threats. On balance, children report that stimulants improve their capacity (...) for moral agency, and they associate this capacity with an ability to meet normative expectations. I argue that although under certain conditions stimulant drug treatment may increase the risk of a threat to authenticity, there are ways to minimise this risk and to maximise the benefits of stimulant drug treatment. Medical professionals in particular should help children to flourish with stimulant drug treatments, in good and in bad conditions. (shrink)

This article probes the relative absence of religion within discussions of intersectionality, and begins to address this absence by bringing intersectionality studies into conversation with another significant field within feminist theory: the study of religious women's agency. Although feminist literatures on intersectionality and religious women's agency have garnered a great deal of scholarly attention, these two bodies of work have rarely been engaged together. After surveying both fields, I argue that research on religious women's agency not only exposes an ambiguity (...) at the heart of intersectionality between identity and oppression, but also challenges several aspects of intersectionality studies, especially as recent theorists increasingly turn away from identity politics in favor of a structural critique of power. These aspects of intersectionality include its often unsituated critique of power, as well as its reliance on a negatively defined consensus on anti-oppression. (shrink)

This article explores the gender dynamics of ‘causing or allowing a child to die’, contrary to the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, section 5. This offence was intended to allow for prosecution where a child had been killed and it was uncertain who had killed him/her, but also to allow for prosecution of non-violent defendants who failed to protect him/her. More women than men have been charged and convicted of this offence signifying a reversal of usual patterns of (...) prosecution and conviction. This analysis interrogates how section 5 criminalises women who have experienced domestic abuse. Drawing on a case observation, reported cases and media reports of cases, I suggest this offence derives from and perpetuates patriarchal constructs of motherhood. Grounded in a feminist approach building on women’s concrete experiences of law, I conclude that section 5 should be amended so that it is only used where it cannot be ascertained which defendant actively harmed a child. (shrink)

Employee wellbeing as a central aspect of organizational growth has been widely regarded and accepted. Therefore, a considerable growth in the number of researches focusing on employee wellbeing has been comprehended in recent years. Employee wellbeing characterizes the individual’s own cognitive interpretation of his/her life at work. The present study made an attempt to examine how workplace spirituality, empathic concern and organizational politics influences employee wellbeing. It was hypothesized that empathic concern mediates the relationship between workplace spirituality and employee wellbeing (...) while organizational politics act as a moderator in this relationship. A survey was conducted on 253 employees working in Uttar Pradesh Police department. The results obtained revealed that workplace spirituality, empathic concern and employee wellbeing carries a positive association among them whereas these variables were found to be negatively correlated with organizational politics. Results also depicted that empathic concern significantly mediates between workplace spirituality and employee wellbeing. Further, moderated mediation analysis confirmed employee wellbeing as a function of workplace spirituality, empathic concern and organizational politics. The present study has put forward several practical implications for business practitioners and research directions for academicians, emphasizing upon the need to investigate the comprehensive impact of employee wellbeing in organization and the society as a whole. (shrink)

I offer a response to an objection to my account of the moral difference between fetuses and newborns, an account that seeks to address an analogy between abortion and infanticide which is based on the apparent equality of moral value of fetuses and newborns.

This paper explores the dilemma faced by mental healthcare professionals in balancing treatment of mental disorders with promoting patient well-being and flourishing. With growing calls for a more explicit focus on patient flourishing in mental healthcare, we address two inter-related challenges: the lack of consensus on defining positive mental health and flourishing, and how professionals should respond to patients with controversial views on what is good for them. We discuss the relationship dynamics between healthcare providers and patients, proposing that ‘liberal’ (...) approaches can provide a pragmatic framework to address disagreements about well-being in the context of flourishing-oriented mental healthcare. We acknowledge the criticisms of these approaches, including the potential for unintended paternalism and distrust. To mitigate these risks, we conclude by suggesting a mechanism to minimize the likelihood of unintended paternalism and foster patient trust. (shrink)

_The first part called the Preamble tackles: (a) the issues of silence and speech, and life and disease; (b) whether we need to know some or all of the truth, and how are exact science and philosophical reason related; (c) the phenomenon of Why, How, and What; (d) how are mind and brain related; (e) what is robust eclecticism, empirical/scientific enquiry, replicability/refutability, and the role of diagnosis and medical model in psychiatry; (f) bioethics and the four principles of beneficence, non-malfeasance, (...) autonomy, and justice; (g) the four concepts of disease, illness, sickness, and disorder; how confusion is confounded by these concepts but clarity is imperative if we want to make sense out of them; and how psychiatry is an interim medical discipline. The second part called The Issues deals with: (a) the concepts of nature and nurture; the biological and the psychosocial; and psychiatric disease and brain pathophysiology; (b) biology, Freud and the reinvention of psychiatry; (c) critics of psychiatry, mind-body problem and paradigm shifts in psychiatry; (d) the biological, the psychoanalytic, the psychosocial and the cognitive; (e) the issues of clarity, reductionism, and integration; (f) what are the fool-proof criteria, which are false leads, and what is the need for questioning assumptions in psychiatry. The third part is called Psychiatric Disorder, Psychiatric Ethics, and Psychiatry Connected Disciplines. It includes topics like (a) psychiatric disorder, mental health, and mental phenomena; (b) issues in psychiatric ethics; (c) social psychiatry, liaison psychiatry, psychosomatic medicine, forensic psychiatry, and neuropsychiatry. The fourth part is called Antipsychiatry, Blunting Creativity, etc. It includes topics like (a) antipsychiatry revisited; (b) basic arguments of antipsychiatry, Szasz, etc.; (c) psychiatric classification and value judgment; (d) conformity, labeling, and blunting creativity. The fifth part is called The Role of Philosophy, Religion, and Spirituality in Psychiatry. It includes topics like (a) relevance of philosophy to psychiatry; (b) psychiatry, religion, spirituality, and culture; (c) ancient Indian concepts and contemporary psychiatry; (d) Indian holism and Western reductionism; (e) science, humanism, and the nomothetic-idiographic orientation. The last part, called Final Goal, talks of the need for a grand unified theory. The whole discussion is put in the form of refutable points._. (shrink)

Pancreatitis is a complex, progressively destructive inflammatory disorder. Alcohol was long thought to be the primary causative agent, but genetic contributions have been of interest since the discovery that rare PRSS1, CFTR and SPINK1 variants were associated with pancreatitis risk. We now report two associations at genome-wide significance identified and replicated at PRSS1-PRSS2 and X-linked CLDN2 through a two-stage genome-wide study. The PRSS1 variant likely affects disease susceptibility by altering expression of the primary trypsinogen gene. The CLDN2 risk allele is (...) associated with atypical localization of claudin-2 in pancreatic acinar cells. The homozygous CLDN2 genotype confers the greatest risk, and its alleles interact with alcohol consumption to amplify risk. These results could partially explain the high frequency of alcohol-related pancreatitis in men. © 2012 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

Ayurveda is a traditional system of healthcare that is native to India and has a rich documented literature of its own. Most of the historians agree that the documentation of core Ayurveda literature took place approximately in between 400 BCE and 200 CE, while acknowledging that the roots of its theoretical framework can be traced back to a much earlier period. For multiple reasons many significant contributions of Ayurveda literature to various streams of biological and medical sciences have remained under-recognized (...) while recounting the historical milestones of development. This is true in the context of the physiology of digestion and metabolism too. In this communication we try to reconstruct a picture of the processes of digestion and metabolism as had been understood by ancient Ayurveda scholars. Though this understanding was primitive and insufficient in many ways, we argue that this deserves to be documented and acknowledged. To help with grasping the importance of these contributions, we juxtapose them with the corresponding insights pertaining to this subject reported by prominent western scientists. The major contributions of Ayurveda that have been recounted in this paper are those related to the description of three distinct phases of digestion (Avasthapaka), multiple sets of transformative entities acting at different levels of metabolism (Agni), and the roles ascribed to various internal and external factors in executing these physiological functions. (shrink)

The majority of antimicrobials that are produced are administered to animals, particularly food animals. While the overall impact of antimicrobial use in animals on antimicrobial resistance in humans and the environment is unclear, it undeniably has a role. Yet, some degree of antimicrobial use in animals is necessary for animal health and welfare purposes. Balancing the benefits and risks of antimicrobial use in animals is challenging because of the complexity of the problem and limitations in available data. However, a range (...) of measures can be implemented to reduce, refine and optimize antimicrobial use in animals, with a goal of minimizing the impact on human and environmental health while maintaining necessary therapeutic use in animals. A pandemic instrument can provide the necessary foundation for the whole-of-society and whole-of government One Health approach that is required to strengthen surveillance, communication, collaboration, and action. (shrink)

Background: Poverty and social deprivation have adverse effects on health outcomes and place a significant burden on healthcare systems. There are some actions that can be taken to tackle them from within healthcare institutions, but clinicians who seek to make frontline services more responsive to the social determinants of health and the social context of people’s lives can face a range of ethical challenges. We summarise and consider a case in which clinicians introduced a poverty screening initiative into paediatric practice (...) using the discourse and methodology of healthcare quality improvement. -/- Discussion: Whilst suggesting that interventions like the PSI are a potentially valuable extension of clinical roles, which take advantage of the unique affordances of clinical settings, we argue that there is a tendency for such settings to continuously reproduce a narrower set of norms. We illustrate how the framing of an initiative as QI can help legitimate and secure funding for practical efforts to help address social ends from within clinical service, but also how it can constrain and disguise the value of this work. A combination of methodological emphases within QI and managerialism within healthcare institutions leads to the prioritisation, often implicitly, of a limited set of aims and governing values for healthcare. This can act as an obstacle to a genuine broadening of the clinical agenda, reinforcing norms of clinical practice that effectively push poverty ‘off limits.’ We set out the ethical dilemmas facing clinicians who seek to navigate this landscape in order to address poverty and the social determinants of health. -/- Conclusions: We suggest that reclaiming QI as a more deliberative tool that is sensitive to these ethical dilemmas can enable managers, clinicians and patients to pursue health-related values and ends, broadly conceived, as part of an expansive range of social and personal goods. (shrink)

Pylyshyn's target article argues that perception is not inferential, but this is true only under a narrow construal of inference. A more general construal is possible, and has been used to provide formal theories of many visual capacities. This approach also makes clear that the evolution of natural constraints need not converge to the “veridical” state of the world.

Included here are some cases that highlight exceptional behaviour under the novel coronavirus pandemic that cuts across religious boundaries. The Christian cases were drawn from the United States and South Korea; Islamic cases were drawn both from India and Iran; and the Hindu and Sikh cases were highlighted from India. Of these, notably, Iran is a declared theocracy, whereas the United States and India are arguably contexts of rising Christian and Hindu theocracies. We are familiar with the evidence of the (...) positive role of religions in society. This paper brings together exceptional cases where irrationality, control and selfishness trump wisdom and altruism. The evidence highlighted here shows that people are capable of suspending reason and behaving with a motive inspired by faith, even when it is clear there might be serious personal and social costs involved. (shrink)

Study of impermanence based on the philosophy of Theravāda Buddhism.

Converging psychophysical evidence suggests that the human visual system parses shapes into component parts for the purposes of object recognition. We examine the Schyns et al. claim of “creation” of features in light of recent work on part-based representations of visual shape, particularly the perceptual rules that human vision uses to parse shapes.

The author compares the linguistic philosophies of Fichte and Hegel, concluding that Hegel's position ismore comprehensive than Fichte's. Fichte and Hegel share essential suppositions about language andphilosophy, best seen in their remarks on Phantasie, schematism, and especially the idea of unity. The issueof recognition is the primary point of difference between them. Fichte sees man's desire for recognition inthe transformation of signs from visual to audible; for Hegel, however, man's desire forrecognition is prior to Fichte's placement of it. Whereas for (...) Fichte, man desires to express his thoughts assoon as he realizes that another man is reasonable, for Hegel, man desires to objectify his thoughts, orvalue, at this moment. With this fundamental difference in their conceptions of recognition, Fichte andHegel end up with very different conceptions of language that reflect in some ways their differingconceptions of philosophy as a whole. The author closes by corroborating this finding through an analysisof their respective treatments of memory. (shrink)

The author compares the linguistic philosophies of Fichte and Hegel, concluding that Hegel's position is more comprehensive than Fichte's. Fichte and Hegel share essential suppositions about language and philosophy, best seen in their remarks on Phantasie, schematism, and especially the idea of unity. The issue of recognition is the primary point of difference between them. Fichte sees man's desire for recognition in the transformation of signs from visual to audible; for Hegel, however, man's desire for recognition is prior to Fichte's (...) placement of it. Whereas for Fichte, man desires to express his thoughts as soon as he realizes that another man is reasonable, for Hegel, man desires to objectify his thoughts, or value, at this moment. With this fundamental difference in their conceptions of recognition, Fichte and Hegel end up with very different conceptions of language that reflect in some ways their differing conceptions of philosophy as a whole. The author closes by corroborating this finding through an analysis of their respective treatments of memory. (shrink)

For many decades, cognition has been viewed as a computational process in the brain. For cognition, the brain, body and the interaction with the environment are important. Conventional views are inclined towards the existence of discrete and internal representations realised by highly specific mechanisms in the brain. The Embodied approach challenges this view and accepts the evolution of cognitive abilities. There is a shift in focus from the belief that the brain is solely responsible for cognition to the thought that (...) the body is somehow deeply integrated into cognition. However, it does not deny the central position of the brain in the process of cognition but opens the doors for other factors for integration. At the basic level, there are three ways in which an agent’s body can be utilised for the cognitive process. An agent’s body may help to generate, operate and distribute the cognitive processes. As a result, this approach tries to diminish the monopoly of the brain by taking into account the importance of the body and the environment for cognition. (shrink)

The proponents of embodied cognition often try to present their research program as the next step in the evolution of standard cognitive science. The domain of standard cognitive science is fairly clearly circumscribed (perception, memory, attention, language, problem solving, learning). Its ontological commitments, that is, its commitments to various theoretical entities, are overt: cognition involves algorithmic processes upon symbolic representations. As a research program, embodied cognition exhibits much greater latitude in subject matter, ontological commitment, and methodology than does standard cognitive (...) science. The proponents of embodied cognition to explain the aspects of human cognition are using the importance of embodied interaction with the environment, which is a dynamic relation. The cause of disagreement between these two approaches is regarding the role assumed by the notion of representation. The discussion about the contrast between embodied cognition and standard cognitive science is incomplete without Gibson’s ecological theory of perception and connectionist account of cognition. I will briefly contrast these important theories with computational view of cognition, highlighting the debate over role of representation. Embodied cognition has incorporated rather extensively a variety of insights emerging from research both in ecological psychology and in connectionism. The way I have followed to contrast embodied cognition with standard cognitive science, involves concentration on those several themes that appear to be prominent in the body of work that is often seen as illustrative of embodied cognition. This strategy has the advantage of postponing hard questions about “the” subject matter, ontological commitments, and methods of embodied cognition until more is understood about the particular interests and goals that embodied cognition theorists often pursue. This approach might show embodied cognition to be poorly unified, suggesting that the embodied cognition label should be abandoned in favor of several labels that reflect more accurately the distinct projects that have been clumped together under a single title. Alternatively, it might show that, in fact, there are some overarching commitments that bring tighter unity to the various bodies of work within embodied cognition that seem thematically only loosely related. The contrast between these two approaches is highlighted not only the basis of a priori argument but major experiments have been mentioned, to show the weight of the assumptions of both the contrasting approaches. (shrink)

In the moral philosophy of the last two centuries, altruism of one kind or another has typically been regarded as identical with moral concern. When self-regarding duties have been recognized, motivation by duty has been sharply distinguished from motivation by self-interest . Accordingly, from Kant, Mill, and Sidgwick to Rawls, Nagel, and Gauthier, concern for our own interests, whether long-term or short-term, has typically been regarded as intrinsically nonmoral. So, for example, although Thomas Nagel regards both prudence and altruism as (...) structural features of practical reason, he identifies only the latter as a moral capacity, prudence being merely rational, long-term egoism. Similarly, John Ravvls and David Gauthier contrast self-interest and other nontuistic interests—interests that are independent of others' interests—with moral interest. We are morally permitted , no doubt, to act out of self-interest within certain constraints, but such acts can have no intrinsic moral worth. Pursuit of our own interests out of duty does have intrinsic moral worth, but such pursuit, by hypothesis, cannot be motivated by self-interest. Self-interested pursuit of our own interests as such, no matter how realistic, farsighted, temperate, honest, or courageous, cannot be intrinsically moral. And this remains the case even if self-interest motivates us to perform other-regarding acts: only those other-regarding acts that are motivated by others' interests count as moral, because only such acts are altruistic. (shrink)

When learning a new math concept, should learners be first taught the concept and its associated procedures and then solve problems, or solve problems first even if it leads to failure and then be taught the concept and the procedures? Two randomized-controlled studies found that both methods lead to high levels of procedural knowledge. However, students who engaged in problem solving before being taught demonstrated significantly greater conceptual understanding and ability to transfer to novel problems than those who were taught (...) first. The second study further showed that when given an opportunity to learn from the failed problem-solving attempts of their peers, students outperformed those who were taught first, but not those who engaged in problem solving first. Process findings showed that the number of student-generated solutions significantly predicted learning outcomes. These results challenge the conventional practice of direct instruction to teach new math concepts and procedures, and propose the possibility of learning from one's own failed problem-solving attempts or those of others before receiving instruction as alternatives for better math learning. (shrink)

This book offers a new argument for the ancient claim that well-being as the highest prudential good -- eudaimonia -- consists of happiness in a life according to virtue. Virtue is a source of happiness, but happiness also requires external goods.

I take friendship to be a practical and emotional relationship marked by mutual and (more-or-less) equal goodwill, liking, and pleasure. Friendship can exist between siblings, lovers, parent and adult child, as well as between otherwise unrelated people. Some friendships are valued chiefly for their usefulness. Such friendships are instrumental or means friendships. Other friendships are valued chiefly for their own sakes. Such friendships are noninstrumental or end friendships. In this paper I am concerned only with end friendships, and the challenge (...) they pose to consequentialism. In an end friendship, one loves the friend as an essential part of one's system of ends, and not solely, or even primarily, as a means to an independent end - career advancement, amusement, philosophical illumination, or greater happiness in the universe. In such love, one loves the friend for the person she is, i.e., for her essential rather than incidental features. These include both her character traits - the fundamental intellectual, psychological, moral, and aesthetic qualities that constitute an individual's personality - and her unique perspective on herself and others: her view of the important and unimportant, her interest in herself and others. Thus in end friendship the friend cannot be replaced by another, for no other can have her essential features. Nor can she be replaced by a more efficient means to one's ends, or abandoned on their achievement, for it is not as a means that one 2 loves her. It is this necessary irreplaceability that most obviously marks off end friendship from means or instrumental friendship, in which the friend is replaceable.i Hence to love a friend as an end is to place a special value on her - to believe that her value is not outweighed, say, simply by the greater needs of others - or the needs of a greater number of others ("Sorry dear, there are more drowning on this end").ii End friendship (hereafter simply "friendship") is a cardinal human value.. (shrink)