This paper considers the place of reasons in the metaphysics of epistemic normativity and defends a middle ground between two popular extremes in the literature. Against members of the ‘reasons first’ movement, we argue that reasons are not the sole fundamental constituents of epistemic normativity. We suggest instead that the virtue-theoretic property of competence is the key building block. To support this approach, we note that reasons must be possessed to play a role in the analysis of central epistemically normative (...) properties, and argue that the relation of possession must be analyzed in terms of competence. But while we diverge with reasons-firsters on this score, we also distance ourselves from those who deny reasons any important role in epistemology. For we maintain that possessed reasons do help to ground deontic facts in the epistemic domain (e.g., facts about what one epistemically ought to believe, may believe, or is justified in believing). Indeed, we present an argument that the possession of sufficient epistemic reasons is necessary and sufficient for propositional justification, and that proper basing on such reasons yields doxastic justification. But since possession and proper basing are themselves grounded in competence, reasons are not the end of the explanatory road: competence enables them to do their work, putting them—and us—in the middle. (shrink)

We argue that we can avoid epistemic dilemmas by properly understanding the nature and epistemology of the suspension of judgment, with a particular focus on conflicts between higher-order evidence and first-order evidence.

The Descartes Dictionary is an accessible guide to the world of the seventeenth-century philosopher René Descartes. Meticulously researched and extensively cross-referenced, this unique book covers all his major works, ideas and influences, and provides a firm grounding in the central themes of Descartes' thought. The introduction provides a biographical sketch, a brief account of Descartes' philosophical works, and a summary of the current state of Cartesian studies, discussing trends in research over the past four decades. The A-Z entries include clear (...) definitions of the key terms used in Descartes' writings and detailed synopses of his works. Also included are entries noting philosophical influences, of both figures that influenced Descartes and those that he in turn influenced. For anyone reading or studying Descartes, rationalism, or modern philosophy more generally, this original resource provides a wealth of useful information, analysis, and criticism. Including clear explanations of often complex terminology, The Descartes Dictionary covers everything that is essential to a sound understanding of Descartes' philosophy. (shrink)

This article provides the first comprehensive conceptual account for the imagistic mental machinery that allows us to travel through time—for the time machine in our mind. It is argued that language reveals this imagistic machine and how we use it. Findings from a range of cognitive fields are theoretically unified and a recent proposal about spatialized mental time travel is elaborated on. The following novel distinctions are offered: external versus internal viewing of time; ‘‘watching” time versus projective ‘‘travel” through time; (...) optional versus obligatory mental time travel; mental time travel into anteriority or posteriority versus mental time travel into the past or future; single mental time travel versus nested dual mental time travel; mental time travel in episodic memory versus mental time travel in semantic memory; and ‘‘seeing” versus ‘‘sensing” mental imagery. Theoretical, empirical, and applied implications are discussed. (shrink)

Beim Wort 'Aufklarung' denken wir zunachst und zumeist an Immanuel Kant und sein beruhmtes Diktum vom 'Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmundigkeit'. Doch die europaische Aufklarungsbewegung war vieldimensional und bewegte sich nicht nur in einer Richtung. Der bohmische Philosoph Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) steht fur einen ganz anderen Pfad in der Geschichte der Aufklarung. Er war ein Philosoph der mitteleuropaischen Denkstromung, der eine Welt jenseits des Kapitalismus und der Ausbeutung des Planeten dachte. Er sah in der Aufklarung einen konkreten Auftrag (...) an jeden einzelnen Menschen, 'stets kluger, (moralisch) besser und damit glucklicher zu werden': Nicht die Welt zu beherrschen, sondern sie zu verstehen, das sei der Auftrag auf diesem Weg zum allgemeinen Gluck. Die Monographie stellt Leben und Werk dieses zu Unrecht vergessenen katholischen Denkers umfassend und quellengesattigt vor. (shrink)

Internalism holds that epistemic justification is determined by what is internal to the mind, not by facts about the mind-independent world. This paper introduces and defends a new kind of internalism that is rooted in rationalist ideas that have been neglected in recent epistemology, despite inspiring internalist projects in cognitive science. Ignoring rationalist insights has, I argue, damaged the prospects for internalism, by needlessly saddling internalists with empiricist burdens. Internalists can refuse these burdens by accepting a better philosophy of mind. (...) Rather than looking to 17th century rationalists, I look to Kant, and especially his idea that normativity is grounded in the constitution of agency and mind. A Kantian approach can avoid stock objections to internalism, I argue, and can also capture all the alleged benefits of externalism. The paper is structured as follows. In §2, I get back to basics and consider more ways to satisfy the core internalist template than have become standard. I draw attention to rationalist insights about how normativity could be grounded in the constitution of mind, and hypothesize that if internalism respects these insights, some problems disappear. I develop this hypothesis in §3 with a Kantian view. I further defend this view in §4. I conclude in §5 by explaining why Kantian internalism answers the latest challenges to internalism. (shrink)

Karl Jaspers was one of the greatest European philosophers and humanists of the twentieth century. He demonstrated a broad range of philosophical thinking that makes his work relevant for the twenty-first century. Coming to philosophy from medicine and psychiatry, Jaspers's views encompass a vast and creative range of empirical, philosophical, social, historical, and poltical ideas. Hannah Arendt described Jaspers as one of the greatest interpreters of Kant in the German tradition. In the 1950s, Jaspers spoke of his "philosophy of reason" (...) and his debt to Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Weber, and others. His philosophy, however, has often been misunderstood by Anglophone readers and interpreters, both with respect to his so-called existentialism, as well as to the originality, creativity, depth, and scope of this thinking and method. The contributors to this fascinating volume offer fresh expositions and interpretations of Jaspers's philosophy. All are prominent experts in Jaspers research from three continents (Europe, North America, and Asia). Six major parts reveal the significant contribution of Jaspers's thought to the philosophy of psychiatry and science, philosophy of history, metaphysics, philosophy of education, philosophy of humanity, philosophy of politics, philosophy of religion, and intercultural philosophy. Key concepts of Jaspers's philosophy are highlighted and interpreted from a fresh and timely perspective: "boundary situations," existential communication, existential truth, transcendence, philosophical faith, the axial age in world history, new politics and the role of a moral and political conversion, the idea of the university, and Jaspers's fascination with and interpretation of Asian thought. The accessible essays will help readers overcome the intimidation often felt when faced with the work of a major German philosopher. The editors introduce and summarize Jaspers's published works, while offering an overview of his basic themes and concerns. New readers and researchers alike will find this collection instrumental in understanding recent developments in the interpretation of Jaspers. (shrink)

Dieser Titel aus dem De Gruyter-Verlagsarchiv ist digitalisiert worden, um ihn der wissenschaftlichen Forschung zugänglich zu machen. Da der Titel erstmals im Nationalsozialismus publiziert wurde, ist er in besonderem Maße in seinem historischen Kontext zu betrachten. Mehr erfahren Sie.

Genetischer Naturalismus und Idealismus : Überlegungen zum genetischen Naturalismus von Günter Dux -- Natur und Freiheit, mit Blick auf Cassirer und Heidegger -- Die Wesentlichkeit einer subjektiven Deduktion -- Hat Platons Höhle einen Ausgang? -- Unerledigte Probleme der Vernunftkritik -- Syllogismus est principium Idealismi -- Die Antinomien in der "Kritik der Urteilskraft" -- Die Logik der Gottesbeweise und die Logik der (Post-)Moderne -- Der logische Ort der Freiheit -- Platons Antizipation und Überwindung des Universalienstreites -- Elementarlehre oder Transzendentale Phänomenologie -- (...) Letztbegründung als transzendentale Theorie konstitutiver Relationalität -- Monade und System oder Perspektivismus versus System? -- Bestimmung und Begründung : zu Kants Deduktion der Ideen der reinen Vernunft. (shrink)

How people understand the fundamental dynamics of stock and flow is an important basic theoretical question with many practical applications. In this paper, we present a universal frame for understanding stock-flow reasoning in terms of the theory of force dynamics. This deep-level analysis is then applied to two different presentation formats of SF tasks in the context of climate change. We can explain why in a coordinate-graphic presentation misunderstandings occur, whereas in a verbal presentation a better understanding is found. We (...) end up with recommendations for presentation formats that will help people to better understand SF dynamics. Better public SF understanding might in turn also enhance corresponding public action – such as enhancing pro-environmental actions in relation to climate change. (shrink)

Despite the recent backlash against epistemic consequentialism, an explicit systematic alternative has yet to emerge. This paper articulates and defends a novel alternative, Epistemic Kantianism, which rests on a requirement of respect for the truth. §1 tackles some preliminaries concerning the proper formulation of the epistemic consequentialism / non-consequentialism divide, explains where Epistemic Kantianism falls in the dialectical landscape, and shows how it can capture what seems attractive about epistemic consequentialism while yielding predictions that are harder for the latter to (...) secure in a principled way. §2 presents Epistemic Kantianism. §3 argues that it is uniquely poised to satisfy the desiderata set out in §1 on an ideal theory of epistemic justification. §4 gives three further arguments, suggesting that it (i) best explains the objective normative significance of the subject's perspective in epistemology, (ii) follows from the kind of axiology needed to solve the swamping problem together with modest assumptions about the relation between the evaluative and the deontic, and (iii) illuminates certain asymmetries in epistemic value and obligation. §5 takes stock and reassesses the score in the debate. (shrink)

English description: We live in a time where the old mechanisms of order have lost their grip on society, leading to numerous infractions and confrontations. In this religious-philosophical study, Kurt Wuchterl develops an epistemic perception of contingency that re-interprets the tense relationship between natural sciences and religion. Contingency always includes the "option of being different," which exacerbates pivotal problems such as chance, chaos, and unavailability. If we as individuals are not able to cope with these contingencies, we encounter the (...) edge of reason; acknowledging this edge, however, poses the question of the otherness of reason. German text. German description: Wir leben in einer Zeit, in der die alten Ordnungsgaranten ihre Orientierungskraft verloren und die Ordnungsbrueche zu vielfaltigen Konfrontationen gefuehrt haben. Kurt Wuchterl entwickelt in seiner religionsphilosophischen Studie einen epistemischen Kontingenzbegriff, mit dem das gespannte Verhaltnis der Naturwissenschaft zur Religion eine neue Deutung erfahrt.Kontingenz beinhaltet immer die Moglichkeit des Anders-sein-konnens. Und damit stellen sich zentrale Probleme wie Zufall, Chaos und Unverfuegbarkeit in verscharfter Form. Wenn es uns als Individuen nicht gelingt, diese Kontingenzen zu bewaltigen, wird die Grenze der Vernunft erreicht. Mit deren Anerkennung aber stellt sich die Frage nach dem Anderen der Vernunft. Wird dies als Chiffre des Religiosen interpretiert, zeigt sich dahinter nicht das Nichts, sondern eben gerade: ein ganz Anderes. In der Kontingenzbegegnung, wie diese Moglichkeit bezeichnet wird, scheiden sich die Geister; ihre Unbestimmtheit ist der Tribut an unsere Endlichkeit. (shrink)

Economic Imperialism is the claim of some economists that the methodology of neoclassical economics has superior scientific qualities and should be adopted by most or all social sciences. The paper first shows why such a dominant claim could develop among economists but in no other science and then goes on to point out the shortcomings of this claim of methodological superiority. These critical remarks are also relevant for methodological controversies within economics between a mainstream and heterodox economists.

Many meta-ethicists have thought that rationality requires us to heed apparent normative reasons, not objective normative reasons. But what are apparent reasons? There are two kinds of standard answers. On de dicto views, R is an apparent reason for S to \ when it appears to S that R is an objective reason to \ . On de re views, R is an apparent reason for S to \ when R’s truth would constitute an objective reason for S to \ (...) , and it appears to S that R. De re views are currently more popular because they avoid overintellectualizing rationality. But they face problems owing to the way in which they do so. Some assume that we can escape these problems by requiring more information to be apparent or by appealing to defeat. But these strategies fail. So, I defend a new view: apparent reasons are apparent facts that agents are competently attracted to treat like objective reasons, where competence is indirectly defined in terms of objective reasons and a competence/performance distinction is honored. Since one can treat X like an F without having the concept of an F, the view does not overintellectualize rationality. But it is also strong enough to dodge the pitfalls of de re views. (shrink)