Les inscriptions présentées dans cet article proviennent du second théâtre de Larissa qui a été construit au ier s. av. J.‑C. avec des blocs de remploi provenant d’un bâtiment arrondi, appartenant à un sanctuaire. Certains de ces blocs portent des dédicaces faites par des affranchis à une divinité qui n’est jamais nommée ; la nature de l’objet consacré n’est jamais précisée (peut‑être s’agit‑il de la pierre elle‑même?). Ces inscriptions, qui datent de la fin du iiie s.-début du iie s. av. (...) J.‑C, sont toutes en dialecte thessalien. Les noms des affranchis sont généralement accompagnés d’un adjectif patronymique, toujours différent du nom de leur manumissor, dont on ne peut dire s’il correspond au nom de leur père ou à celui de leur ancien maître. Certains des affranchissements mentionnés dans ces dédicaces apparaissent comme consécutifs à un héritage et il se pourrait que ce soit le cas de l’ensemble de ces inscriptions. Ces dédicaces constituent vraisemblablement une première forme de la taxe d’affranchissement. (shrink)

Né à Cordoue en 1126, mort en 1198, Ibn Rusd (Averroès), juge, médecin et philosophe andalou, a laissé une œuvre considérable : outre des traités polémiques (contre Galien, contre al-Gazâli) et de nombreux essais, il a consacré à Platon, et surtout à Aristote, des commentaires appelés à exercer une influence particulièrement grande dans les domaines de la logique, de la métaphysique, de la noétique. Rédigé dans les dernières années de sa vie, le Grand Commentaire de la Métaphysique marque le couronnement (...) de l'œuvre philosophique d'Averroès. Ce volume présente la première traduction française annotée du texte arabe de Bêta et du commentaire qu'Averroès y consacre. Souvent considéré comme une introduction générale à toute la métaphysique aristotélicienne, le livre Bêta expose une série d'apories que rencontre le philosophe et qu'il doit tâcher de résoudre. La traduction est précédée d'une introduction qui tente de montrer dans quelle perspective Averroès envisage la " problématique " de la métaphysique. Quels sont les principes, les limites, l'objet ou les enjeux de la métaphysique? Voilà les questions, aussi vastes que capitales, auxquelles Averroès tente ici d'apporter une réponse. (shrink)

The historically most central epistemological issue concerning perception, to which this article will be almost entirely devoted, is whether and how beliefs about physical objects and about the physical world generally can be justified or warranted on the basis of sensory or perceptual experience—where it is internalist justification, roughly having a reason to think that the belief in question is true, that is mainly in question (see the entry justification, epistemic: internalist vs. externalist conceptions of). This issue, commonly referred to (...) as “the problem of the external world,” divides into two closely related sub-issues, which correspond to the first two main sections below. The first of these issues has to do with the nature of sensory experience and its relation to the physical world; it is typically (though as we shall see not altogether perspicuously) formulated as the question of what are the immediate objects of awareness in sensory experience or, in a variant but essentially equivalent terminology, of what is given in such experience. Perhaps the most historically standard, though not currently the most popular answer to this question has been that it is sense-data (private, non-physical entities that actually have the immediately experienced sensory qualities) that are the immediate objects of awareness or that are given. The second issue has to do with the way in which beliefs about the physical world are justified on the basis of such sensory experience. If it is concluded that physical objects are not themselves given, the two main answers to this question are representationalism or indirect realism (the view that the immediate objects of experience represent or depict physical objects in a way that allows one to infer justifiably from such experience to the existence of the corresponding “external” objects) and phenomenalism (the view.. (shrink)

Bioethics has a founding story in which medical paternalism, the interference with the autonomy of patients for their own clinical benefit, was an accepted ethical norm in the history of Western medical ethics and was widespread in clinical practice until bioethics changed the ethical norms and practice of medicine. In this paper I show that the founding story of bioethics misreads major texts in the history of Western medical ethics. I also show that a major source for empirical claims about (...) the widespread practice of medical paternalism has been misread. I then show that that bioethics based on its founding story deprofessionalizes medical ethics. The result leaves the sick exposed to the predatory power of medical practitioners and healthcare organizations with only their autonomy-based rights to non-interference, expressed in contracts, to protect them. The sick are stripped of the protection afforded by a professional, fiduciary relationship of physicians to their patients. Bioethics based on its founding story reverts to the older model of a contractual relationship between the sick and medical practitioners not worthy of intellectual or moral trust (because such trust cannot be generated by what I call ‘deprofessionalizing bioethics’). On closer examination, bioethics based on its founding story, ironically, eliminates paternalism as a moral category in bioethics, thus causing bioethics to collapse on itself because it denies one of the necessary conditions for medical paternalism. Bioethics based on its founding story should be abandoned. (shrink)

IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT LEIBNIZ’S NOTION OF HARMONY plays a crucial role in his philosophical system. Leibniz drew on this concept of harmony in motivating, and explaining, numerous areas of his thought: everything from Leibnizian mathematics and metaphysics to ethics and social philosophy, incorporates the notion of harmony as a central descriptive and explanatory concept. While there has been much discussion of some the applications of harmony in Leibniz’s system– especially the mind-body harmony, and the so-called universal harmony of (...) simple perceiving substances–little attention has been paid to Leibniz’s very concept of harmony. Yet it seems important for understanding Leibniz’s holistic philosophy that we grasp this concept, for he employed the term “harmony” when describing so many features of the created world: there is a harmony between geometry and physics, between efficient and final causation, between nature and grace, to mention just a few. (shrink)

SYMPATHY IN SMITH The most wide-spread, but ill-informed, opinion about Adam Smith, based on his reputation as the founder of modern economics, makes him out to be a Social Darwinist for whom the most important form of human interaction is competition. In fact, the most important principle in Smith's moral psychology is what he calls sympathy, broadly understood as fellow feeling: the imaginative placing of ourselves in the situation of another, representing to ourselves what we would sense, think, and feel (...) were we in his or her situation. We not only conceive some idea of what the other is experiencing, but in a weaker degree also feel something like it; for to conceive or imagine that we are feeling something "excites some degree of the same emotion, in proportion to the vivacity or dulness of the conception." Mutual sympathy, a sense of a "correspondence of the sentiments of others with our own" seems to provide a distinct pleasure of its own: grief can be alleviated and mirth and joy enlivened by being sympathetically shared. Teaching, for example, would lose much of its relish, if one could not enter into and enjoy the feelings good students have in being introduced to important and exciting ideas--ideas that may no longer be that exciting in themselves for their teacher. Sympathy then, the key notion in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, provides the foundation for Smith's understanding of natural sociality: society, or association, proves to be an association in morality. (shrink)

Legal contracts and litigation documents common to the American legal system were encoded in the eXtensible Markup Language (XML). XML also represents rules about the contracts and litigation procedure. In addition to an expert system tool that allows one to make inferences with that engine, a Graphical User Interface (GUI) generates the XML representing the rules. A rulebase is developed by marking up examples of the XML to be interpreted and the XML to be generated, analogously to Query By Example. (...) This article provides a broader context of the synergy between XML and artificial intelligence by including discussions of: (1) the role of Artificial Intelligence in handling routine litigation; (2) how the use of XML enables legal expert systems to get their `input' without the user having to enter the same information again for the expert system;(3) the advantages of XML markup over other forms of markup for documents; (4) the relationship between XML and ontologies; (5) other projects using XML with rules or legal affairs. (shrink)

Criticism of H.L.A. Hart's account of how the movements of a person during the performance of an act that is done by mistake or owing to ignorance are not uncontrolled or involuntary. movements.

And he wondered whether it was not evident to them that it is not possible for human beings to discover these things [sc. divine things, τὰ δαιμόνια]. Since even those who thought most of themselves for their speaking about these things do not hold the same opinions with one another, but are disposed towards one another like madmen.

In fact, Rescher’s system divides rather neatly into two components, which seem to be only loosely connected with each other, one of them predominantly pragmatic and one predominantly idealistic. The pragmatic component is an elaborate and highly complicated epistemological theory, expounded mainly in CTT and MP, which offers a coherentist account of epistemic justification together with a pragmatic meta-justification or validation of this account. The idealistic component, presented mainly in CI, centers around the thesis that our ordinary common sense conceptual (...) framework involves essential reference to mind, and thus that the world-as-we-conceive-it is conceptually mind-dependent. Since it is the former component, the epistemological theory, which appears to have the greater philosophical importance, most of this study will be devoted to it. A brief sketch and critique of Rescher’s rather idiosyncratic version of idealism will be offered in the final section. (shrink)

Le Dieu de la Première Méditation de Descartes reste une figure énigmatique de la Divinité ; le développement de la métaphysique cartésienne opposera à cette vetus opinio d’un Dieu tout-puissant et bon l’idée innée du « vrai Dieu ». Les commentateurs ont cherché à préciser l’origine d’une telle opinion : nous tenterons à notre tour de lever l’anonymat de ce Dieu en montrant que la Première Méditation s’élabore à partir d’une lecture des premières confessions d’Augustin, à savoir le De beata (...) vita. Cette source augustinienne est d’ailleurs confirmée par Régis qui rattache spontanément les attributs du Dieu de la vetus opinio à la théologie d’Augustin. (shrink)

Every man experiences dreams and imaginations, the nature of which is admittedly subjective. It is perfectly possible for me to propose that this same lack of objectivity may characterize all experience. I may conceive that I am a god making the world for my own amusement, being real beyond the reality of this my dream. But this imagined god-head is merely the dream of an idle moment, for I cannot seriously suppose that were I to dream I would dream in (...) exactly this way. Had I the making of this world, it would be a braver, better world than it is. Braver? Better? On second thought, I am not so sure. I would want it to be a better world, but could I make it a better world? Could I spin from my imagination the grandeur and beauty of the universe of stars, the wealth and complexity of the invisibly minute, the beauties of nature, the truths of mathematics, the harmonies of music, the world of meaning everywhere? Could I? I doubt it. For I fail to understand even trivial things: I find myself failing even in unimportant projects. And if I fail in these, the least parts of my universe, could I so ably create the whole? There are, thus, two ways in which this doctrine fails to do more than amuse me for the moment. Did I create this dream, I would aim higher and achieve less. (shrink)

“One, two, three—but where’s the fourth?” When Socrates counts to open the paired dialogues Timaeus-Critias he points to the three who are present, but he points most emphatically to a fourth who is absent—“sick,” Timaeus reports. Who are one, two, and three? But especially who, is the fourth, that ostentatiously absent fourth?

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 10, Page 34-35, October 2011.

Speculations of this last type have existed from a much earlier period in the Eastern civilizations, particularly in those areas affected by Hindu philosophy. For example, in the Sánkhya or Yoga-Sútras by Patánjali, we find a very radical distinction between the external world and the individual soul or self. But for Sánkhya, the "external world" includes everything that could possibly be an object of consciousness--physical objects and their relationships, sensations and imaginations, dreams, memories, expectations, etc. In other words, for Sánkhya, (...) our thoughts or desires, far from being the "cause" of the external world as in some forms of Western idealism, are simply other aspects of the external world itself, that is, merely particular items in the totality of our consciousness. On the other hand, the individual soul or self is only the spectator of this consciousness and not ordinarily conscious of itself. If the self were to become conscious of "itself" in the same way that it was conscious of all other objects, all that it would really be aware of would be another object of consciousness---the mere idea of itself, while it would remain the unknown knower. Nevertheless, realizing that a completely "unconscious self" would be simply a postulate of thought and therefore part of the external world, the Sánkhya-Sútras emphasize that the self can become aware of itself by another and more intuitive means. (shrink)

The neobehaviorist Clark L. Hull and his disciple Kenneth Spence shared in common many views on the nature of science and the role of theories in psychology. However, a telling exchange in their correspondence of the early 1940s reveals a disagreement over the nature of intervening variables in behavior theory. Spence urged Hull to abandon his interpretations of intervening variables in terms of physiological models in favor of positivistic, purely mathematical interpretations that conflicted with Hull's mechanistic explanatory aims and ontological (...) commitment to materialism. This dispute is set against the background of similar disputes in physics, and the origins of Hull's and Spence's divergent views on theoretical explanation are described. (shrink)

No man can, for any considerable time, wear one face to himself and another to the multitude without finally getting bewildered as to which is the true one- Nathaniel HawthorneThe Platonic view that every just person is, in virtue of being such, happier than any unjust person, since all among the latter are unhappy, strikes a most responsive chord in the hearts of a great many persons. But it would seem that this idea has less of a foothold in reality (...) than it does in our hearts. It is far too difficult to deny that there are unjust persons who are happy. Indeed, some even seem to be happier than many a just person.So I shall lower my sights. Rather than attempting to defend as sound the Platonic view, I shall argue that the just person is favored to be happier than a certain kind of unjust person whom I shall simply call a masquerader - this is, an individual who is frequently concerned to masquerade as a deeply caring person. (shrink)

The author recommends an involved study of logical fallacies in order to provide a database of testable hypotheses for error reasoning. The purpose of the study is to make the study of logical fallacies accessible to a wider audience. Following a recent study conducted by Ludwig Schlecht, the author presents a diagnostic method to illustrate how an argument can be fallacious from the breach of particular rational principles. The diagnosis method also serves as investigation into other forms of argumentative fallacies (...) and the author suggests it could later be the basis for training programs for undergraduate students in logic courses. (shrink)

In Defense of Pure Reason is an elaboration and defense of what I characterize as a moderate rationalist conception of a priori justification and knowledge: “rationalist,” because it holds that a priori justification genuinely exists and is not in general to be explained away as merely analytic or definitional in character; “moderate,” because it holds that a priori insight is both fallible and corrigible.