In this paper we investigate the problem of testing the coherence of an assessment of conditional probability following a purely logical setting. In particular we will prove that the coherence of an assessment of conditional probability χ can be characterized by means of the logical consistency of a suitable theory T χ defined on the modal-fuzzy logic FP k (RŁΔ) built up over the many-valued logic RŁΔ. Such modal-fuzzy logic was previously introduced in Flaminio (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. (...) 3571, 2005) in order to treat conditional probability by means of a list of simple probabilities following the well known (smart) ideas exposed by Halpern (Proceedings of the eighth conference on theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge, pp 17–30, 2001) and by Coletti and Scozzafava (Trends Logic 15, 2002). Roughly speaking, such logic is obtained by adding to the language of RŁΔ a list of k modalities for “probably” and axioms reflecting the properties of simple probability measures. Moreover we prove that the satisfiability problem for modal formulas of FP k (RŁΔ) is NP-complete. Finally, as main result of this paper, we prove FP k (RŁΔ) in order to prove that the problem of establishing the coherence of rational assessments of conditional probability is NP-complete. (shrink)

In this paper we present a method to reduce the decision problem of several infinite-valued propositional logics to their finite-valued counterparts. We apply our method to Łukasiewicz, Gödel and Product logics and to some of their combinations. As a byproduct we define sequent calculi for all these infinite-valued logics and we give an alternative proof that their tautology problems are in co-NP.

Propositional logics in general, considered as a set of sentences, can be undecidable even if they have “nice” representations, e.g., are given by a calculus. Even decidable propositional logics can be computationally complex (e.g., already intuitionistic logic is PSPACE-complete). On the other hand, finite-valued logics are computationally relatively simple—at worst NP. Moreover, finite-valued semantics are simple, and general methods for theorem proving exist. This raises the question to what extent and under what circumstances propositional logics represented in various ways can (...) be approximated by finite-valued logics. It is shown that the minimal m-valued logic for which a given calculus is strongly sound can be calculated. It is also investigated under which conditions propositional logics can be characterized as the intersection of (effectively given) sequences of finite-valued logics. (shrink)

In 1979, H. Lewis shows that the computational complexity of the Boolean satisfiability problem dichotomizes, depending on the Boolean operations available to formulate instances: intractable (NP-complete) if negation of implication is definable, and tractable (in P) otherwise [21]. Recently, an investigation in the same spirit has been extended to nonclassical propositional logics, modal logics in particular [2, 3]. In this note, we pursue this line in the realm of many-valued propositional logics, and obtain complexity classifications for the parameterized satisfiability problem (...) of two pertinent samples, Kleene and Gödel logics. (shrink)

In cooperative Cournot oligopoly games, it is known that the β-core is equal to the α-core, and both are non-empty if every individual profit function is continuous and concave (Zhao, Games Econ Behav 27:153–168, 1999b). Following Chander and Tulkens (Int J Game Theory 26:379–401, 1997), we assume that firms react to a deviating coalition by choosing individual best reply strategies. We deal with the problem of the non-emptiness of the induced core, the γ-core, by two different approaches. The first establishes (...) that the associated Cournot oligopoly Transferable Utility (TU)-games are balanced if the inverse demand function is differentiable and every individual profit function is continuous and concave on the set of strategy profiles, which is a step forward beyond Zhao’s core existence result for this class of games. The second approach, restricted to the class of Cournot oligopoly TU-games with linear cost functions, provides a single-valued allocation rule in the γ-core called Nash Pro rata (NP)-value. This result generalizes Funaki and Yamato’s (Int J Game Theory 28:157–171, 1999) core existence result from no capacity constraint to asymmetric capacity constraints. Moreover, we provide an axiomatic characterization of this solution by means of four properties: efficiency, null firm, monotonicity, and non-cooperative fairness. (shrink)

In this paper, we advocate the usage of the family of Heyting-valued modal logics, introduced by M. Fitting, by presenting a simple 3-valued modal language and axiomatizing an interesting 3-valued logic of belief. We give two simple bisimulation relations for the modal language, one that respects non-falsity and one that respects the truth value. The doxastic logic axiomatized, apart from being interesting in its own right for KR applications, it comes with an underlying 3-valued propositional logic which is a (...) syntactic variant of the ‘logic of here-and-there’, whose importance in KR and Logic Programming is well-known, it is endowed from its very inception with a Gentzen-style proof theory from [Fit92] and a completeness theorem from [KNP02], it can be equivalently seen as a logic describing the epistemic agreement of two interrelated agents: a K45 agent who ‘dominates’ an S5 agent, as we show here, its satisfiability problem is NP-complete, i.e. at the lower level one can expect for applied logics. This is the first concrete example of an epistemic logic from Fitting's framework, that has been overlooked hitherto, despite its many attractive characteristics. (shrink)

Neurophenomenological (NP) methods integrate objective and subjective data in ways that retain the statistical power of established disciplines (like cognitive science) while embracing the value of first-person reports of experience. The present paper positions neurophenomenology as an approach that pulls from traditions of cognitive science but includes techniques that are challenging for cognitive science in some ways. A baseline study is reviewed for “lessons learned,” that is, the potential methodological improvements that will support advancements in understanding consciousness and cognition (...) using neurophenomenology. These improvements, we suggest, include (1) addressing issues of interdisciplinarity by purposefully and systematically creating and maintaining shared mental models among research team members; (2) making sure that NP experiments include high standards of experimental design and execution to achieve variable control, reliability, generalizability, and replication of results; and (3) conceiving of phenomenological interview techniques as placing the impetus on the interviewer in interaction with the experimental subject. (shrink)

In many real-life situations, we are interested in the value of a physical quantity y that is difficult or impossible to measure directly. To estimate y, we find some easier-to-measure quantities x1, … , xn which are related to y by a known relation y = f. Measurements are never 100% accurate; hence, the measured values equation image are different from xi, and the resulting estimate equation image is different from the desired value y = f. How different (...) can it be? Traditional engineering approach to error estimation in data processing assumes that we know the probabilities of different measurement errors equation image. In many practical situations, we only know the upper bound Δi for this error; hence, after the measurement, the only information that we have about xi is that it belongs to the interval equation image. In this case, it is important to find the range y of all possible values of y = f when xi ∈ xi. We start the paper with a brief overview of the computational complexity of the corresponding interval computation problems: Most of the related problems turn out to be, in general, at least NP-hard. In this paper, we show how the use of quantum computing can speed up some computations related to interval and probabilistic uncertainty. We end the paper with speculations on whether “hypothetic” physical devices can compute NP-hard problems faster than in exponential time. Most of the paper's results were first presented at NAFIPS'2003 [30]. (shrink)

Modal logic is one of philosophy’s many children. As a mature adult it has moved out of the parental home and is nowadays straying far from its parent. But the ties are still there: philosophy is important to modal logic, modal logic is important for philosophy. Or, at least, this is a thesis we try to defend in this chapter. Limitations of space have ruled out any attempt at writing a survey of all the work going on in our field—a (...) book would be needed for that. Instead, we have tried to select material that is of interest in its own right or exemplifies noteworthy features in interesting ways. Here are some themes that have guided us throughout the writing: • The back-and-forth between philosophy and modal logic. There has been a good deal of give-and-take in the past. Carnap tried to use his modal logic to throw light on old philosophical questions, thereby inspiring others to continue his work and still others to criticise it. He certainly provoked Quine, who in his turn provided—and continues to provide—a healthy challenge to modal logicians. And Kripke’s and David Lewis’s philosophies are connected, in interesting ways, with their modal logic. Analytic philosophy would have been a lot different without modal logic! • The interpretation problem. The problem of providing a certain modal logic with an intuitive interpretation should not be conflated with the problem of providing a formal system with a model-theoretic semantics. An intuitively appealing model-theoretic semantics may be an important step towards solving the interpretation problem, but only a step. One may compare this situation with that in probability theory, where definitions of concepts like ‘outcome space’ and ‘random variable’ are orthogonal to questions about “interpretations” of the concept of probability. • The value of formalisation. Modal logic sets standards of precision, which are a challenge to—and sometimes a model for—philosophy. Classical philosophical questions can be sharpened and seen from a new perspective when formulated in a framework of modal logic. On the other hand, representing old questions in a formal garb has its dangers, such as simplification and distortion. • Why modal logic rather than classical (first or higher order) logic? The idioms of modal logic—today there are many!—seem better to correspond to human ways of thinking than ordinary extensional logic. (Cf. Chomsky’s conjecture that the NP + VP pattern is wired into the human brain.) In his An Essay in Modal Logic (1951) von Wright distinguished between four kinds of modalities: alethic (modes of truth: necessity, possibility and impossibility), epistemic (modes of being known: known to be true, known to be false, undecided), deontic (modes of obligation: obligatory, permitted, forbidden) and existential (modes of existence: universality, existence, emptiness). The existential modalities are not usually counted as modalities, but the other three categories are exemplified in three sections into which this chapter is divided. Section 1 is devoted to alethic modal logic and reviews some main themes at the heart of philosophical modal logic. Sections 2 and 3 deal with topics in epistemic logic and deontic logic, respectively, and are meant to illustrate two different uses that modal logic or indeed any logic can have: it may be applied to already existing (non-logical) theory, or it can be used to develop new theory. (shrink)

This paper considers two kinds of stochastic reentrant job shop scheduling problems, i.e., the SRJSSP with the maximum tardiness criterion and the SRJSSP with the makespan criterion. Owing to the NP-complete complexity of the considered RJSSPs, an effective differential evolutionary algorithm combined with two uncertainty handling techniques, namely, DEA_UHT, is proposed to address these problems. Firstly, to reasonably control the computation cost, the optimal computing budget allocation technique is applied for allocating limited computation budgets to assure reliable evaluation and identification (...) for excellent solutions or individuals, and the hypothesis test technique is added to execute a statistical comparison to reduce some unnecessary repeated evaluation. Secondly, a reentrant-largest-order-value rule is designed to convert the DEA’s individual to the SRJSSP’s solution. Thirdly, a conventional active decoding scheme for the job shop scheduling problem is extended to decode the solution for obtaining the criterion value. Fourthly, an Insert-based exploitation strategy and an Interchange-based exploration strategy are devised to enhance DEA’s exploitation ability and exploration ability, respectively. Finally, the test results and comparisons manifest the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed DEA_UHT. (shrink)

Mainstream nursing history often positions itself in opposition to philosophy and many nursing historians are reticent of theorizing. In the quest to illuminate the lives of nurses and women current historical approaches are driven by reformist aspirations but are based on the conception that nursing or caring is basically good and the timelessness of universal values. This has the effect of essentialising political categories of identity such as class, race and gender. This kind of history is about affirmation rather than (...) friction and about the conservation of memory and musealization. In contrast, we will focus on how we imagine nursing history could be used as a philosophical, critical perspective to challenge the ongoing transformations of our societies. Existing reality must be confronted with strangeness and the historically different can assume the function of this counterpart, meaning present and past must continuously be set in relation to each other. Thus, critical history is always the history of the present but not merely the pre‐history of the present – critique must rather present different realities and different certainties. In this paper, we use this approach to discuss the implementation of the nursing process (NP) in Germany. The nursing process appears to be a technology that helped to set up an infrastructure ‐ or assemblage ‐ to transform nursing interventions into a commodity exchangable between consumers and nurses in a free market. In our theoretical perspective, we argue that NP was a step in the realization of the German ordoliberal program, a specific variety of neoliberalism. In order to implement market‐orientation in the healthcare system it was necessary to transform hospitals into calculable spaces and to make all performances in the hospital calculable. This radically transformed not just the systems, but the ways in which nurses and patients conveived of themselves. (shrink)

This chapter is concerned with plural discourse in the grammatical sense. The goal of the chapter is to urge the value of the event analysis of the matrix of action sentences in thinking about logical form in plural discourse about action. Among the claims advanced are that: -/- 1. The ambiguity between distributive and collective readings of plural action sentences is not lexical ambiguity, either in the noun phrase (NP) or in the verb phrase (VP), but an ambiguity tracing (...) to the scope of the event quantifier introduced by the action verb. 2. This allows us to analyze collective action sentences in a way that commits us only to individual agents acting when we say that groups act, without denying that there are groups as such or that we talk about them as such. 3. Intermediate readings, that seem to be neither purely distributive nor purely collective, can be explained in terms of the same apparatus. (shrink)

The paper proves refined feasibility properties for the disjunction property of intuitionistic propositional logic. We prove that it is possible to eliminate all cuts from an intuitionistic proof, propositional or first-order, without increasing the Horn closure of the proof. We obtain a polynomial time, interactive, realizability algorithm for propositional intuitionistic proofs. The feasibility of the disjunction property is proved for sequents containing Harrop formulas. Under hardness assumptions for NP and for factoring, it is shown that the intuitionistic propositional calculus does (...) not always have polynomial size proofs and that the classical propositional calculus provides a superpolynomial speedup over the intuitionistic propositional calculus. The disjunction property for intuitionistic propositional logic is proved to be P-hard by a reduction to the circuit value problem. (shrink)

It is argued that binding theory (BT) must recognize two types of covaluation: the familiar type, which holds between two NPs when they have the same semantic value, and a new type, which holds between two NPs when one of them denotes an attitude holder and the other the ‘self’ of the attitude holder. This is shown to account for the acceptability of ‘de re’ reflexive pronouns and unacceptability of some ‘de re’ non-reflexive pronouns. Alternative theories, which attempt to (...) preserve the standard BT, are also discussed. (shrink)

We introduce a deductive system Bal which models the logic of balance of opposing forces or of balance between conflicting evidence or influences. ‘‘Truth values’’ are interpreted as deviations from a state of equilibrium, so in this sense, the theorems of Bal are to be interpreted as balanced statements, for which reason there is only one distinguished truth value, namely the one that represents equilibrium. The main results are that the system Bal is algebraizable in the sense of [5] (...) and its equivalent algebraic semantics BAL is definitionally equivalent to the variety of abelian lattice ordered groups, that is, the categories of the algebras in BAL and of ℓ–groups are isomorphic (see [10], Ch.4, 4). We also prove the deduction theorem for Bal and we study different kinds of semantic consequence associated to Bal. Finally, we prove the co-NP-completeness of the tautology problem of Bal. (shrink)

The author examines the arguments for applicability of the limitation clause which specifies the requirements for limitation of constitutional freedoms and rights (Article 31 para. 3 of the Constitution) to the right to protection of life (Article 38). Even if there is almost a general acceptance of such applicability, this approach does not hold up to criticism based on the rule existing in the Polish legal order that treaty commitments concerning human rights have supremacy over national statutory regulations. Due to (...) an international pattern which does not provide application of the limitation clause to the right to life protection, despite the recognition — at the level of a constitutional standard — of applicability of the clause of Article 31 para. 3 to Article 38, and to protection of life in general, this will be made impossible at any attempt to formulate a statutory standard. He also points out the defectiveness of the reasoning leading to acceptance of certain limitations of a particular value (e.g. life) on the basis of the ex definitione exemptions existing in the international standard to the assumption of applicability of the limitation clause when shaping statutory standards in the Polish legal system. The discussed issues are related to the question of interpretation of the inviolability of human rights. This term takes different meaning in the context of: 1) inviolability of all human rights understood in abstracto as normative structures of a general and abstract nature; 2) right protecting certain values with no exception; 3) rights to which an application of the limitation clause is forbidden; 4) rights not subject to derogation; 5) inviolability of understood in concreto, as that is (here and now) due to the subject of dignity; 6) inviolable essence of freedoms and rights. One should also clearly distinguish between (7) the descriptive and (8) the normative meaning of inviolability. -/- Punktem wyjścia jest analiza argumentacji na rzecz tezy o stosowalności do prawa do ochrony życia (art. 38 Konstytucji RP), klauzuli limitacyjnej określającej warunki ograniczania konstytucyjnych wolności i praw (art. 31 ust. 3). Mimo niemal powszechnej akceptacji tej tezy, nie wytrzymuje ona krytyki opartej na pierwszeństwie, które w polskim porządku prawnym mają zobowiązania traktowe dotyczące praw człowieka, wobec regulacji ustawowych. Ze względu na wzorzec międzynarodowy, który nie przewiduje stosowania klasycznej klauzuli limitacyjnej do prawa do życia, mimo uznania - na poziomie standardu konstytucyjnego - stosowalności klauzuli z art. 31 ust. 3 do art. 38 i ochrony życia w ogóle, stosowalność tej klauzuli będzie uniemożliwiona przy każdej próbie formułowania standardu ustawowego. Autor zwraca uwagę na wadliwość wnioskowania prowadzącego od uznania dopuszczalności pewnych ograniczeń ochrony jakiejś wartości (np. życia) na podstawie wyjątków ex definitione obecnych w standardzie międzynarodowym, do tezy o stosowalności klauzuli limitacyjnej przy kształtowaniu standardu ustawowego w polskim systemie prawnym. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with decision proceedures for the 0-valued ukasiewicz logics,. It is shown how linear algebra can be used to construct an automated theorem checker. Two decision proceedures are described which depend on a linear programming package. An algorithm is given for the verification of consequence relations in, and a connection is made between theorem checking in two-valued logic and theorem checking in which implies that determing of a -free formula whether it takes the value one is (...) NP-complete problem. (shrink)

Plant cell culture systems have become an attractive and sustainable approach to produce high‐value and commercially significant metabolites under controlled conditions. Strategies involving elicitor supplementation into plant cell culture media are employed to mimic natural conditions for increasing the metabolite yield. Studies on nanoparticles (NPs) that have investigated elicitation of specialized metabolism have shown the potential of NPs to be a substitute for biotic elicitors such as phytohormones and microbial extracts. Customizable physicochemical characteristics allow the design of monodispersed‐, stimulus‐responsive‐, (...) and hormone‐carrying‐NPs of precise geometries to enhance their elicitation capabilities based on target metabolite/plant cell culture type. We contextualize advances in NP‐mediated elicitation, especially stimulation of specialized metabolic pathways, the underlying mechanisms, impacts on gene regulation, and NP‐associated cytotoxicity. The novelty of the concept lies in unleashing the potential of designer NPs to enhance yield, harness metabolites, and transform nanoelicitation from exploratory investigations to a commercially viable strategy. (shrink)

This paper investigates the typology of copulative predication in Tarifit Berber. Three main copulas are identified: (1) verbal, (2) nominal and (3) locative. Given that these elements can all be used as predicates, a uniform configuration which accounts for their derivation is proposed. The structure consists of a lower lexical layer occupied by the predicate (VP, NP etc.) and a higher functional projection represented by the Predicate Phrase (PredP). The Pred – head then enters into an agreement relation with the (...) lower head in the complement position, yielding a predicational copula sentence. Since these constructions are all marked for tense/aspect, the derivation is extended further to a TP projection where the relevant feature is valued. In view of the unified syntactic analysis, the difference between various copula predicates is optimally reduced to the categorial status of the basic predicate occupying the lower lexical projection. The paper identifies another copula construction, which correlates with the proxemics-locative. An examination of this configuration from a close range reveals that this particular locative occupies the subject position whereas the Pred – head is only filled with a bare syntactic feature but encodes no phonological information. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Liberalism, Art, and FundingDale Francis MurrayLiberalism, Art, and FundingSince Ronald Dworkin published A Matter of Principle, a host of critics have attempted to systematically dismantle his arguments advocating state support for the arts that appear in a chapter entitled, "Can a Liberal State Support Art?"1 The combined critical force of Noël Carroll, Samuel Black, and most recently, Harry Brighouse, has dislodged the main supports of Dworkin's position on this (...) subject.2 However, while I am skeptical that the arguments of liberals who endorse state support for the arts can be fully resurrected, I reckon that a few remarks can be presented to try to deflect at least a fraction of the contentions cast on Dworkin's argument by the critics listed above. In order to refine our understanding of precisely why state support for cultural expression should or should not be permitted, it is imperative that some sort of response to the critics of state support for the arts is offered.In this essay, I focus primarily on Brighouse's objections that Dworkin's arguments supporting arts funding fail primarily because they are not sensitive enough to the ways in which such support violates two demands of justice in a liberal state — state neutrality and publicity. I examine these two objections since they seem to be the most interesting, compelling, and damaging to Dworkin's case if substantiated. If Brighouse is correct, these violations act as heavy bulwarks against state support for arts funding, especially since public distrust of the state's intent (and the state's perceived advocacy of notions of the good with which the public disagrees) is high. I will employ Brighouse's neutrality of intent constraint, because it best represents the alleged specific violations of state neutrality that may undermine Dworkin's case. Additionally, neutrality of intent is the most plausible form of neutrality for advocates of public arts funding to build a case for in the space of a short essay.I also wish to make a distinction, which for the most part, is ignored by Dworkin's critics — that there is a degree to which moral value and aesthetic value are different and that this effects a possible alternative reading of the term "ways of life" as most liberals understand it. As a final note of preface, I will assume that the background conditions of income and wealth are just.3 This proviso will become important when we examine the role of the market in funding arts projects in lieu of the government. Now let us reiterate the two requirements of any just liberal state that are at issue when considering the legitimacy of state support for the arts. [End Page 116]Brighouse sets the pair of constraints on any just liberal state (neutrality and publicity) as the centerpieces of his essay. Neutrality of intent, that he appeals to more specifically, can be understood to mean, as Brighouse himself explains, "[T]hat while it is unobjectionable that state actions will have differential effects on conceptions of the good, the government should not intend to favor some conceptions over others" (NPS, 38, emphasis mine). The publicity constraint can be characterized by saying that in any just, liberal regime, justice must not only be done, but it must also be seen as being done. While this serves as the motto of the publicity constraint, it is significant to acknowledge that it stipulates that the real reasons for governmental action must be comprehensible to, and available for inspection by, reasonable citizens. In addition, it must be readily apparent to citizens that the demands of justice are being met. I will return to this constraint on the state later in this essay.Neutrality is of chief interest, since recent liberal political philosophers have emphasized the primacy of the right over the good (RLD, 245). Presumably, individuals, via their rational autonomy, shall define the good for themselves beyond the dictates of government. Our morality is our own personal affair, just so long as we remain within the confines of the harm principle and do not violate the equal liberty of others.On the surface, it is not apparent that state funding for the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Liberalism, Art, and FundingDale Francis MurrayLiberalism, Art, and FundingSince Ronald Dworkin published A Matter of Principle, a host of critics have attempted to systematically dismantle his arguments advocating state support for the arts that appear in a chapter entitled, "Can a Liberal State Support Art?"1 The combined critical force of Noël Carroll, Samuel Black, and most recently, Harry Brighouse, has dislodged the main supports of Dworkin's position on this (...) subject.2 However, while I am skeptical that the arguments of liberals who endorse state support for the arts can be fully resurrected, I reckon that a few remarks can be presented to try to deflect at least a fraction of the contentions cast on Dworkin's argument by the critics listed above. In order to refine our understanding of precisely why state support for cultural expression should or should not be permitted, it is imperative that some sort of response to the critics of state support for the arts is offered.In this essay, I focus primarily on Brighouse's objections that Dworkin's arguments supporting arts funding fail primarily because they are not sensitive enough to the ways in which such support violates two demands of justice in a liberal state — state neutrality and publicity. I examine these two objections since they seem to be the most interesting, compelling, and damaging to Dworkin's case if substantiated. If Brighouse is correct, these violations act as heavy bulwarks against state support for arts funding, especially since public distrust of the state's intent (and the state's perceived advocacy of notions of the good with which the public disagrees) is high. I will employ Brighouse's neutrality of intent constraint, because it best represents the alleged specific violations of state neutrality that may undermine Dworkin's case. Additionally, neutrality of intent is the most plausible form of neutrality for advocates of public arts funding to build a case for in the space of a short essay.I also wish to make a distinction, which for the most part, is ignored by Dworkin's critics — that there is a degree to which moral value and aesthetic value are different and that this effects a possible alternative reading of the term "ways of life" as most liberals understand it. As a final note of preface, I will assume that the background conditions of income and wealth are just.3 This proviso will become important when we examine the role of the market in funding arts projects in lieu of the government. Now let us reiterate the two requirements of any just liberal state that are at issue when considering the legitimacy of state support for the arts. [End Page 116]Brighouse sets the pair of constraints on any just liberal state (neutrality and publicity) as the centerpieces of his essay. Neutrality of intent, that he appeals to more specifically, can be understood to mean, as Brighouse himself explains, "[T]hat while it is unobjectionable that state actions will have differential effects on conceptions of the good, the government should not intend to favor some conceptions over others" (NPS, 38, emphasis mine). The publicity constraint can be characterized by saying that in any just, liberal regime, justice must not only be done, but it must also be seen as being done. While this serves as the motto of the publicity constraint, it is significant to acknowledge that it stipulates that the real reasons for governmental action must be comprehensible to, and available for inspection by, reasonable citizens. In addition, it must be readily apparent to citizens that the demands of justice are being met. I will return to this constraint on the state later in this essay.Neutrality is of chief interest, since recent liberal political philosophers have emphasized the primacy of the right over the good (RLD, 245). Presumably, individuals, via their rational autonomy, shall define the good for themselves beyond the dictates of government. Our morality is our own personal affair, just so long as we remain within the confines of the harm principle and do not violate the equal liberty of others.On the surface, it is not apparent that state funding for the... (shrink)

CONSIDER A NON EMPTY BUT OTHERWISE ARBITRARY SET OF\nPROPERTIES CALLED OBSERVATION-PROPERTIES (O-PROPERTIES).\nCALL A PROPERTY P A MEANINGFUL PROPERTY (M-PROPERTY) IF IT\nIS EQUIVALENT TO A (FINITE OR INFINITE) DISJUNCTION OF\nO-PROPERTIES--I.E., A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION\nFOR P IS THAT AT LEAST ONE OBSERVATION-PROPERTY IN A\nCERTAIN SET O(P) BE TRUE. OBVIOUSLY THE CONJUNCTION AND\nDISJUNCTION OF TWO M-PROPERTIES IS AN M-PROPERTY; IN\nGENERAL THE NEGATION OF AN M-PROPERTY IS NOT AN M-PROPERTY.\nHOWEVER WE CAN DEFINE THE PSEUDO NEGATION OF AN M-PROPERTY\nP AS THE POSSESSION OF SOME (...) O-PROPERTY INCOMPATIBLE WITH P.\nTHE ALGEBRA OF DISJUNCTION, CONJUNCTION AND PSEUDO NEGATION\nOF M-PROPERTIES TURNS OUT TO START IN THE SAME RELATION TO\nBOOLEAN ALGEBRA AS INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC (NOT 3-VALUED\nLOGIC) DOES TO CLASSICAL LOGIC, AND SUGGESTS THEREFORE THAT\nINTUITIONISTIC RATHER THAN 3-VALUED LOGIC IS THE\nAPPROPRIATE FORMALISM TO DEAL WITH THE PARADOXES OF THE\nBALD MAN, THE HEAP, ETC. (shrink)

If ‘a’ and‘b’are (proper) names and if the meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent, how can‘a = a’differ in cognitive value from‘a = b’if‘a = b’is true? This is Frege's famous puzzle and Bezuidenhout reconstructs it using demonstrative NPs in place of names, i.e.: This X is that X.’Her solution is to posit the‘truth-conditional relevance’of the de re modes of presentation of such expressions. My major objection is that Bezuidenhout's examples are such that the NP to (...) the right of the copula is anaphoric rather than demonstrative and cannot, therefore, support her argument. (shrink)

In the context of propositional logics, we apply semantics modulo satisfiability—a restricted semantics which comprehends only valuations that satisfy some specific set of formulas—with the aim to efficiently solve some computational tasks. Three possible such applications are developed.We begin by studying the possibility of implicitly representing rational McNaughton functions in Łukasiewicz Infinitely-valued Logic through semantics modulo satisfiability. We theoretically investigate some approaches to such representation concept, called representation modulo satisfiability, and describe a polynomial algorithm that builds representations in the newly (...) introduced system. An implementation of the algorithm, test results and ways to randomly generate rational McNaughton functions for testing are presented. Moreover, we propose an application of such representations to the formal verification of properties of neural networks by means of the reasoning framework of Łukasiewicz Infinitely-valued Logic.Then, we move to the investigation of the satisfiability of joint probabilistic assignments to formulas of Łukasiewicz Infinitely-valued Logic, which is known to be an NP-complete problem. We provide an exact decision algorithm derived from the combination of linear algebraic methods with semantics modulo satisfiability. Also, we provide an implementation for such algorithm for which the phenomenon of phase transition is empirically detected.Lastly, we study the game theory situation of observable games, which are games that are known to reach a Nash equilibrium, however, an external observer does not know what is the exact profile of actions that occur in a specific instance; thus, such observer assigns subjective probabilities to players actions. We study the decision problem of determining if a set of these probabilistic constraints is coherent by reducing it to the problems of satisfiability of probabilistic assignments to logical formulas both in Classical Propositional Logic and Łukasiewicz Infinitely-valued Logic depending on whether only pure equilibria or also mixed equilibria are allowed. Such reductions rely upon the properties of semantics modulo satisfiability. We provide complexity and algorithmic discussion for the coherence problem and, also, for the problem of computing maximal and minimal probabilistic constraints on actions that preserves coherence.prepared by Sandro Márcio da Silva Preto.E-mail: [email protected]:https://doi.org/10.11606/T.45.2021.tde-17062021-163257. (shrink)

This study concerns the distribution of metaphorical lexis in discrete syntactic constructions. Source and target seed language from established conceptual metaphors in economic discourse is used to catalogue the specific patterns of how metaphorical pairs align in five syntactic constructions: A-NP, N-N, NP-of-NP, V-NP, and X is Y. Utilizing the Corpus of Contemporary American English, the examination includes 12 frequent metaphorical target triggers combined with 84 source triggers to produce 2,016 ordered collocations, i.e. investment freeze and turbulent market. Through detailed (...) type and token counts, results confirm that source domains function as conceptual material used to structure the target domain and disproportionally fill syntactic positions associated with predication, Studies in cognitive corpus linguistics. Frankfurt: Peter Lang Publishers; Sullivan, Karen. 2013. Frames and constructions in metaphoric language. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing). Given a lexeme’s origin – source or target – when used in source-target metaphors, syntactic alignment can be predicted, market climate is metaphorical, climate market is not. Exceptions to these strong tendencies are explained through genre-specific lexicalization processes in which predicate denoting terms like bubble establish themselves as domain modifiers in economic jargon. Through quantitative techniques to gage metaphorical conventionality and lexical versatility, corpus methodology is used to define and inform the value of frequency effects in cataloguing and understanding metaphorical lexicalization. (shrink)

The paper considers two-agent order acceptance scheduling problems with different scheduling criteria. Two agents have a set of jobs to be processed by a single machine. The processing time and due date of each job are known in advance. In the order accepting scheduling problem, jobs are allowed to be rejected. The objective of the problem is to maximize the net revenue while keeping the weighted number of tardy jobs for the second agent within a predetermined value. A mixed-integer (...) linear programming formulation is provided to obtain the optimal solution. The problem is considered as an NP-hard problem. Therefore, MILP can be used to solve small problem instances optimally. To solve the problem instances with realistic size, heuristic and metaheuristic algorithms have been proposed. A heuristic method is used to determine and secure a quick solution while the metaheuristic based on particle swarm optimization is designed to obtain the near-optimal solution. A numerical experiment is piloted and conducted on the benchmark instances that could be obtained from the literature. The performances of the proposed algorithms are tested through numerical experiments. The proposed PSO can obtain the solution within 0.1% of the optimal solution for problem instances up to 60 jobs. The performance of the proposed PSO is found to be significantly better than the performance of the heuristic. (shrink)

We consider an example of a sentence which according to Hintikka's claim essentially requires for its logical form a Henkin quantifier. We show that if Hintikka is right then recognizing the truth value of the sentence in finite models is an NP-complete problem. We discuss also possible conclusions from this observation.

A recent popular analysis of English indefinites isthat they involve a choice function mechanism in their semantic interpretation. However,there are diversified views regarding how intermediate scope readings should be dealt withand which level(s) existential closure should apply to. This paper attempts to make acontribution to this debate by examining existential polarity wh-phrases in Chinese. I showthat unlike the behaviors of polarity indefinites in St''át''imcets reported by Matthewson(1999), intermediate scope readings are possible for polarity wh-phrases in Chinese but aresubject to some (...) locality conditions. I suggest that implicit arguments of choice functionsmight have a parametric value the choice of which affects availability of intermediate readings.The findings in this paper thus revive the possibility, rejected by Matthewson (1999), that thechoice function mechanism may vary from language to language or from indefinite NPs in onelanguage to indefinite NPs in another language or even from one type of indefiniteNP to another type of indefinite NP within the same language. (shrink)

This volume offers to the English-speaking world a collection of important works by the eminent twentieth century logician, Jan Lukasiewicz, many of which are here translated into English for the first time. This edition differs significantly from the Polish edition which appeared in 1961—containing ten logic papers not appearing there and omitting articles primarily of interest to the Polish reader. In addition to writing in Polish, Lukasiewicz also published works in French, English, and notably in German, and sometimes translated his (...) own works from one language to another. One of the most valuable works on the history of logic is Lukasiewicz’ paper, "On the History of the Logic of Propositions". Lukasiewicz points out the difference between the two basic areas of formal logic, the logic of propositions and the logic of terms, undifferentiated before the development of modern mathematical logic. The understanding of this distinction leads Lukasiewicz to trace the history of propositional logic back to its original development by the Stoics, its further development by the medieval Scholastics, and its axiomatization by Gottlob Frege. The status of mathematical logic is discussed in various works. The most basic system is propositional logic, upon which depend the other logical disciplines and also mathematics. Mathematical logic, also called logistic, is independent of philosophy and espouses no philosophical viewpoint. Early in his career, Lukasiewicz refers to mathematical logic as the logic of algebra and uses mathematical symbolism to represent logical propositions. Later he introduces what we now call "Polish notation," in particular, "Cpq" for "if p, then q" and "Np" for "it is not the case that p" for the primitive functions, eliminating the need for punctuation. He adopts the symbols Π and Σ for quantification from Charles S. Peirce, and also brings to light the almost unknown fact that it was Peirce who invented the matrix method in 1885. The paper, "Investigations into the Sentential Calculus", written by Lukasiewicz and Tarski embodies the results of a decade of research on the sentential calculus initiated by Lukasiewicz at the University of Warsaw systematically compiling the contributions of five logicians: Lindenbaum, Sobocinski, Wajsberg, Tarski, and Lukasiewicz. The approach is metalogical and depends heavily upon set theoretic concepts; it covers both the matrix and axiomatic methods. One of the problems that preoccupied Lukasiewicz was that of determinism, which led to his development of three-valued logic. A proposition such as "I shall be in Warsaw at noon on 21 December of next year" is neither true nor false; a third truth value is needed, one which Lukasiewicz calls "the possible." Another area to which Lukasiewicz contributed is modal logic, proving that modal logic cannot be two-valued. Lukasiewicz’ analysis and axiomatization of Aristotle’s syllogistic is not included in the present volume since an English edition by Lukasiewicz on this topic is available. We have here briefly touched upon a few of Lukasiewicz’ numerous achievements in logic; the best means of appreciating them is to read his works.—T. G. N. (shrink)

We propose a technical reformulation of the measurement problem of quantum mechanics, which is based on the postulate that the final state of a measurement is classical; this accords with experimental practice as well as with Bohr’s views. Unlike the usual formulation (in which the post-measurement state is a unit vector in Hilbert space), our version actually opens the possibility of admitting a purely technical solution within the confines of conventional quantum theory (as opposed to solutions that either modify this (...) theory, or introduce unusual and controversial interpretative rules and/or ontologies). To that effect, we recall a remarkable phenomenon in the theory of Schrödinger operators (discovered in 1981 by Jona-Lasinio, Martinelli, and Scoppola), according to which the ground state of a symmetric double-well Hamiltonian (which is paradigmatically of Schrödinger’s Cat type) becomes exponentially sensitive to tiny perturbations of the potential as ħ→0. We show that this instability emerges also from the textbook wkb approximation, extend it to time-dependent perturbations, and study the dynamical transition from the ground state of the double well to the perturbed ground state (in which the cat is typically either dead or alive, depending on the details of the perturbation). Numerical simulations show that adiabatically arising perturbations may (quite literally) cause the collapse of the wave-function in the classical limit. Thus, at least in the context of a simple mathematical model, we combine the technical and conceptual virtues of decoherence (which fails to solve the measurement problem but launches the key idea that perturbations may come from the environment) with those of dynamical collapse models à la grw (which do solve the measurement problem but are ad hoc), without sharing their drawbacks: single measurement outcomes are obtained (instead of merely diagonal reduced density matrices), and no modification of quantum mechanics is needed. (shrink)

Ethical reasoning of all types is anthropocentric, in that it is addressed to agents, but anthropocentric starting points vary in the preference they accord the human species. Realist claims about environmental values, utilitarian reasoning and rights-based reasoning all have difficulties in according ethical concern to certain all aspects of natural world. Obligation-based reasoning can provide quite strong if incomplete reasons to protect the natural world, including individual non-human animals. Although it cannot establish all the conclusions to which anti-speciesists aspire, it (...) may establish many of them with some clarity. (shrink)

Hope obeys Aristotle's doctrine of the mean: one should neither hope too much, nor too little. But what determines what constitutes too much and what constitutes too little for a particular person at a particular time? The sceptic presents an argument to the effect that it is never rational to hope. An attempt to answer the sceptic leads us in different directions. Decision-theoretic and preference-theoretic arguments support the instrumental value of hope. An investigation into the nature of hope permits (...) us to assess the intrinsic value of hope. However, it must be granted to the sceptic that there is a tension between hope and epistemic rationality. I conclude with some reflections about the relationship between hope and character features that are constitutive of inner strength. (shrink)

According to the dominant philosophical tradition, intrinsic value must depend solely upon intrinsic properties. By appealing to various examples, however, I argue that we should at least leave open the possibility that in some cases intrinsic value may be based in part on relational properties. Indeed, I argue that we should even be open to the possibility that an object''s intrinsic value may sometimes depend (in part) on its instrumental value. If this is right, of course, (...) then the traditional contrast between intrinsic value and instrumental value is mistaken. (shrink)

According to tradition, aesthetic value is non-contingently connected to a certain feeling of liking or pleasure. Is that true? Two answers are on offer in the field of aesthetics today: 1. The Hedonist answers: Yes, aesthetic value is non-contingently connected to pleasure insofar as this value is constituted and explained by the power of its possessors to please (under standard conditions). 2. The Non-Affectivist answers: No. At best, pleasure is contingently related to aesthetic value. The aim (...) of this paper is to point to a blind spot in the dialectic between these two standard positions by defending a third neglected answer to the question above, the answer of the Value-Meriting-Pleasure [VMP] advocate. According to this answer, a certain kind of (cognitive and responsive) pleasure is connected to aesthetic value non-contingently, but also non-hedonically. VMP is the view that objects of aesthetic value are non-contingently related to pleasure insofar as they merit a certain kind of pleasure. But, pace the hedonist, those objects are valuable (those that are to be engaged with etc.) neither on account of their capacity to give pleasure nor on account of the hedonic value of the attitude they merit. (shrink)

In this article, I cast doubt on an apparent truism, namely, that if evidence is available for gathering and use at a negligible cost, then it’s always instrumentally rational for us to gather that evidence and use it for making decisions. Call this ‘value of information’ (VOI). I show that VOI conflicts with two other plausible theses. The first is the view that an agent’s evidence can entail non-trivial propositions about the external world. The second is the view that (...) epistemic rationality requires us to update our credences by conditionalization. These two theses, given some plausible assumptions, make room for rationally biased inquiries where VOI fails. I go on to argue that this is bad news for defenders of VOI. (shrink)

Just because an angel is better than a stone, it does not follow that two angels are better than one angel and one stone. So said Aquinas (Summa contra Gentiles III, 71), and the sentiment was echoed by Leibniz. In section 118 of the Theodicy he wrote: "No substance is either absolutely precious or absolutely contemptible in the sight of God. It is certain that God attaches more importance to a man than to a lion, but I do not know (...) that we can bc sure that he prefers one man to an entire species of lions." Even Kant was bitten by this bug. In one of his pre-Critical works he was moved to say, à propos of lice, that even though they “may in our eyes be as worthless as you like, nevertheless it is of more consequence to Nature to conserve this species as a whole than to conserve a small number of members of a superior species." In these passages Aquinas, Leibniz, and Kant gave expression to a distinctive and interesting view about the value of animal species and animal populations. At its simplest, this is the view that there is a special value in the existence of animal species or in the existence of a wide variety of different animal species. But the view also goes deeper than this. An animal species, after all, is nothing over and above the individual animals which make it up, and the value which it contributes to the world must therefore be some function of the values contributed by those individual animals. At the deepest level, what the view expressed by Aquinas, Leibniz, and Kant holds is that the value which an individual animal contributes to thc world is not constant but varies with the number.. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between the ascription of value to an object and an assessment of conative attitudes taken towards that object. It argues that this relationship is captured by an a priori necessary truth that falls out of the mastery conditions for the concept of value: what has value is worth valuing, when valuing is understood to be a relatively stable conative attitude distinct from judging valuable. What kind of assessment of attitude is at stake? (...) How are we to understand the worth-relation that holds between an object and the attitude? It is argued that deontological, evaluative and alethic eluciations of the worth-relation are wrongheaded. We should be looking for a mind-world relation that marks a success in how the emotional and motivational energies integral to valuing are directed: a success that does not consist in meeting a deontic requirement, in exemplifying value, or in representing truly. (shrink)

This book, like the practice of medicine itself, is about the value of life. Health care is one of the clearest and most visible expressions of a society's ...

Analyses of moral value judgements must meet a practicality requirement: moral speech acts characteristically express pro- or con-attitudes, indicate that speakers are motivated in certain ways, and exert influence on others' motivations. Nondescriptivists including Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard claim that no descriptivist analysis can satisfy this requirement. I argue first that while the practicality requirement is defeasible, it indeed demands a connection between value judgement and motivation that resembles a semantic or conceptual rather than merely contingent psychological (...) link. I then show how a form of descriptivism, the interest-relational theory, satisfies the requirement as a pragmatic and conversational feature of value judgement – thereby also accommodating its defeasibility. The word ``good'' is always indexed to some set of motivations: when this index is unarticulated in many contexts the speaker conversationally implicates possession of those motivations. (shrink)

Epistemic peer disagreement raises interesting questions, both in epistemology and in philosophy of science. When is it reasonable to defer to the opinion of others, and when should we hold fast to our original beliefs? What can we learn from the fact that an epistemic peer disagrees with us? A question that has received relatively little attention in these debates is the value of epistemic peer disagreement—can it help us to further epistemic goals, and, if so, how? We investigate (...) this through a recent case in paleoanthropology: the debate on the taxonomic status of Homo floresiensis remains unresolved, with some authors arguing the fossils represent a novel hominin species, and others claiming that they are Homo sapiens with congenital growth disorders. Our examination of this case in the recent history of science provides insights into the value of peer disagreement, indicating that it is especially valuable if one does not straightaway defer to a peer’s conclusions, but nevertheless remains open to a peer’s evidence and arguments. (shrink)

Consciousness, or its lack, is often invoked in debates in applied and normative ethics. Conscious beings are typically held to be significantly more morally valuable than non-consious, so that establishing whether a being is conscious becomes of critical importance. In this paper, I argue that the supposition that phenomenal consciousness explains the value of our experiences or our lives, and the moral value of beings who are conscious, is less well-grounded than is commonly thought. A great deal of (...) what matters to us and about us can be explained by functional and representational properties that may not be sufficient for phenomenal consciousness. I conclude with some reflections on how these claims might affect debates in ethics. (shrink)