What the causes of aging are and which factors define lifespan are key questions in the understanding of aging. Here, it is argued that cellular life involves (i) inevitable accumulation of damage resulting from imperfectness and heterogeneity of every cellular process, and (ii) dilution of damage when cells divide. While severe damage is cleared by protective systems, milder damage can only be diluted. This is due to the high cost of accuracy, the greater number of damage forms compared to protective (...) systems, and the constraints on cellular life inherited from the prokaryotic world. This strategy also applies to cancer cells, which are particularly dependent on damage dilution. Imposing restriction on cell division necessarily leads to aging. Interventions that extend lifespan act through metabolic reprogramming, thereby changing both damage composition and the rate of damage accumulation. Thus, heterogeneity leading to myriad mild damage forms represents the cause of aging, whereas the processes that affect the damage landscape and damage accumulation are lifespan regulators. (shrink)

Judah and the Judeans in the Achaemenid Period: Negotiating Identity in an International Context. Edited by Oded Lipschits; Gary N. Knoppers; and Manfred Oeming. Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2011. Pp. xvi + 600, illus. $64.50.

Judah and the Judeans in the Achaemenid Period: Negotiating Identity in an International Context. Edited by Oded Lipschits; Gary N. Knoppers; and Manfred Oeming. Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2011. Pp. xvi + 600, illus. $64.50.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume: Between Leibniz and Kant (The role of pre-established harmony in Hume's philosophy) Vadim Vasilyev 1. Introduction In the history of eighteenth century European philosophy, Hume appears as an important connecting link between Leibniz and Kant. I mean, however, not only the well-known historical fact that Hume "awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber" (and it was the "dogmatism" ofLeibnizian metaphysics), but I shall try to show that it (...) is true from the philosophical point of view as well. The first problem I would like to discuss is the actual relationship between Hume and Leibniz. Hume never openly criticized the views of Leibniz. On the other hand, Hume did not admit himself to be a follower of him. Did Hume everread any works ofLeibniz? Hume has never said thathe did. Hume also hasn't directly quoted these works, so it looks like Hume wasn't acquainted with them at all. Nonetheless, we can show that already in 1739 Hume had known Theodicée which can be considered as the main treatise ofLeibniz. In his Abstract Hume writes: The celebratedMonsieurLeibnitz has observed it tobe a defect in the common systems of logic, that they are very copious when they explain the operations ofthe understanding in the forming ofdemonstrations, but are too concise when they treat of probabilities, and those other measures of evidence on which life and action entirely depend, and which are our guides even in most of our philosophical speculations. In this censure, he comprehends the essay on human understanding, Ie recherche de la vérité, and l'art dépenser.1 The fragment is a rendering of the following passage from Theodicée: caril n'y a rien de plus impartaitqui nostre Logique, lorsqu'on va au delà des argumens nécessaires; et les plus excellens philosophes de nostre temps, tels que les Auteurs de l'Art de penser, de la Recherche de la vérité, et de l'Essai sur Volume XLX Number 1 19 VADIMVASILYEV l'entendment, ont été fort éloignés de nous marquer les vrais moyens propres à aider cette faculté qui nous doit faire peser les apparences du vrait et du faux: sans parler de l'art d'inventer.2 So, it is highly probable that Hume knew Theodicée. The ideas ofLeibniz in Hume's philosophy The most important philosophical ideas of Theodicée are: the definitions ofpossibility and oftwo kinds ofnecessity, a theory of"the best possible world" and a conception ofthe pre-established harmony. As we shall see, all these ideas, one way or another, were assimilated by Hume. In his Theodicée Leibniz states that a distinction should be made between two kinds of necessity and, correspondingly, between two kinds ofnecessary knowledge: metaphysical and moral.? ne faut done que bien entendre des distinctions, comme celle que nous avons pressée bien souvent entre le necessaire et le certain, et entre la nécessité métaphysique et la nécessité morale. (Theodicée, 284, par. 282) Metaphysical or mathematical truths are such that propositions which are opposite to them imply contradictions. Or les vérités de la Raison sont de deux sortes; les unes sont ce qu'on appelle les Vérités Eternelles, qui sont abolument nécessaires, en sorte que l'opposé implique contradiction. (Theodicée, 50, par. 2) Not so regarding the moral truths; the opposite statements may be false but they imply no contradictions and are possible: "? est vray qu'il n'y auroit point eu de contradiction dans la supposition que Spinosa fût mort à Leide, et non pas à La Haye; il n'y auroit rien de si possible" (Theodicée, 218, par. 174). The possibility is equivalent to logical consistency and what is possible may be distinctly conceived: puisqu'il y a bien des choses qui ne sont jamais arrivées et n'arriveront jamais, et qui cependant sont concevables distinctement, et n'impliquent aucune contradiction, comment peut on dire qu'elles sont absolument impossibles? (Theodicée, 257, par. 234) 20Hume Studies HUME: BETWEEN LEIBNIZ AND KANT Hume uses all these definitions. The following fragment is a good example. The non-existence ofany being, without exception, is as clear and distinct an... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume: Between Leibniz and Kant (The role of pre-established harmony in Hume's philosophy) Vadim Vasilyev 1. Introduction In the history of eighteenth century European philosophy, Hume appears as an important connecting link between Leibniz and Kant. I mean, however, not only the well-known historical fact that Hume "awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber" (and it was the "dogmatism" ofLeibnizian metaphysics), but I shall try to show that it (...) is true from the philosophical point of view as well. The first problem I would like to discuss is the actual relationship between Hume and Leibniz. Hume never openly criticized the views of Leibniz. On the other hand, Hume did not admit himself to be a follower of him. Did Hume everread any works ofLeibniz? Hume has never said thathe did. Hume also hasn't directly quoted these works, so it looks like Hume wasn't acquainted with them at all. Nonetheless, we can show that already in 1739 Hume had known Theodicée which can be considered as the main treatise ofLeibniz. In his Abstract Hume writes: The celebratedMonsieurLeibnitz has observed it tobe a defect in the common systems of logic, that they are very copious when they explain the operations ofthe understanding in the forming ofdemonstrations, but are too concise when they treat of probabilities, and those other measures of evidence on which life and action entirely depend, and which are our guides even in most of our philosophical speculations. In this censure, he comprehends the essay on human understanding, Ie recherche de la vérité, and l'art dépenser.1 The fragment is a rendering of the following passage from Theodicée: caril n'y a rien de plus impartaitqui nostre Logique, lorsqu'on va au delà des argumens nécessaires; et les plus excellens philosophes de nostre temps, tels que les Auteurs de l'Art de penser, de la Recherche de la vérité, et de l'Essai sur Volume XLX Number 1 19 VADIMVASILYEV l'entendment, ont été fort éloignés de nous marquer les vrais moyens propres à aider cette faculté qui nous doit faire peser les apparences du vrait et du faux: sans parler de l'art d'inventer.2 So, it is highly probable that Hume knew Theodicée. The ideas ofLeibniz in Hume's philosophy The most important philosophical ideas of Theodicée are: the definitions ofpossibility and oftwo kinds ofnecessity, a theory of"the best possible world" and a conception ofthe pre-established harmony. As we shall see, all these ideas, one way or another, were assimilated by Hume. In his Theodicée Leibniz states that a distinction should be made between two kinds of necessity and, correspondingly, between two kinds ofnecessary knowledge: metaphysical and moral.? ne faut done que bien entendre des distinctions, comme celle que nous avons pressée bien souvent entre le necessaire et le certain, et entre la nécessité métaphysique et la nécessité morale. (Theodicée, 284, par. 282) Metaphysical or mathematical truths are such that propositions which are opposite to them imply contradictions. Or les vérités de la Raison sont de deux sortes; les unes sont ce qu'on appelle les Vérités Eternelles, qui sont abolument nécessaires, en sorte que l'opposé implique contradiction. (Theodicée, 50, par. 2) Not so regarding the moral truths; the opposite statements may be false but they imply no contradictions and are possible: "? est vray qu'il n'y auroit point eu de contradiction dans la supposition que Spinosa fût mort à Leide, et non pas à La Haye; il n'y auroit rien de si possible" (Theodicée, 218, par. 174). The possibility is equivalent to logical consistency and what is possible may be distinctly conceived: puisqu'il y a bien des choses qui ne sont jamais arrivées et n'arriveront jamais, et qui cependant sont concevables distinctement, et n'impliquent aucune contradiction, comment peut on dire qu'elles sont absolument impossibles? (Theodicée, 257, par. 234) 20Hume Studies HUME: BETWEEN LEIBNIZ AND KANT Hume uses all these definitions. The following fragment is a good example. The non-existence ofany being, without exception, is as clear and distinct an... (shrink)

The bi-polar confrontation between the Soviet Union and the USA involved many leading game theorists from both sides of the Iron Curtain: Oskar Morgenstern, John von Neumann, Michael Intriligator, John Nash, Thomas Schelling and Steven Brams from the United States and Nikolay Vorob’ev, Leon A. Petrosyan, Elena B. Yanovskaya and Olga N. Bondareva from the Soviet Union. The formalization of game theory took place prior to the Cold War but the geopolitical confrontation hastened and shaped its evolution. In our article (...) we outline four similarities and differences between Western GT and Soviet GT: 1) the Iron Curtain resulted in a lagged evolution of GT in the Soviet Union; 2) Soviet GT focused more on operations research and issues of centralized planning; 3) the contemporary Western view on Soviet GT was biased and Soviet contributions, including works on dynamic stability, non-emptiness of the core and many refinements, suggest that Soviet GT was able to catch up to the Western level relatively fast; 4) international conferences, including Vilnius, 1971, fostered interaction between Soviet game theorists and their Western colleagues. In general, we consider the Cold War to be a positive environment for GT in the West and in the Soviet Union. (shrink)

The review discusses the recently published second issue of the Philosophical Projective Dictionary. Having encountered difficulties in understanding the articles of the dictionary, I turn to the explanations of the motives of the dictionary’s authors and editors Epstein notes that the entries in the dictionary are not intended to generalize the already existing use of terms and concepts, but to kind of projecting and anticipating the meanings of concepts and texts that may be created in the future. Tulchinskii writes more (...) modest, asserting the performative nature of the concepts and ideas presented in the dictionary. I discuss these explanations of the compilers of the dictionary, problematizing and testing the strength of their arguments. In particular, I doubt that Epstein is right when speaking of the projection of terms and texts. From my point of view, Epstein uses the concept of projection in a very broad sense, which does not allow to accept his statement. In turn, citing a case from personal practice, I expresses my own version of introducing terms and constructing new concepts. Agreeing with Tulchinskii’s opinion that the articles in the dictionary and the dictionary itself are a unique vision of their authors, I raise the question of the existence of projective dictionary as a specific genre. I note that the dictionary’s entries that are devoted to already known concepts, offer an up-to-date modern interpretation of these concepts. To demonstrate that, I consider the concept of man in an article by Yulia Shichanina. At the end of the review, the importance of the work done by the authors of the dictionary is emphasized and an example of the use of two terms from the dictionary in my practice is given. (shrink)

This text consists of two parts. The first part is an interview given by Aleksandr Moiseevich Piatigorskii to Vadim Nikolaevich Sadovskii. Both are graduates of the Department of Philosophy at Moscow State University in the first postwar years. Meeting in London in 1992, they decided to discuss how they studied philosophy at that time. As time was short, for all practical purposes only Piatigorskii's reflections were recorded on tape. Hence, on the suggestion of the editorial board, a second part, (...) containing Sadovskii's account of these same topics, was produced—written in Moscow, of course. (shrink)

_Raritan: A Quarterly Review_ , IX, 68-98, Summer 1989. Reprinted (with footnotes), _Occasional Paper #8_ , Center on Violence and Human Survival, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, The City University of New York, 1991; Daniel Kolak and R. Martin, eds., _Self & Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues_ , Macmillan, 1991.

Conceptualization and measurement of organizational commitment involve different dimensions that include economic, affective, as well as moral aspects labelled in the literature as: ‘continuance’, ‘affective’ and ‘normative’ commitment. This multidimensional framework emerges from the convergence of different research lines. Using Aristotle’s philosophical framework, that explicitly considers the role of the will in human commitment, it is proposed a rational explanation of the existence of mentioned dimensions in organizational commitment. Such a theoretical proposal may offer a more accurate definition of ‘affective (...) commitment’ that distinguishes feelings from rational judgments. The use of a philosophical explanation coherent with psychological findings also allows the discovery of a wider moral concept of ‘normative commitment’. (shrink)

Ravelingien et al1 argue that, given the restrictions that must be imposed on recipients of xenotransplanted organs, we should conduct clinical trials of xenotransplantation only on patients in a persistent vegetative state. I argue that there is no ethical barrier to using terminally ill patients instead. Such patients can choose to waive their rights to the liberties that xenotransplantation would probably restrict; it is surely rational to prefer to waive your rights rather than to die, and permissible to allow patients (...) to make this choice.Perhaps the single most important advance in the history of moral thought occurred when it came to be generally recognised that all people are protected by rights that are inviolable, at least without their consent. The precise nature and content of these rights is controversial, but there is a consensus among reasonable people over their core. We all have a right to life, to liberty, to security of person and to equality before the law. Other rights—so-called positive rights, such as the right to economic security, or cultural rights, for instance—may be controversial, but we all agree at least on these.Ravelingien et al1 therefore seem to be on solid ground when they conclude that it would not be permissible to use living persons as subjects in clinical trials of xenotransplantation, as such trials, potentially or actually, result in the violation of the core human rights of the subjects. Their argument is as follows:" Xenotransplantation carries with it a currently unquantifiable risk of the transmission of viruses, from the animal that is the source of the organ transplanted, to the human recipient. Such viruses could have potentially catastrophic consequences, up to and including triggering a global and devastating pandemic. Therefore, it would be necessary to monitor the health status of recipients of … ". (shrink)

León-Portilla, M. El pensamiento prehispánico.--O'Gorman, E. América.--Gallegos Rocafull, J. M. La filosofía moderna en la Nueva España.--Villoro, L. Las corrientes ideológicas en la época de la Independencia.--Zea, L. El positivismo.--Salmerón, F. Los de filósofos mexicanos del siglo XX.--Villegas, A. El liberalismo mexicano.

On one way of talking about a traditional metaethical topic, realists accept that some items appear on the list of what exists in the moral or more broadly normative domain of inquiry. They then divide over whether those items are like what science and experience suggest that all other items on the list of what exists across all domains are like – naturalistic and secular. Reductive naturalists answer this further question affirmatively. Why don’t nonnaturalists? I explore the answer that it’s (...) because normative entities are “just too different” in the sense that they are countably different things. However, I argue that this answer rests on the subtle presupposition that the normative domain doesn’t also contain uncountable entities of the sort that analytic metaphysicians call “stuff”. Taking intuitions of difference seriously points the way to a novel form of metaethical reductive naturalism. The key is to identify the stuff that matters. (shrink)

Avicenna holds that since God has existed from all eternity and is immutable and impassible, he cannot come to have an attribute or feature that he has not had from all eternity. He also claims for the simultaneous causation. A puzzle arises when we consider God’s creating this world. If God is immutable and impassible, then his attributes associated with his creating this world are unchanging. So, God must have been creating the world from all eternity. But then God’s creative (...) act, one might object, seems to be no different from a matter of natural necessity. This is a threat to divine freedom, for God would then have no choice concerning his creative action. Anthony Ruffus and Jon McGinnis argue that this puzzle can be solved in such a way that Avicenna can consistently affirm divine freedom along with divine simplicity. They suggest that Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s interpretation might help to show that it is false that Avicenna’s God cannot choose absolutely. For it is still open to him to choose either to create eternally or to refrain from creating anything at all. Ruffus and McGinnis argue that since creating or not creating anything at all do not correspond to two distinct concepts, Avicenna’s account of divine simplicity, which denies any multiplicity in divine mind, is safeguarded along with divine freedom. I claim that God’s omnirationality requiring that he always acts for reasons is a serious threat to such an interpretation. (shrink)

Auf Grund aller oben erörterten Betrachtungen und Tatsachen können wir jetzt die folgenden allgemeinen Gesetze der organischen Evolution erwähnen, die bzw. sich an die unmittelbaren Ursachen, Mechanismen und Tendenzen der Evolution beziehen: Unmittelbare Ursachen: das Gesetz der Mutation; Mechanismen: das Gesetz der natürlichen Auswahl : Tendenzen: das Gesetz der funktionellen Differenzierung; das Gesetz der Koordinierung der sich differenzierenden Funktionen; das Gesetz der Integrierung der funktionellen Systemen; das Gesetz der funktionellen Verbesserung des Lebens; das Gesetz der Beschleunigung der Evolution.Alle diese Gesetze (...) bilden zusammen ein einheitliches Ganzes und sind eher als Teilaus drücke eines einzelnen allgemeinen Gesetzes der organischen Evolution aufzufassen. Ob der Verfasser eine richtige Interpretation der Tatsachen gefunden hat, darüber darf man diskutieren; — das ist nur die Fragestellung.Das Problem selbst ist sowohl theoretisch wie auch praktisch sehr wichtig, so dass wir kein menschliches Recht haben um seine Lösung den künftigen Generationen zu überlassen.Life is considered as a functional whole, but not in the holistic sense of the word, because of an essentially different interpretation of the role of the individual element in the evolution of the functional system at various levels of the organisation of the life. This paper contains the following chapters: a) introduction, b) the unity of the life, c) the main questions of the theory of evolution, d) some regularities of organic evolution, and e) the general laws of organic evolution.The following general laws, referring to the immediate causes, mechanisms and tendences of evolution are formulated. the law of mutation , the law of selection , the law of functional differentiation, the law of coordination of the differentiating functions, the law of integration of the functional systems, the law of functional perfection of the life, the law of acceleration of the evolution.All this laws form together an internally coherent system, which may be considered as the unitary law of evolution. (shrink)

Auf Grund aller oben erörterten Betrachtungen und Tatsachen können wir jetzt die folgenden allgemeinen Gesetze der organischen Evolution erwähnen, die bzw. sich an die unmittelbaren Ursachen, Mechanismen und Tendenzen der Evolution beziehen: Alle diese Gesetze bilden zusammen ein einheitliches Ganzes und sind eher als Teilaus drücke eines einzelnen allgemeinen Gesetzes der organischen Evolution aufzufassen. Ob der Verfasser eine richtige Interpretation der Tatsachen gefunden hat, darüber darf man diskutieren; — das ist nur die Fragestellung. Das Problem selbst ist sowohl theoretisch wie (...) auch praktisch sehr wichtig, so dass wir kein menschliches Recht haben um seine Lösung den künftigen Generationen zu überlassen. (shrink)

Working under large cardinal assumptions such as supercompactness, we study the Borel reducibility between equivalence relations modulo restrictions of the nonstationary ideal on some fixed cardinal κ. We show the consistency of Eλ-clubλ++,λ++, the relation of equivalence modulo the nonstationary ideal restricted to Sλλ++ in the space λ++, being continuously reducible to Eλ+-club2,λ++, the relation of equivalence modulo the nonstationary ideal restricted to Sλ+λ++ in the space 2λ++. Then we show that for κ ineffable Ereg2,κ, the relation of equivalence modulo (...) the nonstationary ideal restricted to regular cardinals in the space 2κ is Σ11-complete. We finish by showing that, for Π21-indescribable κ, the isomorphism relation between dense linear orders of cardinality κ is Σ11-complete. (shrink)

With the help of the natural history of “zero,” and the use of “zero” as a starting point, one may consider two types of metaphysics. On the one hand, the epistemological metaphysics, based on the perceptual/rational dichotomy, is related to the zero as a vacancy between numbers. On the other hand, the genetic metaphysics, based on the dichotomy of source-evolution, has much to do with the zero as a number between negative and positive numbers. In this respect, zero represents the (...) horizon of metaphysics: we can forever approach it, but we cannot ultimately arrive at it. Though serving as the point of convergence and divergence for all relationships, zero has no definable content of its own. Such is the essence of zero, and of metaphysics as well. (shrink)

El siglo XVIII está considerado como una época en la que el método de investigación newtoniano está bien establecido y su uso no se cuestiona, según autores como Kuhn. Sin embargo, como veremos, esto está muy alejado de la realidad, ya que aquí planteamos los dos objetivos siguientes: por un lado, observaremos como dentro de los propios llamados newtonianos no hay un uso uniforme del método newtoniano y que algunos de ellos incluso lo modifican en sus obras donde exponen la (...) doctrina de Newton. Por otro lado, expondremos el método de Émilie du Châtelet, quien, habiendo leído a Newton y a estos pensadores, siente rechazo hacia la metodología que proponen y se dispone a elaborar lo que se puede considerar un precedente del método hipotético-deductivo utilizado hoy día. Lo que se persigue con el presente estudio, en definitiva, es arrojar luz sobre la situación del newtonianismo del siglo XVIII y mostrar el trabajo de du Châtelet como un puente entre dos épocas en relación a la metodología. (shrink)