While he rejects the paradigmatic method in its historic intent, Mr. Weiss has a good deal to say about "nonassociated man" as a model for the understanding of human association and its aims. It seems fair to say that it is really this paradigmatic element which enables Mr. Weiss to support comments on the inadequacies of the analytic and empirical procedures. If the process of analysis itself gives no clue to the elements to be discovered in analysis, and if the (...) empirical investigation of social life does not provide any key to the distinction between the essential and the irrelevant, then the clue or key must lie in some concept of man. For clearly the "socially habituated ways of acting" from which this dialectical procedure sets out do not themselves provide any infallible guide to what is essential and what is irrelevant, to what is beneficial and what is inimical, in human existence. To know what society, state, culture, and civilization are in essence is to have more than a knowledge of existing social forms themselves. The features of prevailing social patterns cannot alone suggest what is normative or ideal, unless ultimately what is is to be taken for what ought to be. (shrink)

Recently, several authors have utilized the notion of dependence to respond to the traditional argument for the incompatibility of freedom and divine foreknowledge. However, proponents of this response have not always been so clear in specifying where the incompatibility argument goes wrong, which has led to some unfounded objections to the response. We remedy this dialectical confusion by clarifying both the dependence response itself and its interaction with the standard incompatibility argument. Once these clarifications are made, it becomes clear (...) both (1.) that the dependence response does not beg the question against the proponent of the incompatibility argument and (2.) that the dependence response advances the dialectic whether it is developed as a version of Ockhamism or as a version of multiple-pasts compatibilism. (shrink)

Human rights discourse has been likened to a global lingua franca, and in more ways than one, the analogy seems apt. Human rights discourse is a language that is used by all yet belongs uniquely to no particular place. It crosses not only the borders between nation-states, but also the divide between national law and international law: it appears in national constitutions and international treaties alike. But is it possible to conceive of human rights as a global language or lingua (...) franca not just in a figurative or metaphorical sense, but in a literal or linguistic sense as a legal dialect defined by distinctive patterns of word choice and usage? Does there exist a global language of human rights that transcends not only national borders, but also the divide between domestic and international law? Empirical analysis suggests that the answer is yes, but this global language comes in at least two variants or dialects. New techniques for performing automated content analysis enable us to analyze the bulk of all national constitutions over the last two centuries, together with the world’s leading regional and international human rights instruments, for patterns of linguistic similarity and to evaluate how much language, if any, they share in common. Specifically, we employ a technique known as topic modeling that disassembles texts into recurring verbal patterns. The results highlight the existence of two species or dialects of rights talk—the universalist dialect and the positive-rights dialect—both of which are global in reach and rising in popularity. The universalist dialect is generic in content and draws heavily on the type of language found in international and regional human rights instruments. It appears in particularly large doses in the constitutions of transitional states, developing states, and states that have been heavily exposed to the influence of the international community. The positive-rights dialect, by contrast, is characterized by its substantive emphasis on positive rights of a social or economic variety, and by its prevalence in lengthier constitutions and constitutions from outside the common law world, especially those of the Spanish-speaking world. Both dialects of rights talk are truly transnational, in the sense that they appear simultaneously in national, regional, and international legal instruments and transcend the distinction between domestic and international law. Their existence attests to the blurring of the boundary between constitutional law and international law. (shrink)

Let (leeway) incompatibilism be the thesis that causal determinism is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. Several prominent authors have claimed that incompatibilism alone can capture, or at least best captures, the intuitive appeal behind Jorge Luis Borges's famous “Garden of Forking Paths” metaphor. The thought, briefly, is this: the “single path” leading up to one's present decision represents the past; the forking paths that one must decide between represent those possible futures consistent with the past and the (...) class='Hi'>laws of nature. But if determinism is true, there is only one possible future consistent with the past and the laws and, hence, only one path to choose from. That is, if determinism is true, then we are not free to do otherwise. In this paper, I argue that this understanding of the Garden of Forking Paths faces a number of problems and ought to be rejected even by incompatibilists. I then present an alternative understanding that not only avoids these problems but still supports incompatibilism. Finally, I consider how various versions of (leeway) compatibilism fit with the Garden of Forking Paths as well as the broader question of whether metaphors, however intuitive, have any dialectical force in the debates over freedom. (shrink)

The Dialectical Forge identifies dialectical disputation as a primary formative dynamic in the evolution of pre-modern Islamic legal systems, promoting dialectic from relative obscurity to a more appropriate position at the forefront of Islamic legal studies. The author introduces and develops a dialectics-based analytical method for the study of pre-modern Islamic legal argumentation, examines parallels and divergences between Aristotelian dialectic and early juridical jadal-theory, and proposes a multi-component paradigm—the Dialectical Forge Model—to account for the power of jadal (...) in shaping Islamic law and legal theory.In addition to overviews of current evolutionary narratives for Islamic legal theory and dialectic, and expositions on key texts, this work shines an analytical light upon the considerably sophisticated “proto-system” of juridical dialectical teaching and practice evident in Islam’s second century, several generations before the first “full-system” treatises of legal and dialectical theory were composed. This proto-system is revealed from analyses of dialectical sequences in the 2nd/8th century Kitāb Ikhtilāf al-ʿIrāqiyyīn / ʿIrāqiyyayn through a lens molded from 5th/11th century jadal-theory treatises. Specific features thus uncovered inform the elaboration of a Dialectical Forge Model, whose more general components and functions are explored in closing chapters. (shrink)

This book fundamentally challenges the radical credentials of post-structuralism. Though Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze claim to have 'deconstructed' metaphysics, their work has much in common with previous attempts to 'end' the metaphysical tradition, from Kant to Nietzshe and Heidegger, and by sociology in general. Gillian Rose shows that this anti-metaphysical writing always appears in historically specific jurisprudential terms, which themselves found and recapitulate metaphysical categories. She reconsiders post-structuralism in this light and assesses the relationship between deconstruction and the earlier structuralism (...) of Saussure and Levi-Strauss. She argues in conclusion that the choice between post-structuralist nihilism and Hegelian and Marxist dialectic is spurious. (shrink)

In this wide-ranging interview Alan Norrie discusses how he became involved with Critical Realism, his work on Dialectical Critical Realism, and responses to it amongst the Critical Realist communi...

Dialogues and dialectics have come to playan important role in the field of ArtificialIntelligence and Law. This paper describes thelegal-theoretical and logical background of this role,and discusses the different services into whichdialogues are put. These services include:characterising logical operators, modelling thedefeasibility of legal reasoning, providing the basisfor legal justification and identifying legal issues,and establishing the law in concrete cases. Specialattention is given to the requirements oflaw-establishing dialogues.

The Dialectical Path of Law discusses the origin of law leading to the development of advanced corporate law intertwined with the formation of technical tax rules. Lincoln explores the recent developments of the OECD and United States tax rules within a hardly discussed context in legal academia - the Hegelian dialectic.

Language & Logic -- Glossary -- Aristotle's syllogisms -- Russell's paradox & Frege's logicism -- profile: Aristotle -- Russell's theory of description -- Frege's puzzle -- Gödel's theorem -- Epimenides' liar paradox -- Eubulides' heap -- Science & Epistemology -- Glossary -- I think therefore I am -- Gettier's counter example -- profile: Karl Popper -- The brain in a vat -- Hume's problem of induction -- Goodman's gruesome riddle -- Popper's conjectures & refutations -- Kuhn's scientific revolutions -- Mind (...) & Metaphysics -- Glossary -- Descartes mind-body problem -- Brentano's intentionality -- Fodor's language of thought -- Parfit's persons -- profile: René Descartes -- Chalmer's zombies -- Zeno's paradoxes -- Kant's left hand -- Theseus' ship -- Laplace's demon, determinism, & free will -- Ryle's ghost in the machine -- Ethics & Political Philosophy -- Glossary -- Aristotle's ethics -- States of nature and the social contract -- Kant's categorical imperative -- profile: Immanuel Kant -- Mill's utilitarianism -- Marx's historical materialism -- The trolley problem -- Religion -- Glossary -- Aquinas' five ways -- Anselm's ontological argument -- profile: Thomas Aquinas -- Epicurus' riddle -- Paley's watchmaker -- Pascal's wager -- Hume against miracles -- Grand Moments -- Glossary -- Socrates' method -- Plato's cave -- Aristotle's four causes -- Lucretius' atomism -- profile: Ludwig Wittgenstein -- Berkeley's idealism -- Kant's synthetic a priori -- Hegel's dialectic -- James' pragmatism -- Moore's common sense -- Wittgenstein's picture theory of language -- Continental Philosophy -- Glossary -- Nietzsche's Superman -- profile: Friedrich Nietzsche -- Derrida's deconstruction -- Heidegger's nothing -- Sartre's bad faith. (shrink)

The Dialectical Forge: Juridical Disputation and the Evolution of Islamic Law. By Walter Edward Young. Logic, Argumentation and Reasoning, vol. 9. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017. Pp. xiv + 643. $149.99, €124.79 ; $109, €101.14.

Nineteenth-century Lutheran giants C.F.W. Walther and Søren Kierkegaard both stressed over the application of Martin Luther’s doctrine of Law and Gospel. Both viewed Law and Gospel as concepts to be distinguished and as concepts that dialectically belong together. To his Pelagian audience tempted to abuse the Law and abolish the Gospel, Walther stressed the distinction of Law and Gospel. To his Antinomian audience tempted to abuse the Gospel and abolish the Law, Kierkegaard stressed the dialectic of Law and Gospel. Walther (...) and Kierkegaard’s contrasting Law and Gospel emphases are clearly seen in their contrasting accounts of the Rich Young Ruler in the Synoptic Gospels. (shrink)

This article analyses a sceptical challenge resulting from metaphysical approaches to the problem of the necessity of empirical laws of nature in Kant’s critical philosophy (what I shall call ‘essentialist’ readings). I argue that this challenge may jeopardize the purpose of empirical enquiry (and therefore the plausibility of essentialist readings), but that Kant has internal resources to address it in the Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason. I show that reading this problem through the lens of the Dialectic (...) allows us to reconcile the metaphysical question of necessitation of laws with a robust sense of empirical cognition. (shrink)

In connection with the discussion on the problem of logic, both within our country and abroad , it has already turned from the general, comparatively abstract, and difficult-to-resolve problem of the "relationship between formal logic and dialectics" to the more concrete problem of the functional scope of formal logic. Some people have even utilized special articles to inquire about a certain law in formal logic: the functional scope of the law of identity or the law of contradiction. The purpose of (...) these philosophers or logicians is to try to define the functional scope of a certain law in formal logic as a starting point, and then to proceed to study the functional scope of formal logic in the entire thinking process of mankind. If the functional scope of formal logic in mankind's entire thinking process is clearly and precisely defined, the solution of this complicated problem of the "relationship between formal logic and dialectics" would certainly not be very difficult. The basic purpose of Comrade Chu-ko Yin-t'ung's article on the problem of "whether or not formal logic's law of contradiction can be contravened in the dialectical thinking process" of men, which appeared in issue No. 82 of the "Philosophy" supplement of Kuang-ming Daily on April 24, is like this. It should be considered as a rather practical method. But I do not quite agree with his basic points of argument and with his analysis of certain examples of dialectics. I intend to present my superficial views here and to study them with Comrade Chu-ko. (shrink)

International economic law is peculiar. It claims universal character, yet eschews engagement with many, if not all, the racialised features of the global political economy. Its scholars mostly ignore imperialism, colonialism, and capitalism; they exclude slavery, predation, and racism altogether. In the following article, we draw upon Walter Rodney’s dialectics of development to offer a racial capitalist critique of international economic law. The disciplinary boundaries and operative logic normalised by its denizens corral us in a white, Eurocentric episteme. Ahistoricism, decontextualisation, (...) and externalisation are three epistemic devices at the forefront of the exclusionary discourse of IEL. In this space, the histories and epistemologies of Black peoples are ghettoised, treated as alien to the framework. After identifying this bias, we use the Black Radical Tradition to evaluate IEL’s amenability to the racial capitalism critique. (shrink)

It is generally accepted among Marxists that the laws of materialist dialectics represent a great, scientifically significant achievement for human knowledge, and that they develop as cognition advances. It is also generally accepted that, under new conditions - for example, in a fundamentally new phase in the development of human society such as is presented by socialism - the objective laws of dialectics acquire distinctive new characteristics, are altered, modified. But is it proper to speak of change or (...) evolution of the laws of objective dialectics? Two different viewpoints on this matter were clearly present at the USSR Symposium in April 1965. (shrink)

The dialectical connection of law and culture is the relevant subject of research in philosophy, theory, and sociology of law, first and foremost due to the fact that insufficient theoretical substantiation lawmaking activity of politicians currently generates serious issues. Those of one cultural-legal traditions are unable to understand their partners belonging to another legal culture. Any modern legal theory should take into account the definition of culture the backbone factor for modern civilization. The novelty this research consists in examination (...) of the fundamental aspects of “law-culture” system alongside on the analysis of views of Western researchers previously unfamiliar to the Russian science. The goal of this work lies in revealing the key aspects of dialectical connection of law and culture and their correlation in modern era. The philosophy of law features ambivalent interpretation of the phenomenon of law: 1) as one of the forms of collective consciousness – along with culture, morality, philosophy, science,or religion; 2) in broad view of culture as a synonym of civilization, law would manifests as the crucial element of culture that generates multiple realities of sociocultural life of the people, society and the state. The research of dialectical connection of law and culture developed in the modern era, may contribute to resolution of complex problems that emerge in the contradictory “law-culture” system, which is of vital importance for the existence of separate national communities, as well as for survival of all the entire humanity. (shrink)

The complexity of this question derives from the fact that both the mechanism of action and the mechanism of utilization of social laws operate through the practical life and activity of human beings. Human beings are the vehicles of the objective-subjective relationships formed in the process of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption of material and cultural goods, and because of this fact are a part of the systems and mechanisms of action and the mechanism of utilization of social (...) class='Hi'>laws. This creates the impression that the objective-subjective activity of people is indivisible and, accordingly, that there is but one mechanism of manifestation of these laws; this, of course, compounds the difficulty of knowing and taking into account objective conditions and subjective factors in the process of scientific leadership and administration of society as a whole. What, then, is the relationship between the mechanism of action and the mechanism of utilization of social laws at the object-subject level? (shrink)

The separation of church and state disguised the coordination of two very different conceptions of liberty at work in Revolutionary America, one with a religious basis in radical Protestant thought and the other with a legal basis in the secular Enlightenment. The essay combines the disciplines of law, literature, and intellectual history to investigate these contrasting formulations and their changing relationship. Cross-cultural analysis of the language of protest in both England and America gives the investigation a crucial focus. It also (...) explains a larger movement from direct influence to refraction in Anglo-American relations. (shrink)

Currently there is a widely held view that international law and its historiography did not emerge until the nineteenth century, with earlier forms of jus gentium or Völkerrecht being consigned to the status of a superseded ‘pre-history’. It is not widely understood that this view itself belongs to a particular kind of historiography–the dialectical historiography of international law–that was born in 1840s Germany, and wielded this viewpoint as a cultural-political weapon to exclude its rivals from ‘modernity’. In outlining a (...) history of this dialectical historiography, the present article focuses on the reception of Kantian and Hegelian philosophies, understood as species of Protestant rationalist metaphysics, in the juridical-political arena of the German Vormärz. Dialectical histories and theories of international law were the effects and instruments of this reception, which gave rise to the new academic subculture of philosophical international law. This subculture in turn permitted the fashioning of a new intellectual persona, the philosopher-jurist, who could claim to transcend positive treaty-based international law through personal insight into a ‘common international legal consciousness’, and to treat this insight as the threshold of ‘modern’ international law. (shrink)

Muhammad Arsyad Al-Banjari who lived from 1710 to 1812 in Borneo, Indonesia, applied a model of integrating uses of the Banjarese tradition into Islamic Jurisprudence based on a dialectical constitution of qiyās, the legal argumentation theory for parallel reasoning and analogy, he learned from the Shāfi‘ī-school of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh). Our paper focuses in the model of integration proposed and practiced by Al-Banjari, a rational debate grounded on a dynamic view on legal systems. We will illustrate the method with (...) the help of two different kinds of qiyās deployed by Al-Banjari in order to argue for the rejection of some traditional Banjarese offering-rituals for avoiding disease or calamities (manyanggar and mambuang pasilih), and for the acceptance of the use of consuming the traditional drink called lahang made of the juice of sugar-palm. As our dialogical reconstruction shows, the development of the debates, particularly the first one, is quite sophisticated, with a Banjarese opponent that does not surrender easily to the rejection of his use of those rituals. (shrink)

This research aims to offer a concept of dialectics without mystifications, following Bertell Ollman’s reading of Marx’s work. In this sense, dialectics will be understood as a philosophical tradition and as a method of investigation, in which the figure of Marx is fundamental, but which can be nourished by the perspective of other philosophers who share some of his points. Secondly, the ontological basis and the epistemological substratum that allow dialectics to operate will be explained. Once these aspects have been (...) clarified, the main dialectical laws or tendencies will be presented. In order to understand its operation, dialectics will be characterized as a deeply critical philosophical tradition and method. Finally, some conclusions will be offered. (shrink)

This paper suggests an alternative reading of Practice in Christianity to Merold Westphal’s interpretation of the text as defining what he calls “religiousness C.” Attending closely to the rhetorical construction of Practice, and situating it in the context of Kierkegaard’s intensive reading of Luther late in his life, I argue that this text extends the Postscript’s meditation on inwardness and writing to one of the central theological constructs of Lutheranism, the distinction between law and gospel. On my reading, Practice both (...) defends the primacy of faith and grace within Christianity, and refuses their commodification into directly communicable results. At the end of this paper, I consider Kierkegaard’s seeming retraction, in 1855, of two rhetorical features of Practice that my reading emphasizes. Iconclude that this gesture in fact intensifies Kierkegaard’s appropriation of the law/gospel paradigm, and speaks to the impossibility of any direct, comprehensive, and final account of authentic Christian life. (shrink)

Consequences of world-scale anti-terrorism campaign (which included pre-emptive and coercive regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq) equaled to or even exceeded consequences of the terrorist challenge itself, and must be analyzed as dialectically interfaced dual factor influencing international politics and law. This dual factor changes basic rules of international relations through wider employment of the principle of pre-emption (retaliation against perceived intentions, rather than against actions), and further blurring of national sovereignty resulting from more coercive interference of the international community (...) into domestic affairs of certain states and societies. Counter-terrorism is philosophically interpreted internationally as reestablishment and strengthening of the monopoly of a state onto use of force, while terrorism is accused for illegal use of force “for private political purposes”. Counter-terrorist practices return previously missing severe coercive sanctions in the international law, and are implemented on behalf of the international community. The problem is to assure both legality and legitimacy of applied measures, especially in situation when major world powers’ interests are split in elaboration of the UN SC decisions authorizing the internationalinterference into sovereign affairs of states. In fact, the very field of counter-terrorism becomes a field for projection and juxtaposing pragmatic interests of world powers. Classical contradiction between international law based on values and principles and pragmatic politics based on interests re-emerges in the area of terrorist challenges/antiterrorist responses. Counter-terrorist practices require as much legal regulation as do terrorist challenges themselves. (shrink)

The building of advanced socialism and the gradual transition to communism is the basic theoretical problem and practical task formulated in the proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Congress of the CPSU and the congresses of the fraternal parties of the countries of the socialist community. Solution of this task is carried out on the basis of knowledge of the uniform dialectical laws of development of society operating on the scale of the entire worldwide socialist system. The experience of the (...) countries of the socialist community not only totally confirms the conclusions and generalizations made by scientific communism but in many respects enriches them, demonstrating the indissoluble connection among the objective dialectics of development of socialist society, the theory of scientific communism, and the activity of the Communist parties. (shrink)

A dialectical contradiction can be appropriately described within the framework of classical formal logic. It is in harmony with the law of noncontradiction. According to our definition, two theories make up a dialectical contradiction if each of them is consistent and their union is inconsistent. It can happen that each of these two theories has an intended model. Plenty of examples are to be found in the history of science.

This paper is an attempt to construct a bridge between dialectics and mathematics, to interpret main dialectical laws in terms of the theory of dynamical systems. Negation is interpreted as a discrete shift along the dynamical system trajectory. For conservative systems, double negation law is trivial as in formal logic; for non-conservative systems, this law means slow evolution of the system under consideration. There are also mathematical interpretations for the transition from quantity to quality and interconnection between opposites.

This work utilizes examples from chemical sciences to present fundamentals of dialectics and synergetics. The laws of dialectics remain appropriate at the level of atoms, at the level of molecules, at the level of the reactions, and at the level of ideas. The law of the unity and conflict of opposites is seen, for instance, in the relationships between the ionization energy and electron affinity of atoms, between the forward and back reactions, as well as in the differentiation and (...) integration between the various areas of chemistry. The law of the passage of quantitative changes into qualitative changes describes the transformation properties of the compounds when the number and arrangement of atoms in the molecule undergoes changes. According to this law, the development is accompanied by breaks and jumps. This paper suggests equations for the description of these relationships. The law of the negation of the negation is manifested in the Periodic Law, in the evolution of ideas about the mutual transformation of chemical elements, in the development the concept of triads of elements, etc. Small changes in the conventional Periodic Table on the basis of previously rejected versions allow reflecting secondary and additional periodicity. Synergetics, similarly to dialectics, is dedicated to the studies of general laws of evolution. Synergetics includes highly advanced and specified ideas of dialectics. The cornerstone of synergetics is the principles of self-organization and nonlinearity. Mathematical development of these concepts was substantially facilitated by considering oscillating chemical reactions as an example. These reactions are quite complex and therefore provide adequate models for self-organization. Oscillations may exist only upon execution of specific thermodynamic, mathematical, and chemical conditions. Mechanisms of several oscillatory reactions are briefly reviewed. The construction of novel biomimetic or smart materials based on oscillating reactions is described. (shrink)

Both "dialectical contradiction" and "logical contradiction" use the word "contradiction." This is misleading; it may easily lead people to believe that the word "contradiction" has only one meaning and thus confuse dialectical contradiction with logical contradiction. As a matter of fact, in dialectics and logic "contradiction" implies different things. "Contradiction" as used in dialectics refers to the two contradictory aspects in a thing. In contrast, "contradiction" as described in formal logic means the self-contradictoriness in thinking. For example, contradictions (...) between the productive forces and the relations of production, between one's merits and weaknesses, and between getting rid of the stale and taking in the fresh are all dialectical contradictions. "At once a man and a not-man," "at once existent and non-existent," "at once meritorious and non-meritorious," and so forth are all logical contradictions. The law of contradiction of formal logic excludes only the self-contradictoriness in thinking and has nothing to do with dialectical contradiction. The law of contradiction says that there can be no"A and not-A." That is to say, "A and not-A" is the logic contradiction that the law of contradiction should rule out. If we admit that dialectical contradiction is not logical contradiction, we then cannot describe dialectical contradiction as "A and not-A.". (shrink)

Inspired by legal reasoning, this paper presents a formal framework for assessing conflicting arguments. Its use is illustrated with applications to realistic legal examples, and the potential for implementation is discussed. The framework has the form of a logical system for defeasible argumentation. Its language, which is of a logic-programming-like nature, has both weak and explicit negation, and conflicts between arguments are decided with the help of priorities on the rules. An important feature of the system is that these priorities (...) are not fixed, but are themselves defeasibly derived as conclusions within the system. Thus debates on the choice between conflicting arguments can also be modelled.The proof theory of the system is stated in dialectical style, where a proof takes the form of a dialogue between a proponent and an opponent of an argument. An argument is shown to be justified if the proponent can make the opponent run out of moves in whatever way the opponent attacks. Despite this dialectical form, the system reflects a declarative, or relational approach to modelling legal argument. A basic assumption of this paper is that this approach complements two other lines of research in AI and Law, investigations of precedent-based reasoning and the development of procedural, or dialectical models of legal argument. (shrink)

The Catastrophe Theory of Rene Thom and E. C. Zeeman suggests a mathematical interpretation of certain aspects of Hegelian and Marxist dialectics. Specifically, the three 'classical' dialectical principles, (1) the transformation of quantity into quality, (2) the unity and struggle of opposites, and (3) the negation of negation, can be modeled with the seven 'elementary catastrophes' given by Thorn, especially the catastrophes known as the 'cusp' and the 'butterfly'. Far from being empty metaphysics or scholasticism, as critics have argued, (...) the dialectical principles embody genuine insights into a class of phenomena, insights which can now be expressed within a precise mathematical formalism. This fact does not, however, support the claim that these principles, possibly modified or supplemented, constitute the laws of motion for human thought and for natural and social processes or even just the last of these. (shrink)

This is an examination of the dialectical structure of deep disagreements about matters not open to empirical check. A dramatic case in point is the Law of Non-Contradiction . Dialetheists are notoriously of the view that, in some few cases, LNC has a true negation. The traditional position on LNC is that it is non-negotiable. The standard reason for thinking it non-negotiable is, being a first principle, there is nothing to negotiate. One of my purposes is to show that (...) the first-principle defence of LNC is inadequate. A second purpose is to argue that it flows from this inadequacy that LNC stands or falls on economic considerations, much in the spirit of Quine's pragmatism about logic generally. This is a tactical victory for dialetheists. It gives them room to make the case against LNC on cost-benefit grounds. As things presently stand, no such case can be considered decisive. But, given that costs and benefits shift with changing circumstances, it is possible that a winning case for the dialetheist may present itself in the future. Notwithstanding the rivalry between consistentists and dialetheists, they share a common opponent. This is trivialism, the doctrine that everything whatever is true. It is an ironic alliance, in as much as the dialetheist's case against the consistentist can be adapted to a defence of trivialism. How damaging this turns out to be depends on the adequacy of the reasons for the dialetheist's rejection of trivialism. My further purpose is to show that the damage is slighter than dialetheists commonly believe. (shrink)

An introduction to the basic ideas of philosophy as a science, materialism, the categories and laws of motion of nature, society and human thought, dialectics, the theory of knowledge.

The paper starts with a thesis on the dialectical structure of modern law that goes back the European revolutionary tradition and constitutes a legal structure that is at once emancipatory and repressive. Once it became democratic the modern nation states has solved more or less successfully the crises that emerged in modern Europe since the 16th Century. Yet, this state did not escape the dialectical snares of modern law and modern legal regimes. It’s greatest advance, the exclusion of (...) inequalities presupposed the exclusion of the internal other of blacks, workers, women etc, and the other that stemmed from the non-European world that furthermore was under European colonial rule or other forms of European, Northamerican and Japanese imperial control. Yet, the wars and revolutions of the 20th Century let to a complete reconstruction, new foundation and globalization of all national and international law. The evolutionary advance of the 20th Century was the emergence of world law, and this enabled the construction of international and national welfarism and the global expansion of the exclusion of inequalities. Nevertheless the dialectic of enlightenment came back again and led to new forms of postnational domination, hegemony, oppression and exclusion. The final section tries to detect some ideas and principles how to overcome the crisis. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate the similarities betweenthe dialectical procedure in the pragma-dialecticaltheory and dialectical procedures in AI and Law. I dothis by focusing on one specific type of reasoning inlaw: analogy argumentation. I will argue that analogyargumentation is not only a heuristic forfinding new premises, but also a part of thejustification of legal decisions. The relevantcriteria for the evaluation of analogy argumentationare not to be found at the logical level of inference,but at the procedural level of the (...) discussion. I willproceed as follows. I start with an outline ofPrakken's theory of argumentation frameworks andprocedural models. Then, I will discuss Peczenik'sanalysis of analogy argumentation and try to combineit with the descriptive-normative research ofMacCormick and Summers. Finally, I propose asystematization of the criteria for the evaluation ofanalogy argumentation within the framework of apragma-dialectical notion of an argumentation scheme. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe remarkable philosophical present-day turn to Paul pays a lot of attention to the particular role played by the famous distinctions that structure Paul’s rhetoric such as the distinction between faith and law, life and death, and spirit and flesh. These distinctions lead to the question of whether Paul endorses a dualism or not. In this essay, the author investigates Badiou’s and Agamben’s readings of Paul and asks whether one cannot find a form of dialectics rather than dualism in these (...) readings. The concept of the exception seems to corroborate this suggestion. To examine whether this suggestion makes sense, the author first discusses Badiou’s focus on the antidialectics of death and resurrection as well as the dialectical remnants in Badiou’s reading of Paul. Subsequently, the author analyses Agamben’s dialectical account of the Pauline terms katargein, chrēsis and charis. (shrink)

Dialectical logic is the science of the most general laws of development of nature, society, and human thought. These laws are reflected in the form of special concepts called the categories of logic. Therefore d. 1. may also be defined as the science of dialectical categories. Comprising a system of dialectical categories, it investigates their mutual relationship, sequence, and the transitions from one category to another.