Though accepting the traditional view that truth and falsity are properties of propositions and judgments, Leibniz does not refrain from predicating truth and falsity of pre-judgmental items such as ideas, which he considers to be true iff logically consistent, and false otherwise. Elsewhere, however, Leibniz claims that ideas are true or false only insofar as they include the (true or false) affirmation that their object is possible. This paper aims to cast light on Leibniz’s doctrine of ideas as truth-bearers by (...) exploring its historical background. On the one hand, Leibniz’s pronouncements reflect his reaction to the post-Cartesian debates. On the other hand, they appear to be inspired from Aquinas’s doctrine of accidental falsity. (shrink)

Medieval scholastics share a commitment to a substance-accident ontology and to an analysis of efficient causation in which agents act in virtue of their powers. Given these commitments, it seems ready-made which entities are the agents or powers: substances are agents and their accidents powers. William of Ockham, however, offers a rather different analysis concerning material substances and their essential powers, which this article explores. The article first examines Ockham’s account of propria and his reasons for claiming that a material (...) substance is essentially powerful sine accidentibus. However, the article subsequently argues that, given Ockham’s reductionism about material substance, only substantial forms – never substances – are truly agents and powers. Thus, a material substance is essentially powerful but only by courtesy – per accidens, as Ockham calls it – because it has a non-identical part, its substantial form, which does all the causal work by itself, per se. (shrink)

Die Studie stellt einen direkten Vergleich zwischen der Scholastik und der byzantinischen Philosophie und Theologie dar. Sie stellt Lehren der Philosophie und Theologie des Hoch- und Spätmittelalters einander gegenüber und bespricht diese in kritischer, jedenfalls nicht in doxographischer Hinsicht. Die Zeitlogik hat ihren Ursprung in der Antike. In der Spätantike und insbesondere im Mittelalter erlangten ihre Resultate auch eine theologische und politische Brisanz. Das Studium der Semantik von Sätzen über Zukunftsereignisse, die eintreten oder auch ausbleiben können, sowie das Studium der (...) Semantik von Sätzen über Vergangenheitsereignisse lehren uns Einiges über Zukunftserwartungen. Zusätzlich ist der Vergleich lateinischer und griechischer mittelalterlicher Quellen zur Zeitlogik bezeichnend für die Reichweite der philosophischen Reflektion in der mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung. (shrink)

In In V Metaphysics, lec. 9, Aquinas distinguishes between “being by accident” (ens per accidens) and “being by itself” (ens per se) and includes the nine accidental categories under the latter. But isn’t substance a being per se while accidents are, by definition, accidental beings? Several authors—including Ralph McInerny, Paul Symington, and Greg Doolan—have offered explanations of this strange classification. Drawing on an overlooked parallel text in the Posterior Analytics commentary and on Aquinas’s critique of Avicenna’s understanding of accidental (...) denominatives, this paper presents an alternative explanation of the lecture. In the process, it clarifies how Aquinas views the relation of the ten categories to predication and suggests important implications for how we should understand the analogy of being and the phrase “substantial being” (esse substantiale). (shrink)

​In risposta all’ipotesi di estendere la categoria del falso valutativo alle motivazioni di una sentenza, l’articolo tenta una ricostruzione critica della progressiva apertura del falso intellettuale ad atti dispositivi e giudizi tecnici, ponendone in evidenza alcune aporie e proponendo specifici temperamenti. Tanto la teoria dei fatti psichici, quanto quella delle attestazioni implicite e del vero legale, nella loro congiunta sovrapposizione alla struttura della fattispecie penale, possono scadere in una violazione del divieto di analogia in materia penale. Il caso da cui (...) parte l’analisi attiene una procedura di selezione per la chiamata di professore universitario di prima fascia e la sentenza del T.A.R. che decide sul ricorso di un candidato. Falsity of the judicial decision. Implicit statements, legal truth and technical judgments. In response to the hypothesis of extending the category of "evaluative" falsehood to the motivations of a judicial decision, the paper attempts a critical reconstruction of the progressive evolution of these crimes in matter of acts of will and technical judgments, highlighting some aporias and proposing some corrections. Both the theory of psychic facts, as well as the theory of implicit attestations and the legal truth, in their joint action, can violate the prohibition of analogical interpretation in criminal matters. The controversial case from which the analysis starts concerns a public competition for a university professorship and the T.A.R.’s judgment that decides on a candidate's appeal. (shrink)

Among medieval Aristotelians, William of Ockham defends a minimalist account of artifacts, assigning to statues and houses and beds a unity that is merely spatial or locational rather than metaphysical. Thus, in contrast to his predecessors, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, he denies that artifacts become such by means of an advening ‘artificial form’ or ‘form of the whole’ or any change that might tempt us to say that we are dealing with a new thing (res). Rather, he understands artifacts (...) as per accidens composites of parts that differ, but not so much that only divine power could unite them, as in the matter and form of a proper substance. For Ockham, artifacts are essentially rearrangements, via human agency, of already existing things, like the clay shaped by a sculptor into a statue or the stick and bristles and string one might fashion into a broom. Ockham does not think that a new thing is thereby created, although his emphasis on the contribution of human artisans seems to leave questions about the ontological status of their agency open. In any case, there are no such things as natural statues, any more than substances created by human artifice. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 53, Issue 2-4, pp 142 - 169 I offer an explanation of why the fallacy of “accident” is so called. By ‘accident’ here, Aristotle does not mean accidental predication but being _per accidens_. Understood in this way, the fallacy of accident can be analyzed in terms of the rules that Aristotle gives for being _per accidens_. The fallacy of accident lost the original justification for its name in the late Greek period. It became associated with accidental predication (...) and not with being _per accidens_. The fallacy was then solved by construing it syllogistically so that the paralogisms became invalid through not having a universal major premise. This medieval analysis became the dominant approach in the medieval period but has led to confusion over the fallacy of accident in millennia of logic books. I end by considering how to formulate the fallacy of accident more fruitfully in modern terms via Aristotle’s original approach. (shrink)

For Aristotle the fallacy of accident arises from mistakes about being per accidens and not from accidental predication. Mistakes in perceiving per accidens come from our judgements about being per accidens and so commit that fallacy. Practical syllogisms have the same formal structure as being and perceiving per accidens . Moreover perceiving per accidens typically provides the minor premise for the practical syllogism as it makes it possible for us to know singular propositions, especially those (...) about substances. Thus these minor premises may come about through fallacious reasoning, what today would be called reasoning via collateral information. On account of these foundations for the practical syllogism, even a person of practical wisdom will need a lot of luck to avoid mistakes. (shrink)

Abstract. Con il presente contributo si propone una rilettura critica del concetto di “verità legale”, ove propugnato per estendere l’area di prensione punitiva delle false comunicazioni sociali anche ai giudizi discrezionali. Il disaccordo con l’impianto motivazionale delle Sezioni Unite – nel contesto argomentativo dei valori monetari intesi come “traduzione” di fatti obbiettivi – si radica in particolare nell’assunto del «ridotto margine di opinabilità» delle scienze contabili. L’affermazione, come si vedrà, è foriera di fraintendimenti. Si attribuisce al parametro adottato (normativo prima (...) che scientifico) proprietà che non gli appartengono, legittimandolo ad integrare il contenuto della norma penale. Il “falso per inosservanza” assume, così, i connotati di un mero strumento sanzionatorio in bianco di regole tracciate altrove, con ripercussioni tanto nella prospettiva della riserva di legge, quanto in ordine alla genericità del precetto. SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa. – 2. Una distanza incolmabile tra fatto e giudizio. – 3. All’origine dei “fatti materiali”. Raffronto con la frode fiscale previgente. – 4. Raffronto con il falso societario previgente. Tra indici positivi contrastanti e ambiguità terminologiche. – 5. La materialità nella mutata economia della fattispecie. – 6. La soluzione della sentenza Giovagnoli – 7. La mutata prospettiva delle Sezioni Unite e le scienze a ridotto margine di opinabilità. – 8. Dalla realtà obiettiva all’obiettività della sua rappresentazione. – 9. I limiti dell’equiparazione fatto-giudizio. Trascurabilità del margine d’errore e mero accertamento tecnico. – 10. Il parametro della verità coerente nella sentenza Coopcostruttori. – 11. Conclusioni. (shrink)

Excerpt from Considerazioni Sopra le Dottrine Religiose di Vittorio Cousin, per Servir di Appendice Alla Introduzione Allo Studio della Filosofia Le accuse ch 10 muovo contro le dottrine del sig. Cousin nella mia Introduzione allo studio della filosofia benchè bre vemente espresse essendo gravissime, ragion vuole che siano ben provate. Io mi reputo tanto più in obbligo di farlo che I' illustre Autore negli ultimi suoi scritti protesta altamente di non meritarle. Dichiarazione che ogni lettore assennato accet terebbe tanto più (...) volentieri quanto è più lodevole e degno di un animo generoso il ritrattar gli errori in cui la giovinezza, I' esempio el' indole dei tempi possono precipitare gl' ingegni più eminenti. Il panteismo e la miscredenza sono così fatali a chi segue un cattivo metodo nelle sue speculazioni, che una mente eziandio capacissima può esserne sedotta non ostante la loro falsità ed assurdità intrinseca. Quanti sono al dl d' oggi, a cui sia toccata la buona sorte di ricevere debitamente la fede cattolica, e di conservarla fra le tristi influenze del secolo? Quanti che nel dar opera agli studi speculativi siano provve duti di una buona metodologia? Certo pochissimi; e niuno sicuramente vorrà recare a colpa del sig. Cousin se pagò anch' egli il fio all' infelicissima età in cui a noi tutti è toccato di nascere. Imperocche, quando non si è ben ricevuto negli anni teneri, o si è scosso all' entrar nel mondo il giogo salutare della fede vi sottentra quello del senso e lo spirito dell' uomo ricade senza saperlo nella condizione del gentilesimo a cui(4) About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Cartesian CompositesPaul HoffmanTowards the end of a paper in which I argued that Descartes thinks a human being is a genuine unity, I invited other commentators to come to Descartes’s defense by accounting for his apparently contradictory claims that a human being is an ens per se and that it is an ens per accidens.1 These claims seem to be contradictory, because in saying that a human being (...) is an ens per se, Descartes appears to be asserting that a human being is genuinely one, and in saying that a human being is an ens per accidens, he appears to assert that a human being is not genuinely one, but instead is a mere heap or aggregate. In the ensuing eleven years no one has taken up my invitation, except to argue that I was mistaken in claiming that Descartes thinks a human being has per se unity in any robust sense.2In this paper I will take up the challenge myself, having noticed a similarity between Descartes’s account of the unity of composite substances and his account of composite figures having true and immutable natures. After showing how he can consistently maintain that a human being is both an ens per se and ens per accidens in roughly the same way he can consistently maintain that composite figures both do and do not have true and immutable natures, I will try to respond to criticisms of my claim that he thinks of a human being as a substance or an ens per se.Let me begin with an analysis and comparison of two passages from the Objections and Replies. In the first, from the Replies to the First Objections, Descartes [End Page 251] discusses composite figures. In the second, from the Replies to the Fourth Objections, Descartes discusses composite substances.Next, to remove the other part of the difficulty, it should be noted that those ideas which do not contain true and immutable natures, but contain only ones which are fictitious and composed by the intellect, can be divided by the same intellect, not only through abstraction, but through a clear and distinct operation, so that any ideas which the intellect cannot so divide were undoubtedly not composed by it. As, for example, when I think of a winged horse, or an actually existing lion, or a triangle inscribed in a square, I easily understand that I can also in opposition think of a horse without wings, a non-existing lion, a triangle without a square, and so on; from which it follows that these do not have true and immutable natures. But if I think of a triangle or a square (I do not speak here of a lion or horse because their natures are not clearly evident to us), then certainly whatever I apprehend as contained in the idea of a triangle, as that its three angles are equal to two right angles, etc., I will truly affirm of the triangle, and of the square whatever is found in the idea of the square. For even if I can understand a triangle, abstracting from the fact that its angles should equal two right angles, I cannot nevertheless deny that of it by a clear and distinct operation, that is, correctly understanding this is what I say. Furthermore, if I consider a triangle inscribed in a square, not in order to attribute to the square those things which pertain only to the triangle or to the triangle those things which pertain to the square, but in order to examine only those things which arise from the conjunction of the two, then its nature will be no less true and immutable than the square or triangle alone, and it will be permitted to affirm that the square is not less than twice the triangle inscribed in it and similar things which pertain to the nature of this composite figure. (AT VII 117–8; CSM II 83–4)3I am not unaware that some substances are commonly called ‘incomplete.’ But if they are said to be incomplete because they cannot exist per se alone, I confess that it seems contradictory to me that... (shrink)

in a january 1642 letter, rené descartes advises his correspondent—his then-follower, the Utrecht medical professor Henricus Regius—to consistently endorse the view that the human mind is related to its body by means of a "substantial union": Whenever the occasion arises, as much privately as publicly, you ought to profess that you believe a human to be a true ens per se and not per accidens and the mind to be really and substantially united to the body not through position (...) or disposition [situm aut dispositionem], as you say in your last written text, but through a true mode of union [verum modum unionis], as everyone... (shrink)

Prima facie it seems easy to understand what he had in mind when he spoke of accidental being and being as true. Accidental or incidental being, what the Latins would later call ens per accidens, was in fact a juxtaposition of two or more categorical beings. As such it lacked a unified essence and thus it lacked genuine being. It was being "only in name." Being as true, he told us, was in the synthesis of the intellect, that is, (...) the intellect's second operation of judgment. Apparently, it was the being of the copula "is" in a true judgment. Contrasted with this was being as false, or pseudo-being, which strictly is nonbeing, found in the copula of a false judgment. (shrink)

Truth of x (independently of any description of x) that it is f. A property f which holds of x but is not per se of x is said to hold per accidens of x. The essence of an individual is the sum of its per se properties. We can formulate the following: doctrine a: concrete individuals do not have essences though abstract entities do. Doctrine b: concrete individuals have essences but they do not individuate, whereas abstract entities have (...) essences which do individuate. Assumption i: we shall say that a thing exists insofar as it has an essence. Assumption ii: we shall say that we know a thing when we know what its per se properties are. We argue that plato held doctrine a and aristotle doctrine b (with assumptions i and ii). (edited). (shrink)

This book explores noteworthy approaches to modal syllogistic adopted by medieval logicians including Abélard, Albert the Great, Avicenna, Averröes, Jean Buridan, Richard Campsall, Robert Kilwardby, and William of Ockham. The book situates these approaches in relation to Aristotle's discussion in the Prior and Posterior Analytics, and other parts of the Organon, but also in relation to the thought of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Boethius on the one hand, and to modern interpretations of the modal syllogistic on the other. Problems explored (...) include: Aristotle's doctrine of modal conversion, the pure and mixed necessity-moods, modal ecthesis, the pure and mixed contingency-moods, and Aristotle's use of counter-examples. Medieval logicians brought various concepts to bear on these problems, including the distinction between per se and per accidens terms, the notion of essential predication, the distinction between ut nunc and simpliciter propositions, the distinction between de dicto and de re modals, and the notion of ampliation. All these are examined in this book. (shrink)

Early twelfth-century logicians invoked past-tensed statements with future-oriented contents to undermine the assumption that every proposition ‘about the past’ is determinate. In the second half of the century, the notion of future-dependence was used to restrict the scope of necessity per accidens. At some point, this idea began to be applied in theology to solve puzzles surrounding predestination, prescience, prophecy, and faith. In the mid-1160s, Magister Udo quotes some thinkers who insisted that the principle of the necessity of the (...) past should exclude dicta that ‘relate to the future’, such as that he has been predestined. Peter of Poitiers adopted this ‘Ockhamist’ strategy around 1170. We find similar accounts in Simon of Tournai and Alan of Lille, who invoked it in other contexts as well. By the time of Praepositinus of Cremona, Hubert of Pirovano, and Stephen Langton, the restricted principle became something of a common view at Paris. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 38.1 (2000) 27-40 [Access article in PDF] Sensible Qualities: The Case of Sound Robert Pasnau University of Colorado 1. Background The Aristotelian tradition distinguishes the familiar five external senses from the less familiar internal senses. Aristotle himself did not in fact use this terminology of 'external' and 'internal,' but the division became common in the work of Arab and Hebrew philosophers, and in (...) the Latin West the distinction is taken for granted.1 I am going to put to one side the obscurities involved in the various internal senses of phantasia, imagination, memory, etc.; I will instead focus on the external senses. These five external senses—sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch—have their familiar counterparts in the external world: color, sound, odor, flavor, and the various tangible qualities. (The tangible qualities, unfortunately, resist being reduced to a single genus, and are typically listed as hot and cold, wet and dry, etc., where this etc. stands in for the complete list that one might or might not be able to give.2 ) These sensibilia (I will simply speak of sensibles) were known as the proper or special objects of the external senses.In addition to these proper objects, the senses were taken to have five common objects—size, shape, number, motion, rest—and also an unlimited variety of incidental objects, the per accidens sensibles—Coriscus, one's enemy, a horse race, etc. These per accidens sensibles are in a way the most interesting and important sense objects of all. They are interesting, first, inasmuch as one of the hardest and most interesting problems about perception is the problem of seeing as, which seems to be precisely the phenomenon at issue [End Page 27] here. They are important, also, inasmuch as genuine perception, as we now think of it, almost always involves the perception of something sensible per accidens. Our everyday sensory experiences revolve around the experience of seeing objects of certain kinds. We can of course step back and decide that what we are really seeing is colors and shapes. But that is not how we ordinarily see things.Despite their interest and importance, I want to put aside these per accidens sensibles, and focus instead on the common and proper sensibles, both of which Aristotle described as sensible per se (kath' hauta). In his classic statement on the objects of sensation, at De anima II 6, 418a7-25, Aristotle suggests that the grounds for distinguishing the per se from the per accidens are that the former sensibles are capable in their own right of making an impression on the senses. Color itself affects the external senses, and so does size. Coriscus, however, considered as Coriscus, does no such thing. He affects the senses only inasmuch as he is colored, perfumed, etc.3 To focus on the per se sensibles, then, is to focus on those things in the world that are suited to make impressions on the external senses.Why are some such sensibles proper, whereas others are common? The well-known rule of thumb here, reflected in how we refer to these sensibles, is that each proper sensible can be perceived by only one of the external senses. The common sensibles are those per se sensibles that fail this test. (Note that, of the common sensibles, only number, movement and rest are truly common to all five of the senses; shape and size are perceptible only by touch and sight.4 ) It is not clear, however, that this is the appropriate criterion for distinguishing the proper from the common sensibles. Albert the Great, for instance, argues that a proper sensible must meet three tests: (1) It is sensed by only one sense; (2) this sense is not capable of error with respect to it; and (3) the organ of this sense is naturally suited to be affected by it alone.5 The last of these tests is problematic, however, for at least two reasons. First, it is problematic for touch, given that the tangible qualities resist being reduced to a single genus. Second, more seriously... (shrink)

St. Thomas’s Third Way to prove the existence of God, “Of Possibility and Necessity” (ST 1, q.2, art. 3, response) is one of the most controverted passages in the entire Thomistic corpus. The central point of dispute is that if there were only possible beings, each at some time would cease to exist and, therefore, at some point in time nothing would exist, and because something cannot come from nothing, in such an eventuality, nothing would exist now—a reductio ad absurdum (...) conclusion. Therefore, at least one necessary being must exist. Generations of critics and defenders have contended over St. Thomas’s proof. This article argues that the principle of pros hen analogy is implicit in the Third Way and that once identified explains the ontological dependency of possible beings, as secondary analogates, on the first necessary being, as primary analogate. Thus, without the necessary being as primary analogate, possible beings simply could not exist. The fact that they do exist is evidence for the existence of the necessary being. St. Thomas makes synthesizes the principle of pros hen analogy, as found in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, with the Neoplatonic principle of participation. Aristotle develops pros hen analogy in contradistinction to univocal and equivocal predication as well as to genus in Metaphysics 4.2, 11.3, 12.3-5. Since Scotus and re-enforced by modern analytic logic, philosophers have almost universally regarded any kind of analogical predication as a sub-category of equivocal predication and, thus, implicitly occlude the possibility of considering pros hen analogy in their readings of the Third Way. Distinction of per se and per accidens infinite regress and of radical and natural contingency are also central to understanding the Third Way. While resolving apparent problems in the Third Way, the article also seeks to rehabilitate the doctrine of pros hen analogy as a basic principle in Thomistic and, indeed, Aristotelian metaphysics. (shrink)

In diesem Aufsatz suche ich zu zeigen, a) daß Leibniz eine Lehre vertrat — den Superessentialismus -, nach der keine Eigenschaft, die ein Individuum i besitzt, i fehlen könnte, ohne daß es aufhörte, als i zu existieren/zu sein ; b) daß es im Hinblick auf die Wahrheit von a) keinen Unterschied in irgendeinem Sinne macht, wie der Begriff einer wesentlichen Eigenschaft bestimmt wird; c) daß nach Leibniz' Auffassung vollständige individuelle Begriffe individuelle Wesenheiten/Essenzen sind oder repräsentieren ; d) daß folglich die (...) Unterscheidung zwischen vollständigen und unvollständigen Begriffen in Wirklichkeit eine Unterscheidung zwischen individuellen und spezifischen Wesenheiten/Essenzen ist; e) daß letzteres eine Differenzierung zwischen einem modal nicht-unterscheidenden und einem modal unterscheidenden Sinn von ”wesentlich“ voraussetzt; und schließlich f), daß die Unterscheidung zwischen Prädikation per se und Prädikation per accidens sich mit der Unterscheidung zwischen vollständigen und spezifischen Begriffen überschneidet. Der Rest des Aufsatzes ist einer Analyse weniger wichtiger Einzelheiten der Interpretation gewidmet. (shrink)

The present essay takes up matters discussed by Robert Pasnau in his response to our previous criticism of his account of Aquinas's view of when a foetus acquires a human soul. We are mainly concerned with metaphysical and biological issues and argue that the kind of organization required for ensoulment is that sufficient for the full development of a human being, and that this is present from conception. We contend that in his criticisms of our account Pasnau fails clearly to (...) distinguish first, between a passive potentiality and an active capacity; second, between having a power intrinsically and being an instrumental agent of that which has it intrinsically; third, between per accidens and per se causal series; and fourth, between sense cognition and conceptual thought. We conclude that philosophy and embryology support the position that human beings exist from the point of conception. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: A Contribution to Recent Discussion* ST. THOMAS AQUINAS accepted and consistently defended Boethius' definition of person: "persona est substantia individua rationalis naturae." St. Thomas' analysis of this definition necessarily involves metaphysical questions because of the implications of the terms " substance" and " nature" and moreover it manifests the inescapahle imprint of the theological problematics which surrounded the issue (e.g. the (...) Trinity and the hypostatic union). Both of these influences, metaphysical and theological, have engendered problems of interpretation and criticism. Contemporary discussions of person largely either continue the scholastic controversies or adopt a modern perspective from which to expose apparent contradictions in St. Thomas' doctrine. The purpose of this article will be limited to a consideration of the metaphysical problems concerning the relationship between individual substance, universal, nature, and existence. It is hoped that such a clarification will resolve not only the neoscholastic controversies, but also some of the contemporary problems. I. BOETHIUS' DEFINITION OF PERSON AND ST. THOMAS' EXPLANATION A. BOETHIUS' DEFINITION Boethius develops his definition of person in the Liber contra Eutychen et N estorium after a careful consideration of na- * I have to thank cordially Father Brian Shanley, 0.P. for having revised completely this English version, devoting much time and energy to fit the text and the footnotes to the style of The Thomist. He adapted the version in good style and verified the Latin quotations. 435 436 HORST SEIDL ture and substance.1 In the first chapter he sets out to define nature and discovers four possible meanings. The first and broadest definition, embracing both substances and accidents, describes nature as belonging to all things which by their being can be in some way or another be comprehended by reason: "natura est earum rermn quae, cum sint, quoquo modo intellectu capi possunt." A second definition, comprising substances alone both corporeal and incorporeal, describes nature as anything that can effect or suffer something: " natura est vel quod facere vel quod pati possit." A third sense, taken from the Aristotelian analysis of the motion of natural substances, describes nature as the immanent principle of movement : "natura est motus principium per se et non per accidens." Finally, nature can also refer to the formal cause which provides the specific difference: " natura est unam quamque rem informans specifica differentia" (cf. ST Ia. 29, I ad 4). It is this last sense which is most important. In sum, "nature" is a broad term encompassing both composite beings and their causes. Boethius continues in chapter two by first narrowing the relevant sense of nature to substances (thus excluding accidents ) and then presenting a complete division of substances. The major distinction is between corporeal substances and incorporeal substances. Corporeal subdivides further into inanimate and animate, with animate dividing. into insensitive and sensitive and the latter dividing finally into irrational and rational. Incorporeal subdivides into rational and irrational (the life-principle of animals), with rational incorporeal substances being further distinguished into those that are immutable by nature (the Creator) and those that are not so by nature (the human soul and angels) but may become so by virtue of the immutable substance. Boethius then argues that person cannot be affirmed of inanimate beings or irrational animals. A 1 All citations from Boethius are taken from the Loeb text in Boethius: Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy, ed. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918). THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 437 final distinction of :substance into universal and particular leads to the conclusion that person must refer to an individual. Thus the background is set for the definition of person which opens the third chapter: " naturae rationalis individua substantia." Person must be an individual substance of a certain nature, namely rational, which nature accounts for the form or specific difference of the particular substance (the fourth meaning of chapter 1). The connection of this definition with Aristotle 's definition of man as a rational animal is unmistakable. It should also be noted that this definition of person is applicable not only to man, in whom the rational nature is not identical with his substance, but also to the... (shrink)

Many discussions of per se and per accidens series focus on efficient causality and how a consideration of the metaphysics of the matter can deliver us a primary efficient cause of all that is (God). Drawing on my own previous work on causal series, I offer in this article a model for the understanding of per se causal series wherein the causality involved is that of finality. I then consider whether or not such per se final causal series are (...) infinite. Finally, I consider the implications this has for our conception of God as creator. (shrink)

The article looks into the recent magisterium of the Church on the death penalty and deems it an instance of the development of doctrine rather than a circumstantiated reaction. It then dwells on the thinking that constitutes the backbone of the Encyclical Evangelium Vitae and compares and contrasts it with the various pronouncements of the teaching office of the Church, and with the two editions of the Cathechism of the Catholic Church. When one carefully examines the issue, human dignity and (...) its consequent human rights - among which one must mention the inalienable right to life - emerge as the hermeneutical cog of the problem. Together with the personalistic views of Vatican II, such a hermeneutic asks for a rethinking of the ethical norms in penal law which, in a clearer and more definitive way - per se, and not simply per accidens -, must then declare the moral implausibility of death whenever it is meted out as punishment. A death inflicted on someone else can only be justified within the strict and rigorous condition of legitimate self-defence. (shrink)

The second chapter is devoted to the analysis of the first introduction of and quarrels over Cartesianism at the University of Utrecht, as determined by the teaching of a Cartesian natural philosophy and physiology by Henricus Regius. First, it is shown how his teaching gave rise to the querelle d’Utrecht (1641), in which two main issues were debated: the rejection of substantial forms, and the characterisation of man as ens per accidens. During the quarrel, questions were raised about the (...) consistency of the new philosophy with theology and – insofar as it raised the problem of the individuation of bodies and species by substantial forms – of the unity of man. Secondly, it is shown how Regius’s peculiar approach to natural philosophy (and physiology) led him to quarrel with Descartes himself in 1645–1648, with regard to two main questions: the nature of mind, and the method of natural philosophy, which Regius interprets in both cases from an empirical standpoint, as he maintains that the nature of mind may consist in matter (according to medical evidence), and that all knowledge has a sensory origin. Accordingly, he paved the way for ‘radical’ interpretations of Descartes which rejected his metaphysics, but also for an approach to a natural philosophy more open to the use of experience. In this chapter, I scrutinise the reasons behind Regius’s approach to physics and metaphysics by paying attention, on the one hand, to his quarrel with Descartes, and on the other to the sources of his methodology, which he largely borrows from medical authors. In conclusion, I show that Cartesianism, in the hands of Regius, might serve as the basis for medicine but could not yet become a full-fledged alternative to Aristotelianism. (shrink)

In the last 30 years there has been growing interest in and a greater appreciation of the unique contributions that medieval authors have made to the history of logic. In this thesis, we compare and contrast the modal logics of Robert Kilwardby and John Buridan and explore how their two conceptions of modality relate to and differ from modern notions of modal logic. We develop formal reconstructions of both authors' logics, making use of a number of different formal techniques. In (...) the case of Robert Kilwardby we show that using his distinction between per se and per accidens modalities, he is able to provide a consistent interpretation of the apodictic fragment of Aristotle's modal syllogism and that, by generalising this distinction to hypothetical construction, he can develop an account of connexive logic. In the case of John Buridan we show that his modal logic is a natural extension of the usual Kripke-style possible worlds semantics, and that this modal logic can be shown to be sound and complete relative to a proof-theoretic formalisation of Buridan's treatment of the expository syllogism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:DOES KANT REDUCE THE COSMOLOGICAL PROOF TO THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF? JOHN PETERSON The University of Rhode Island Kingston, Rhode Island KANT ARGUES in the Dialectic that the cosmological proof fails because it feeds on the central proposition of the ontological proof.1 The ontological proof he has in mind is that of Descartes.2 The proposition he refers to, call it H, is that the highest being is a necessary being. (...) In Descartes's proof in the fifth Meditation H is construed as asserting that existence is found in the concept of ens realissimum, the highest being. From the fact that I cannot conceive a triangle whose angles do not equal two right angles it does not follow that a triangle exists. This is because having angles that equal two right angles belongs to the concept of a triangle while existence does not. It follows in the view of Descartes that because I cannot conceive a non-existent ens realissimum existence belongs to the concept of an ens realissimum. Kant denies that the inconceivability of a non-existent ens realissimum implies that consequence. For the inference assumes that existence is a predicate and it is not. Otherwise, says Kant, the concept of a hundred real dollars is different from the concept of a hundred imaginary dollars and it is not. On this point Aquinas agrees with Kant. You can know perfectly well what a phoenix is, says Aquinas, even if you do not know there is a phoenix, showing that existence adds something to the essence or concept of a phoenix.3 Be that as it may, 1 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (London, 1958) A 603, B631ff; pp. 507 ff. 2 Ibid., A 602, B 630; pp. 507 ff. 3 St. Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, translated by A. Maurer (Toronto, 1949), p. 46. 463 464 JOHN PETERSON as Kant believes that H falsely assumes that existence is a predicate, he concludes that the cosmological proof fails for the same reason the ontological proof fails. How the cosmological proof requires H Kant spells out by distinguishing two phases in the proof. The first phase gives the appearance that the proof is radically different from the ontological proof since, in the minor premise of this phase (CP1-2 below ), appeal is made to experience. At its onset, therefore, the cosmological proof does differ from the ontological proof which shuns experience altogether and proceeds by concepts alone. But in the view of Kant, this difference masks the ultimate dependence of the proof on the same proposition, H, which governs the ontological proof. And this is made evident in phase 2 of the proof. Phase 1 of the proof goes as follows : CPl 1 If anything exists, an absolutely necessary being must also exist. 2 Now I, at least, exist. 3 Therefore an absolutely necessary being exists. What at best CPl shows is that there is a necessary being and not that the necessary being is the highest being or God. What must be added is what Kant calls the nervus probandi of the cosmological proof, namely, that the necessary being is the highest being. But this final conclusion of the proof is deduced only by invoking H, says Kant. I here summarize Kant's review of phase 2 of the proof : CP2 1 If every necessary being is the highest being then some highest being is a necessary being (by conversion per accidens). 2 What is true of some highest being is true of any highest being. 3 Hence, if every necessary being is the highest being then any highest being is a necessary being (from 1 and 2). 4 But if " a necessary being is the highest being" implies " the highest being is a necessary being," then " the highest being is a necessary being " implies " a necessary being is the highest being " (from 3 and conversion simpliciter). 5 But, H, the highest being is a necessary being (by definition). 6 Therefore, a necessary being is the highest being (from 4 and 5). KANT ON THE COSMOLOGICAL PROOF 465 CPl-3 and CP2-6 are then joined to yield the final conclusion that God... (shrink)

The diversity of interpretations of Aristotle’s treatment of chance and luck springs from an apparent contradiction between the claims that “chance events are for the sake of something” and that “chance events are not for the sake of their outcome.” Chance seems to entail the denial of an end. Yet Aristotle systematically refers it to what is for the sake of an end. This paper suggests that, in order to give an account of chance, a reference to “per accidens (...) causes” is not sufficient. Chance occurs as a parody of teleology; it is a“for-no-purpose” that looks like a purpose. The notion of “irony” is suggested as a way of accounting for a situation that keeps an ambiguity open. The fact that chance is thought of in relation to teleology does not mean that it is “reappropriated” by teleology. Rather,chance reveals a hiatus that betrays the limitation of a language concerned with substances to account for events. (shrink)

The diversity of interpretations of Aristotle’s treatment of chance and luck springs from an apparent contradiction between the claims that “chance events are for the sake of something” and that “chance events are not for the sake of their outcome.” Chance seems to entail the denial of an end. Yet Aristotle systematically refers it to what is for the sake of an end. This paper suggests that, in order to give an account of chance, a reference to “per accidens (...) causes” is not sufficient. Chance occurs as a parody of teleology; it is a“for-no-purpose” that looks like a purpose. The notion of “irony” is suggested as a way of accounting for a situation that keeps an ambiguity open. The fact that chance is thought of in relation to teleology does not mean that it is “reappropriated” by teleology. Rather,chance reveals a hiatus that betrays the limitation of a language concerned with substances to account for events. (shrink)

The present essay takes up matters discussed by Robert Pasnau in his response (published in the same issue of Philosophy) to our previous criticism of his account of Aquinas's view of when a foetus acquires a human soul. We are mainly concerned with metaphysical and biological issues and argue that the kind of organization required for ensoulment is that sufficient for the full development of a human being, and that this is present from conception. We contend that in his criticisms (...) of our account Pasnau fails clearly to distinguish first, between a passive potentiality and an active capacity; second, between having a power intrinsically and being an instrumental agent of that which has it intrinsically; third, between per accidens and per se causal series; and fourth, between sense cognition and conceptual thought. We conclude that philosophy and embryology support the position that human beings exist from the point of conception. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: A Contribution to Recent Discussion* ST. THOMAS AQUINAS accepted and consistently defended Boethius' definition of person: "persona est substantia individua rationalis naturae." St. Thomas' analysis of this definition necessarily involves metaphysical questions because of the implications of the terms " substance" and " nature" and moreover it manifests the inescapahle imprint of the theological problematics which surrounded the issue (e.g. the (...) Trinity and the hypostatic union). Both of these influences, metaphysical and theological, have engendered problems of interpretation and criticism. Contemporary discussions of person largely either continue the scholastic controversies or adopt a modern perspective from which to expose apparent contradictions in St. Thomas' doctrine. The purpose of this article will be limited to a consideration of the metaphysical problems concerning the relationship between individual substance, universal, nature, and existence. It is hoped that such a clarification will resolve not only the neoscholastic controversies, but also some of the contemporary problems. I. BOETHIUS' DEFINITION OF PERSON AND ST. THOMAS' EXPLANATION A. BOETHIUS' DEFINITION Boethius develops his definition of person in the Liber contra Eutychen et N estorium after a careful consideration of na- * I have to thank cordially Father Brian Shanley, 0.P. for having revised completely this English version, devoting much time and energy to fit the text and the footnotes to the style of The Thomist. He adapted the version in good style and verified the Latin quotations. 435 436 HORST SEIDL ture and substance.1 In the first chapter he sets out to define nature and discovers four possible meanings. The first and broadest definition, embracing both substances and accidents, describes nature as belonging to all things which by their being can be in some way or another be comprehended by reason: "natura est earum rermn quae, cum sint, quoquo modo intellectu capi possunt." A second definition, comprising substances alone both corporeal and incorporeal, describes nature as anything that can effect or suffer something: " natura est vel quod facere vel quod pati possit." A third sense, taken from the Aristotelian analysis of the motion of natural substances, describes nature as the immanent principle of movement : "natura est motus principium per se et non per accidens." Finally, nature can also refer to the formal cause which provides the specific difference: " natura est unam quamque rem informans specifica differentia" (cf. ST Ia. 29, I ad 4). It is this last sense which is most important. In sum, "nature" is a broad term encompassing both composite beings and their causes. Boethius continues in chapter two by first narrowing the relevant sense of nature to substances (thus excluding accidents ) and then presenting a complete division of substances. The major distinction is between corporeal substances and incorporeal substances. Corporeal subdivides further into inanimate and animate, with animate dividing. into insensitive and sensitive and the latter dividing finally into irrational and rational. Incorporeal subdivides into rational and irrational (the life-principle of animals), with rational incorporeal substances being further distinguished into those that are immutable by nature (the Creator) and those that are not so by nature (the human soul and angels) but may become so by virtue of the immutable substance. Boethius then argues that person cannot be affirmed of inanimate beings or irrational animals. A 1 All citations from Boethius are taken from the Loeb text in Boethius: Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy, ed. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918). THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 437 final distinction of :substance into universal and particular leads to the conclusion that person must refer to an individual. Thus the background is set for the definition of person which opens the third chapter: " naturae rationalis individua substantia." Person must be an individual substance of a certain nature, namely rational, which nature accounts for the form or specific difference of the particular substance (the fourth meaning of chapter 1). The connection of this definition with Aristotle 's definition of man as a rational animal is unmistakable. It should also be noted that this definition of person is applicable not only to man, in whom the rational nature is not identical with his substance, but also to the... (shrink)

The article presents a formalization of Thomas Aquinas proof for the indestructibility of the human soul. The author of the formalization—the first of its kind in the history of philosophy—is Father Joseph Maria Bocheński. The presentation involves no more than updating the logical symbolism used and accompanies the logical formulae with ordinary language paraphrases in order to ease the reader’s understanding of the formulae. “The fundamental idea of the Thomist proof is of utmost simplicity: things which are destructible are destructible (...) either per se or per accidens; but the human soul is destructible neither per se nor per accidens: therefore the human soul is not destructible”. Bochenski’s words required him to devote considerable effort for the sake of precision of the symbolic language that would be maximally adequate to Thomas’ discourse. Moreover, I have thought it necessary to provide an ample commentary to the traditional and contemporary semantical presuppositions of Aquinas philosophical anthropology in light of Bocheński’s interpretation thereof. (shrink)

It can be confusing to define the object of an action because it may be unclear if there is a per se or a per accidens order to the end. Three common difficulties in distinguishing between these are that the per se ordering must be either in the nature of the end or in the act, that this ordering to an end is a real and not merely a logical one, and that technology has a tendency to ignore the (...) teleology of natures by breaking things down to their parts for manipulation. Having drawn these distinctions, craniotomy is then compared to lethal self-defense. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 13.4 : 611–616. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to investigate the legitimacy of the principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," as it is found in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Special emphasis will be placed upon the function of this principle in the proofs for God's existence. The relevance of the principle in this latter context can be seen at once when it is observed that it is the key to the solution of the well known "prob (...) lem of infinite regress. " The investigation of the principle in question will be divided into two Parts. A preliminary examination of the function of the principle will be made in Part I: Domains Other Than That of Creature-God. The domains to be considered in this Part are those of accident-substance, change, and knowledge. Employing what is learned of the function of the principle in these areas of application, Part II: The Domain of Creature-God will analyze the role of the principle in the proofs for God's existence. This latter Part will constitute the greater portion of the book, since the domain of creatures in their relation to God is the most significant application of the principle in the writings of St. Thomas. In the course of this investigation, relevant analyses by St. Thomas' commentators - both classical and contemporary - will be considered. Finally, in light of the insights offered by St. (shrink)

This paper explores the interaction between medicine and metaphysics in modern natural philosophy and especially in Descartes ' philosophy. I argue that Descartes ' hypothetical account of birthmarks in connection with his embryology provides an argumentative proof of the metaphysical necessity of a substantial union between mind and body, which however does not threaten his doctrine of the real distinction between these two substances. It would appear that his argument relies on a temporal conception of alethic modalities and provides a (...) new answer to Henricus Regius who in 1641 claimed that, for Descartes, the human being is an ens per accidens. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: ch. 1 The Cry of Rachel -- Maritain's 1942 Marquette Aquinas Lecture -- Maritain's The Person and the Common Good -- Camus's The Plague -- ch. 2 Joy -- Being as the Good and the Eruption of Willing -- Being and Philosophical Psychology -- An Ordinary Knowledge of God and Metaphysics -- Metaphysics as Implicit Knowledge -- Being and the Intellectual Emotions -- ch. 3 Quandoque Evils -- Aquinas's Rationale for the Corruptible Order -- The Corruptible (...) Order and Quandoque Evils -- Bracketing Quandoque Evils between Goods -- A Caveat in Understanding the Subject of the Consequent Good -- The Effect of Human Providence upon the Frequency of Quandoque Evils -- ch. 4 Natural Corruptions -- Death as a Natural Corruption -- Natural Corruption as Nondefinitive -- Ambiguity of "Praeter Intentionem" and "Per Accidens" -- God and the Evil of Punishment (Poena) -- Other Interpretations -- Abraham and Isaac -- Conclusion -- ch. 5 Preliminaries to Aquinas and the Contemporary Discussion -- C.G. III, 71: "If Evil Exists, God Exists" -- William Rowe on Cosmological Reasoning -- De Ver. X, 12, ad 10m: "If not God from Justice, then God from Some Other Effect" -- Summary of Aquinas on the Existence of Evil -- A Strategy -- ch. 6 The Thomist and the Contemporary Discussion: Personalist Theodicies -- Marilyn McCord Adams and "Horrendous Evils" -- William Hasker: Personal Satisfaction and World Approval -- John Hick: Creation as a Gymnasium for the Development of Our Virtues -- David Ray Griffin and the Denial of Genuine Evils -- The Brothers Karamazov -- Thomistic "Natural Desires" of the Human Person -- ch. 7 The Thomist and the Contemporary Discussion: Cosmological Theodicies -- Diogenes Allen and Suffering as an Experience of God -- David Hume and Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, X and XI -- William Rowe and "Pointless Evils" -- J. L. Mackie and Further Objections to a Cosmological Theodicy -- Mackie's Fourth Criticism and Aquinas on the Causality of Human Choices -- Aquinas and Plantinga -- The Avoidance of Determinism -- The Avoidance of Divine Culpability -- A Thomistic Free Will Defense? -- Richard Swinburne: Nature as a Necessary Display Case for Our Knowledge of Good and Evil -- Bruce Reichenbach: Developing Plantinga and Swinburne -- ch. 8 Conclusion and Comparison to Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump -- Brian Davies's Apophatic Treatment of the Evil Problem -- Eleonore Stump and the Love of God -- The Consolation of Rachel. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:ST. THOMAS ON ANGELIC TIME AND MOTION J. J. MACINTOSH University ofCalgary Calgary, Alberta, Canada A. THOMAS'S STANDARD DOCTRINE: THE NEED FOR ASINGLE TIME. T HERE IS an under-discussed problem about time for St. Thomas. Most discussions of his views on time center around either the question of God's foreknowledge or around the notions of eternity and aeviternity. Even those discussions which deal directly with Thomas's views on time (...) ignore the issue I wish to discuss here.' The problem is this: St. Thomas held both that there is a single time, created by God, and that there are three distinct times: two for the angels, and one for the rest of creation. Moreover, he seems, fairly explicitly, to have been unwilling to adopt either of the obvious ways out of this apparent contradiction. Thomas believed, and often said, that time is unitary, and typically offered an Aristotelian reason for the claim: "the true reason why time is one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most simple, all other movements are measured. Therefore time is referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but also as accident 1 See, for example, Piero Ariotti, "Celestial reductionism of time: on the scholastic conception of time from Albert the great and Thomas Aquinas to the end of the 16th century," Studia Internationale Filosofia 4 (1972): 91-120, and Antonio Moreno, "Time and Relativity: Some Philosophical Considerations," The Thomist 45 (1981): 62-79. I have referred to this problem earlier in "Time and St. Thomas" (in To Myselffrom Others, ed. David Miller [Warwick: University of Warwick, 1989)), and in "Aquinas, Ockham, and Prior (and the unexpected examination),'' Auckland Philosophy Papers, no. 1 (1990). 547 548 J. J. MACINTOSH is to subject; and thus receives unity from it."2 Moreover, such a doctrine is necessary if what he tells us about the foreknowledge of God, and God's inability to change the past,3 not to mention his views on the knowledge that angels and demons have of what is genuinely future, is to be correct. Briefly, those views commit him to a view of a single time that is linear past, and is nonbranching future as well.4 There is some exegetical question as to whether or not his views on time, contingency, and freedom led him to adopt a truth-gap account of genuinely future tense contingent propositions, but that the singleness of time is required has not been questioned.5 This is not the place to deal with the difficulties Aquinas faced concerning God's foreknowledge, but a brief introductory word is in order to show how central the singleness of time is for his thought in this area. Since all past- and present-tense truths have necessity per accidens (that is, they concern matters which are now irrevocable), the class of contingent truths is a proper subset of genuinely future-tense claims. A proper subset because 2 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 10, a. 6 c (hereafter cited as sn; English translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 5 vols., (1920; reprint, Westminster, Maryland: Christian Classics, 1981). This is the translation I have standardly used, sometimes with slight changes, but I have also made use of the translation by the Blackfriars (61 vols. [London: Blackfriars, in conjunction with Eyre and Spottiswood, 1964-81], hereafter cited as Blackfriars). 3 Thus, for example, "God can make the existence of an angel not future; but He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have been, after he has been" (ST I, q. 10, a. 5, ad 3). 4 By contrast, Ockham, for example, adopted an implicit tense logic with branching future possibilities. As far as I know, no mediaeval thinker allowed branching pasts. For a discussion of that possibility, see John Mackie, Truth, Probability and Paradox: Studies in Philosophical Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973). For a helpful general discussion of the issues involved, see R. Thomason, "Combinations of Tense and Modality," in D. Gabbay and D. Guenthner, eds., Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 3 vols. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1984), 2... (shrink)

As contemporary ethical discourse has highlighted, due to the world’s increasing connectedness, everyday actions can contribute to harmful consequences far removed from everyday experience. I argue that Aquinas’s treatment of consequences can give us insight into our responsibility for such effects of our actions on a global scale. In particular, Aquinas recognises that we are responsible for per accidens effects of good actions performed negligently. Even an unintended per accidens effect may follow with a degree of likelihood that (...) makes it foreseeable, even if not actually foreseen; thus the agent is responsible if he fails to take steps to prevent the negative per accidens effect from occurring. I argue that certain global effects of our actions fit this pattern, namely, they are per accidens effects that nonetheless follow from our actions with a high degree of likelihood. Thus, we have a responsibility to take steps to prevent them. (shrink)

In a following section of the book, under the heading “Causes and Analysis” causes per se and causes per accidens are studied. Predication is per se when the attribute belongs to the intrinsic structure of the subject, or when it is not accidental, and finally when it belongs to the thing itself. All causes can be reduced, Bastit believes, to formal causality.

_ Source: _Volume 55, Issue 4, pp 239 - 272 According to Peter Auriol, OFM, efficient causation is a composite being consisting of items belonging to three distinct categories: a change, an action, and a passion. The change functions as the subject bearing action and passion. After presenting Aristotle’s account of action and passion, which constitutes the background to Auriol’s theory of causation, this paper considers Auriol’s interpretation of Aristotle’s account in contrast to an alternative interpretation defended by Hervaeus Natalis (...) and William of Ockham. Finally, it shows how Auriol, on the basis of his interpretation of Aristotle, develops his own account of efficient causation as a composite being. (shrink)

The debate concerning the so-called U.S. Health and Human Services Contraception Mandate has been adequately framed, in the academic field, within the traditional ethical doctrine on cooperation with evil. This principle will allow us to conclude whether employers may ethically comply with the onerous existing law or not. The discussion has been quite heated, because the practical conclusions authors have reached vary widely, depending on which interpretation of the theory they rely on. In this paper, some of these explanations are (...) addressed and analyzed from the standpoint of the Thomistic theory of action, which is now the most common point of view. This work concludes that, although the Contraception Mandate will most likely be repealed by the current U.S. administration, as things once stood, compliance with it may have been ethically licit in some cases. (shrink)

『자연학』 2권 5장에서 아리스토텔레스는 운을 작용인으로 분류하면서도, 운은 부수적 원인이지 자체적 원인은 아님을 분명히 한다. 이에 우리는 두 가지 물음을 묻게 된다. 첫째, 그의 자연 세계에는 목적 지향적 행위들의 예상치 못한 시공간적 합치를 만들어 내는 원인이 없을까? 본고는 ‘없다’고 답하면서, 이 합치가 무엇에 의해 만들어지는지를 물으며 신적 섭리라 답했던 보에티우스와 달리 아리스토텔레스는 이와 같은 물음을 묻지 않았는데, 이는 궁극적으로 그가 이러한 합치를 ‘사건’으로 간주하지 않았기 때문임을 보인다. 둘째, 아리스토텔레스는 원인에 대한 파악을 우리의 앎에서 필수적인 것으로 간주했는데, 운으로 말미암는 일에 자체적 (...) 원인이 없어서 우리의 지성이 그것을 연구 대상으로 삼을 수 없다면, 이는 세상에 대한 우리의 앎에 놓인 치명적 공백일까? 본고는 치명적 공백이 ‘아니’라 답하면서, 다음의 이유를 제시한다. 『형이상학』 6권 2-3장은 운으로 말미암는 일처럼 부수적으로 있는 것들을 ‘비존재에 가까운 어떤 것’이자 ‘생성이 없는 것’으로 간주한다. 이는 그것들에 자체적 작용인뿐 아니라 온전한 기체도 없어서, 일상적으로 ‘생긴다’고 표현되지만 엄격한 의미에서 생기는 것이 아니고, 단지 ‘없다가 있을 뿐’이라는 뜻으로 이해되며, 이런 일들이 무엇에 의해 있을지가 지성에 의해 헤아려지지 않는 것은 당연하다. 이런 점에서 운으로 말미암는 일은 존재론적 위상이 낮거니와, 여기까지를 파악한 지성이 해당 탐구를 종료하는 것은 자연스러운 일이고, 이는 들리지 않는 색깔의 소리를 청각이 들으려 하지 않는 것과 일면 유사하다고 할 수 있다. (shrink)

This work presents an overview of four different approaches to the problem of future contingency and determinism in temporal logics. All of them are bivalent, viz. they share the assumption that propositions concerning future contingent facts have a determinate truth-value. We introduce Ockhamism, Peirceanism, Actualism and T x W semantics, the four most relevant bivalent alternatives in this area, and compare them from the point of view of their expressiveness and their underlying metaphysics of time.