Two issues are addressed in this commentary: the universality and the “psychological reality” of locus equations as cues to place of articulation. Preliminary data collected in our laboratory suggest that locus equations do not reliably distinguish place of articulation for fricatives. Additionally, perception studies show that listeners can identify place of articulation based on much less temporal information than that required for deriving locus equations.

Results from our laboratories show clear frequency effects for regularly inflected forms in both German and English. Moreover, there does not seem to be sufficient evidence to treat the -s plural as the default plural in German. Together, these data do not support a dual modular structure of the language faculty.

Our commentary outlines a number of arguments questioning an autonomous model of word recognition without feedback. Arguments are presented against the need for a phonemic decision stage and in support of a featural level in a model including feedback.

We develop a multi-agent deontic action logic to study the logical behaviour of two types of deontic conditionals: (1) conditional obligations, having the form "If group H were to perform action aH, then, in group F's interest, group G ought to perform action aG" and (2) conditional permissions, having the form "If group H were to perform action aH, then, in group F's interest, group G may perform action aG". First, we define a formal language for multi-agent deontic action logic (...) and a class of consequentialist models to interpret the formulas of the language. Second, we define a transformation that converts any strategic game into a consequentialist model. Third, we show that an outcome a* is a Nash equilibrium of a strategic game if and only if a conjunction of certain conditional permissions is true in the consequentialist model that results from the transformation of that strategic game. (shrink)

A key argument of Dixon et al. in the target article is that prejudice reduction through intergroup contact and collective action work in opposite ways. We argue for a complementary approach focusing on extreme emotions to understand why people turn to non-normative collective action and to understand when and under what conditions extreme emotions may influence positive effects of contact on reconciliation.

There is a growing discourse on “new sincerity,” and related terms like “quirky” and “metamodernism,” as a movement or sensibility in contemporary cinema developing from the late 1990s onward, exemplified by the work of filmmakers such as Wes Anderson and Charlie Kaufman. However, what this new concept means in the context of cinema has so far remained under-defined and requires further philosophical analysis. This article provides such an analysis by offering a reconceptualization of Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialist-phenomenological notions of good faith (...) and sincerity, which will be connected to developments in film and elaborated in relation to Frances Ha (Noah Baumbach, 2012). I propose, against Sartre's own preference for the problematic term “authenticity,” to understand sincerity as the reflective resumption of good faith's pre-reflective acceptance of human-reality. This conception of sincerity as reflective allows us to accurately understand the combination of self-awareness and affirmation that characterizes new sincerity cinema: its self-awareness does not serve the postmodernist strategy of endless self-ironization; instead, its portrayals affirm the meaningfulness of its filmic reality, while also being aware of film as a medium. An analysis of Frances Ha illustrates how this concept of sincerity might be seen to function both on the level of story world, characters and themes, and on that of narrative structure and audio-visual style, thereby showing how we can meaningfully speak of sincerity in and of film. (shrink)

Individualists claim that collective obligations are reducible to the individual obligations of the collective’s members. Collectivists deny this. We set out to discover who is right by way of a deontic logic of collective action that models collective actions, abilities, obligations, and their interrelations. On the basis of our formal analysis, we argue that when assessing the obligations of an individual agent, we need to distinguish individual obligations from member obligations. If a collective has a collective obligation to bring about (...) a particular state of affairs, then it might be that no individual in the collective has an individual obligation to bring about that state of affairs. What follows from a collective obligation is that each member of the collective has a member obligation to help ensure that the collective fulfills its collective obligation. In conclusion, we argue that our formal analysis supports collectivism. (shrink)

I apply Kooi and Tamminga's (2012) idea of correspondence analysis for many-valued logics to strong three-valued logic (K3). First, I characterize each possible single entry in the truth-table of a unary or a binary truth-functional operator that could be added to K3 by a basic inference scheme. Second, I define a class of natural deduction systems on the basis of these characterizing basic inference schemes and a natural deduction system for K3. Third, I show that each of the resulting natural (...) deduction systems is sound and complete with respect to its particular semantics. Among other things, I thus obtain a new proof system for Lukasiewicz's three-valued logic. (shrink)

If group members aim to fulfill a collective obligation, they must act in such a way that the composition of their individual actions amounts to a group action that fulfills the collective obligation. We study a strong sense of joint action in which the members of a group design and then publicly adopt a group plan that coordinates the individual actions of the group members. We characterize the conditions under which a group plan successfully coordinates the group members' individual actions, (...) and study how the public adoption of a plan changes the context in which individual agents make a decision about what to do. (shrink)

We use a deontic logic of collective agency to study reducibility questions about collective agency and collective obligations. The logic that is at the basis of our study is a multi-modal logic in the tradition of *stit* logics of agency. Our full formal language has constants for collective and individual deontic admissibility, modalities for collective and individual agency, and modalities for collective and individual obligations. We classify its twenty-seven sublanguages in terms of their expressive power. This classification enables us to (...) investigate reducibility relations between collective deontic admissibility, collective agency, and collective obligations, on the one hand, and individual deontic admissibility, individual agency, and individual obligations, on the other. (shrink)

Quine's holistic empiricist account of scientific inquiry can be characterized by three constitutive principles: *noncontradiction*, *universal revisability* and *pragmatic ordering*. We show that these constitutive principles cannot be regarded as statements within a holistic empiricist's scientific theory of the world. This claim is a corollary of our refutation of Katz's [1998, 2002] argument that holistic empiricism suffers from what he calls the Revisability Paradox. According to Katz, Quine's empiricism is incoherent because its constitutive principles cannot themselves be rationally revised. Using (...) Gärdenfors and Makinson's logic of belief revision based on epistemic entrenchment, we argue that Katz wrongly assumes that the constitutive principles are *statements* within a holistic empiricist's theory of the world. Instead, we show that constitutive principles are best seen as *properties* of a holistic empiricist's theory of scientific inquiry and we submit that, without Katz's mistaken assumption, the paradox cannot be formulated. We argue that our perspective on the status of constitutive principles is perfectly in line with Quinean orthodoxy. In conclusion, we compare our findings with van Fraassen's [2002] argument that we should think of empiricism as a stance, rather than as a doctrine. (shrink)

This paper presents two systems of natural deduction for the rejection of non-tautologies of classical propositional logic. The first system is sound and complete with respect to the body of all non-tautologies, the second system is sound and complete with respect to the body of all contradictions. The second system is a subsystem of the first. Starting with Jan Łukasiewicz's work, we describe the historical development of theories of rejection for classical propositional logic. Subsequently, we present the two systems of (...) natural deduction and prove them to be sound and complete. We conclude with a ‘Theorem of Inversion’. (shrink)

C.S. Peirce's and Isaac Levi's accounts of the belief-doubt-belief model are discussed and evaluated. It is argued that the contemporary study of belief change has metamorphosed into a branch of philosophical logic where empirical considerations have become obsolete. A case is made for reformulations of belief change systems that do allow for empirical tests. Last, a belief change system is presented that (1) uses finite representations of information, (2) can adequately deal with inconsistencies, (3) has finite operations of change, (4) (...) can do without extra-logical elements, and (5) only licenses consistent beliefs. (shrink)

The power of some new entrants to the music industry derives from their position as brokers in computer-mediated environments. Brokers act instrumentally to exploit their position within a network which, in turn, depends on their ability to build and sustain links (and, in computer-mediated environments, hyperlinks). Bricolage in computer-mediated entrepreneurship refers to the intuitive manipulation of resources in order to achieve (perhaps tacit) goals. Without careful stewardship of the new intellectual wealth thus created, bricolage may profit neither the individual nor (...) the wider community. (shrink)

We present a theory that copes with the dynamics of inconsistent information. A method is set forth to represent possibly inconsistent information by a finite state. Next, finite operations for expansion and contraction of finite states are given. No extra-logical element — a choice function or an ordering over (sets of) sentences — is presupposed in the definition of contraction. Moreover, expansion and contraction are each other's duals. AGM-style characterizations of these operations follow.

Considerable research evidence has accumulated indicating that there is an increased likelihood for illness and injury among employees working in long-hour schedules and schedules involving unconventional shift work. In addition, studies show that fatigue-related errors made by employees working in these kind of demanding schedules can have serious and adverse repercussions for public safety. As the result of these concerns, new protective legislation is being advocated in the United States, for instance, to restrict the hours of work among nurses and (...) other healthcare professionals. This article reviews the history of concerns about long working hours and the current scientific evidence regarding their effects on workers' health. The ethical implications of unconventional shift work and long work-hour schedules are considered. Relevant ethical considerations involve mandatory or unpaid overtime and the possibility of employer coercion, the political basis for government regulation of working hours, potential limits on voluntary assumption of risk, societal benefits accruing from the equitable distribution of available working hours, gender-based inequities related to working hours, and employer responsibilities for protecting individuals who are not employees from the spillover effects of demanding work schedules. (shrink)

Interviews met tien hedendaagse Nederlandse filosofen over hun manier van denken.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.3 (2001) 245-259 [Access article in PDF] Virtue in Aristotle's Rhetoric: A Metaphysical and Ethical Capacity Susan K. Allard-Nelson It has been argued that Aristotle's description of excellence (aretê) as a capacity (dynamis) in Rhetoric 1.9 is inconsistent with his treatment of excellence in Nicomachean Ethics 2.5, where he specifically argues that aretê is not a dynamis, but a hexis (i.e., a state or condition). (...) 1 Certainly, the word that Aristotle uses throughout the Nicomachean Ethics to both describe and categorize aretê is hexis, and he uses this word at Rhetoric 1.6.1362b13, where he says that several of the virtues, and all other such states (kai hai allai hai toiautai hexeis), are excellences of the soul. However, as part of his discussion of the ethical aspects of oratory, Aristotle states that aretê is "a capacity (dynamis) of providing and preserving good things, and a capacity of conferring many great benefits (euergetikê)" (Rh. 1.9.1366a36-1366b1). 2 This discussion is set in language similar to that used to discuss excellence and goodness in Rhetoric 1362b2-4 and 1361a28-30; this suggests that Aristotle intentionally identifies aretê with dynamis in this text, and, to some degree at least, with the dynamis to benefit others. In the former passage, Aristotle claims that "the excellences, too, must be a good thing, for those who possess them are in a good condition, and they are productive of good things and good actions" (Rh. 1.6.1362b2-4). In the latter passage, Aristotle states that honor (timê) can be paid, not only to those who have already done good, but also to those who have the capacity to do good (dynamenos euergetein) in the future. Indeed, in the Rhetoric 1.9.1366b3-7, Aristotle further unites the concepts of excellence, capacity, and beneficence by stating, "If excellence is the capacity of conferring benefits (dynamis euergetikê), then the greatest virtues must be those which are the most useful to others, and, for this reason, justice and courage are the most honored; for the latter is useful to others in war, and the former both in war and in peace" (1366b3-7). [End Page 245]Based on an understanding of this apparent inconsistency in terminology as intentional on Aristotle's part, I intend to argue here that Aristotle's identification of aretê with dynamis in Rhetoric can be understood within the highly specific context of rhetoric as an art as more appropriate, both metaphysically and ethically, than would have been an identification of aretê with hexis. I also intend to argue that, while certain tensions and difficulties are created by the classification of aretê as a dynamis in the Rhetoric and as a hexis in the Nicomachean Ethics, 3 Aristotle can be defended against the charge of inconsistency.To this end, then, I begin by examining the implications of defining rhetoric as an art (technê) that has persuasion (pistis) as its end (telos) and function (ergon). 1. Rhetoric is an art, and, as we know from EN 6.4, art is identical to a state of reasoned capacity to make, and all art is concerned with the coming into being of something that is capable of either being or not being, and whose origin is in the maker (1140a1-23). Art is a rational capacity, or a potency that moves according to, and involves, a rational formula (kai ta men kata logon dynatai kinein kai hai dynameis auton meta logou), and, as such, it is capable of producing contrary effects (Met. 9.5.1047b31-1048a24). For this reason, and to negate the impossibility of contrary effects being produced simultaneously, Aristotle states that a rational capacity involves not only the elements of agent and patient, but also a desire or choice on the part of the agent that moves her 4 to act (Met. 9.5.1048a10). This necessary desire or choice, in fact, explains why an inference in the case of the arts (or of any rational capacity) can be made in one direction... (shrink)

This paper is concerned with a natural deduction system for First Degree Entailment (FDE). First, we exhibit a brief history of FDE and of combined systems whose underlying idea is used in developing the natural deduction system. Then, after presenting the language and a semantics of FDE, we develop a natural deduction system for FDE. We then prove soundness and completeness of the system with respect to the semantics. The system neatly represents the four-valued semantics for FDE.

Taking our inspiration from modal correspondence theory, we present the idea of correspondence analysis for many-valued logics. As a benchmark case, we study truth-functional extensions of the Logic of Paradox (LP). First, we characterize each of the possible truth table entries for unary and binary operators that could be added to LP by an inference scheme. Second, we define a class of natural deduction systems on the basis of these characterizing inference schemes and a natural deduction system for LP. Third, (...) we show that each of the resulting natural deduction systems is sound and complete with respect to its particular semantics. (shrink)

Two groups of agents, G1 and G2, face a *moral conflict* if G1 has a moral obligation and G2 has a moral obligation, such that these obligations cannot both be fulfilled. We study moral conflicts using a multi-agent deontic logic devised to represent reasoning about sentences like "In the interest of group F of agents, group G of agents ought to see to it that phi". We provide a formal language and a consequentialist semantics. An illustration of our semantics with (...) an analysis of the Prisoner’s Dilemma follows. Next, necessary and sufficient conditions are given for (1) the possibility that a single group of agents faces a moral conflict, for (2) the possibility that two groups of agents face a moral conflict within a single moral code, and for (3) the possibility that two groups of agents face a moral conflict. (shrink)

The branch of philosophical logic which has become known as “belief change” has, in the course of its development, become alienated from its epistemological origins. However, as formal criteria do not suffice to defend a principled choice between competing systems for belief change, we do need to take their epistemological embedding into account. Here, on the basis of a detailed examination of Isaac Levi's epistemology, we argue for a new direction of belief change research and propose to construct systems for (...) belief change that can do without, but do not rule out, selection functions, in order to enable an *empirical* assessment of the relative merits of competing belief change systems. (shrink)

In the 1930s, several members of the Vienna Circle set out to incorporate psychology in the unity of science, by showing that all cognitively significant sentences of psychology can be translated into the language of physics. This epistemological analysis of psychology has become known as logical behaviourism. Carnap was the first logical empiricist to expound this programme in considerable detail. Relying on his particular notion of protocol languages, Carnap develops a view on the philosophy of psychology that not only is (...) thoroughly physicalistic, but also shows due appreciation to 'introspection' as a purely subjective, but reliable way to verify sentences about one's own mind. Second, contrary to the received view on logical behaviourism, Carnap's philosophy of psychology not only takes into account overt behaviour, but micro-physiological processes as well. Last, Carnap's physicalistic philosophy of mind couples full awareness of the changeability of scientific knowledge with the aspiration to develop a philosophy of psychology that really does justice to this changeability. (shrink)

In the 1930s, Carnap set out to incorporate psychology into the unity of science, by showing that all cognitively meaningful sentences of psychology can be translated into the language of physics. I will argue that Carnap, relying on his notion of protocol languages, defends a physicalistic philosophy of psychology that shows due appreciation to 'introspection' as a strictly subjective, but reliable way to verify sentences about one’s own mind. Second, I will point out that Carnap’s philosophy of psychology not only (...) takes into account overt behaviour, but must comprise neurophysiological processes as well. Last, I will show that Carnap aims to develop a philosophy of psychology that does justice to the ongoing changeability of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

We investigate the genesis of metaphysical physicalism and its influence on the development of Place's, Smart's, and Armstrong's ideas on the relation between the mental and the physical. We first reconstruct the considerations that led Armstrong and Smart to a 'scientific' world view. We call 'metaphysical physicalism' the comprehensive theory on reality, truth, and meaning which ensued from this world view. Against the background of this metaphysical physicalism we study Armstrong's and Smart's analyses of secondary properties and the genesis of (...) their identity theories of mind and matter. We argue that fundamental revisions in Smart's theories on colour and consciousness were driven by his aspiration to fully work out the philosophical consequences of metaphysical physicalism. Finally, we briefly consider the role metaphysical physicalism has played in twentieth-century philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Levi, setting out to formalize Peirce's and Dewey's *belief-doubt-belief*-model, took the lead in defining the field of philosophical logic that has become known as *belief change*. First, Levi's theory of knowledge is placed within the context of American pragmatism. A discussion follows of Levi's criteria under which a change of belief must be judged an improvement. In the final section, a critical evaluation of Levi's logical epistemology opens new venues for logical and epistemological inquiry.

In order to come to grips with Peirce's definition of truth as the ideal limit of inquiry, I give a succinct exposition of Peirce's theory of inquiry and his philosophical logic, paying attention to several types of reasoning and their interrelations. Subsequently, the arguments of a contemporary apologist of Peirce's notion of truth, C.J. Misak, are subjected to a scrutiny and found to be insufficient, as the principle of bivalence is defended improperly and, as a Peircean definition of truth, turns (...) out to be incompatible with a pragmatist epistemology. (shrink)

Every truth-functional three-valued propositional logic can be conservatively translated into the modal logic S5. We prove this claim constructively in two steps. First, we define a Translation Manual that converts any propositional formula of any three-valued logic into a modal formula. Second, we show that for every S5-model there is an equivalent three-valued valuation and vice versa. In general, our Translation Manual gives rise to translations that are exponentially longer than their originals. This fact raises the question whether there are (...) three-valued logics for which there is a shorter translation into S5. The answer is affirmative: we present an elegant linear translation of the Logic of Paradox and of Strong Three-valued Logic into S5. (shrink)

Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample (...) – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward. (shrink)

Methodological individualists often claim that any social phenomenon can ultimately be explained in terms of the actions and interactions of individuals. Any Nagelian version of methodological individualism requires that there be bridge laws that translate social statements into individualistic ones. We show that Nagelian individualism can be put to logical scrutiny by making the relevant social and individualistic languages fully explicit and mathematically precise. In particular, we prove that the social statement that a group of (at least two) agents performs (...) a deontically admissible group action cannot be expressed in a well-established deontic logic of agency that models every combination of actions, omissions, abilities, and obligations of finitely many individual agents. (shrink)

The biennial DEON conferences are designed to promote interdisciplinary cooperation amongst scholars interested in linking the formal-logical study of normative concepts and normative systems with computer science, artificial intelligence, linguistics, philosophy, organization theory and law. In addition to these general themes, DEON 2016 encouraged a special focus on the topic "Reasons, Argumentation and Justification.".

We present a method that generates two-sided sequent calculi for four-valued logics like "first degree entailment" (FDE). (We say that a logic is FDE-like if it has finitely many operators of finite arity, including negation, and if all of its operators are truth-functional over the four truth-values 'none', 'false', 'true', and 'both', where 'true' and 'both' are designated.) First, we show that for every n-ary operator * every truth table entry f*(x1,...,xn) = y can be characterized in terms of a (...) pair of sequent rules. Secondly, we use these sequent rules to build sequent calculi and prove their completeness. With the help of two simplification procedures we then show that the 2⋅4^n sequent rules that characterize an n-ary operator can be systematically reduced to at most four sequent rules. Thirdly, we use our method to investigate the proof-theoretical consequences of including intuitive truth-functional implications in FDE-like logics. (shrink)

The term "false memories" has been used to refer to suggestibility experiments in which whole events are apparently confabulated and in media accounts of contested memories of childhood abuse. Since 1992 psychologists have increasingly used the term "false memory" when discussing memory errors for details, such as specific words within word lists. Use of the term to refer to errors in details is a shift in language away from other terms used historically (e.g., "memory intrusions"). We empirically examine this shift (...) in language and discuss implications of the new use of the term "false memories." Use of the term presents serious ethical challenges to the data-interpretation process by encouraging over-generalization and misapplication of research findings on word memory to social issues. (shrink)