Search results for 'Pain Perception' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  32
    Murat Aydede (forthcoming). Pain: Perception or Introspection? In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge
    [Penultimate draft] I present the perceptualist/representationalist theories of pain in broad outline and critically examine them in light of a competing view according to which awareness of pain is essentially introspective. I end the essay with a positive sketch of a naturalistic proposal according to which pain experiences are intentional but not fully representational. This proposal makes sense of locating pains in body parts as well as taking pains as subjective experiences.
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  2. C. Richard Chapman (2004). Pain Perception, Affective Mechanisms, and Conscious Experience. In Thomas Hadjistavropoulos & Kenneth D. Craig (eds.), Pain: Psychological Perspectives. 59-85.
  3. George Pitcher (1970). Pain Perception. Philosophical Review 74 (July):368-93.
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  4.  23
    M. Tiengo (2003). Pain Perception, Brain and Consciousness. Neurological Sciences 24:76- 79.
  5. Richard Gray (2014). Pain, Perception and the Sensory Modalities: Revisiting the Intensive Theory. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):87-101.
    Pain is commonly explained in terms of the perceptual activity of a distinct sensory modality, the function of which is to enable us to perceive actual or potential damage to the body. However, the characterization of pain experience in terms of a distinct sensory modality with such content is problematic. I argue that pain is better explained as occupying a different role in relation to perception: to indicate when the stimuli that are sensed in perceiving anything (...)
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  6.  49
    A. Demertzi, E. Racine, M.-A. Bruno, D. Ledoux, O. Gosseries, A. Vanhaudenhuyse, M. Thonnard, A. Soddu, G. Moonen & S. Laureys (2013). Pain Perception in Disorders of Consciousness: Neuroscience, Clinical Care, and Ethics in Dialogue. [REVIEW] Neuroethics 6 (1):37-50.
    Pain, suffering and positive emotions in patients in vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS) and minimally conscious states (MCS) pose clinical and ethical challenges. Clinically, we evaluate behavioural responses after painful stimulation and also emotionally-contingent behaviours (e.g., smiling). Using stimuli with emotional valence, neuroimaging and electrophysiology technologies can detect subclinical remnants of preserved capacities for pain which might influence decisions about treatment limitation. To date, no data exist as to how healthcare providers think about end-of-life options (e.g., withdrawal of (...)
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  7. Moreland Perkins (2005). An Indirectly Realistic, Representational Account of Pain(Ed) Perception. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/MIT Press
     
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  8.  15
    Joseph Margolis (1976). Pain and Perception. International Studies in Philosophy 8:3-12.
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  9.  3
    Lynne Sneddon (2011). Pain Perception in Fish. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):9-10.
    Pain assessment in fish is particularly challenging due toBioscience Building, Liverpool, L69 7ZB their evolutionary distance from humans, their lack of audible vocalization, and apparently expressionless demeanour. However, there are criteria that can be used to gauge whether pain perception occurs using carefully executed scientific approaches. Here, the standards for pain in fish are discussed and can be considered in three ways: neural detection and processing of pain; adverse responses to pain; and consciously experiencing (...)
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  10.  27
    K. J. S. Anand (2007). Consciousness, Cortical Function, and Pain Perception in Nonverbal Humans. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):82-83.
    Postulating the subcortical organization of human consciousness provides a critical link for the construal of pain in patients with impaired cortical function or cortical immaturity during early development. Practical implications of the centrencephalic proposal include the redefinition of pain, improved pain assessment in nonverbal humans, and benefits of adequate analgesia/anesthesia for these patients, which certainly justify the rigorous scientific efforts required. (Published Online May 1 2007).
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  11.  23
    Katja Wiech, Markus Ploner & Irene Tracey (2008). Neurocognitive Aspects of Pain Perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (8):306-313.
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  12.  16
    Athina Demertzi, Eric Racine, Marie-Aurélie Bruno, Didier Ledoux, Olivia Gosseries, Audrey Vanhaudenhuyse, Marie Thonnard, Andrea Soddu, Gustave Moonen & Steven Laureys (forthcoming). Pain Perception in Disorders of Consciousness: Neuroscience, Clinical Care, and Ethics in Dialogue. Neuroethics.
  13. Murat Aydede (2009). Is Feeling Pain the Perception of Something? Journal of Philosophy 106 (10):531-567.
    According to the increasingly popular perceptual/representational accounts of pain (and other bodily sensations such as itches, tickles, orgasms, etc.), feeling pain in a body region is perceiving a non-mental property or some objective condition of that region, typically equated with some sort of (actual or potential) tissue damage. In what follows I argue that given a natural understanding of what sensory perception requires and how it is integrated with (dedicated) conceptual systems, these accounts are mistaken. I will (...)
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  14.  5
    Ramona Kenntner-Mabiala, Peter Weyers & Paul Pauli (2007). Independent Effects of Emotion and Attention on Sensory and Affective Pain Perception. Cognition and Emotion 21 (8):1615-1629.
  15.  7
    Richard H. Gracely, Mickael J. Farrell & Masilo Ab Grant (2002). Temperature and Pain Perception. In J. Wixted & H. Pashler (eds.), Stevens' Handbook of Experimental Psychology. Wiley
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  16.  3
    Mortimer H. Appley (1980). Stress and Arousal in Pain Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (2):301.
  17.  55
    Lisa Shapiro (2010). Instrumental or Immersed Experience: Pleasure, Pain and Object Perception in Locke. In CT Wolfe & O. Gal (eds.), The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge: Embodied Empiricism in Early Modern Science. Springer 265--285.
  18. Mary T. Phillips (1993). Savages, Drunks, and Lab Animals: The Researcher's Perception of Pain. Society and Animals 1 (1):61-81.
    Historically, treatment for pain relief has varied according to the social status of the sufferer. A similar tendency to make arbitrary distinctions affecting pain relief was found in an ethnographic study of animal research laboratories. The administration of pain-relieving drugs for animals in laboratories differed from standard practice for humans and, perhaps, for companion animals. Although anesthesia was used routinely for surgical procedures, its administration was sometimes haphazard. Analgesics, however, were rarely used. Most researchers had never thought (...)
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  19.  1
    Ruth S. Ogden, David Moore, Leanne Redfern & Francis McGlone (2015). The Effect of Pain and the Anticipation of Pain on Temporal Perception: A Role for Attention and Arousal. Cognition and Emotion 29 (5):910-922.
  20.  11
    James Warren (2007). Anaxagoras on Perception, Pleasure, and Pain. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 33:19-54.
  21.  3
    Nicholas Everitt (1988). Pain and Perception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89:113 - 124.
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  22.  2
    Wulf Schiefenhövel (1995). Perception, Expression, and Social Function of Pain: A Human Ethological View. Science in Context 8 (1).
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  23.  36
    Jennifer Corns (2014). The Inadequacy of Unitary Characterizations of Pain. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):355-378.
    Though pain scientists now understand pain to be a complex experience typically composed of sensation, emotion, cognition, and motivational responses, many philosophers maintain that pain is adequately characterized by one privileged aspect of this complexity. Philosophically dominant unitary accounts of pain as a sensation or perception are here evaluated by their ability to explain actual cases—and found wanting. Further, it is argued that no forthcoming unitary characterization of pain is likely to succeed. Instead, I (...)
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  24. Murat Aydede (2001). Naturalism, Introspection, and Direct Realism About Pain. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1):29-73.
    This paper examines pain states (and other intransitive bodily sensations) from the perspective of the problems they pose for pure informational/representational approaches to naturalizing qualia. I start with a comprehensive critical and quasi-historical discussion of so-called Perceptual Theories of Pain (e.g., Armstrong, Pitcher), as these were the natural predecessors of the more modern direct realist views. I describe the theoretical backdrop (indirect realism, sense-data theories) against which the perceptual theories were developed. The conclusion drawn is that pure representationalism (...)
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  25. E. Christian Brugger (2012). The Problem of Fetal Pain and Abortion: Toward an Ethical Consensus for Appropriate Behavior. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22 (3):263-287.
    This essay concerns what people should do in conflict situations when a doubt of fact bears on settling whether an alternative under consideration is legitimate or not. Its principal audience are those who believe that abortion can be legitimate when not having an abortion gives rise to serious harms that can be avoided by having one, but who are concerned that fetuses might feel pain when being aborted, and who believe that causing unnecessary pain should be avoided when (...)
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  26.  44
    Yutaka Nakamura & R. Chapman (2002). Measuring Pain: An Introspective Look at Introspection. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):582-592.
    The measurement of pain depends upon subjective reports, but we know very little about how research subjects or pain patients produce self-reported judgments. Representationalist assumptions dominate the field of pain research and lead to the critical conjecture that the person in pain examines the contents of consciousness before making a report about the sensory or affective magnitude of pain experience as well as about its nature. Most studies to date have investigated what Fechner termed “outer (...)
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  27.  20
    D. Barrell Price & Rainville J. (2002). Integrating Experimental-Phenomenological Methods and Neuroscience to Study Neural Mechanisms of Pain and Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):593-608.
    Understanding the nature of pain at least partly depends on recognizing its inherent first person epistemology and on using a first person experiential and third person experimental approach to study it. This approach may help to understand some of the neural mechanisms of pain and consciousness by integrating experiential–phenomenological methods with those of neuroscience. Examples that approximate this strategy include studies of second pain summation and its relationship to neural activities and brain imaging-psychophysical studies wherein sensory and (...)
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  28.  27
    David M. Armstrong (1961). Perception And The Physical World. Humanities Press.
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  29.  24
    David J. Mellor, Tamara J. Diesch, Alistair J. Gunn & Laura Bennet (2005). The Importance of 'Awareness' for Understanding Fetal Pain. Brain Research Reviews 49 (3):455-471.
  30. Yutaka Nakamura & C. Chapman (2002). Constructing Pain: How Pain Hurts. In Kunio Yasue, Marj Jibu & Tarcisio Della Senta (eds.), No Matter, Never Mind. John Benjamins
     
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  31. George Pitcher (1978). The Perceptual Theory of Pain: A Response to Thomas Mayberry's, the Perceptual Theory of Pain. Philosophical Investigations 1:44-46.
     
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  32.  31
    Nikola Grahek (1991). Objective and Subjective Aspects of Pain. Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):249-66.
  33.  24
    R. Kaufman (1985). Is the Concept of Pain Incoherent? Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):279-84.
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  34.  30
    Roy W. Perrett (1999). Preferring More Pain to Less. Philosophical Studies 93 (2):213-226.
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  35.  7
    Mélanie Boly, Marie-Elisabeth Faymonville, Brent A. Vogt, Pierre Maquet & Steven Laureys (2007). Hypnotic Regulation of Consciousness and the Pain Neuromatrix. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press 15-27.
  36.  7
    Thomas C. Mayberry (1979). The Perceptual Theory of Pain: Another Look. Philosophical Investigations 2 (1):53-55.
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  37.  1
    John C. Wordsworth (1954). Pain And Other Problems: A Criticism Of Modern Philosophies. Allen & Unwin.
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  38.  32
    Austen Clark (2005). Painfulness is Not a Quale. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/MIT Press
    When you suffer a pain are you suffering a sensation? An emotion? An aversion? Pain typically has all three components, and others too. There is indeed a distinct sensory system devoted to pain, with its own nociceptors and pathways. As a species of somesthesis, pain has a distinctive sensory organization and its own special sensory qualities. I think it is fair to call it a distinct sensory modality, devoted to nociceptive somesthetic discrimination. But the typical (...) kicks off other processes too. For one it can grab your attention in a distinctive way, alerting you to its presence and sometimes obliging you to focus attention on the damaged member. Intense pain can eliminate your ability to think about anything else. Pain typically has direct and immediate motivational consequences: one wants it to stop, has an incentive to do whatever one can to reduce it, and is gratified by its termination. As these desires and motives collide with neural reality, emotional components of mental anguish, anxiety, and dread arise. The suffering involved in suffering from pain has multiple strands: it is not just the painfulness of the sensation, or the frustration of the desire that it end, but also the anguish over the possibility that it will never end, and the impossibility, if the pain is sufficiently intense, of focusing one’s attention on anything else. (shrink)
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  39. Murat Aydede (2005). The Main Difficulty with Pain. In Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/MIT Press 123-136.
    Consider the following two sentences: " I see a dark discoloration in the back of my hand. I feel a jabbing pain in the back of my hand. " They seem to have the same surface grammar, and thus prima facie invite the same kind of semantic treatment. Even though a reading of ‘see’ in where the verb is not treated as a success verb is not out of the question, it is not the ordinary and natural reading. Note (...)
     
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  40. Murat Aydede (ed.) (2005). Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. MIT Press.
    What does feeling a sharp pain in one's hand have in common with seeing a red apple on the table? Some say not much, apart from the fact that they are both conscious experiences. To see an object is to perceive an extramental reality -- in this case, a red apple. To feel a pain, by contrast, is to undergo a conscious experience that doesn't necessarily relate the subject to an objective reality. Perceptualists, however, dispute this. They say (...)
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  41. David Bain (2003). Intentionalism and Pain. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):502-523.
    The pain case can appear to undermine the radically intentionalist view that the phenomenal character of any experience is entirely constituted by its representational content. That appearance is illusory, I argue. After categorising versions of pain intentionalism along two dimensions, I argue that an “objectivist” and “non-mentalist” version is the most promising, provided it can withstand two objections: concerning what we say when in pain, and the distinctiveness of the pain case. I rebut these objections, in (...)
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  42. D. Stokes, M. Matthen & S. Biggs (eds.) (2014). Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press.
    This volume is about the many ways we perceive. Contributors explore the nature of the individual senses, how and what they tell us about the world, and how they interrelate. They consider how the senses extract perceptual content from receptoral information. They consider what kinds of objects we perceive and whether multiple senses ever perceive a single event. They consider how many senses we have, what makes one sense distinct from another, and whether and why distinguishing senses may be useful. (...)
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  43. Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere (2002). Some Foundational Problems in the Scientific Study of Pain. Philosophy of Science Supplement 69 (3):265-83.
    This paper is an attempt to spell out what makes the scientific study of pain so distinctive from a philosophical perspective. Using the IASP definition of ‘pain’ as our guide, we raise a number of questions about the philosophical assumptions underlying the scientific study of pain. We argue that unlike the study of ordinary perception, the study of pain focuses from the very start on the experience itself and its qualities, without making deep assumptions about (...)
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  44.  43
    Daniel Kostic (2012). The Vagueness Constraint and the Quality Space for Pain. Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):929-939.
    This paper is concerned with a quality space model as an account of the intelligibility of explanation. I argue that descriptions of causal or functional roles (Chalmers Levine, 2001) are not the only basis for intelligible explanations. If we accept that phenomenal concepts refer directly, not via descriptions of causal or functional roles, then it is difficult to find role fillers for the described causal roles. This constitutes a vagueness constraint on the intelligibility of explanation. Thus, I propose to use (...)
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  45.  17
    Keith A. Wilson (2014). Review of Charles Travis, Perception: Essays After Frege. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014 (April).
    Charles Travis’s new collection on perception brings together eleven of his previously published essays on this topic, some of which are substantially revised, plus one new essay. The intentionally ambiguous subtitle hints at the author’s endorsement of Fregean anti-psychologism, though influences from Wittgenstein and Austin are equally apparent. The work centres around two major questions in the philosophy of mind and perception. First, Travis argues against the view that perceptual experience, as distinct from perceptual judgement or belief, is (...)
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  46.  36
    Abraham Olivier (2006). The Spatiality of Pain. South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):336-349.
    How far can one ascribe a spatial meaning to pain? When I have a pain, for instance, in my leg, how should one understand the “in” in the “pain in my leg”? I argue (contrary to Noordhof) that pain does have a spatial meaning, but (contrary to Tye) that the spatiality of pain is not to be understood in the standard sense of spatial enclosure. Instead, spatiality has a special meaning with regard to pain. (...)
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  47.  7
    Gabriele Kitzmüller, Terttu Häggström & Kenneth Asplund (2013). Living an Unfamiliar Body: The Significance of the Long-Term Influence of Bodily Changes on the Perception of Self After Stroke. [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (1):19-29.
    The aim of this study is to illuminate the significance of the long-term influence of bodily changes on the perception of self after stroke by means of narrative interviews with 23 stroke survivors. A phenomenological-hermeneutic approach inspired by the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur is the methodological framework. Zahavi’s understanding of the embodied self and Leder’s concept of dys-appearance along with earlier research on identity guide the comprehensive understanding of the theme. The meaning of bodily changes after stroke can (...)
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  48.  3
    Kenneth M. Sayre (1969). Consciousness: A Philosophic Study of Minds and Machines. Random House.
  49. S. Benjamin Fink (2011). Independence and Connections of Pain and Suffering. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):46-66.
    Is a phenomenal pain a conscious primitive or composed of more primitive phenomenal states? Are pain experiences necessarily or only contingently unpleasant? Here, I sketch how to answer such questions concerning intra-phenomenal metaphysics using the example of pain and unpleasantness. Arguments for a symmetrical metaphysical independence of phenomenal pain and unpleasant affect are presented, rejecting a composite view like the IASP definition and dimensional views. The motivating intuition of these views is explained by common binding mechanisms (...)
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  50.  47
    Richard J. Hall (1989). Are Pains Necessarily Unpleasant? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):643-59.
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