Search results for 'Pain Perception' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. C. Richard Chapman (2004). Pain Perception, Affective Mechanisms, and Conscious Experience. In Thomas Hadjistavropoulos & Kenneth D. Craig (eds.), Pain: Psychological Perspectives. 59-85.score: 216.0
  2. George Pitcher (1970). Pain Perception. Philosophical Review 74 (July):368-93.score: 210.0
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  3. M. Tiengo (2003). Pain Perception, Brain and Consciousness. Neurological Sciences 24:76- 79.score: 210.0
  4. A. Demertzi, E. Racine, M.-A. Bruno, D. Ledoux, O. Gosseries, A. Vanhaudenhuyse, M. Thonnard, A. Soddu, G. Moonen & S. Laureys (2013). Pain Perception in Disorders of Consciousness: Neuroscience, Clinical Care, and Ethics in Dialogue. [REVIEW] Neuroethics 6 (1):37-50.score: 192.0
    Pain, suffering and positive emotions in patients in vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS) and minimally conscious states (MCS) pose clinical and ethical challenges. Clinically, we evaluate behavioural responses after painful stimulation and also emotionally-contingent behaviours (e.g., smiling). Using stimuli with emotional valence, neuroimaging and electrophysiology technologies can detect subclinical remnants of preserved capacities for pain which might influence decisions about treatment limitation. To date, no data exist as to how healthcare providers think about end-of-life options (e.g., withdrawal of (...)
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  5. [deleted]Candida S. McCabe Ailie J. Turton, Mark Palmer, Sharon Grieve, Timothy P. Moss, Jenny Lewis (2013). Evaluation of a Prototype Tool for Communicating Body Perception Disturbances in Complex Regional Pain Syndrome. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 192.0
    Patients with Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS) experience distressing changes in body perception. However representing body perception is a challenge. A digital media tool for communicating body perception disturbances was developed. A proof of concept study evaluating the acceptability of the application for patients to communicate their body perception is reported in this methods paper. Thirteen CRPS participants admitted to a two week inpatient rehabilitation program used the application in a consultation with a research nurse. (...)
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  6. Richard Gray (2014). Pain, Perception and the Sensory Modalities: Revisiting the Intensive Theory. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):87-101.score: 186.0
    Pain is commonly explained in terms of the perceptual activity of a distinct sensory modality, the function of which is to enable us to perceive actual or potential damage to the body. However, the characterization of pain experience in terms of a distinct sensory modality with such content is problematic. I argue that pain is better explained as occupying a different role in relation to perception: to indicate when the stimuli that are sensed in perceiving anything (...)
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  7. Moreland Perkins (2005). An Indirectly Realistic, Representational Account of Pain(Ed) Perception. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.score: 186.0
     
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  8. Joseph Margolis (1976). Pain and Perception. International Studies in Philosophy 8:3-12.score: 180.0
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  9. K. J. S. Anand (2007). Consciousness, Cortical Function, and Pain Perception in Nonverbal Humans. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):82-83.score: 156.0
    Postulating the subcortical organization of human consciousness provides a critical link for the construal of pain in patients with impaired cortical function or cortical immaturity during early development. Practical implications of the centrencephalic proposal include the redefinition of pain, improved pain assessment in nonverbal humans, and benefits of adequate analgesia/anesthesia for these patients, which certainly justify the rigorous scientific efforts required. (Published Online May 1 2007).
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  10. Athina Demertzi, Eric Racine, Marie-Aurélie Bruno, Didier Ledoux, Olivia Gosseries, Audrey Vanhaudenhuyse, Marie Thonnard, Andrea Soddu, Gustave Moonen & Steven Laureys (forthcoming). Pain Perception in Disorders of Consciousness: Neuroscience, Clinical Care, and Ethics in Dialogue. Neuroethics.score: 150.0
  11. Lynne Sneddon (2011). Pain Perception in Fish. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):9-10.score: 150.0
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  12. Katja Wiech, Markus Ploner & Irene Tracey (2008). Neurocognitive Aspects of Pain Perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (8):306-313.score: 150.0
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  13. Mortimer H. Appley (1980). Stress and Arousal in Pain Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (2):301.score: 150.0
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  14. Richard H. Gracely, Mickael J. Farrell & Masilo Ab Grant (2002). Temperature and Pain Perception. In J. Wixted & H. Pashler (eds.), Stevens' Handbook of Experimental Psychology. Wiley.score: 150.0
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  15. Ramona Kenntner-Mabiala, Peter Weyers & Paul Pauli (2007). Independent Effects of Emotion and Attention on Sensory and Affective Pain Perception. Cognition and Emotion 21 (8):1615-1629.score: 150.0
  16. Murat Aydede (2009). Is Feeling Pain the Perception of Something? Journal of Philosophy 106 (10):531-567.score: 144.0
    According to the increasingly popular perceptual/representational accounts of pain (and other bodily sensations such as itches, tickles, orgasms, etc.), feeling pain in a body region is perceiving a non-mental property or some objective condition of that region, typically equated with some sort of (actual or potential) tissue damage. In what follows I argue that given a natural understanding of what sensory perception requires and how it is integrated with (dedicated) conceptual systems, these accounts are mistaken. I will (...)
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  17. Lisa Shapiro (2010). Instrumental or Immersed Experience: Pleasure, Pain and Object Perception in Locke. In CT Wolfe & O. Gal (eds.), The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge: Embodied Empiricism in Early Modern Science. Springer. 265--285.score: 132.0
  18. James Warren (2007). Anaxagoras on Perception, Pleasure, and Pain. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 33:19-54.score: 120.0
  19. Nicholas Everitt (1988). Pain and Perception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89:113 - 124.score: 120.0
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  20. Mary T. Phillips (1993). Savages, Drunks, and Lab Animals: The Researcher's Perception of Pain. Society and Animals 1 (1):61-81.score: 120.0
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  21. Wulf Schiefenhövel (1995). Perception, Expression, and Social Function of Pain: A Human Ethological View. Science in Context 8 (1).score: 120.0
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  22. Jennifer Corns (2014). The Inadequacy of Unitary Characterizations of Pain. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):355-378.score: 102.0
    Though pain scientists now understand pain to be a complex experience typically composed of sensation, emotion, cognition, and motivational responses, many philosophers maintain that pain is adequately characterized by one privileged aspect of this complexity. Philosophically dominant unitary accounts of pain as a sensation or perception are here evaluated by their ability to explain actual cases—and found wanting. Further, it is argued that no forthcoming unitary characterization of pain is likely to succeed. Instead, I (...)
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  23. Murat Aydede (2001). Naturalism, Introspection, and Direct Realism About Pain. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1):29-73.score: 96.0
    This paper examines pain states (and other intransitive bodily sensations) from the perspective of the problems they pose for pure informational/representational approaches to naturalizing qualia. I start with a comprehensive critical and quasi-historical discussion of so-called Perceptual Theories of Pain (e.g., Armstrong, Pitcher), as these were the natural predecessors of the more modern direct realist views. I describe the theoretical backdrop (indirect realism, sense-data theories) against which the perceptual theories were developed. The conclusion drawn is that pure representationalism (...)
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  24. E. Christian Brugger (2012). The Problem of Fetal Pain and Abortion: Toward an Ethical Consensus for Appropriate Behavior. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22 (3):263-287.score: 96.0
    This essay concerns what people should do in conflict situations when a doubt of fact bears on settling whether an alternative under consideration is legitimate or not. Its principal audience are those who believe that abortion can be legitimate when not having an abortion gives rise to serious harms that can be avoided by having one, but who are concerned that fetuses might feel pain when being aborted, and who believe that causing unnecessary pain should be avoided when (...)
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  25. Nathalie Mella, Joseph Studer, Anne-Laure Gilet & Gisela Labouvie-Vief (2012). Empathy for Pain From Adolescence Through Adulthood: An Event-Related Brain Potential Study. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 96.0
    Affective and cognitive empathy are traditionally differentiated, the affective component being concerned with resonating with another’s emotional state, whereas the cognitive component reflects regulation of the resulting distress and understanding of another’s mental states (see Decety and Jackson, 2004 for a review). Adolescence is a critical period for the development of cognitive control processes necessary to regulate affective processes: it is only in young adulthood that these control processes achieve maturity (Steinberg, 2005). Thus, one should expect adolescents to show greater (...)
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  26. Nikola Grahek (1991). Objective and Subjective Aspects of Pain. Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):249-66.score: 90.0
  27. Yutaka Nakamura & R. Chapman (2002). Measuring Pain: An Introspective Look at Introspection. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):582-592.score: 90.0
  28. David J. Mellor, Tamara J. Diesch, Alistair J. Gunn & Laura Bennet (2005). The Importance of 'Awareness' for Understanding Fetal Pain. Brain Research Reviews 49 (3):455-471.score: 90.0
  29. Roy W. Perrett (1999). Preferring More Pain to Less. Philosophical Studies 93 (2):213-226.score: 90.0
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  30. R. Kaufman (1985). Is the Concept of Pain Incoherent? Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):279-84.score: 90.0
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  31. D. Barrell Price & Rainville J. (2002). Integrating Experimental-Phenomenological Methods and Neuroscience to Study Neural Mechanisms of Pain and Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):593-608.score: 90.0
  32. Thomas C. Mayberry (1979). The Perceptual Theory of Pain: Another Look. Philosophical Investigations 2 (1):53-55.score: 90.0
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  33. Mélanie Boly, Marie-Elisabeth Faymonville, Brent A. Vogt, Pierre Maquet & Steven Laureys (2007). Hypnotic Regulation of Consciousness and the Pain Neuromatrix. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press. 15-27.score: 90.0
  34. David M. Armstrong (1961). Perception And The Physical World. Humanities Press.score: 90.0
     
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  35. Yutaka Nakamura & C. Chapman (2002). Constructing Pain: How Pain Hurts. In Kunio Yasue, Marj Jibu & Tarcisio Della Senta (eds.), No Matter, Never Mind. John Benjamins.score: 90.0
     
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  36. John C. Wordsworth (1954). Pain And Other Problems: A Criticism Of Modern Philosophies. Allen & Unwin.score: 90.0
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  37. George Pitcher (1978). The Perceptual Theory of Pain: A Response to Thomas Mayberry's, the Perceptual Theory of Pain. Philosophical Investigations 1:44-46.score: 90.0
     
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  38. M. Forgiarini, M. Gallucci & A. Maravita (2010). Racism and the Empathy for Pain on Our Skin. Frontiers in Psychology 2:108-108.score: 84.0
    Empathy is a critical function regulating human social life. In particular, empathy for pain is a source of deep emotional feelings and a strong trigger of pro-social behavior. We investigated the existence of a racial bias in the emotional reaction to other people’s pain and its link with implicit racist biases. Measuring participants’ physiological arousal, we found that Caucasian observers reacted to pain suffered by African people significantly less than to pain of Caucasian people. The reduced (...)
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  39. [deleted]Philip L. Jackson Louis-Alexandre Marcoux, Pierre-Emmanuel Michon, Julien I. A. Voisin, Sophie Lemelin, Etienne Vachon-Presseau (2013). The Modulation of Somatosensory Resonance by Psychopathic Traits and Empathy. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 84.0
    A large number of neuroimaging studies have showed neural overlaps between first hand pain and it’s perception in others. It was also demonstrated that individuals’ factors could modulate the cerebral response to other’s pain. The goal of this study was to investigate the impact of psychopathic traits on the relation between sensorimotor resonance to other’s pain and self-reported empathy. Somatosensory steady-state response (SSSR) to a non-painful stimulation was compared between high (n = 15) and low (n= (...)
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  40. Austen Clark (2005). Painfulness is Not a Quale. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.score: 82.0
    When you suffer a pain are you suffering a sensation? An emotion? An aversion? Pain typically has all three components, and others too. There is indeed a distinct sensory system devoted to pain, with its own nociceptors and pathways. As a species of somesthesis, pain has a distinctive sensory organization and its own special sensory qualities. I think it is fair to call it a distinct sensory modality, devoted to nociceptive somesthetic discrimination. But the typical (...) kicks off other processes too. For one it can grab your attention in a distinctive way, alerting you to its presence and sometimes obliging you to focus attention on the damaged member. Intense pain can eliminate your ability to think about anything else. Pain typically has direct and immediate motivational consequences: one wants it to stop, has an incentive to do whatever one can to reduce it, and is gratified by its termination. As these desires and motives collide with neural reality, emotional components of mental anguish, anxiety, and dread arise. The suffering involved in suffering from pain has multiple strands: it is not just the painfulness of the sensation, or the frustration of the desire that it end, but also the anguish over the possibility that it will never end, and the impossibility, if the pain is sufficiently intense, of focusing one’s attention on anything else. (shrink)
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  41. Murat Aydede (2005). The Main Difficulty with Pain. In , Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press. 123-136.score: 72.0
    Consider the following two sentences:
    (1) I see a dark discoloration in the back of my hand.
    (2) I feel a jabbing pain in the back of my hand.
    They seem to have the same surface grammar, and thus prima facie invite the same kind of semantic treatment. Even though a reading of ‘see’ in (1) where the verb is not treated as a success verb is not out of the question, it is not the ordinary and (...)
     
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  42. [deleted]Anna Berti Lorenzo Pia, Francesca Garbarini, Carlotta Fossataro, Luca Fornia (2013). Pain and Body Awareness: Evidence From Brain-Damaged Patients with Delusional Body Ownership. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 72.0
    A crucial aspect for the cognitive neuroscience of pain is the interplay between pain perception and body awareness. Here we report a novel neuropsychological condition in which right brain-damaged patients displayed a selective monothematic delusion of body ownership. Specifically, when both their own and the co-experimenter’s left arms were present, these patients claimed that the latter belonged to them. We reasoned that this was an ideal condition to examine whether pain perception can be ‘referred’ to (...)
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  43. [deleted]Matteo Martini, Daniel Pérez Marcos & Maria V. Sanchez-Vives (2013). What Color is My Arm? Changes in Skin Color of an Embodied Virtual Arm Modulates Pain Threshold. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 72.0
    It has been demonstrated that visual inputs can modulate pain. However, the influence of skin colour on pain perception is unknown. Red skin is associated to inflamed, hot and more sensitive skin while blue is associated to cold. We aimed to test whether the colour of the skin would alter the heat pain threshold. To this end, we used an immersive virtual environment where we induced embodiment of a virtual arm that was co-located with the real (...)
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  44. [deleted]India Morrison (2013). Facets and Mechanisms of Adaptive Pain Behavior: Predictive Regulation and Action. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7:755.score: 72.0
    Neural mechanisms underlying nociception and pain perception are considered to serve the ultimate goal of limiting tissue damage. However, since pain usually occurs in complex environments and situations that call for elaborate control over behavior, simple avoidance is insufficient to explain a range of mammalian pain responses, especially in the presence of competing goals. In this integrative review we propose a Predictive Regulation and Action (PRA) model of acute pain processing. It emphasizes evidence that the (...)
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  45. [deleted]Lorenzo Pia, Francesca Garbarini, Carlotta Fossataro, Luca Fornia & Anna Maria Berti (2013). Pain and Body Awareness: Evidence From Brain-Damaged Patients with Delusional Body Ownership. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7:298.score: 72.0
    A crucial aspect for the cognitive neuroscience of pain is the interplay between pain perception and body awareness. Here we report a novel neuropsychological condition in which right brain-damaged patients displayed a selective monothematic delusion of body ownership. Specifically, when both their own and the co-experimenter’s left arms were present, these patients claimed that the latter belonged to them. We reasoned that this was an ideal condition to examine whether pain perception can be ‘referred’ to (...)
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  46. Harold Langsam (1995). Why Pains Are Mental Objects. Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):303-13.score: 70.0
  47. Richard J. Hall (1989). Are Pains Necessarily Unpleasant? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):643-59.score: 70.0
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  48. Edward W. Averill (1978). Explaining the Privacy of Afterimages and Pains. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (March):299-314.score: 70.0
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  49. D. Stokes, M. Matthen & S. Biggs (eds.) (2014). Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press.score: 66.0
    This volume is about the many ways we perceive. Contributors explore the nature of the individual senses, how and what they tell us about the world, and how they interrelate. They consider how the senses extract perceptual content from receptoral information. They consider what kinds of objects we perceive and whether multiple senses ever perceive a single event. They consider how many senses we have, what makes one sense distinct from another, and whether and why distinguishing senses may be useful. (...)
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  50. David Bain (2003). Intentionalism and Pain. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):502-523.score: 66.0
    The pain case can appear to undermine the radically intentionalist view that the phenomenal character of any experience is entirely constituted by its representational content. That appearance is illusory, I argue. After categorising versions of pain intentionalism along two dimensions, I argue that an “objectivist” and “non-mentalist” version is the most promising, provided it can withstand two objections: concerning what we say when in pain, and the distinctiveness of the pain case. I rebut these objections, in (...)
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