Results for 'epistemic subject'

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  1. The Complete Epistemic Subject and the Unity of Human Knowing.Philip Peterson - 1992 - Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)
    This thesis offers a re-definition of Kantian a priorism by expanding the notions surrounding it from within a Piagetian genetic epistemological viewpoint. ;In particular, the notion of "noumenon" is re-examined from within this viewpoint, and extended to all structural facets of the genetic epistemological knowing "situation". ;By means of these re-examinations of classical epistemological notions, the various forms of knowledge characteristically produced from within the bounds of that knowing "situation" can then be structurally located with respect to intent and focus (...)
     
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  2.  33
    A Critique of Epistemic Subjectivity.Chien-Te Lin - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):915-920.
    John R. Searle argues that consciousness is a biological problem, and that the subjective feature of consciousness doesn’t exclude the scientific study thereof. In this paper I attempt to show that Searle’s identification of the subjectivity of conscious experience as being merely ontologically subjective, but not epistemically subjective is problematic, as it confuses epistemic subjectivity with axiological subjectivity. Since Searle regards the distinction between epistemic subjectivity and ontological subjectivity as an important basis for scientific studies of consciousness, the (...)
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  3.  45
    Extended Cognitive System and Epistemic Subject.Barbara Trybulec - 2015 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 40 (1):111-128.
    The concept of an extended cognitive system is central to contemporary studies of cognition. In the paper I analyze the place of the epistemic subject within the extended cognitive system. Is it extended as well? In answering this question I focus on the differences between the first and the second wave of arguments for the extended mind thesis. I argue that the position of Cognitive Integration represented by Richard Menary is much more intuitive and fruitful in analyses of (...)
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  4.  47
    Piaget's epistemic subject and science education: Epistemological vs. psychological issues.Richard F. Kitchener - 1993 - Science & Education 2 (2):137-148.
  5. Individuals-in-communities: The search for a feminist model of epistemic subjects.Heidi E. Grasswick - 2004 - Hypatia 19 (3):85-120.
    : Feminist epistemologists have found the atomistic view of knowers provided by classical epistemology woefully inadequate. An obvious alternative for feminists is Lynn Hankinson Nelson's suggestion that it is communities that know. However, I argue that Nelson's view is problematic for feminists, and I offer instead a conception of knowers as "individuals-in-communities." This conception is preferable, given the premises and goals of feminist epistemologists, because it emphasizes the relations between knowers and their communities and the relevance of these relations for (...)
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  6.  31
    When is Disbelief Epistemic Injustice? Criminal Procedure, Recovered Memories, and Deformations of the Epistemic Subject.Jan Christoph Bublitz - forthcoming - Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-28.
    People can be treated unjustly with respect to the level of credibility others accord to their testimony. This is the core idea of the philosophical idea of epistemic justice. It should be of utmost interest to criminal law which extensively deals with normative issues of evidence and testimony. It may reconstruct some of the long-standing criticisms of criminal law regarding credibility assessments and the treatment of witnesses, especially in sexual assault cases. However, philosophical discussions often overlook the intricate complexities (...)
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  7.  16
    Objective Knowledge and the not Dispensability of Epistemic Subjects. Some remarks on Popper's notion of objective knowledge.Shahid Rahman, Juan Redmond & Nicolas Clerbout - unknown
    While discussing his notion of objective knowledge Popper introduces the idea of dispensability of knowing subjects, the autonomy of knowledge and the argumentative function of language. The main claim of our paper is that, on our view, objective knowledge produced by argumentative interaction is not achieved by dispensing knowing subjects but by differentiating between the play and the strategic levels of argumentation, where a distinction should be drawn between a particular concrete knowing subject engaged in that interaction, say Karl, (...)
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  8.  52
    Epistemic authority and autonomy of the epistemic subject.Igor Gasparov - 2017 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 53 (3):108-122.
    The author considers the account of epistemic authority as it was proposed by Linda Zagzebski in her book “Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief" [Zagzebski, 2012]. Zagzebski claims that the idea of epistemic authority could be reconciled with the modern idea of epistemic subject's autonomy without rejecting the principles of contemporary liberalism. The author aims to show that even if Zazgebski is right in claiming that epistemic authority and (...) autonomy are closely connected to each other the nature of their connection is different from that which Zagzebski believes to be. In the further analysis the author shows that weakness of her account is that it cannot explain where the substantial link between a subject's following after an epistemic authority and this subject's intention of getting truth can be. (shrink)
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  9. Part I. The debate between summativists and non-summativists. Social process reliabilism : solving justification problems in collective epistemology / Alvin I. Goldman ; When is there a group that knows? : distributed cognition, scientific knowledge, and the social epistemic subject / Alexander Bird ; A deflationary account of group testimony. [REVIEW]Jennifer Lackey - 2014 - In Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
     
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  10. The epistemic basis of subjectivity.Scott Sturgeon - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (5):221-35.
  11. Epistemic Internalism, Content Externalism and the Subjective/Objective Justification Distinction.J. Adam Carter & S. Orestis Palermos - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (3):231-244.
    Two arguments against the compatibility of epistemic internalism and content externalism are considered. Both arguments are shown to fail, because they equivocate on the concept of justification involved in their premises. To spell out the involved equivocation, a distinction between subjective and objective justification is introduced, which can also be independently motivated on the basis of a wide range of thought experiments to be found in the mainstream literature on epistemology. The subjective/objective justification distinction is also ideally suited for (...)
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  12.  77
    The Epistemic View of Subjectivity.Scott Sturgeon - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (5):221-235.
  13. Episteme and Subjectivity: The Context does not solve the “Gettier Problem”.Dimitry Mentuz - 2017 - Austrian Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 3:77-82.
    Objective: In this essay, I will try to track some historical and modern stages of the discussion on the Gettier problem, and point out the interrelations of the questions that this problem raises for epistemologists, with sceptical arguments, and a so-called problem of relevance. Methods: historical analysis, induction, generalization, deduction, discourse, intuition results: Albeit the contextual theories of knowledge, the use of different definitions of knowledge, and the different ways of the uses of knowledge do not resolve all the issues (...)
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  14.  73
    The Epistemic irresponsibility of the subjects-of-a-life account.Julia Tanner - 2009 - Between the Species 13 (9):7.
    In this paper I will argue that Regan’s subjects-of-a-life account is epistemically irresponsible. Firstly, in making so many epistemic claims. Secondly in making the claims themselves.
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  15.  72
    Epistemic Accuracy and Subjective Probability.Marcello D'Agostino & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2010 - In M. Dorato M. Suàrez (ed.), Epsa Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer. pp. 95--105.
  16.  9
    Subjectivity and epistemicity: corpus, discourse, and literary approaches to stance.Dylan Glynn & Mette Sjölin (eds.) - 2014 - Lund: Centre for Languages and Literature, Lund University.
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  17.  15
    Epistemic Relativism, Probability, and Forms of Subjectivity.Sergey B. Kulikov - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (6):1061-1079.
    In this article, the epistemological interpretation of the relationship between concepts of relativism, beliefs, and probability ensures a defense of two theses, namely, (i) epistemic relativism refers to attitudes that depend on the repetition and anchoring of probabilistic beliefs, and (ii) Popper’s propensity interpretation of probability discloses the connections between relativity, probability, and collective subjectivity. The propensity interpretation brings a framework for describing the role of collective subjectivity in epistemic systems. This approach, as an acceptable epistemological stance, is (...)
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  18.  54
    Epistemic justification: its subjective and its objective ways.Wolfgang Spohn - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3837-3856.
    Objective standards for justification or for being a reason would be desirable, but inductive skepticism tells us that they cannot be presupposed. Rather, we have to start from subjective-relative notions of justification and of being a reason. The paper lays out the strategic options we have given this dilemma. The paper explains the requirements for this subject-relative notion and how they may be satisfied. Then it discusses four quite heterogeneous ways of providing more objective standards, which combine without guaranteeing (...)
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  19. Worldview disagreement and subjective epistemic obligations.Daryl Ooi - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-23.
    In this paper, I provide an account of subjective epistemic obligations. In instances of peer disagreement, one possesses at least two types of obligations: objective epistemic obligations and subjective epistemic obligations. While objective epistemic obligations, such as conciliationism and remaining steadfast, have been much discussed in the literature, subjective epistemic obligations have received little attention. I develop an account of subjective epistemic obligations in the context of worldview disagreements. In recent literature, the notion of (...)
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  20. Why Change the Subject? On Collective Epistemic Agency.András Szigeti - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):843-864.
    This paper argues that group attitudes can be assessed in terms of standards of rationality and that group-level rationality need not be due to individual-level rationality. But it also argues that groups cannot be collective epistemic agents and are not collectively responsible for collective irrationality. I show that we do not need the concept of collective epistemic agency to explain how group-level irrationality can arise. Group-level irrationality arises because even rational individuals can fail to reason about how their (...)
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  21. Epistemic Atonement.Elise Woodard - 2023 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 18. Oxford University Press.
    When we think about agents who change a long-standing belief, we sometimes have conflicting reactions. On the one hand, such agents often epistemically improve. For example, their new belief may be better supported by the evidence or closer to the truth. On the other hand, such agents are often subject to criticism. Examples include politicians who change their minds on whether climate change is occurring or whether vaccines cause autism. What explains this criticism, and is it ever justified? To (...)
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  22.  36
    Subjectivity and certainty in epistemic modality: A study of Dutch epistemic modifiers.José Sanders & Wilbert Spooren - 1996 - Cognitive Linguistics 7 (3):241-264.
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  23. Subject sensitive invariantism and epistemic contextualism.Ahmad Reza Hemmati Moghaddam - forthcoming - Philosophical Investigations.
  24. Think of the Children! Epistemic Justification and Cognitively Unsophisticated Subjects.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    I undermine the argument that ‘high’ epistemic standards are false because children and other cognitively unsophisticated subjects possess justification while lacking certain logical and epistemic concepts. I argue, instead, that the standards we often use to attribute logical and epistemic concepts to ordinary, cognitively sophisticated adults can easily be seen to cover many unsophisticated subjects; therefore, the alleged lack of certain concepts is no basis for rejecting ‘high’ epistemic standards. Whether or not such standards are correct (...)
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  25. Epistemic Challenges in Neurophenomenology: Exploring the Reliability of Knowledge and Its Ontological Implications.Anna Shutaleva - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (5):94.
    This article investigates the challenges posed by the reliability of knowledge in neurophenomenology and its connection to reality. Neurophenomenological research seeks to understand the intricate relationship between human consciousness, cognition, and the underlying neural processes. However, the subjective nature of conscious experiences presents unique epistemic challenges in determining the reliability of the knowledge generated in this research. Personal factors such as beliefs, emotions, and cultural backgrounds influence subjective experiences, which vary from individual to individual. On the other hand, scientific (...)
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  26. What is the subject-matter of the theory of epistemic justification?Sanford C. Goldberg - 2015 - In David K. Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
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  27.  83
    Agent Reliabilism, Subjective Justification, and Epistemic Credit.Christine McKinnon - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):489-508.
    In this paper I examine John Greco’s agent reliabilism, in particular, his requirement of subjective justification. I argue that his requirement is too weak as it stands to disqualify as knowledge claims some true beliefs arrived at by reliable processes and that it is vulnerable to the “value problem” objection. I develop a more robust account of subjective justification that both avoids the objection that agents require beliefs about their dispositions in order to be subjectively justified and explains why knowledge (...)
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  28.  22
    Relation of epistemic curiosity to subjective uncertainty.James E. Crandall - 1971 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 88 (2):273.
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  29. Knowledge Attributions and Relevant Epistemic Standards.Dan Zeman - 2010 - In François Récanati, Isidora Stojanovic & Neftalí Villanueva (eds.), Context Dependence, Perspective and Relativity. Mouton de Gruyter.
    The paper is concerned with the semantics of knowledge attributions(K-claims, for short) and proposes a position holding that K-claims are contextsensitive that differs from extant views on the market. First I lay down the data a semantic theory for K-claims needs to explain. Next I present and assess three views purporting to give the semantics for K-claims: contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism and relativism. All three views are found wanting with respect to their accounting for the data. I then propose a (...)
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  30. Epistemic Injustice and Powerlessness in the Context of Global Justice. An Argument for “Thick” and “Small” Knowledge.Gottfried Schweiger - 2016 - Wagadu. A Journal of Transnational Women's and Gender Studies 15:104-125.
    In this paper, I present an analysis of the “windows into reality” that are used in theories of global justice with a focus on issues of epistemic injustice and the powerlessness of the global poor. I argue that we should aim for a better understanding of global poverty through acknowledging people living in poverty as epistemic subjects. To achieve this, we need to deepen and broaden the knowledge base of theories of global justice and approach the subject (...)
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  31. Epistemic logic in the later Middle Ages.Ivan Boh - 1993 - New York: Routledge.
    Epistemic logic is one of the most exciting areas in medieval philosophy. Neglected almost entirely after the end of the Middle Ages, it has been rediscovered by philosophers of the twentieth century. Epistemic Logic in the Later Middle Ages provides the first comprehensive study of the subject. Ivan Boh explores the contrast between epistemic and alethic conceptions of consequence, the general epistemic rules of consequence, the search for conditions of knowing contingent propositions, the problems of (...)
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  32.  9
    Agent-oriented epistemic reasoning: Subjective conditions of knowledge and belief.Daniel G. Schwartz - 2003 - Artificial Intelligence 148 (1-2):177-195.
  33. Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Accountability.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.
    Everyone agrees that not all norms that govern belief and assertion are epistemic. But not enough attention has been paid to distinguishing epistemic norms from others. Norms in general differ from merely evaluative standards in virtue of the fact that it is fitting to hold subjects accountable for violating them, provided they lack an excuse. Different kinds of norm are most readily distinguished by their distinctive mode of accountability. My thesis is roughly that a norm is epistemic (...)
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  34. From Bayesianism to the Epistemic View of Mathematics: Review of R. Jeffrey, Subjective Probability: The Real Thing[REVIEW]Jon Williamson - 2006 - Philosophia Mathematica 14 (3):365-369.
    Subjective Probability: The Real Thing is the last book written by the late Richard Jeffrey, a key proponent of the Bayesian interpretation of probability.Bayesians hold that probability is a mental notion: saying that the probability of rain is 0.7 is just saying that you believe it will rain to degree 0.7. Degrees of belief are themselves cashed out in terms of bets—in this case you consider 7:3 to be fair odds for a bet on rain. There are two extreme Bayesian (...)
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  35. Objective and Subjective 'Ought'.Ralph Wedgwood - 2016 - In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. Oxford University Press. pp. 143-168.
    This essay offers an account of the truth conditions of sentences involving deontic modals like ‘ought’, designed to capture the difference between objective and subjective kinds of ‘ought’ This account resembles the classical semantics for deontic logic: according to this account, these truths conditions involve a function from the world of evaluation to a domain of worlds (equivalent to a so-called “modal base”), and an ordering of the worlds in such domains; this ordering of the worlds itself arises from two (...)
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  36.  65
    What is it like to be the Metaphysical Subject? An Essay on Early Wittgenstein, our Epistemic Position, and Beyond.Konrad Werner - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):921-946.
    I argue that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s idea of the metaphysical subject sheds new light on subjective qualities of experience. In this article I draw first of all on the interpretations provided by Michael Kremer and James Conant. Subsequently, I conclude that “what is it like” means primarily “what is it like to see myself as the metaphysical subject”.
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  37.  48
    Collective Epistemic Agency: Virtue and the Spice of Vice.Anita Konzelmann Ziv - 2011 - In Hans Bernhard Schmid, Daniel Sirtes & Marcel Weber (eds.), Collective Epistemology. Ontos. pp. 45-72.
    The paper evaluates Christopher Hookway's claim that individual epistemic vice can enhance the value of collective epistemic virtue. I suggest that this claim can be defended on the grounds of a dynamic account of collective intentional properties that is supplemented by an account of a spontaneous ordering mechanism such as the "intangible hand". Both these accounts try to explain how individual traits integrate into collective traits by way of aggregation. In this respect, they are different from normative and (...)
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  38. Epistemic Courage and the Harms of Epistemic Life.Ian James Kidd - forthcoming - In Heather Battaly (ed.), The Routledge Handbook to Virtue Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 244-255.
    Since subjection to harm is an intrinsic feature of our social and epistemic lives, there is a perpetual need for individual and collective agents with the virtue of epistemic courage. In this chapter, I survey some of the main issues germane to this virtue, such as the nature of courage and of harm, the range of epistemic activities that can manifest courage, and the status of epistemic courage as a collective and as a professional virtue.
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  39. Epistemic Injustice in Psychiatry.Paul Crichton, Havi Carel & Ian James Kidd - 2017 - Psychiatry Bulletin 41:65-70..
    Epistemic injustice is a harm done to a person in their capacity as an epistemic subject by undermining her capacity to engage in epistemic practices such as giving knowledge to others or making sense of one’s experiences. It has been argued that those who suffer from medical conditions are more vulnerable to epistemic injustice than the healthy. This paper claims that people with mental disorders are even more vulnerable to epistemic injustice than those with (...)
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  40. Towards Epistemic Justice in Islam.Fatema Amijee - 2023 - In Mohammad Saleh Zarepour (ed.), Islamic philosophy of religion: analytic perspectives. New York: Routledge. pp. 241-257.
    Epistemic injustice consists in a wrong done to someone in their capacity as a knower. I focus on epistemic injustice—more specifically, testimonial injustice—as it arises in the Qur’an. Verse 2:282 implies that the worth of a man’s testimony is twice that of a woman’s testimony. The divine norm suggested by the verse is in direct conflict with the norms that govern testimonial justice. These norms require that women should not be judged less reliable simply because they are women. (...)
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  41. Epistemic Contextualism, Semantic Blindness and Content Unawareness.André J. Abath - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):593 - 597.
    It is held by many philosophers that it is a consequence of epistemic contextualism that speakers are typically semantically blind, that is, typically unaware of the propositions semantically expressed by knowledge attributions. In his ?Contextualism, Invariantism and Semantic Blindness? (this journal, 2009), Martin Montminy argues that semantic blindness is widespread in language, and not restricted to knowledge attributions, so it should not be considered problematic. I will argue that Montminy might be right about this, but that contextualists still face (...)
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  42. Against epistemic absolutism.Changsheng Lai - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3945-3967.
    Epistemic absolutism is an orthodox view that propositional knowledge is an ungradable concept. Absolutism is primarily grounded in our ungradable uses of “knows” in ordinary language. This paper advances a thorough objection to the linguistic argument for absolutism. My objection consists of two parts. Firstly, arguments for absolutism provided by Jason Stanley and Julien Dutant will be refuted respectively. After that, two more general refutation-strategies will be proposed: counterevidence against absolutism can be found in both English and non-English languages; (...)
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  43. Epistemic Autonomy and Externalism.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Kirk Lougheed & Jonathan Matheson (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. London: Routledge.
    The philosophical significance of attitudinal autonomy—viz., the autonomy of attitudes such as beliefs—is widely discussed in the literature on moral responsibility and free will. Within this literature, a key debate centres around the following question: is the kind of attitudinal autonomy that’s relevant to moral responsibility at a given time determined entirely by a subject’s present mental structure at that time? Internalists say ‘yes’, externalists say ’no’. In this essay, I motivate a kind of distinctly epistemic attitudinal autonomy, (...)
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  44. Epistemic Sentimentalism and Epistemic Reason-Responsiveness.Robert Cowan - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Epistemic Sentimentalism is the view that emotional experiences such as fear and guilt are a source of immediate justification for evaluative beliefs. For example, guilt can sometimes immediately justify a subject’s belief that they have done something wrong. In this paper I focus on a family of objections to Epistemic Sentimentalism that all take as a premise the claim that emotions possess a normative property that is apparently antithetical to it: epistemic reason-responsiveness, i.e., emotions have evidential (...)
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  45. Epistemic Decision Theory's Reckoning.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - manuscript
    Epistemic decision theory (EDT) employs the mathematical tools of rational choice theory to justify epistemic norms, including probabilism, conditionalization, and the Principal Principle, among others. Practitioners of EDT endorse two theses: (1) epistemic value is distinct from subjective preference, and (2) belief and epistemic value can be numerically quantified. We argue the first thesis, which we call epistemic puritanism, undermines the second.
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  46. An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.
    Despite the recent backlash against epistemic consequentialism, an explicit systematic alternative has yet to emerge. This paper articulates and defends a novel alternative, Epistemic Kantianism, which rests on a requirement of respect for the truth. §1 tackles some preliminaries concerning the proper formulation of the epistemic consequentialism / non-consequentialism divide, explains where Epistemic Kantianism falls in the dialectical landscape, and shows how it can capture what seems attractive about epistemic consequentialism while yielding predictions that are (...)
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  47. The Epistemic Role of Vividness.Joshua Myers - forthcoming - Analysis.
    The vividness of mental imagery is epistemically relevant. Intuitively, vivid and intense memories are epistemically better than weak and hazy memories, and using a clear and precise mental image in the service of spatial reasoning is epistemically better than using a blurry and imprecise mental image. But how is vividness epistemically relevant? I argue that vividness is higher-order evidence about one’s epistemic state, rather than first-order evidence about the world. More specifically, the vividness of a mental image is higher-order (...)
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  48.  67
    Epistemic Rationality and Epistemic Normativity.Patrick Bondy - 2017 - New York: Routledge.
    The aim of this book is to answer two important questions about the issue of normativity in epistemology: Why are epistemic reasons evidential, and what makes epistemic reasons and rationality normative? Bondy's argument proceeds on the assumption that epistemic rationality goes hand in hand with basing beliefs on good evidence. The opening chapters defend a mental-state ontology of reasons, a deflationary account of how kinds of reasons are distinguished, and a deliberative guidance constraint on normative reasons. They (...)
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  49. Reconciling Ontic and Epistemic Constraints on Mechanistic Explanation, Epistemically.Dingmar van Eck - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (1):5-22.
    In this paper I address the current debate on ontic versus epistemic conceptualizations of mechanistic explanation in the mechanisms literature. Illari recently argued that good explanations are subject to both ontic and epistemic constraints: they must describe mechanisms in the world in such fashion that they provide understanding of their workings. Elaborating upon Illari’s ‘integration’ account, I argue that causal role function discovery of mechanisms and their components is an epistemic prerequisite for achieving these two aims. (...)
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  50. Epistemic Welfare Bads and Other Failures of Reason.Antti Kauppinen - 2022 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 46:251-279.
    Very plausibly, there is something important missing in our lives if we are thoroughly ignorant or misled about reality – even if, as in a kind of Truman Show scenario, intervention or fantastic luck prevents unhappiness and practical failure. But why? I argue that perfectionism about well-being offers the most promising explanation. My version says, roughly, that we flourish when we exercise our self-defining capacities successfully according to their constitutive standards. One of these self-defining capacities, or capacities whose exercise reveals (...)
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