Results for 'Lynne Baker'

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  1.  4
    Death and the Afterlife.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2005 - In William J. Wainwright (ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of religion. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Monotheistic conceptions of an afterlife raise a philosophical question: In virtue of what is a postmortem person the same person who lived and died? Four standard answers are surveyed and criticized: sameness of soul, sameness of body or brain, sameness of soul-body composite, sameness of memories. The discussion of these answers to the question of personal identity is followed by a development of my own view, the Constitution View. According to the Constitution View, you are a person in virtue of (...)
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  2.  38
    A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2003 - Mind 112 (445):148-151.
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  3.  56
    Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1987 - Princeton University Press.
    "This book is a comprehensive attack on several of the views that have been most influential in the philosophy of psychology during the last two decades. Professor Baker argues that mentalistic notions should not be eliminated, and need not be explained in terms of other notions, in cognitive science.' The book is interesting and shows an honest concern for clear argumentation. It deserves a wide readership." --Tyler Burge, University of California at Los Angeles"This book is a provocative and relentlessly (...)
  4. The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Lynne Rudder Baker presents and defends a unique account of the material world: the Constitution View. In contrast to leading metaphysical views that take everyday things to be either non-existent or reducible to micro-objects, the Constitution View construes familiar things as irreducible parts of reality. Although they are ultimately constituted by microphysical particles, everyday objects are neither identical to, nor reducible to, the aggregates of microphysical particles that constitute them. The result is genuine ontological diversity: people, bacteria, donkeys, (...)
  5. Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    What is a human person, and what is the relation between a person and his or her body? In her third book on the philosophy of mind, Lynne Rudder Baker investigates what she terms the person/body problem and offers a detailed account of the relation between human persons and their bodies. Baker's argument is based on the 'Constitution View' of persons and bodies, which aims to show what distinguishes persons from all other beings and to show how (...)
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  6. Metaphysics and mental causation.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1995 - In Pascal Engel (ed.), Mental causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 75-96.
    My aim is twofold: first, to root out the metaphysical assumptions that generate the problem of mental causation and to show that they preclude its solution; second, to dissolve the problem of mental causation by motivating rejection of one of the metaphysical assumptions that give rise to it. There are three features of this metaphysical background picture that are important for our purposes. The first concerns the nature of reality: all reality depends on physical reality, where physical reality consists of (...)
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  7.  96
    Unity without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1999 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):144-165.
    relation between, say, a lump of clay and a statue that it makes up, or between a red and white piece of metal and a stop sign, or between a person and her body? Assuming that there is a single relation between members of each of these pairs, is the relation “strict” identity, “contingent” identity or something else?1 Although this question has generated substantial controversy recently,2 I believe that there is philo- sophical gain to be had from thinking through the (...)
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  8.  33
    Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2013 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
    Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy? In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive and eliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a non-Cartesian first-person perspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that (...)
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  9. The first-person perspective: A test for naturalism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1998 - American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (4):327-348.
    Self-consciousness, many philosophers agree, is essential to being a person. There is not so much agreement, however, about how to understand what self-consciousness is. Philosophers in the field of cognitive science tend to write off self-consciousness as unproblematic. According to such philosophers, the real difficulty for the cognitive scientist is phenomenal consciousness--the fact that we have states that feel a certain way. If we had a grip on phenomenal consciousness, they think, self-consciousness could be easily handled by functionalist models. For (...)
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  10.  71
    Has content been naturalized?Lynne Rudder Baker - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
    The Representational Theory of the Mind (RTM) has been forcefully and subtly developed by Jerry A. Fodor. According to the RTM, psychological states that explain behavior involve tokenings of mental representations. Since the RTM is distinguished from other approaches by its appeal to the meaning or "content" of mental representations, a question immediately arises: by virtue of what does a mental representation express or represent an environmental property like coto or shoe? This question asks for a general account of the (...)
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  11. Cognitive suicide.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1988 - In Robert H. Grimm & Daniel Davy Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. Tucson. pp. 401--13.
  12. Content by courtesy.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (April):197-213.
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  13.  43
    Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1995 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Explaining Attitudes offers an important challenge to the dominant conception of belief found in the work of such philosophers as Dretske and Fodor. According to this dominant view beliefs, if they exist at all, are constituted by states of the brain. Lynne Rudder Baker rejects this view and replaces it with a quite different approach - practical realism. Seen from the perspective of practical realism, any argument that interprets beliefs as either brain states or states of immaterial souls (...)
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  14. The ontological status of persons.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):370-388.
    Throughout his illustrious career, Roderick Chisholm was concerned with the nature of persons. On his view, persons are what he called ‘entia per se.’ They exist per se, in their own right. I too have developed an account of persons—I call it the ‘Constitution View’—an account that is different in important ways from Chisholm’s. Here, however, I want to focus on a thesis that Chisholm and I agree on: that persons have ontological significance in virtue of being persons. Although I’ll (...)
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  15.  68
    A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science.Lynne Rudder Baker & Paul M. Churchland - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):906.
  16.  93
    III. On the very idea of a form of life.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1984 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 27 (1-4):277-289.
    Drawing on writers as diverse as Saul Kripke, Stanley Cavell, G. E. M. Anscombe, Jonathan Lear, and Bernard Williams, I offer an interpretation of Wittgenstein's key notion of a form of life that explains why Wittgenstein was so enigmatic about it. Then, I show how Hilary Putnam's criticism of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics and Richard Rorty's support of (what he takes to be) Wittgenstein's legacy in the philosophy of mind both require mistaken assumptions about Wittgenstein's idea of a form of (...)
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  17. On a causal theory of content.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:165-186.
    The project of explaining intentional phenomena in terms of nonintentional phenomena has become a central task in the philosophy of mind.' Since intentional phenomena like believing, desiring, intending have content essentially, the project is one of showing how semantic properties like content can be reconciled with nonsemantic properties like cause. As Jerry A. Fodor put it, The worry about representation is above all that the semantic (and/or the intentional) will prove permanently recalcitrant to integration in the natural order; for example (...)
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  18.  27
    The Hand of Nature in the Glove of Phenomenology: Reply to Gallagher.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):171-178.
    This article outlines several important agreements between Lynne Rudder Baker’s philosophical program and Shaun Gallagher’s target article, while also highlighting important differences. Like Gallagher, Baker does not believe that nature can be adequately understood from a reductive point of view. Unlike Gallagher, however, she argues against rethinking nature (or science) as a non-reductionist project, which instead focuses on ‘holistic relations (brain-body-environment)’ and not just on brains, for example. Regardless of whether the classic conception of nature is mainly (...)
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  19.  42
    The threat of cognitive suicide.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1987 - In Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism. Princeton University Press. pp. 134-148.
  20.  74
    Replies.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):623-635.
    Persons and Bodies develops and defends an account of persons and of the relation between human persons and their bodies. Human persons are constituted by bodies, without being identical to the bodies that constitute them—just as, I argue, statues are constituted by pieces of bronze, say, without being identical to the pieces of bronze that constitute them. The relation of constitution, therefore, is not peculiar to persons and their bodies, but is pervasive in the natural world.
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  21.  55
    Why Constitution is Not Identity.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (12):599.
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  22.  34
    Philosophy in Mediis Rebus.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2001 - Metaphilosophy 32 (4):378-394.
    How should philosophy be pursued? I want to defend a conception of philosophy in mediis rebus—philosophy in the middle of things. The more familiar Latin phrase is ‘in medias res,’ but Latin distinguishes two readings of ‘in the middle of things.’ There’s the middle of things from which one starts, and there’s the middle of things into which one jumps. ‘In medias res’ is the middle of things into which one jumps; I, however, mean to invoke the middle of things (...)
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  23. Why constitution is not identity.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (12):599-621.
  24. Dretske on the explanatory role of belief.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 63 (July):99-111.
  25. Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):127-129.
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  26. What is this thing called 'commonsense psychology'?Lynne Rudder Baker - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):3-19.
    What is this thing called ‘Commonsense Psychology’? The first matter to settle is what the issue is here. By ‘commonsense psychology,’ I mean primarily the systems of describing, explaining and predicting human thought and action in terms of beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, expectations, intentions and other so-called propositional attitudes. Although commonsense psychology encompasses more than propositional attitudes--e.g., emotions, traits and abilities are also within its purview--belief-desire reasoning forms the core of commonsense psychology. Commonsense psychology is what we use to explain (...)
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  27.  27
    Judgment and Justification.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (3):481.
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  28. Instrumental intentionality.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (June):303-16.
    Many physicalists are committed to an austere dichotomy: either beliefs, desires and intentions are scientifically respectable or attributions of such attitudes are all false. One physicalist, Daniel Dennett, offers a third alternative, which seems to permit a kind of instrumentalism concerning attitudes. I argue that Dennett's attempt to reconcile an instrumentalistic account of attributions of attitudes with a thoroughgoing physicalism founders on unresolvable conflicts between his official theory and his actual treatment of key concepts. As a result, instrumentalism concerning attitudes (...)
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  29.  63
    Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1995 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Explaining Attitudes develops a new account of propositional attitudes - practical realism.
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  30. Reply to Zimmerman's 'should a Christian be a mind/body dualist?' - Yes.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2003 - In Michael L. Peterson (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Hoboken: Blackwell.
  31. Why computers can't act.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1981 - American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (2):157-163.
    To be an agent, one must be able to formulate intentions. To be able to formulate intentions, one must have a first-person perspective. Computers lack a first-person perspective. So, computers are not agents.
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  32. Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1987 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):61-66.
     
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  33.  5
    Thought and Object: Essays on Intentionality.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (1):137-142.
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  34. Rejoinder to Zimmerman.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2003 - In Michael L. Peterson (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Hoboken: Blackwell.
     
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  35. The ontology of artifacts.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):99 – 111.
    Beginning with Aristotle, philosophers have taken artifacts to be ontologically deficient. This paper proposes a theory of artifacts, according to which artifacts are ontologically on a par with other material objects. I formulate a nonreductive theory that regards artifacts as constituted by - but not identical to - aggregates of particles. After setting out the theory, I rebut a number of arguments that disparage the ontological status of artifacts.
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  36.  44
    Lynne Rudder Baker, Review of Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind by John Haugeland. [REVIEW]Lynne Rudder Baker - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):494-495.
  37. Precis of Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  38. A farewell to functionalism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (July):1-14.
    dilemma, a dilemma concerning the individuation of psychological states that explain behavior. Beliefs are individuated by most functionahsts in terms of that 'that'-clauses; functional states are individuated 'narrowly' (i.e.
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  39.  52
    Content meets consciousness.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):1-22.
  40.  13
    Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism.Lynne Rudder Baker (ed.) - 1987 - Princeton University Press.
    This stimulating book critically examines a wide range of physicalistic conceptions of mind in the works of Jerry A. Fodor, Stephen P. Stich, Paul M. Churchland, Daniel C. Dennett, and others. Part I argues that intentional concepts cannot be reduced to nonintentional concepts; Part II argues that intentional concepts are nevertheless indispensable to our cognitive enterprises and thus need no foundation in physicalism. As a sustained challenge to the prevailing interpretation of cognitive science, this timely book fills a large gap (...)
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  41. Naturalism and the first-person perspective.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - In Georg Gasser (ed.), How Successful is Naturalism? Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 203-226.
    The first-person perspective is a challenge to naturalism. Naturalistic theories are relentlessly third-personal. The first-person perspective is, well, first-personal; it is the perspective from which one thinks of oneself as oneself* without the aid of any third-person name, description, demonstrative or other referential device. The exercise of the capacity to think of oneself in this first-personal way is the necessary condition of all our self-knowledge, indeed of all our self-consciousness. As important as the first-person perspective is, many philosophers have not (...)
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  42.  93
    Practical realism defended: Replies to critics.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2001 - In Anthonie Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
    The topics that I shall consider are these: (1) Causal Explanatoriness of the Attitudes (Dretske, Elugardo); (2) The “Brain-Explain” Thesis and Metaphysical Constraints on Explanation (Antony, Elugardo); (3) Causal Powers of Beliefs (Meyering); (4) Microreduction (Beckermann); (5) Non-Emergent, Non-Reductive Materialism (Antony); (6) The Master Argument Against the Standard View (Dretske, Antony, Elugardo); (7) Practical Realism Extended (Meijers); (8) Alternative to Both the Standard View and Practical Realism (Newen).
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  43. Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):143-147.
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  44. Persons: Natural, Yet Ontologically Unique.Lynne Baker - 2008 - ENCYCLOPAIDEIA 23.
  45.  95
    Content and context.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:17-32.
  46.  32
    Comments on Hubert L. Dreyfus “Intelligence without representation”.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (4):411-412.
    My main reaction to “Intelligence without representation” is to applaud. Dreyfus’s use of Merleau-Ponty is a refreshing new breeze in philosophy of psychology. About twenty or so years ago, philosophers struck an unfortunate course dictated by a pair of dubious assumptions: (1) that ordinary psychological attributions were at risk unless vindicated by some science; and (2) that the only possible scientific vindication required that intentional content be represented in the brain. Thus did representationalism become, in Jerry Fodor’s memorable phrase, “the (...)
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  47. JFM Hunter, Understanding Wittgenstein Reviewed by.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1986 - Philosophy in Review 6 (2):69-71.
     
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  48.  44
    Reply to Jackson, II.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):196-198.
    Commonsense psychological explanations are an integral part of a comprehensive commonsense background that includes almost everything that we deal with everyday— from traffic jams to paychecks to cozy dinners for two. It is the comprehensive commonsense background that I think is not wholesale refutable by science. A good deal of the comprehensive commonsense background itself depends on there being beliefs, desires, intentions and other propositional attitudes. If there never have been propositional attitudes, then there never have been statues or schools (...)
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  49.  91
    Reply to Van Gulick.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):217-221.
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  50.  31
    Recent work in the philosophy of mind.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1989 - Philosophical Books 30 (January):1-9.
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