A thorough analysis of the Golden Rule (GR) is given including formal investigations of its logical structure and essential implications. Starting with the general distinction of positive and negative forms of GR a set of sixteen formal implications, one for each variant of the rule, is presented. The moral acceptability of the output of the different versions of GR is assessed in various problem contexts and in discussing several objections to GR with the conclusion that GR is hopelessly inadequate as (...) a general criterion of moral choice. (shrink)

At first sight one might be tempted to regard Descartes' "cogito ergo sum" as logically true by existential generalisation. This however would neither exhaust the specific epistemic content of "cogito" nor reveal the philosophical peculiarities of "sum" which the author takes to have two ontologically different meanings. The full sense of "cogito ergo sum" finally turns out to be "Credo* me* cogitare ergo scio* me* $\text{esse}_{1/2}$ ". Furthermore this proposition can formally be proved to be true by means of epistemic (...) logic. (shrink)

Die Arbeit wendet sich gegen die These, daß in nichtiterierten Gefangenendilemmata der Konsequentialismus als solcher die kollektive Erreichbarkeit seines eigenen Zieles der Nutzenmaximierung unterminiere und sich insofern ,,selbst aufhebe". Es sei daher rational, in GD-Konstellationen nichtkonsequentialistische, jene ineffizienten Folgezustände nicht nach sich ziehende Handlungsregeln zu wählen.Ausgehend vom Begriff der Effektivnutzenbewertung bei folgenorientiertem Handeln, von dem die - bei GD-Analysen üblicherweise allein betrachtete - Eigennutzenbewertung nur ein Spezialfall ist, betont die Arbeit demgegenüber folgendes: Es ist keineswegs der Konsequentialismus per se, sondern (...) lediglich eine, je nach CD-Auszahlungsmatrix, hinreichend stark egoistische Folgenbewertung, die jene fatale Implikation der ,,Selbstaufhebung" aufweist. Anhand von 2- bzw. von n-Personen-Dilemmata wird gezeigt, daß eine utilitaristische oder Maximin-Bewertung aller Spieler, aber auch jede nicht interpersonal invariante, hinreichend stark altruistische Folgenbewertung bei kollektiver Anwendung Ineffizienzen vermeidet, daß man also den GD-Klugheitsfallen auch im Rahmen des Konsequentialismus entgehen kann.Darüber hinaus wird der Begriff des nur partiellen Klugheitsdilemmas eingeführt, von dem die üblichen Klugheitsdilemmata nur Grenzfälle sind. (shrink)

Der Artikel klassifiziert erstens deskriptiv nach systematischen Gesichtspunkten die wichtigsten deontologischen some konsequentialistischen Ethiktypen. Er prüft diese zweitens kursorisch bezüglich ihrer normativen Leistungsfähigkeit als allgemeinverbindliche, metaphysikfreie Richtlinien rein ethischer Entscheidungsfindung für einen einzelnen Entscheider. (Einzig normativ-ethische Abwandlungen von spieltheoretischen Kooperations-, Verhandlungs- und Vertragsmoddhn werden insofern nicht mitbetrachtet.) Votiert wird am Ende für eine bestimmte Variante von universalistischem präferenzaggregierendem Konsequentialismus ("Gerechtigkeitsutilitarismus"). Dieser schreibt eine Nutzenniveau- statt nur eine Nutzenzwachsaggregation sowie eine Anreicherung der rein additiven utilitaristischen Aggregationsformel mit bestimmten Gerechtigkeitsparametern vor, die (...) auch Nicht-Nutzeninformation, wie die Streuung der Nutzenniveaus und die Berücksichtigungswürdigkeit bzw. das Verdientsein manifestierter Partikularnutzenzuwachswerte in die ethische Entscheidung einzubeziehen gestatten. (shrink)

Der Artikel klassifiziert erstens deskriptiv nach systematischen Gesichtspunkten die wichtigsten deontologischen some konsequentialistischen Ethiktypen. Er prüft diese zweitens kursorisch bezüglich ihrer normativen Leistungsfähigkeit als allgemeinverbindliche, metaphysikfreie Richtlinien rein ethischer Entscheidungsfindung für einen einzelnen Entscheider. (Einzig normativ-ethische Abwandlungen von spieltheoretischen Kooperations-, Verhandlungs- und Vertragsmoddhn werden insofern nicht mitbetrachtet.) Votiert wird am Ende für eine bestimmte Variante von universalistischem präferenzaggregierendem Konsequentialismus ("Gerechtigkeitsutilitarismus"). Dieser schreibt eine Nutzenniveau- statt nur eine Nutzenzwachsaggregation sowie eine Anreicherung der rein additiven utilitaristischen Aggregationsformel mit bestimmten Gerechtigkeitsparametern vor, die (...) auch Nicht-Nutzeninformation, wie die Streuung der Nutzenniveaus und die Berücksichtigungswürdigkeit bzw. das Verdientsein manifestierter Partikularnutzenzuwachswerte in die ethische Entscheidung einzubeziehen gestatten. (shrink)

Ausgehend von der Tatsache, daß eine Kommunikation zwischen den verschiedenen Richtungen der Philosophie in Deutschland entweder gar nicht stattfindet oder bestimmten heutzutage zu fordernden Rationalitätsstandards nicht genügt, wird in einem ersten allgemeinen Teil auf die großen Vor- und geringen Nachteile aufmerksam gemacht, die ein vor allem an gewissen fundamentalen Einsichten der sprachanalytischen Philosophie orientiertermethodischer Minimalkonsens mit sich brächte, und in einem spezielleren und wichtigeren zweiten Teil eine sprachphilosophische Lokalisation aller Arten von Inexaktheiten, die in normalsprachlichen (nicht nur philosophischen) Texten vorkommen (...) können, mit dem praktischen Ziel vorgenommen, deren Vermeidung — soweit diese theoretisch überhaupt möglich ist — als zentralen Bestandteil des genannten Konsenses zu empfehlen. (shrink)

Investigations in meta-theoretical topics such as the definability of disposition terms or the explication of qualitative and quantitative concepts of confirmation, as well as discussions of various systems of modal logic, e.g., deontic logic, often deal with a number of well known paradoxes. In general, classical logic is used in deriving the paradox of the ravens, Goodman's paradox, the paradoxes of derived obligation, etc. The questions whether these paradoxes depend essentially on the use of classical logic and whether they can (...) be avoided by using intuitionistic or minimal logic are considered. (shrink)

Do individuals accept a moral point of view - if they are completely oriented towards their natural preferences and interests? The present article outlines the context of discussion concerning this question within moral philosophy and the social science. In addition it suggests a game-theoretical model with the help of which the question can be answered positively.

Frontmatter -- Vorwort -- Inhalt -- 1. Teil Klassische Positionen -- Natürliche Freiheit / Locke, John -- Freiheit und praktische Vernunft / Kant, Immanuel -- Bürgerliche Freiheit / Mill, John Stuart -- Natürliche Freiheit, moralische Einschränkungen und der Staat / Nozick, Robert -- Kant's Theory of Justice / Pogge, Thomas W. -- Morality and the Liberal Ideal / Sandel, Michael J. -- Freiheit im Liberalismus und bei Marx -- 2. Teil Zeitgenössische Positionen -- Zwei Freiheitsbegriffe / Berlin, Isaiah -- Liberalism (...) / Dworkin, Ronald -- Gleiche Freiheit für alle / Rawls, John -- Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism / Waldron, Jeremy -- Defending Liberalism / Galston, William -- Liberalism and the Art of Separation / Walzer, Michael -- Der Gedanke eines übergreifenden Konsenses / Rawls, John -- 3. Teil Rechtsphilosophische Aspekte -- Between Utility and Rights / Hart, H. L. A. -- The Utilitarian Logic of Liberalism / Hardin, Russell -- Freiheit, Normen und operatives Gerichtsverfahren / Roberts, Julian -- 4. Teil Postmoderne Freiheit -- The Subject and Power / Foucault, Michel --,Nachmetaphysische Ethik' oder: die Freiheit, seine Moral selbst zu wählen / Scheit, Herbert -- Die Kontingenz eines liberalen Gemeinwesens / Rorty, Richard -- 5. Teil Entscheidungstheoretische Aspekte -- Individualrechte ernst - aber nicht unangemessen ernst genommen / Trapp, Rainer Werner -- Grundlinien einer Theorie gesellschaftlicher Freiheit / Koller, Peter -- Positionen und Rechte: Drei Lösungen des Liberalen Paradoxons / Kern, Lucian / Nida-Rümelin, Julian -- Zur Bedeutung von Freiheitsrechten für die moralische Beurteilung kollektiver Entscheidungen / Nida-Rümelin, Martine -- Quellennachweise -- Backmatter. (shrink)

The book series Linguistische Arbeiten (LA) publishes high-quality work in linguistics that addresses current issues in synchrony and diachrony, theoretically or empirically oriented.

Ethik und Seelsorge sind Bereiche, in denen menschliches Sein und Handeln reflektierend begleitet wird, um Orientierung, Unterstützung oder Trost zu geben. Bei Berufen, in denen Menschen auf eine gewaltverstrickte Lebenswelt treffen, ihrerseits staatlich legitimiert Gewalt ausüben und selbst von Gewalt betroffen sind, tauchen dabei besondere Widersprüche und Sinnfragen auf. Diese Herausforderungen in den Blick zu nehmen und an der Schnittstelle von Philosophie und praktischer Theologie zu erörtern, so wie es der Münsteraner Theologe Werner Schiewek richtungsweisend vorgezeichnet hat, ist das (...) Ziel des vorliegenden Bandes. (shrink)

Mitte der 80er Jahre bildete sich an der Universitat-Gesamthochschule Pader born eine Diskussionsgruppe, die unzufrieden daIiiber war, wie mit Vielfalt bzw. Alternativen in den Kulturwissenschaften umgegangen wird. Diese Unzufriedenheit bezog sieh auf die verschiedensten Gebiete. Selbst dort, wo vielfiiltige Positionen in Forschung und Lehre dargestellt werden, geschieht dies selten systematisch vergleichend. Auch werden hierbei keine Methoden entwickelt, die herausfinden lassen, ob es sieh bei den verschiedenen Positio nen urn Alternativen handelt und wie unter ihnen gegebeneofalls LOsungen als die vorerst besten (...) auszuzeichnen sind. Ohne Klarung dieses Problemkreises istnicht zu sehen, in welchem AusmaB wissenschaftliches Wissen zu verant worten ist. Angesiehts der grundlegenden technischen Herausforderungen und der Bedeu tung des wissenschaftlichen Wissens hierfiir wurde die Frage drangend, wie die angesprochene Lage zu verbessern sei. Es stellte sieh bald heraus, daB es sinnvoll sein muBte, einen neuen Typ einer wissenschaftlichen Diskussions zeitschrift zu griinden, die nieht nur Forschungen prasentiert, sondern selbst als Forschungsprojekt fur die Suche nach einem besseren Umgang mit Alternativenkonzipiertist. Ende der80erJahregriindetesieheineInitiativgruppe fur die Zeitschrift 'Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften' und konstituierte die FORSCHUNGSGRUPPE ERW AGUNGSKULTIJR, die seit 1990 diese Zeitschrift heraus gibt und Forschungsergebnisse in Arbeitspapieren veroffentlicht. Ergebnisse der Forschungen dieser Gruppe sind in diesem Band abgedruckt. (shrink)

The book introduces a conception of discourse ethics, an intersubjectivist version of Kantian ethics. Analyzing contributions from Jürgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel, Wolfgang Kuhlmann, Albrecht Wellmer, Robert Alexy, Klaus Günther, Rainer Forst, Marcel Niquet and others, it reconstructs critical discussions on the justification of the principle of morality (part I) and on the various proposals on how to apply it (part II). It defends an alternative model of how discourse ethics can provide guidance under non-ideal circumstances and avoid both arbitrariness (...) and rigorism. (shrink)

Der Forschung gelaufig ist die Rede von einer ersten (5./4. Jh. v. Chr.) und der sog. Zweiten Sophistik (2. Jh. n. Chr). Aber auch die Literatur des Hellenismus und der fruhen Kaiserzeit kennt zahlreiche Sophisten. Der Sophist, verstanden als (schlechter) Lehrer und Redner, Gegenspieler des Philosophen oder Vertreter der griechischen Bildung, bildet deshalb den Dreh-und Angelpunkt der Beitrage, die Schlaglichter auf Orte, Methoden und Personen der Bildungsvermittlung werfen. Die Beitrage zeigen, wie pagane und judische Denker, Platoniker und Stoiker Bildung als (...) Weg zum richtigen Welt- und Gottesverstandnis verstehen. Mit Beitragen von: Christian Fron, Marco Galli, Johann Goeken, Stefanie Holder, Alexandra Michalewski, Peter Scholz, Paul Schubert, Gregory E. Sterling, Werner Urbanz, Beatrice Wys. (shrink)

Fontane Effi Briest by the German director Rainer Werner Fassbinder is arguably one of the greatest adaptations from literature to screen, and the best Effi Briest adaptation. Although the first reception of the movie, when it appeared in 1974, was not without unmixed reviews, most scholars nowadays share the conviction that it is a masterpiece. Elke Siegel defines the film as a success both at the Berlinale and at the box office. Kreft Wetzel, however, in an interview with (...) Fassbinder in 1974, refers to the ambivalent attitude of the critics abroad at the time of the movie‘s release, to which Fassbinder replies that Fontane‘s language is the foundation of the movie and, hence, the film works to its full extent only in German. Forty years after this interview and judging from the scholarly work carried out on Fassbinder in general and Fontane Effi Briest in particular, it is plausible to claim that Fassbinder‘s art has moved beyond the language barriers and appeals to an audience beyond the German culture and language. (shrink)

The article starts from an examination of the authorship of the ‘Geleitwort’, the programmatic statement which appeared in the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft when it came under new editors in 1904. Recently scholars have begun to view it as an important text by Max Weber recovered from obscurity, but this is a mistake. Examination of major contemporary works by Weber and Werner Sombart – the obvious co-author – as well as the first public disclosure of an entirely new MS. by (...) Weber, show that in all probability the text was drafted by Sombart and then revised fairly lightly by Weber. This story of a combined, if unequal, authorship leads into two broader seams of intellectual history: the relationship between Weber and Sombart, and the history of the Archiv as a journal. An unusual starting point thus casts fresh and unexpected light on some of the most central figures and episodes in German social science at the beginning of the 20th century, not least Weber's seminal essay on “Objectivity” in social science. ☆ This paper relies on intellectual interchange and the generosity of colleagues to a quite unusual degree. I note three particular debts: to Prof. Friedrich Lenger, for a copy of Sombart's important 1897 essay on ‘Social Scientific Journals’; to Prof. Guenther Roth for letter transcripts bearing on the Archiv from and to Edgar Jaffé, and for showing me in draft his ground-breaking work ‘Edgar Jaffé and Else von Richthofen: a biographical essay based on the family archive of Christopher Jeffrey’ [hereafter ‘Biographical Essay]; and to Dr. Edith Hanke and Prof. Rainer Lepsius (on behalf of the Max Weber Gesamtausgabe). Dr. Hanke brought to my notice the existence of the MS. which I have called Weber's draft Editorial Notice (see §.IV below), and Prof. Lepsius then gave permission for me to see and to cite from this document. — Some abbreviations: AfSS for Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik; AfGS for Archiv für Soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik; Lebensbild for Marianne Weber, Max Weber. Ein Lebensbild [1926] (Tübingen, 1989); MWG for Max Weber Gesamtausgabe ed. Horst Baier et al. (Tübingen, 1984-). Letters by Weber within the MWG are cited as Briefe; ‘Nachlaß Max Weber’ for unpublished letters in the Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, VI. HA Nachlaß Max Weber. (shrink)

The present collection of essays brings into dialogue Pier Paolo Pasolini (1922-1975) and Rainer Werner Fassbinder (1945-1982) by comparing their cultural and intellectual legacy. Pasolini and Fassbinder are amongst the last radical filmmakers to have emerged in Europe. Born in Italy and Germany, they inherited a traumatic social and political past which is reflected in their works through a number of similarly articulated and unresolved tensions: high and popular cultures, theatre, literature and cinema, ideology and narration, major and (...) minor codes of expression. The essays in this book examine the uncompromising character of Pasolini's and Fassbinder's films. Constantly oscillating between utopia and nihilism, these works invite us to reconsider subjective and collective questions which from today's perspective seem lost forever. (shrink)

Interactive social cognition theory and approaches of developmental psychology widely agree that central aspects of emotional and social experience arise in the unfolding of processes of embodied social interaction. Bi-directional dynamical couplings of bodily displays such as facial expressions, gestures, and vocalizations have repeatedly been described in terms of coordination, synchrony, mimesis, or attunement. In this paper, I propose conceptualizing such dynamics rather as processes of affective resonance. Starting from the immediate phenomenal experience of being immersed in interaction, I develop (...) the philosophical notion of affective resonance to refer to a dynamic entanglement of moving and being-moved in relation. The concept of affective resonance makes visible that the interaction dynamic itself creates an affective experience rather than transmitting internal feeling states between pre-existent individuals. This leads to a philosophical framework in which relationality and ontogeny are primary over separate individuals, and in which the naturalistic distinction of a fundamental physical level versus an emerging level of social processes has to be given up. (shrink)

Data analytics and data-driven approaches in Machine Learning are now among the most hailed computing technologies in many industrial domains. One major application is predictive analytics, which is used to predict sensitive attributes, future behavior, or cost, risk and utility functions associated with target groups or individuals based on large sets of behavioral and usage data. This paper stresses the severe ethical and data protection implications of predictive analytics if it is used to predict sensitive information about single individuals or (...) treat individuals differently based on the data many unrelated individuals provided. To tackle these concerns in an applied ethics, first, the paper introduces the concept of “predictive privacy” to formulate an ethical principle protecting individuals and groups against differential treatment based on Machine Learning and Big Data analytics. Secondly, it analyses the typical data processing cycle of predictive systems to provide a step-by-step discussion of ethical implications, locating occurrences of predictive privacy violations. Thirdly, the paper sheds light on what is qualitatively new in the way predictive analytics challenges ethical principles such as human dignity and the (liberal) notion of individual privacy. These new challenges arise when predictive systems transform statistical inferences, which provide knowledge about the cohort of training data donors, into individual predictions, thereby crossing what I call the “prediction gap”. Finally, the paper summarizes that data protection in the age of predictive analytics is a collective matter as we face situations where an individual’s (or group’s) privacy is violated using dataotherindividuals provide about themselves, possibly even anonymously. (shrink)

This paper sets out the notion of a current “biopolitical turn of digital capitalism” resulting from the increasing deployment of AI and data analytics technologies in the public sector. With applications of AI-based automated decisions currently shifting from the domain of business to customer (B2C) relations to government to citizen (G2C) relations, a new form of governance arises that operates through “algorithmic social selection”. Moreover, the paper describes how the ethics of AI is at an impasse concerning these larger societal (...) and socioeconomic trends and calls for an ethics of AI that includes, and acts in close alliance with, social and political philosophy. As an example, the problem of Predictive Analytics is debated to make the point that data-driven AI (Machine Learning) is currently one of the main ethical challenges in the ethics of AI. (shrink)

Contents: Foreword. Wolfgang BALZER and C. ULISES MOULINES: Introduction. José A. DÍEZ CALZADA: Structuralist Analysis of Theories of Fundamental Measurement. Adolfo GARCÍA DE LA SIENRA and Pedro REYES: The Theory of Finite Games in Extensive Form. Hans Joachim BURSCHEID und Horst STRUVE: The Theory of Stochastic Fairness - its Historical Development, Formulation and Justification. Wolfgang BALZER and Richard MATTESSICH: Formalizing the Basis of Accounting. Werner DIEDERICH: A Reconstruction of Marxian Economics. Bert HAMMINGA and Wolfgang BALZER: The Basic Structure of (...) Neoclassical General Equilibrium Theory. Klaus MANHART: Balance Theories: Two Reconstructions and the Problem of Intended Applications. Rainer WESTERMANN: Festinger's Theory of Cognitive Dissonance: A Structuralist Theory-Net. Rainer REISENZEIN: Wundt's Three-Dimensional Theory of Emotion. Pablo LORENZANO: Classical Genetics and the Theory-Net of Genetics. Hinne HETTEMA and Theo A.F. KUIPERS: The Formalisation of the Periodic Table. C. ULISES MOULINES: The Basic Core of Simple Equilibrium Thermodynamics. Thomas BARTELBORTH: An Axiomatization of Classical Electrodynamics. Author's Index. Subject Index. (shrink)

In nine essays and lectures composed in the last years of his life, Werner Heisenberg offers a bold appraisal of the scientific method in the twentieth century--and relates its philosophical impact on contemporary society and science to the particulars of molecular biology, astrophysics, and related disciplines. Are the problems we define and pursue freely chosen according to our conscious interests? Or does the historical process itself determine which phenomena merit examination at any one time? Heisenberg discusses these issues in (...) the most far-ranging philosophical terms, while illustrating them with specific examples. (shrink)

Proponents of impure moral perception claim that, while there are perceptual moral experiences, these experiences epistemically depend on a priori moral knowledge. Proponents of pure moral perception claim that moral experiences can justify independently of substantive a priori moral knowledge. Some philosophers, most notably David Faraci, have argued that the pure view is mistaken, since moral perception requires previous moral background knowledge, and such knowledge could not itself be perceptual. I defend pure moral perception against this objection. I consider two (...) ways to understand the notion of “background knowledge” that is crucial to the objection. On a reading, the claim that background knowledge is necessary for moral perception is likely false. On a second and weaker reading, the claim is true, but the background knowledge in question could be perceptual, and thus compatible with pure moral perception. Thus, the objection fails. (shrink)

This volume has its already distant or1g1n in an inter national conference on Evolutionary Epistemology the editors organized at the University of Ghent in November 1984. This conference aimed to follow up the endeavor started at the ERISS (Epistemologically Relevant Internalist Sociology of Science) conference organized by Don Campbell and Alex Rosen berg at Cazenovia Lake, New York, in June 1981, whilst in jecting the gist of certain current continental intellectual developments into a debate whose focus, we thought, was in (...) danger of being narrowed too much, considering the still underdeveloped state of affairs in the field. Broadly speaking, evolutionary epistemology today con sists of two interrelated, yet qualitatively distinct inves tigative efforts. Both are drawing on Darwinian concepts, which may explain why many people have failed to discriminate them. One is the study of the evolution of the cognitive apparatus of living organisms, which is first and foremost the province of biologists and psychologists (H. C. Plotkin, Ed. , Learning, Development, and Culture: Essays in Evolu tionary Epistemology, New York, Wiley, 1984), although quite a few philosophers - professional or vocational - have also felt the need to express themselves on this vast subject (F. M. Wuketits, Ed. , Conce ts and Approaches in Evolutionary Epistemology, Dordrecht Boston, Reidel, 1984). The other approach deals with the evolution of science, and has been dominated hitherto by (allegedly) 'naturalized' philosophers; no book-length survey of this literature is available at present. (shrink)

Imagine coming across an alternative community such that, while they have normative terms like 'ought' with the same action-guiding roles and relationships to each other, their normative terms come to pick out different properties. When we come across such a community, or even just imagine it, those of us who strive to be moral and rational want to ask something like the following: Further Question: Which set of concepts ought we use—theirs or ours? The problem, first raised by Eklund, is (...) that on almost any metasemantic theory, Further Question cannot be stated in a way that captures the spirit of what we want to ask. This is because any way of asking the question makes use of our own normative concepts, and thus their reference is already fixed on the properties that our current normative concepts refer to. Any purported solution to this problem must meet two conditions. First, it must capture the spirit of what Further Question is intuitively attempting to ask. Second, it must reframe the inquiry in a way that makes the answer neither trivial nor ineffable. In this paper, I propose a solution to this problem by appeal to edenic representation, inspired by, but not identical to, Chalmers’ notion of edenic content. The rough idea here is that representation is edenic to the extent that the representational vehicle mirrors, in quality and structure, the represented property. I argue that a reframing of Further Question in terms of edenic representation can capture the spirit of the question, without collapsing it into a question with a trivial or ineffable answer. Thus, the realist about normative properties can face the problem of the alternative normative community head on, without collapsing into incoherence or triviality. If correct, this solution is of further interest to any metanormative realist concerned with metasemantic questions, because it can tell us more about how the proper representation of the robustly normative would look. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue, first, that Hegel defended a version of the analytic/synthetic distinction—that, indeed, his version of the distinction deserves to be called Kantian. For both Kant and Hegel, the analytic/synthetic distinction can be explained in terms of the discursive character of cognition: insofar as our cognition is discursive, its most basic form can be articulated in terms of a genus/species tree. The structure of that tree elucidates the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Second, I argue that (...) Hegel has an interesting and so far unexplored argument for the analytic/synthetic distinction: Hegel argues that the systematic relationship between concepts expressed in a genus/species tree can only be expressed through synthetic judgments. Third and finally, I explore some of the implications that the arguments in the first two parts of the essay have for understanding the way in which Hegel differs from Kant. I argue that Hegel accepts Kant's point that discursive cognition cannot be used to cognize the absolute. However, Hegel thinks that we can, nevertheless, cognize the absolute. I explore the character of this non-discursive cognition and argue that we can understand Hegel's glosses on this form of cognition—as simultaneously analytic and synthetic and as having a circular structure—through contrasting it with his account of discursive cognition. As a consequence, I argue that we must give up on attempts to understand ‘the dialectical method’ and ‘speculative cognition’ on the model of discursive cognition. (shrink)