In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological CategoryMax RosenkrantzThomas Dixon. From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. x + 287. Cloth, $60.00Thomas Dixon's From Passions to Emotions defends a provocative set of theses. (1) The concept of "emotion" is of relatively recent vintage, having been designed by secular Scottish writers in the first half (...) of the nineteenth century. (2) That concept embraces a range of phenomena that earlier Christian writers such as Augustine and Aquinas understood in terms of a manifold of concepts such as "appetites," "passions," "affections," and "sentiments." (3) The concept of "emotion" is too crude an instrument for understanding human psychology. Further, (4) today the secular conceptual framework has completely displaced the religious one. This has nothing to do with the former's greater proximity to the truth, as is shown by the persistence of cogent Christian theories in the second half of the nineteenth century, the period of secularism's triumph; and (5) The opposition between reason and emotion arises only when theorists begin to think of "emotions" rather than "appetites," "passions," "affections," and "sentiments." Christian writers did not see the passions as simply the enemies of reason.The basis for Dixon's argument is his interpretation of nineteenth-century psychological theory in the English speaking world. Specifically he argues that the concept of "emotion" was invented by the Scottish thinker Thomas Brown (1778-1820). Brown's innovation was then appropriated and developed by Spencer, Darwin, and William James. The foil for this story is the Christian tradition represented most compellingly by Augustine and Aquinas and carried on by a host of lesser nineteenth-century figures. In my judgment, the story thus told cannot bear the weight Dixon places upon it.The centerpiece of Dixon's argument is his claim that Brown "invents" (109) the emotions and thereby initiates a conceptual revolution in western thought. While Dixon may be right in asserting that Brown is the first to use the word 'emotion' in a systematic fashion, this achievement is merely terminological. Brown deploys the term to develop a mechanistic account of human nature, one in which the springs of action are located not in the will and reason, but in the emotions. Replace 'emotion' in the preceding sentence with 'passion' and one gets a concise characterization of Hobbes's view. Dixon is aware that Brown and others work within a Hobbesian framework (250) but does not attend to that framework. Thus his claims for the significance of the developments he describes fail to convince. The real innovation in psychological theory—as in so much else—took place in the seventeenth century.Just as Dixon overestimates the importance and originality of the Scottish writers he discusses, so too he overestimates the intellectual importance of Augustine and Aquinas. His presentation of their views (26-62) is accurate, but he does not note that they take over the Platonic-Aristotelian view of the soul according to which reason can and should penetrate, educate and direct the passions. Thus the guiding thought that structures the work—the nineteenth century witnesses an ultimately successful revolt against Christian psychology—must be rejected. The revolt is against ancient, pre-Christian modes of thought and is undertaken and largely won in the seventeenth century. The events Dixon describes are skirmishes in that larger campaign.The rest of the theses Dixon defends can be dispatched with more quickly. The idea that the modern concept of "emotion" is insufficiently subtle is averted to frequently, but never adequately defended. At no point does Dixon demonstrate, or even claim to demonstrate, that Christian thinkers recognized something secular thinkers miss. Roughly the same can be said for his claims about the persistence of Christian psychology in the nineteenth century. What Dixon means is not just that such thinkers exist, but that their thought remains vibrant. Again I see no argument for such a verdict. Finally, there is the matter of the opposition between reason and passion. To his credit Dixon rejects the view according to which almost all Western thought is hostile to the passions. As he shows, this... (shrink)

Recent scholarship holds that unfulfilled definite descriptions do not play a role in motivating Russell’s theory of descriptions. In this paper, I make use of Gustav Bergmann’s ideal language method to develop an interpretation that restores the puzzle raised by ‘the King of France’ to the central place it once occupied in discussions of the theory of descriptions. In restoring ‘the King of France’, I show that Russell’s discussion of the problem it raises provides a decisive argument against Fregean senses, (...) a claim that also runs counter to most recent work on the theory of descriptions. (shrink)

This paper presents a detailed exegesis of Russell’s “Gray’s Elegy Argument”. It holds that the GEA mounts a successful attack on Frege—a thesis that has been widely controverted in the literature. The point of departure for my interpretation is Russell’s charge that it is impossible to speak about Sinne, or “meanings” as Russell calls them. I argue that the charge concerns the construction of an “ideal language.” For Russell, an ideal language is an artificial schema designed to represent the truth-makers (...) for sentences occurring in natural language. Its signs stand for the entities that are constituents of those truth-makers. Russell’s charge can thus be expressed more clearly and completely as follows: an ideal language designed to express Frege’s ontology requires signs for meanings ; however, the signs introduced for that purpose cannot be correlated with the entities they are supposed to represent. Thus, the requirement cannot be met. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Russell's “On Denoting” is a work in ontology, not the philosophy of language or logic. Specifically, I claim that it addresses two ontological problems: (1) What is the proper analysis of the truth‐makers for sentences containing definite descriptions? (2) What is the proper analysis of the connection between those sentences and their truth‐makers?

ABSTRACT Frege presents the eponymous distinction of "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" as a correction to the theory of identity he held in the Begriffsschrift.1 His retrospective assessment has prompted different reactions from commentators. Many have simply taken him at his word.2 Others, who have lingered over the relevant texts, have encountered a difficulty: in the Begriffsschrift Frege appears to raise the same problem with which he begins USB and to respond to it in words that are strikingly similar to those (...) found in the later work.3 Thus, a number of important scholars have been led to argue that Frege misrepresents his earlier view: contrary to what he says in USB, the Begriffsschrift already contains the distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung.4 Despite their obvious differences, the logic of both interpretations requires that the two works be responsive to the same problem. In this paper I challenge that fundamental premise.5 If I might be allowed to express my thesis tersely but suggestively: the problem of the Begriffsschrift is epistemological; that of USB, ontological.6 The two problems and Frege's solutions to them shall be explained in what follows. (shrink)

It is universally agreed that in the “Gray’s Elegy Argument” (GEA) Russell raises a difficulty for the attempt to “speak about” meanings (the phrase is Russell’s) and that the difficulty, assuming it to be genuine, shows the very notion of meaning to be unintelligible. In this paper I try to show that in the GEA Russell considers and rejects an alternative way of manifesting an understanding of meanings—namely, by “dealing with” them (also Russell’s phrase). This step in the GEA has (...) not, so far as I am aware, been noticed before. (shrink)

In this article I argue that Russell's multiple-relation theory of judgment is a continuation of the campaign against Frege and Meinong begun in “On Denoting” with the theory of descriptions. More precisely, I hold that the problem of false belief, to which the multiple-relation theory is presented as a solution, emerges quite naturally out of the problem context of “On Denoting” and threatens to give new life to the theories Russell purports to have laid to rest there, and that Russell's (...) solution to the much neglected third puzzle of “On Denoting” contains the gist of the multiple-relation theory. The failure of that theory to solve the problem of false belief thus signifies the failure of the theory of descriptions. (shrink)

In this article I construe Russell's definite description notation as a fragment of an "ideal language"– a language in which, as Russell puts it in the "Logical Atomism" lectures, "the words in a proposition correspond one by one with the components of the corresponding fact." Russell's notation – containing as it does variables, quantifiers and the identity sign – commits him to an ontology that is lavish indeed. It thus conflicts with the spirit of the theory of descriptions, which is (...) developed in the service of ontological frugality. I make use of arguments derived from the Tractatus to show that an ideal language need not contain logical signs. I thus defend the spirit of the theory of descriptions while departing from its letter. (shrink)

This volume is an invaluable resource for student and scholar alike.

The Protestant ethic — a moral code stressing hard work, rigorous self-discipline, and the organization of one's life in the service of God — was made famous by sociologist and political economist Max Weber. In this brilliant study (his best-known and most controversial), he opposes the Marxist concept of dialectical materialism and its view that change takes place through "the struggle of opposites." Instead, he relates the rise of a capitalist economy to the Puritan determination to work out anxiety over (...) salvation or damnation by performing good deeds — an effort that ultimately discouraged belief in predestination and encouraged capitalism. Weber's classic study has long been required reading in college and advanced high school social studies classrooms. (shrink)

This book grew out of previously published papers of mine composed over a period of years; they have been reworked (sometimes beyond recognition) so as to form a reasonably coherent whole. Part One treats of informative inference. I argue (Chapter 2) that the traditional principle of induction in its clearest formulation (that laws are confirmed by their positive cases) is clearly false. Other formulations in terms of the 'uniformity of nature' or the 'resemblance of the future to the past' seem (...) to me hopelessly unclear. From a Bayesian point of view, 'learning from experience' goes by conditionalization (Bayes' rule). The traditional stum bling block for Bayesians has been to fmd objective probability inputs to conditionalize upon. Subjective Bayesians allow any probability inputs that do not violate the usual axioms of probability. Many subjectivists grant that this liberality seems prodigal but own themselves unable to think of additional constraints that might plausibly be imposed. To be sure, if we could agree on the correct probabilistic representation of 'ignorance' (or absence of pertinent data), then all probabilities obtained by applying Bayes' rule to an 'informationless' prior would be objective. But familiar contra dictions, like the Bertrand paradox, are thought to vitiate all attempts to objectify 'ignorance'. BuUding on the earlier work of Sir Harold Jeffreys, E. T. Jaynes, and the more recent work ofG. E. P. Box and G. E. Tiao, I have elected to bite this bullet. In Chapter 3, I develop and defend an objectivist Bayesian approach. (shrink)

I explore physics implications of the External Reality Hypothesis (ERH) that there exists an external physical reality completely independent of us humans. I argue that with a sufficiently broad definition of mathematics, it implies the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH) that our physical world is an abstract mathematical structure. I discuss various implications of the ERH and MUH, ranging from standard physics topics like symmetries, irreducible representations, units, free parameters, randomness and initial conditions to broader issues like consciousness, parallel universes and (...) Gödel incompleteness. I hypothesize that only computable and decidable (in Gödel’s sense) structures exist, which alleviates the cosmological measure problem and may help explain why our physical laws appear so simple. I also comment on the intimate relation between mathematical structures, computations, simulations and physical systems. (shrink)

I am happy to report that serious metaphysics is alive and well in the work of Jonathan Lowe. His recent book The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time is a major contribution to analytical metaphysics; it confirms Lowe’s standing as a leading figure in the field.

Upon Scheler’ s death in 1928, Martin Heidegger remarked that he was the most important force in philosophy at the time. Jose Ortega y Gasset called Scheler "the first man of the philosophical paradise." The Human Place in the Cosmos, the last of his works Scheler completed, is a pivotal piece in the development of his writing as a whole, marking a peculiar shift in his approach and thought. He had been asked to provide an initial sketch of his much (...) larger works on philosophical anthropology and metaphysics--works he was not able to complete because of his early demise. Frings' new translation of this key work allows us to read and understand Scheler's thought within current philosophical debates and interests. The book addresses two main questions: What is the human being? And what is the place of the human being in the universe? Scheler responds to these questions within contexts of said two projected much larger works but not without reference to scientific research. He covers various levels of being: inorganic reality, organic reality (including plant life and psychological life), all the way up to practical intelligence and the spiritual dimension of human beings, and touching upon the holy. Negotiating two intertwined levels of being, life-energy ("impulsion") and "spirit," this work marks not only a critical moment in the development of his own philosophy but also a significant contribution to the current discussions of continental and analytic philosophers on the nature of the person. (shrink)

Max Schelers Magnum Opus aus dem Jahr 1913/16 kann als der gründlichste und umfassendste Entwurf einer am Personenbegriff orientierten und auf die Objektivität von Werten setzenden Ethik angesehen werden. Vor dem Hintergrund der Phänomenologie Husserls und in kritisch distanzierender Würdigung der Kantischen Philosophie entwickelt Scheler die Grundlagen der Praktischen Philosophie, indem er die Fülle der menschlichen Wirklichkeit in all ihren Facetten ernst nimmt, um sie zugleich vor dem Hintergrund eines materialen Wertaprioris verständlich zu machen. Die Kritik an formalen Ethikentwürfen und (...) die Zurückweisung von utilitaristischen Ansätzen entwickelt sich vor dem Hintergrund einer subtilen Diskussion des Wertbegriffs, einer höchst differenzierten Analyse der Rangordnung von Werten und einer Phänomenologie der Person, die bis heute einschlägig und wirksam ist. Neben dem Gesamtentwurf besticht die Schelersche Schrift durch feingliedrige phänomenologische Analysen zu einzelnen Fragestellungen, die auch nach einem Jahrhundert nicht an Brisanz verloren haben. Hierzu zählen u.a. die Ausführungen zur Leiblichkeit, die Diskussion der Gefühle oder die Konzeption des Liebesbegriffs. Hundert Jahre nach der Erstveröffentlichung 1913/1916 erscheint Schelers Hauptwerk in einer kritischen Fassung als Ausgabe letzter Hand. Der Text wird durch eine Einleitung und einen editorischen Bericht sowie Begriffs-, Personen- und Literaturregister erschlossen. Zudem werden nachträglich eingefügte Änderungen am Text ausgewiesen sowie unvollständige Angaben ergänzt bzw. Verweise und Anspielungen durch Herausgeberanmerkungen kommentiert. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Recent Relativism Standard Semantics and Ordinary Truth Relativist Semantics and Ordinary Truth Issues of Commensurability References.

Das Buchbeinhaltet Max Webers vollständige Schriften zu wissenschaftlichen und politischen Berufen: „Wissenschaft als Beruf”, die Artikel zu Hochschulen, und „Politik als Beruf”. Die Einleitung des Herausgebers verbindet beide Berufe konzeptionell und in der Person Max Webers. Die Verwendung von C. G. Jungs psychologischer Typentheorie, die durch den Myers-Briggs Typindikator (MBTI) weiterentwickelt wurde, wird ein Verständnis seines Persönlichkeitstypus ermöglicht. Das Buch ist die überarbeitete und aktualisierte Auflage der englischen Ausgabe „Max Weber’s Complete Writings on Academic and Political Vocations”. In der zweiten (...) Auflage des Bandes wurde die Einleitung um einige Analysen von Webers Schriften erweitert. Außerdem wurden zwei weitere Artikel aufgenommen und die Bibliographie um einige bedeutsame Werke ergänzt. Einleitung und englische Kommentare wurden einheitlich neu übersetzt. (shrink)

Heidegger, M. Andenken an Max Scheler.--Gadamer, H.-G. Max Scheler, der Verschwender.--Plessner, H. Erinnerungen an Max Scheler.--Kuhn, H. Max Scheler als Faust.--Dempf, A. Schelers System christlicher Geistphilosophie als Grundlage einer religiösen Erneuerung.--Scheler, M. Neun Briefe an Karl Muth.--Rombach, H. Die Erfahrung der Freiheit.--Landgrebe, L. Geschichtsphilosophische Perspektiven bei Scheler und Husserl.--Theunissen, M. Wettersturm und Stille.--Good, P. Anschauung und Sprache.--Welsch, W. Mit Scheler.--Avé-Lallement, E. Die phänomenologische Reduktion in der Philosophie Max Schelers.--Gehlen, A. Rückblick auf die Anthropologie Max Schelers.--Schoeps, H. J. Die Stellung des (...) Menschen im Kosmos.--Ströker, E. Der Tod im Denken Max Schelers.--Wyss, D. und Huppmann, G. Die Bedeutung Max Schelers für die Medizinische Anthropologie.--Lieber, H.-J. Bemerkungen zur Wissenssoziologie Max Schelers.--Fetscher, I. Max Schelers Auffassung von Krieg und Frieden.--Bochenski, J. M. Ist die Sprache Schelers in eine analytische übersetzbar? (shrink)

Addressing six primary philosophical concerns - the self, reality, epistemology, ethics, politics and religion, this text contains not only many readings from the Western canon, but essential readings from many cultural perspectives not typically included in introductory philosophy classes as well.

Many environmentalists believe that religion has been a major contributor to our ecological crisis, for Judeo-Christians have been taught that they have dominion over the earth and so do not consider themselves part of a biotic community. In this book a philosopher of environmental ethics acknowledges that religion may contribute to environmental problems but argues that religion can also play an important role in solving these problems―that religion can provide an ethical context that will help people to become sensitive to (...) the environment and to elect leaders who are genuinely responsive to the ecological crisis. Examining a broad range of Western religious traditions―from conservative Christianity and orthodox Judaism to Goddess feminism and nature religion―Max Oelschlaeger provides a sociolinguistic analysis of their creation stories and finds environmentally positive aspects in each of them. He asserts that religious discourse in the public arena can offer a way for such environmental issues as biodiversity, pollution, and population to be addressed outside the realm of special-interest politics. And he urges local churches to make "caring for creation" a theme for worship in their services; the majority of Americans, says Oelschlaeger, will discover an environmental ethic only through their religious faith. (shrink)

Many theorists have defended the claim that collective entities can attain genuine agential status. If collectives can be agents, this opens up a further question: can they be conscious? That is, is there something that it is like to be them? Eric Schwitzgebel argues that yes, collective entities, may well be significantly conscious. Others, including Kammerer, Tononi and Koch, and List reject the claim. List does so on the basis of Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory of consciousness. I argue here that (...) List’s rejection is too quick, and that groups can, at least in principle, display the kind of informational integration we might think is necessary for consciousness. However, group consciousness will likely differ substantially from the individual experiences that give rise to it. This requires the defender of group consciousness to face up to a similar combination problem as the panpsychist. (shrink)

In a recent issue of this journal, Benjamin Schnieder has presented an objection to the account of individual substance that we have developed and put to various uses in our works on metaphysics. According to Schnieder's objection, our proposal to analyse this notion of substantiality suffers from a special kind of circularity. In this paper, we give two replies to Schnieder's objection. The first is that a successful analysis is not, in fact, required to avoid the sort of circularity about (...) which Schnieder complains. The second is that our analysis does not involve the alleged circularity. (shrink)

The Nordic PhD: Surviving and Succeeding is an edited book written for prospective and current doctoral students by a mix of doctoral students and those who have recently completed their doctorates. The premise is simple: if you could go back in time and talk with yourself when you began your studies, what advice would you give? Isn't hindsight a bonus? If only I knew then what I know now! The Nordic PhD: Surviving and Succeeding follows editions focused on study in (...) Aotearoa New Zealand, Australia, the U.K., U.S., and South Africa. What sets The Nordic PhD: Surviving and Succeeding apart from many others on the market is its down-to-earth and practical approach. Furthermore, its originality also lies in the fact that it is grounded in the context of doctoral studies in the Nordic countries. (shrink)

In diesem Band der Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe werden Webers Texte zum asketischen Protestantismus aus den Jahren 1904 bis 1906 in ihrer überarbeiteten Fassung, wie er sie 1919/20 zum Druck gab, zusammen mit der »Vorbemerkung« in historisch-kritischer Bearbeitung präsentiert. Diese »Vorbemerkung« stellte er an den Beginn seiner Sammlung religionssoziologischer Aufsätze, die vier Bände umfassen sollte, und legte darin den Zweck dieser Sammlung dar.

An important contribution to the foundations of probability theory, statistics and statistical physics has been made by E. T. Jaynes. The recent publication of his collected works provides an appropriate opportunity to attempt an assessment of this contribution.

Utilitarians think that what matters in ethics is making the world a better place. In that case, it might seem that we each rationally ought to do our best—perform the actions, out of those open to each of us, with the best expected outcomes. In other words, we should follow act-utilitarian reasons. But often the result of many altruistic agents following such individualistic reasons is worse than the result of them following collectivist ‘team-reasons’. So utilitarians should reject act utilitarianism, and (...) accept a dualist view according to which both individualistic and team reasons are fundamental. In order to align these distinct kinds of reason, utilitarians must focus centrally on questions of political and social reform—as did their historical forebears. (shrink)