This monograph on the capability approach does two things. First, it provides an advanced introduction to the capability approach, as an account used in philosophy, as well as other disciplines. Second, it provides an account of the capability approach which is able to encompass all existing views and theories on the capability approach, including the writings on the capability approach by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen.

In _The Idealism of Freedom_, Klaus Vieweg argues for a Hegelian turn in philosophy: Hegel’s idealism of freedom contains a number of epoch-making ideas that articulate a new understanding of freedom, which still shape contemporary philosophy.

Eighteenth-century theologian_Jonathan Edwards remains a significant influence on modern religion, and this book constitutes his most important contribution to Christian thought. Edwards_raises timeless questions about desire, choice, good, and evil, contrasting the opposing Calvinist and Arminian views of free will and addressing issues related to God's foreknowledge, determinism, and moral agency.

A first in English, this book engages with the ways in which Hegel and Sartre answer the difficult questions: What is it to be human? What place do we have in the world? How should we live? What can we be?

Moral Images of Freedom resurrects the Kantian project of affirmative political philosophy and traces its oft-forgotten influences found in thinkers like Martin Heidegger, Ernst Cassirer, Frantz Fanon, and Walter Benjamin. As a whole the book attempts to respond to nihilistic claims about the empty purpose of critical theory in a world so utterly captured by violence in all of its worst forms: economic, social, political, and cultural. Instead, this book draws together a sweeping thread of hope in the varied (...) symbolic forms of freedom persistent throughout the work of a broader range of critical theorists and addresses the burning challenge for such work to respond seriously to the need for a decolonization of critical theory itself and a sustained commitment to the possible future of socialism. (shrink)

Freedom, and in particular, the freedom of human beings, is a hot topic within the field of metaphysics. In this paper, instead of arguing for the truth of a particular position on freedom, I explore whether a particular position, compatibilism, might be consistent with the existence of moral responsibility and retributive justice. To alleviate ambiguity, I construct a model by which the four primary positions on freedom might be clearly understood. I then distinguish between what I (...) call ‘common-sense’ views of moral responsibility, and ‘complex’ views of moral responsibility. I select a particular complex view, which I term the ‘virtue’ theory of moral responsibility, offer some justification for the sensibility of such a theory, and demonstrate how the virtue theory is consistent with compatibilism. Finally, I propose that retributive justice is consistent with the virtue theory of moral responsibility, and consequently, that retributive justice is consistent with compatibilism. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Freedom of association, as I understand it, refers to the liberty a person possesses to enter into relationships with others—for any and all purposes, for a momentary or long-term duration, by contract, consent, or acquiescence. It likewise refers to the liberty to refuse to enter into such relationships or to terminate them when not otherwise compelled by one's voluntary assumption of an obligation to maintain the relationship. Freedom of association thus is a quite capacious liberty.

Winfield (philosophy, U. of Georgia) charges that the self- determination assailed by the postmodern credo is a strawman, and that spurning the autonomy of reason and action is not possible without that very independence.

In this short book Peter Sloterdijk offers a genealogy of the concept of freedom from Ancient Greece to the present day. This genealogy is part of a broader theory of the large political body, according to which Sloterdijk argues that political communities arise in response to a form of anxiety or stress. Through a highly original reading of Rousseaus late Reveries of a Solitary Walker, Sloterdijk shows that, for Rousseau, the modern subject emerges as a subject free of all (...) stress, unburdened by the cares of the world. Most of modern philosophy, and above all German Idealism, is an attempt to reign back Rousseaus useless and anarchical subject and anchor it in the cares of the world, in the task of having to produce both the world and itself. In the light of this highly original account, Sloterdijk develops his own distinctive account of freedom, where freedom is conceptualized as the availability for the improbable. This important text, in which Sloterdijk develops his account of freedom and the modern subject, will be of great interest to students and scholars in philosophy and the humanities and to anyone interested in contemporary philosophy and critical theory. (shrink)

Die meisten Erörterungen der Freiheitsproblematik bei Leibniz beschränken sich auf die Frage, ob das logische Prinzip vom unzureichenden Grunde eine praktisch-kausale Determination menschlicher Handlungen einschließt. Meine Abhandlung gibt darauf eine bejahende Antwort und zeigt, daß Leibniz sich sehr darum bemüht hat, logische Handlungsgründe als unmittelbare Verhaltensursachen, d.h. als kausale Erklärung menschlicher Freiheit zu begreifen, der wichtigste Beitrag der Abhandlung besteht jedoch darin, im Detail gezeigt zu haben, daß Leibniz neben der obigen eine andere und neue Freiheitskonzeption vom Standpunkt der Unvollkommenheit (...) des moralisch handelnden Subjektes entwickelt hat. -Diese Freiheit realisiert sich gemäß einer informellen, aber komplexen Methode moralischer Entwicklung und Selbstbestimmung, wodurch der moralisch Handelnde eine zunehmende Herrschaft über die Triebe und Leidenschaften gewinnt, diese Methode moralischer Selbstverwirklichung besitzt Ähnlichkeiten mit der „moralischen Therapieײ der späteren Stoa und mit der Kantischen Methode der sich selbst bestimmenden „praktischen Vernunftײ. (shrink)