Description of the biologicalhierarchy of the organism has been extendedhere to included the evolutionary andecological sub-hierarchies with theirrespective levels in order to give a completehierarchical description of life. These newdescriptions include direction of formation,types of constraints, and dual levels. Constraints are produced at the macromolecularlevel of genes/proteins, some of which (a) aredescendent restraints which hold a hierarchytogether and others (b) interact horizontallywith selective agents at corresponding levelsof the niche. The organism is a dual levelconstrained by both the ecologicalsub-hierarchy (survival) (...) and evolutionarysub-hierarchy (fitness) while serving as thehighest level of the specializationsub-hierarchy, therefore, it is unique inbelonging to three sub-hierarchies. Organismsexperience birth, sometimes death, andparticipate in evolution. Birth of an organismis realized when a cell is removed from theconstraints of the organism and assumes itsown organismal constraints. Death occurs withthe cessation of protein synthesis becauseproteins and their products constitutecomponents at high levels of the hierarchy. Selection is of two types, natural selection,involving adaptive traits interacting withfeatures in a niche, and hierarchicalselection, requiring traits to be compatiblewith existing hierarchical constraints. (shrink)

Large scale experiments at CERN’s Large Hadron Collider rely heavily on computer simulations, a fact that has recently caught philosophers’ attention. CSs obviously require appropriate modeling, and it is a common assumption among philosophers that the relevant models can be ordered into hierarchical structures. Focusing on LHC’s ATLAS experiment, we will establish three central results here: with some distinct modifications, individual components of ATLAS’ overall simulation infrastructure can be ordered into hierarchical structures. Hence, to a good degree of approximation, hierarchical (...) accounts remain valid at least as descriptive accounts of initial modeling steps. In order to perform the epistemic function Winsberg Model-based reasoning in scientific discovery. Kluwer Academic/plenum Publishers, New York, pp 255–269, 1999) assigns to models in simulation—generate knowledge through a sequence of skillful but non-deductive transformations—ATLAS’ simulation models have to be considered part of a network rather than a hierarchy, in turn making the associated simulation modeling messy rather than motley. Deriving knowledge-claims from this ‘mess’ requires two sources of justification: holistic validation :253–262, 2010; in Carrier M, Nordmann A Science in the context of application. Springer, Berlin, pp 115–130, 2011), and model coherence. As it turns out, the degree of model coherence sets HEP apart from other messy, simulation-intensive disciplines such as climate science, and the reasons for this are to be sought in the historical, empirical and theoretical foundations of the respective discipline. (shrink)

Scientists and philosophers frequently speak about levels of description, levels of explanation, and ontological levels. This paper presents a framework for studying levels. I give a general definition of a system of levels and discuss several applications, some of which refer to descriptive or explanatory levels while others refer to ontological levels. I illustrate the usefulness of this framework by bringing it to bear on some familiar philosophical questions. Is there a hierarchy of levels, with a fundamental level (...) at the bottom? And what does the answer to this question imply for physicalism, the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical? Are there emergent higher-level properties? Are higher-level descriptions reducible to lower-level ones? Can the relationship between normative and non-normative domains be viewed as one involving levels? And might a levelled framework shed light on the relationship between third-personal and first-personal phenomena? (shrink)

We consider fine hierarchies in recursion theory, descriptive set theory, logic and complexity theory. The main results state that the sets of values of different Boolean terms coincide with the levels of suitable fine hierarchies. This gives new short descriptions of these hierarchies and shows that collections of sets of values of Boolean terms are almost well ordered by inclusion. For the sake of completeness we mention also some earlier results demonstrating the usefulness of fine hierarchies.

Scientists and philosophers frequently speak about levels of description, levels of explanation, and ontological levels. In this paper, I propose a unified framework for modelling levels. I give a general definition of a system of levels and show that it can accommodate descriptive, explanatory, and ontological notions of levels. I further illustrate the usefulness of this framework by applying it to some salient philosophical questions: (1) Is there a linear hierarchy of levels, with a fundamental level at the (...) bottom? And what does the answer to this question imply for physicalism, the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical? (2) Are there emergent properties? (3) Are higher-level descriptions reducible to lower-level ones? (4) Can the relationship between normative and non-normative domains be viewed as one involving levels? Although I use the terminology of “levels”, the proposed framework can also represent “scales”, “domains”, or “subject matters”, where these are not linearly but only partially ordered by relations of supervenience or inclusion. (shrink)

Hierarchical views of nature have for centuries been used to justify the enslaving of peoples perceived as inferior, the often violent and coercive “reeducation” of indigenous peoples, the patriarchal subjugation of women, the cruel use of nonhuman animals for often trivial purposes, and the wanton destruction of the natural world. I join those who condemned the oppressive nature of these forms of hierarchical thinking. Yet, I fear that, in their effort to right past wrongs, too many thinkers are in danger (...) of throwing the axiological baby out with the ontological bathwater. Though the aim at a great ontological leveling is certainly understandable, I fear that, in embracing the opposite extreme and rejecting all hierarchical thinking, some may be in danger of doing violence to the many real and even morally significant differences between individuals. My claim in this paper is that Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy of organism provides a model for how to appreciate the many grades and types of beings in the world, while avoiding an invidious normative hierarchy that inevitably places everything at the whim of human beings. That is, I will argue that it is possible to defend hierarchy without anthroparchy. To provide context, I will begin with a brief analysis of Aristotle’s “Great Chain of Being” and will then contrast it with Whitehead’s process philosophy. Given this context, using the subtle and perceptive work of the ecofeminist Karen J. Warren, I will then present a model for how to recognize a “descriptive hierarchy” while rejecting a simplistic “prescriptive hierarchy.” . (shrink)

Ce texte vise à proposer quelques arguments pour une critique empiriste de la hiérarchie des normes, c'est-à-dire pour les besoins d'une science du droit descriptive et explicative. La hiérarchie des normes est à la fois objet d’étude scientifique, et théorie construisant cet objet. Une approche empiriste nécessite la formalisation de quelques concepts et une justification minimale de la possibilité d'une science juridique empiriste : ce seront les objets des premiers points de ce texte. Il s'agira ensuite de proposer une (...) formulation de la conception de la hiérarchie des normes à laquelle l’empirisme peut conduire, permettant de réévaluer la théorie (normativiste) de la hiérarchie des normes proposée par Kelsen comme une théorie politique, qui ne décrit pas son objet mais le construit comme contrainte. (shrink)

Hierarchies abound to help us organize our world. A hierarchy places items into a general order, where more ‘general’ is also more ‘abstract’. The etymology of hierarchy is grounded in notions of religious and social rank. This article, after a historical review, focuses on knowledge systems, an interloper of the term hierarchy since at least the 1800s. Hierarchies in knowledge systems include taxonomies, classification systems, or thesauri in information science, and systems for representing information and knowledge to (...) computers, notably ontologies and knowledge representation languages. Hierarchies are the logical underpinning of inference and reasoning in these systems, as well as the scaffolding for classification and inheritance. Hierarchies in knowledge systems express subsumption relations that have flexible variants, which we can represent algorithmically, and thus computationally. This article dissects that variability, leading to a proposed typology of hierarchies useful to knowledge systems. The article argues through a perspective informed by Charles Peirce that natural hierarchies are real, can be logically determined, and are the appropriate basis for knowledge systems. Description logics and semantic language standards reflect this perspective, importantly through their open-world logic and vocabularies for generalized subsumption hierarchies. Recent research suggests possible mechanisms for the emergence of natural hierarchies. (shrink)

The separation, uniformization, and other properties of the Borel and projective hierarchies over hyperfinite sets are investigated and compared to the corresponding properties in classical descriptive set theory. The techniques used in this investigation also provide some results about countably determined sets and functions, as well as an improvement of an earlier theorem of Kunen and Miller.

Under which conditions are social relationships hierarchical, and under which conditions are they not? This article has three main aims. First, I will explain what this question amounts to by providing a more detailed description of the general phenomenon of social hierarchy. Second, I will provide an account of what social hierarchy is. Third, I will provide some considerations in favour of this account by discussing how it improves upon three alternative ways of thinking about social hierarchy (...) that are sometimes explicitly endorsed and sometimes suggested or presupposed in writings in philosophy and elsewhere. (shrink)

The topological arithmetical hierarchy is the effective version of the Borel hierarchy. Its class Δta 2 is just large enough to include several types of pointsets in Euclidean spaces ℝ k which are fundamental in computable analysis. As a crossbreed of Hausdorff's difference hierarchy in the Borel class ΔB 2 and Ershov's hierarchy in the class Δ0 2 of the arithmetical hierarchy, the Hausdorff-Ershov hierarchy introduced in this paper gives a powerful classification within Δta (...) 2. This is based on suitable characterizations of the sets from Δta 2 which are obtained in a close analogy to those of the ΔB 2 sets as well as those of the Δ0 2 sets. A helpful tool in dealing with resolvable sets is contributed by the technique of depth analysis. On this basis, the hierarchy properties, in particular the strict inclusions between classes of different levels, can be shown by direct constructions of witness sets. The Hausdorff-Ershov hierarchy runs properly over all constructive ordinals, in contrast to Ershov's hierarchy whose denotation-independent version collapses at level ω 2. Also, some new characterizations of concepts of decidability for pointsets in Euclidean spaces are presented. (shrink)

We explore the formal foundations of recent studies comparing aural pattern recognition capabilities of populations of human and non-human animals. To date, these experiments have focused on the boundary between the Regular and Context-Free stringsets. We argue that experiments directed at distinguishing capabilities with respect to the Subregular Hierarchy, which subdivides the class of Regular stringsets, are likely to provide better evidence about the distinctions between the cognitive mechanisms of humans and those of other species. Moreover, the classes of (...) the Subregular Hierarchy have the advantage of fully abstract descriptive (model-theoretic) characterizations in addition to characterizations in more familiar grammar- and automata-theoretic terms. Because the descriptive characterizations make no assumptions about implementation, they provide a sound basis for drawing conclusions about potential cognitive mechanisms from the experimental results. We review the Subregular Hierarchy and provide a concrete set of principles for the design and interpretation of these experiments. (shrink)

Let [Formula: see text] be an integer. We show that the set of real numbers that are Poisson generic in base [Formula: see text] is [Formula: see text]-complete in the Borel hierarchy of subsets of the real line. Furthermore, the set of real numbers that are Borel normal in base [Formula: see text] and not Poisson generic in base [Formula: see text] is complete for the class given by the differences between [Formula: see text] sets. We also show that (...) the effective versions of these results hold in the effective Borel hierarchy. (shrink)

§1. I will start with a quick definition of descriptive set theory: It is the study of the structure of definable sets and functions in separable completely metrizable spaces. Such spaces are usually called Polish spaces. Typical examples are ℝn, ℂn, Hilbert space and more generally all separable Banach spaces, the Cantor space 2ℕ, the Baire space ℕℕ, the infinite symmetric group S∞, the unitary group, the group of measure preserving transformations of the unit interval, etc.In this theory sets (...) are classified in hierarchies according to the complexity of their definitions and the structure of sets in each level of these hierarchies is systematically analyzed. In the beginning we have the Borel sets in Polish spaces, obtained by starting with the open sets and closing under the operations of complementation and countable unions, and the corresponding Borel hierarchy. After this come the projective sets, obtained by starting with the Borel sets and closing under the operations of complementation and projection, and the corresponding projective hierarchy.There are also transfinite extensions of the projective hierarchy and even much more complex definable sets studied in descriptive set theory, but I will restrict myself here to Borel and projective sets, in fact just those at the first level of the projective hierarchy, i.e., the Borel (), analytic () and coanalytic () sets. (shrink)

Recent studies indicate that indicative conditionals like "If people wear masks, the spread of Covid-19 will be diminished" require a probabilistic dependency between their antecedents and consequents to be acceptable (Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016). But it is easy to make the slip from this claim to the thesis that indicative conditionals are acceptable only if this probabilistic dependency results from a causal relation between antecedent and consequent. According to Pearl (2009), understanding a causal relation involves multiple, hierarchically organized conceptual dimensions: (...) prediction, intervention, and counterfactual dependence. In a series of experiments, we test the hypothesis that these conceptual dimensions are differentially encoded in indicative and counterfactual conditionals. If this hypothesis holds, then there are limits as to how much of a causal relation is captured by indicative conditionals alone. Our results show that the acceptance of indicative and counterfactual conditionals can become dissociated. Furthermore, it is found that the acceptance of both is needed for accepting a causal relation between two co-occurring events. The implications that these findings have for the hypothesis above, and for recent debates at the intersection of the psychology of reasoning and causal judgment, are critically discussed. Our findings are consistent with viewing indicative conditionals as answering predictive queries requiring evidential relevance (even in the absence of direct causal relations). Counterfactual conditionals in contrast target causal relevance, specifically. Finally, we discuss the implications our results have for the yet unsolved question of how reasoners succeed in constructing causal models from verbal descriptions. (shrink)

This paper addresses the role of time scales in conceptualizing biological hierarchies. So far, the concept of hierarchies in philosophy of science has been dominated by the idea of composition and parthood, respectively. However, this view does not exhaust the diversity of hierarchical descriptions in the biosciences. Therefore, we highlight a type of hierarchy usually overlooked by philosophers of science. It distinguishes processes based on the different time scales (i.e. rates, frequencies, and rhythms) on which they occur. These time (...) scale hierarchies often are connected with assumptions defended in process ontology. Due to their ability to describe interlevel dynamics of various kinds, we call these hierarchies ‘dynamic hierarchies.’ In order to highlight and discuss their organization, explanatory roles, and epistemic virtues we focus on dynamic hierarchies in developmental biology and evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo). In these fields, dynamic hierarchies offer crucial complementary information to descriptions of compositional hierarchies. (shrink)

We study the sets of the infinite sentences constructible with a dictionary over a finite alphabet, from the viewpoint of descriptive set theory. Among others, this gives some true co-analytic sets. The case where the dictionary is finite is studied and gives a natural example of a set at level ω of the Wadge hierarchy.

Published in honor of Victor L. Selivanov, the 17 articles collected in this volume inform on the latest developments in computability theory and its applications in computable analysis; descriptive set theory and topology; and the theory of omega-languages; as well as non-classical logics, such as temporal logic and paraconsistent logic. This volume will be of interest to mathematicians and logicians, as well as theoretical computer scientists.

Eloise Jelinek was a leading authority on syntactic and semantic theory, information structure, and several Native American languages (including Lummi, Yaqui, and Navajo). She was one of the very first generative linguists who brought the theoretical implications of the properties of typologically unusual and understudied languages to the forefront of mainstream generative thinking.Jelinek originated the Pronominal Argument Hypothesis the idea that many languages restrict realization of their arguments to pronouns. In other work, Jelinek investigated a broad range of morphological, syntactic (...) and semantic phenomena in understudied and endangered languages. Besides the theoretical value of that work, it was instrumental in providing sophisticated semantic and syntactic documentation for such languages, where description is typically limited to the basic morphophonology and morphosyntax, as well as texts, that form the core of most descriptive work.Thirteen of her most important papers, together with a fourteenth essay previously unpublished, are here collected, each preceded by a short introduction that provides context for the work and evidence of its subsequent influence. (shrink)

Descriptive abstraction means omission of information from descriptions of phenomena. In this paper, I introduce a distinction between vertical and horizontal descriptive abstraction. Vertical abstracts away levels of mechanism or organization, while horizontal abstracts away details within one level of organization. The distinction is implicit in parts of the literature, but it has received insufficient attention and gone mainly unnoticed. I suggest that the distinction can be used to clarify how computational descriptions are formed in some variants of (...) the mechanistic account of physical computation. Furthermore, I suggest that, if this suggestion is adopted, it can be used to resolve what I call abstraction, hierarchy, and generality problems raised against mechanistic account of physical computation. According to the abstraction problem, the mechanistic account of physical computation is conceptually confused in claiming that physical systems process computational, abstract properties. An existing solution distinguishes between descriptive and metaphysical abstraction, suggesting that the abstraction problem unnecessarily postulates metaphysically abstract entities. The solution has been criticized for leading to what I call hierarchy and generality problems: it results in two separate hierarchies, one physical and one computational, making it problematic both to account for the generality of computational descriptions and to specify how the two hierarchies are related to each other. Adopting the vertical-horizontal distinction and the view that computational descriptions are achieved by horizontal abstraction allows one to account for the generality of computational descriptions, and to form a single hierarchy in which there are no separate hierarchies in need of integration. (shrink)

We prove that, for each countable ordinal ξ≥1, there exist some -complete ω-powers, and some -complete ω-powers, extending previous works on the topological complexity of ω-powers [O. Finkel, Topological properties of omega context free languages, Theoretical Computer Science 262 669–697; O. Finkel, Borel hierarchy and omega context free languages, Theoretical Computer Science 290 1385–1405; O. Finkel, An omega-power of a finitary language which is a borel set of infinite rank, Fundamenta informaticae 62 333–342; D. Lecomte, Sur les ensembles de (...) phrases infinies constructibles a partir d’un dictionnaire sur un alphabet fini, Séminaire d’Initiation a l’Analyse, 1, année 2001–2002; D. Lecomte, Omega-powers and descriptive set theory, Journal of Symbolic Logic 70 1210–1232; J. Duparc, O. Finkel, An ω-Power of a Context-Free Language Which Is Borel Above , in: S. Bold, B. Löwe, T. Räsch, J. van Benthem , in the Proceedings of the international conference foundations of the formal sciences V : Infinite Games, November 26th to 29th, 2004, Bonn, Germany, in: Studies in Logic, vol. 11, College Publications at King’s College, 2007, pp. 109–122]. We prove effective versions of these results; in particular, for each recursive ordinal there exist some recursive sets A2<ω such that , where and denote classes of the hyperarithmetical hierarchy. To do this, we prove effective versions of a result by Kuratowski, describing a set as the range of a closed subset of the Baire space ωω by a continuous bijection. This leads us to prove closure properties for the pointclasses in arbitrary recursively presented Polish spaces. We apply our existence results to get better computations of the topological complexity of some sets of dictionaries considered in [D. Lecomte, Omega-powers and descriptive set theory, Journal of Symbolic Logic 70 1210–1232]. (shrink)

The distinction between existence and essence in contingent beings is one of the foundational doctrines of medieval philosophy. Building upon Neoplatonic precursors, thinkers such as Avicenna and Aquinas debated its nature. However, one Islamic philosopher, who had an enormous influence on the development of philosophical discourse in Iran, subverted the traditional Peripatetic vision of reality and disputed the ontological nature of existence. Through a critique of the Peripatetic notion of existence, Suhrawardi demonstrated the irrelevance of the distinction for metaphysical inquiry, (...) which should, instead, rely upon an eidetic vision of the 'hierarchy of lights'. I shall explain why the later tradition advocated an essentialist reading of Suhrawardi and suggest that the Platonic hermeneutic of essential vision which Suhrawardi expounds, might be the reason for it. Later philosophers in the Islamic tradition had mistaken methodology for a description of reality. (shrink)

Phenomenographic research about teachers’ conception of teaching has consistently revealed that teachers’ conception of teaching influence their classroom practices, which in turn shape students’ learning experiences. This paper reports teachers’ conceptions of teaching with regards to the use of interactive spherical video-based virtual reality in Chinese descriptive composition writing. Twenty-one secondary teachers in Hong Kong involved in an ISV-VR-supported Chinese descriptive writing program participated in this phenomenographic study. Analyses of the semi-structured interviews establish seven conception categories that are (...) specifically related to the use of ISV-VR for descriptive Chinese composition writing: offering students more observational opportunities; improving students’ writing skills; promoting students’ learning participation and motivation; shifting learning from teacher-centric to student-centric, enhancing collaborative learning among students; cultivating students’ positive values and moral character, and shaping students’ self-identity as “writers.” The concurrent and convenient access to the ISV-VR resources was for the teachers an enriched and supportive environment for them to cultivate students’ writer identity. In addition, it was discovered that the structural relationships of the conceptions may be better organized along three axes of continuum: conception’s orientation, teaching attention locus, and understanding of writing. These categories form a hierarchy from skill-oriented to community-oriented, and finally to identity-oriented conception. The findings may provide researchers and practitioners with novel insight into the teaching of composition writing in the contexts of L1 acquisition supported by virtual reality technology. (shrink)

Values are essentially interpretive: they can, even must be interpreted and can and should be understood as (somehow socially or personally standardized) interpretive constructs of a specific kind and according to different types to be distinguished and classified within an hierarchical typology. There is a special connection between values and actions as well as their characteristic of being related to their ascription to persons, goods, events etc. This connection is indeed covered, borne or carried out by interpretation. In fact, any (...) ascription of a value concept or predicate whatsoever is dependent on a structure and hierarchy of normative and in part descriptive schemes of at times conventional and dispositional scheme-interpretations. Generally speaking, the thesis is that the methodological model of interpretive constructs (scheme-interpretationism) can be thoroughly applied to the concept and usage of values. Social values are then in this sense socially originated, institutionally sanctioned or standardized interpretational constructs of a social character, notably for social comparisons in using and establishing preferences for a kind of (limited) uniformity and expectability and predictability of social behavior and actions. (shrink)

The thesis focuses on a quite recent research field lying in between Descriptive Set Theory and Automata Theory (for infinite objects). In both areas, one is often concerned with subsets of the Cantor space or of its homeomorphic copies. In Descriptive Set Theory, such subsets are usually stratified in topological hierarchies, like the Borel hierarchy, the Wadge hierarchy and the difference hierarchy; in Automata Theory, such sets are studied in terms of regularity, that is, the (...) property of being recognised by an automaton or, equivalently, of being expressible in Monadic Second-Order Logic. This double point of view leads to many interesting questions about the interplay and relationship between topological complexity and regularity. While we have a complete picture of what happens in the case of automata on words, the case of automata on trees is still a terra incognita. Some results have already been obtained for particular classes of languages, like Buchi languages, deterministic languages, ¨ and unambiguous languages. In this thesis we instead drop any restriction and prove some new results concerning arbitrary regular tree languages which belong to low levels of the Borel hierarchy and of the Wadge hierarchy. (shrink)

We introduce and study certain classes of optimization problems over the real numbers. The classes are defined by logical means, relying on metafinite model theory for so called R-structures . More precisely, based on a real analogue of Fagin's theorem [12] we deal with two classes MAX-NPR and MIN-NPR of maximization and minimization problems, respectively, and figure out their intrinsic logical structure. It is proven that MAX-NPR decomposes into four natural subclasses, whereas MIN-NPR decomposes into two. This gives a real (...) number analogue of a result by Kolaitis and Thakur [13] in the Turing model. Our proofs mainly use techniques from [17]. Finally, approximation issues are briefly discussed. (shrink)

The so-called integration problem concerning mechanistic and computational explanation asks how they are related to each other. One approach is that a computational explanation is a species of mechanistic explanation. According to this view, computational or mathematical descriptions are mechanism sketches or macroscopic descriptions that include computationally relevant and exclude computationally irrelevant physical properties. Some suggest that this results in a so-called single hierarchy view of physical computation, where computational or mathematical properties sit together in the same mechanistic (...) class='Hi'>hierarchy with the implementational properties. This view can be contrasted with a separate hierarchy view, according to which computational and physical descriptions have their own hierarchies which are related to each other via a bridging implementation relation. The single hierarchy view has been criticized for downplaying the explanatory value of computational explanations and not being hospitable to multiple realization of cognitive processes. In this paper, I argue that the aforementioned criticisms fail, and there might be a deeper problem with the single hierarchy view, which is that the single hierarchy view might collapse into a separate hierarchy view. The kind of abstraction used by the single hierarchy view does not seem to grant mathematical or computational descriptions but only more stripped physical or implementational descriptions. (shrink)

In the evolutionary biology of the Modern Synthesis the study of patterns refers to how to identify and systematise order in lineages, looking for hierarchies or for branching/splitting events in the tree of life, whereas the resulting order is supposed to be due to underlying processes or mechanisms. But patterns and processes play distinct roles in evo-devo: four different views on the role of patterns and processes in descriptions and explanations of development and evolution: A) transformational; B) generative; C) processual; (...) and D) complex are reviewed in this paper. Then, this discussion is related to two issues in evo-devo: homology and variation. (shrink)

Values are essentially interpretive: they can, even must be interpreted and can and should be understood as (somehow socially or personally standardized) interpretive constructs of a specific kind and according to different types to be distinguished and classified within an hierarchical typology. There is a special connection between values and actions as well as their characteristic of being related to their ascription to persons, goods, events etc. This connection is indeed covered, borne or carried out by interpretation. In fact, any (...) ascription of a value concept or predicate whatsoever is dependent on a structure and hierarchy of normative and in part descriptive schemes of at times conventional and dispositional scheme-interpretations. Generally speaking, the thesis is that the methodological model of interpretive constructs (scheme-interpretationism) can be thoroughly applied to the concept and usage of values. Social values are then in this sense socially originated, institutionally sanctioned or standardized interpretational constructs of a social character, notably for social comparisons in using and establishing preferences for a kind of (limited) uniformity and expectability and predictability of social behavior and actions. (shrink)

I begin by tracing some of the confusions regarding levels and reduction to a failure to distinguish two different principles according to which theories can be viewed as hierarchically arranged — epistemic authority and ontological constitution. I then argue that the notion of levels relevant to the debate between symbolic and connectionist paradigms of mental activity answers to neither of these models, but is rather correlative to the hierarchy of functional decompositions of cognitive tasks characteristic of homuncular functionalism. Finally, (...) I suggest that the incommensurability of the intentional and extensional vocabularies constitutes a strongprima facie reason to conclude that there is little likelihood of filling in the story of Bechtel''s missing level in such a way as to bridge the gap between such homuncular functionalism and his own model of mechanistic explanation. (shrink)

Let κ be a cardinal, and let H κ be the class of sets of hereditary cardinality less than κ ; let τ (κ) > κ be the height of the smallest transitive admissible set containing every element of {κ}∪H κ . We show that a ZFC-definable notion of long unfoldability, a generalisation of weak compactness, implies in the core model K, that the mouse order restricted to H κ is as long as τ. (It is known that some weak (...) large cardinal property is necessary for the latter to hold.) In other terms we delimit its strength as follows: Theorem Con(ZFC+ω2-Π 1 1-Determinacy) ⇒ ⇒Con(ZFC+V=K+∃ a long unfoldable cardinal ⇒ ⇒Con(ZFC+∀X(X # exists) + ‘‘ $\forall D \subseteq \omega_1 D$ is universally Baire ⇔ ∃r∈R(D∈L(r)))’’, and this is set-generically absolute). We isolate a notion of ω-closed cardinal which is weaker than an ω1-Erd\ os cardinal, and show that this bounds the first long unfoldable: Theorem Let κ be ω -closed. Then there is a long unfoldable ł<κ. (shrink)

We give positive answers to two open questions from [15]. (1) For every set C countably determined over A, if C is Π 0 α (Σ 0 α ) then it must be Π 0 α (Σ 0 α ) over A, and (2) every Borel subset of the product of two internal sets X and Y all of whose vertical sections are Π 0 α (Σ 0 α ) can be represented as an intersection (union) of Borel sets with (...) vertical sections of lower Borel rank. We in fact show that (2) is a consequence of the analogous result in the case when X is a measurable space and Y a complete separable metric space (Polish space) which was proved by A. Louveau and that (1) is equivalent to the property shared by the inverse standard part map in Polish spaces of preserving almost all levels of the Borel hierarchy. (shrink)

This book bridges the gaps between logic, mathematics and computer science by delving into the theory of well-quasi orders, also known as wqos. This highly active branch of combinatorics is deeply rooted in and between many fields of mathematics and logic, including proof theory, commutative algebra, braid groups, graph theory, analytic combinatorics, theory of relations, reverse mathematics and subrecursive hierarchies. As a unifying concept for slick finiteness or termination proofs, wqos have been rediscovered in diverse contexts, and proven to be (...) extremely useful in computer science. The book introduces readers to the many facets of, and recent developments in, wqos through chapters contributed by scholars from various fields. As such, it offers a valuable asset for logicians, mathematicians and computer scientists, as well as scholars and students. (shrink)

Dignāga’s theory of semantics called the “theory of apoha ” has been criticized by those who state that it may lead to a circular argument wherein “exclusion of others” is understood as mere double negation. Dignāga, however, does not intend mere double negation by anyāpoha. In his view, the word “cow” for instance, excludes those that do not have the set of features such as a dewlap, horns, and so on, by applying the semantic method called componential analysis. The present (...) paper aims to prove this by referring to the fragments quoted by Jinendrabuddhi and Siddhasenagaṇi. Dignāga logically proves that the denotation of the referent Q by the word “P” cannot be derived from the joint presence of “P” with Q. Instead, he derives it from the joint absence of “P” with the nonexistence of Q. Anyāpoha is nothing but verbal vyatireka. Componential analysis is used for describing what is to be excluded. Dignāga draws taxonomic hierarchies of words based on their customary use, and assumes componential analysis to operate in the background of the hierarchies formed in semantic fields, stating that a general term is restricted to having the same reference with one of its specific terms insofar as the former is connected with the characteristics of the latter’s referent. Moreover, he states that a proper name also denotes its referent by excluding those that do not have the cluster of a certain number of qualities. (shrink)

In his dissertation, Wadge defined a notion of guessability on subsets of the Baire space and gave two characterizations of guessable sets. A set is guessable if and only if it is in the second ambiguous class, if and only if it is eventually annihilated by a certain remainder. We simplify this remainder and give a new proof of the latter equivalence. We then introduce a notion of guessing with an ordinal limit on how often one can change one’s mind. (...) We show that for every ordinal $\alpha$, a guessable set is annihilated by $\alpha$ applications of the simplified remainder if and only if it is guessable with fewer than $\alpha$ mind changes. We use guessability with fewer than $\alpha$ mind changes to give a semi-characterization of the Hausdorff difference hierarchy, and indicate how Wadge’s notion of guessability can be generalized to higher-order guessability, providing characterizations of ${\mathbf{\Delta}}^{0}_{\alpha}$ for all successor ordinals $\alpha\gt 1$. (shrink)

In this paper we aim to show that phenomenal consciousness is realized by a particular level of brain operational organization and that understanding human consciousness requires a description of the laws of the immediately underlying neural collective phenomena, the nested hierarchy of electromagnetic fields of brain activity – operational architectonics. We argue that the subjective mental reality and the objective neurobiological reality, although seemingly worlds apart, are intimately connected along a unified metastable continuum and are both guided by the (...) universal laws of the physical world such as criticality, self-organization and emergence. (shrink)

Over the last two decades, network-focused approaches have become highly popular in diverse fields of biology, including neuroscience, ecology, molecular biology and genetics. While the network approach continues to grow very rapidly, some of its conceptual and methodological aspects still require a programmatic foundation. This challenge particularly concerns the question of whether a generalized account of explanatory, organisational and descriptive levels of networks can be applied universally across biological sciences. Consequently, the central focus of this theme issue will be (...) on the definition, motivation and application of key concepts in biological network science, such as levels, hierarchies, and explanatory directionality. A unification will be achieved by formulating norms for delimiting the distinctively network-topological class of explanations that connect general as well as very specific biological research questions. The impact of this theme issue is broad and encompassing, as it is highly interdisciplinary and opens a uniquely normative perspective on the foundational aspects of network-based explanations and modelling. This theme issue is intended to become a landmark publication for practical research as well as funding policy decisions, by unifying network approaches in biological sciences in terms of fundamental concepts and informing the public understanding of the network science. (shrink)

Description: The common western understanding of Buddhism today envisions this major world religion as one of compassion and tolerance. But as the author Droit reveals, this view bears little resemblance to one broadly held in the nineteenth-century European philosophical imagination that saw Buddhism as a religion of annihilation calling for the destruction of the self. The Cult of Nothingness traces the history of the western discovery of Buddhism. In so doing, the author shows that such major philosophers as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, (...) Hegel, Cousin, and Renan imagined Buddhism as a religion that was, as Nietzsche put it, a negation of the world. In fact, says the author, such portrayals were more a reflection of what was happening in Europe at the time-when the collapse of traditional European hierarchies and values, the specter of atheism, and the rise of racism and social revolts were shaking European societies-than an accurate description of Buddhist thought. The author also reflects on how this history continues to echo in contemporary western understanding of Buddhism. The book includes a comprehensive bibliography on books on Buddhism published in the west between 1638 and 1890. (shrink)

Description: This book Marxian Ethics: Some Preliminary Considerations, is an attempt to explore the meaning and significance of some of the basic formulations of Marxian thought and ideology with a view to cull the ethical dimensions implicitly embedded in Marx's theoretical framework. The work is important in view of the fact that there are extreme divergences and contradictions in the interpretations of Marxism leading to a controversy between the exponents of scientific and philosophico-ethical aspects of Marxism. The work presupposes a (...) few basic questions in the context of Marx's concern for ethics and morality. Is Marx advocating a moral principle which must be confronted to or is he seeking a goal realization? Is he concerned with a sociological analysis of factors in the decline or rise of moral values or is he visualizing an ideal state of affairs which ought to come into existence? The language of morality cannot be understood except against the background of certain norms of social existence. Marx, according to the author, is not only confronted with the moral problem but, indeed, forces the moral question on us. The author maintains that Marx's entire social philosophy flows from his radical and revolutionary views on reality as manifested in his state of alienation-a concept which according to her lies at the heart of Marx's social and moral analysis. The author grapples with the question why Marxism is accepted almost as a religion by the countless millions of people. It is because it looks at and tries to solve the riddles of man's existence from a moral point of view? The author discusses the relevance of man's relation to nature, history and society and tries to view it from a valuational standpoint which incorporates within it the absolute supremacy and dignity of man, which have an unconditional priority in the hierarchy of values. She locates the basis of Marxian system of moral values in a metaphysics of human nature. (shrink)

Over the last decades, network-based approaches have become highly popular in diverse fields of biology, including neuroscience, ecology, molecular biology and genetics. While these approaches continue to grow very rapidly, some of their conceptual and methodological aspects still require a programmatic foundation. This challenge particularly concerns the question of whether a generalized account of explanatory, organisational and descriptive levels of networks can be applied universally across biological sciences. To this end, this highly interdisciplinary theme issue focuses on the definition, (...) motivation and application of key concepts in biological network science, such as explanatory power of distinctively network explanations, network levels, and network hierarchies. (shrink)

Locally finite omega languages were introduced by Ressayre [Formal languages defined by the underlying structure of their words. J Symb Log 53(4):1009–1026, 1988]. These languages are defined by local sentences and extend ω-languages accepted by Büchi automata or defined by monadic second order sentences. We investigate their topological complexity. All locally finite ω-languages are analytic sets, the class LOC ω of locally finite ω-languages meets all finite levels of the Borel hierarchy and there exist some locally finite ω-languages which (...) are Borel sets of infinite rank or even analytic but non-Borel sets. This gives partial answers to questions of Simonnet (Automates et Théorie Descriptive, Ph.D. Thesis. Université Paris 7, March 1992) and of Duparc et al. [Computer science and the fine structure of Borel sets. Theor Comput Sci 257(1–2):85–105, 2001]. (shrink)

In the course of the last 20 years, the problem of Kant’s view of races has evolved from a marginal topic to a question which affects his critical philosophy in general, including the anthropology and its influence on contemporary social studies. The goal of our paper is to examine the anthropological role of Kant’s concept of race from the largely overlooked or underestimated perspective of his Lectures on Anthropology. Taking into account the differences between Kant’s approach in the early lectures (...) of the 1770s and early 1780s and the lectures of the late 1780s in the light of the development of the idea of race in Kant’s works, we will demonstrate that several key elements of Kant’s 1780s theory of race presented in his published works can be found in his early lectures. On the other hand, we will prove that Kant gradually abandons racial hierarchies and moral characteristics of races in his anthropological lectures of the late 1780s and in the Anthropology from the Pragmatic Point of View, shifting his focus to more nuanced descriptions of morals of different nations. (shrink)

Levels of reality reflect one kind of complexity, which can be modeled using a specification hierarchy. Levels emerged during the Big Bang, as physical degrees of freedom became increasingly fixed as the expanding universe developed, and new degrees of freedom associated with higher levels opened up locally, requiring new descriptive semantics. History became embodied in higher level entities, which are increasingly individuated, aggregate patterns of lower level entities. Development is an epigenetic trajectory from vaguer to more definite and (...) individuated embodiment, punctuated by the emergence of new integrative levels. It is constrained by being subsumed by lower levels (e.g., physical dynamics) and may be guided by structural attractors as well as by internally stored information (e.g., genes) in the higher levels. I conjecture, on a thermodynamic basis, that the number of levels that become manifest in an expanding universe depends upon its rate of expansion. (shrink)

We study the extension of dependence logic \ by a majority quantifier \ over finite structures. We show that the resulting logic is equi-expressive with the extension of second-order logic by second-order majority quantifiers of all arities. Our results imply that, from the point of view of descriptive complexity theory, \\) captures the complexity class counting hierarchy. We also obtain characterizations of the individual levels of the counting hierarchy by fragments of \\).

The publication of Darwin's On the Origin of Species in 1859 ignited a public storm he neither wanted nor enjoyed. Having offered his book as a contribution to science, Darwin discovered to his dismay that it was received as an affront by many scientists and as a sacrilege by clergy and Christian citizens. To answer the criticism that his theory was a theory only, and a wild one at that, he published two volumes in 1868 to demonstrate that evolution was (...) obvious to anyone who cared to look at a bull in a pasture or a dog on a hearth. In response to those who insisted that species were distinct since creation, Darwin pointed to breeders of pigs and pigeons. In reply to those who protested that human intervention is one thing and natural selection another, he argued, "If organic beings had not possessed an inherent tendency to vary, man could have done nothing." To counter those who scorned his descriptions of species in exotic places, he submitted local evidence of cabbages and cauliflower. Based on a wide array of sources, from ancient pictographs to Polish roosters, from skins and from skeletons, from scientific journals and breeding manuals, Darwin assembled a mass of proof--and a hypothesis about species reversion that risked his reputation anew. The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication is a two-volume compilation of his thorough and intensive research and the revolutionary conclusions that resulted. The first portion of his work is dedicated to a meticulous analysis of various aspects of plant and animal life, including an inventory of varieties and their physical and behavioral characteristics, investigation of the impact of a species' surrounding environment and the role that both natural and forced changes in this environment have had. Darwin then turns to a richly detailed discussion of the roles of inheritance and crossing in the development of species. A wealth of illustrations further support and enhance his findings. This fascinating, invaluable, and courageous undertaking eventually formed the foundation for our current understanding of evolution. "In science as in politics the victors tend to write the history books. As a result, the record of the past is edited, intentionally or unintentionally, so that it focuses mainly on the precursors of contemporary orthodoxy. Such a focus may accurately represent the genealogy of modern ideas, but it almost inevitably misrepresents the historical experience of their progenitors... Even the powerful, persuasive, and ultimately triumphant theory of evolution by natural selection required not only defense, but repeated buttressing and revision. Variation showed Darwin hard at work on this rearguard action, using the materials he had at hand... His information was gleaned from the observations of fanciers, breeders, and amateur naturalists, as well as from the treatises of those on the cutting edge of zoology and botany. As hindsight narrows the historical spotlight, it imposes its own sense of hierarchy on the preoccupations of the past. But Darwin was interested in all of these topics, valued all of these sources, and belonged, to a greater or lesser extent, to all of these communities."--from the Introduction. (shrink)