The Faces of Reason traces the history of philosophy in English Canada from 1850 to 1950, examining the major English-Canadian philosophers in detail adn setting them in the context of the main currents of Canadian thought. The book concludes with a brief survey of the period after 1950. What is distinctive in Canadian philosophy, say the authors, is the concept of reason and the uses to which it is put. Reason has interacted with experience in a new world and a (...) cold climate to create a distinctive Canadian community. The diversity of political, geographic, social, and religious factors has fostered a particular kind of thinking, particular ways of reasoning and communicating. Rather than one grand, overarching Canadian way of thinking, there are “many faces of reason,” “a kind of philosophic federalism”. The book has two dimensions: “it is a continuos story which makes a point about the development of philosophical reason in the Canadian context.... it is a reference work which may be consulted by readers interested in particular figures, ideas, movements, or periods.”. (shrink)

In this view from 2007–2009, the ethical challenges facing a potential global effort to control infectious disease are explored; they provide sobering insight into the challenges of later decades. Despite the devastating pandemic of HIV/AIDS that erupted in the early 1980s, despite the failure to eradicate polio and the emergence of resistant forms of tuberculosis that came into focus in the 1990s, and despite newly emerging diseases like Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 and the fearsome prospect of human-to-human (...) avian flu, it is nevertheless a time of some excitement over prospects for effective control of much of infectious disease. Funded by national and international governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private foundations, and even popular entertainers, large-scale new efforts are under way to address global killers like AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, among others. This “marvelous momentum” can be seen as part of a continuing effort from the time of Jenner onward. Extrapolating from this, we explore the notion of a “comprehensive global effort for the eradication, elimination or control of infectious disease”, with particular attention to the ethical issues that arise. This is to “think big” about disease-control efforts that are now often done in piecemeal ways. This chapter identifies five tracks along which such efforts need to be pursued: (1) national and international organizations and the development of collective will; (2) epidemiological and health care infrastructure; (3) scientific development; (4) religious, social, and cultural considerations; (5) legal and social protections for individuals and groups. Each of these poses significant ethical issues which, we argue, should be viewed in a comprehensive way, to ensure that practice, research, and policy in each of these areas understands the person with communicable infectious disease as both victim and (potential) vector. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article, we first document the virtually complete absence of infectious disease examples and concerns at the time bioethics emerged as a field. We then argue that this oversight was not benign by considering two central issues in the field, informed consent and distributive justice, and showing how they might have been framed differently had infectiousness been at the forefront of concern. The solution to this omission might be to apply standard approaches in liberal bioethics, such as autonomy (...) and the harm principle, to infectious examples. We argue that this is insufficient, however. Taking infectious disease into account requires understanding the patient as victim and as vector. Infectiousness reminds us that as autonomous agents we are both embodied and vulnerable in our relationships with others. We conclude by applying this reunderstanding of agency to the examples of informed consent and distributive justice in health care. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article, we first document the virtually complete absence of infectious disease examples and concerns at the time bioethics emerged as a field. We then argue that this oversight was not benign by considering two central issues in the field, informed consent and distributive justice, and showing how they might have been framed differently had infectiousness been at the forefront of concern. The solution to this omission might be to apply standard approaches in liberal bioethics, such as autonomy (...) and the harm principle, to infectious examples. We argue that this is insufficient, however. Taking infectious disease into account requires understanding the patient as victim and as vector. Infectiousness reminds us that as autonomous agents we are both embodied and vulnerable in our relationships with others. We conclude by applying this reunderstanding of agency to the examples of informed consent and distributive justice in health care. (shrink)

During the past two decades, several reports have documented substantial support from clinicians, policy-makers, and the general public for the use of advance directives, yet studies continue to find that only a minority of individuals have completed these legal documents. Advance directives are written instructions, such as living wills or durable powers of attorney for health care, which describe an individual's medical treatment wishes in the event that individual becomes incapacitated in the future. The completion and use of advance directives (...) is one of several components of the broader activity of advance care planning, that is, the overall planning and communication of personal wishes concerning future medical care.In December 1991, the federal Patient Self-Determination Act became effective. Promoted as a federal initiative to enhance an individual's control over medical treatment decision making and, therefore, patient autonomy and self-determination, PSDA placed several new requirements on health care organizations receiving Medicare or Medicaid payments. (shrink)

During the past two decades, several reports have documented substantial support from clinicians, policy-makers, and the general public for the use of advance directives, yet studies continue to find that only a minority of individuals have completed these legal documents. Advance directives are written instructions, such as living wills or durable powers of attorney for health care, which describe an individual's medical treatment wishes in the event that individual becomes incapacitated in the future. The completion and use of advance directives (...) is one of several components of the broader activity of advance care planning, that is, the overall planning and communication of personal wishes concerning future medical care.In December 1991, the federal Patient Self-Determination Act became effective. Promoted as a federal initiative to enhance an individual's control over medical treatment decision making and, therefore, patient autonomy and self-determination, PSDA placed several new requirements on health care organizations receiving Medicare or Medicaid payments. (shrink)

The question 'Why should I obey the law?' introduces a contemporary puzzle that is as old as philosophy itself. The puzzle is especially troublesome if we think of cases in which breaking the law is not otherwise wrongful, and in which the chances of getting caught are negligible. Philosophers from Socrates to H.L.A. Hart have struggled to give reasoned support to the idea that we do have a general moral duty to obey the law but, more recently, the greater number (...) of learned voices has expressed doubt that there is any such duty, at least as traditionally conceived. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Ceci est une réponse à l’étude critique de Vance Maxwell, «Making God Go Away», consacrée au livre de Leslie Armour, Being and Idea. La discussion porte sur la question suivante: est-il possible qu’il y ait une signification transcendante à nos vies sans un Dieu tyrannique? Le livre traitait, de manière centrale, du fait que les réponses affirmatives à cette question exigent une unification du savoir. Maxwell suggère que le livre est un commentaire de Spinoza et de Hegel (...) — malgré son soustitre: Developments of Some Themes in Spinoza and Hegel. Et il ignore la tentative qui s’y trouve poursuivie de construire un système nouveau. Le présent article explique ce système et défend certaines lectures de Spinoza. (shrink)

RésuméCeci est une réponse à l'étude critique de Vance Maxwell, «Making God Go Away», consacrée au livre de Leslie Armour, Being and IdeaLa discussion porte sur la question suivante : est-ilpossible qu'il y ait une signification transcendante à nos vies sans un Dieu tyrannique? Le livre traitait, de manière centrale, du fait que les réponses affirmatives à cette question exigent une unification du savoir. Maxwell suggère que le livre est un commentaire de Spinoza et de Hegel—malgré son soustitre (...) :Developments of Some Themes in Spinoza and HegelEt il ignore la tentative qui s'y trouve poursuivie de construire un systeme nouveau. Le preésent article explique ce système et défend certaines lectures de Spinoza. (shrink)

The wager fragment in Blaise Pascal’s _Penseés _opens with the phrase "_infini rien_"—"infinite nothing"—which is meant to describe the human condition. Pascal was responding to what was, even in the seventeenth century, becoming a pressing human problem: we seem to be able to know much about the world but less about ourselves. The traditional European view of human beings as creatures made in the image of God and potentially capable of a mystical union with God was increasingly confounded by the (...) difficulty of finding God in nature. Despite his own scientific work, however, Pascal argued that if one does not know whether or not God exists, one should bet that he does: if one is right the rewards are infinitely good and, if one is wrong, what one has lost is, by comparison, utterly trivial. The argument behind this wager is one of the most celebrated—and disputed—in the history of philosophy. It has been seen in terms of the calculus of probabilities, as a piece of religious apologetic, as an event in the religious and psychological life of Pascal himself, and as an event in the life of the Jansenist movement and its various expressions at Port-Royal. In this book, Leslie Armour explores the underlying logic of ideas brought to the surface by the intersection of two philosophical lines of thought. He shows that Pascal had come to philosophy by way of two particular strands of Platonism, one strongly mystical, associated with the founder of the French Oratorian order, Pierre de Bérulle, and the other the Augustinian Platonism associated with Duvergier de Hauranne and Cornelius Jansen. At the same time Pascal was engaged in an internal struggle with skepticism. While he agreed that it is difficult to find God in physical nature, he disagreed with the claim that we know nothing of nature. The problem is that the human being is both infinite and nothing. Thus, Armour locates Pascal’s wager within the confluence of a vital neo-Platonism and an intellectually powerful skepticism. He concludes that even today, "If we must act and cannot know enough, we must bet.". (shrink)

This paper examines the characteristics of infectious diseases that raise special medical and social ethical issues, and explores ways of integrating both current bioethical and classical public health ethics concerns. Many of the ethical issues raised by infectious diseases are related to these diseases' powerful ability to engender fear in individuals and panic in populations. We address the association of some infectious diseases with high morbidity and mortality rates, the sense that infectious diseases are caused by invasion or attack on (...) humans by foreign micro-organisms, the acute onset and rapid course of many infectious diseases, and, in particular, the communicability of infectious diseases. The individual fear and community panic associated with infectious diseases often leads to rapid, emotionally driven decision making about public health policies needed to protect the community that may be in conflict with current bioethical principles regarding the care of individual patients. The discussion includes recent examples where dialogue between public health practitioners and medical-ethicists has helped resolve ethical issues that require us to consider the infected patient as both a victim with individual needs and rights and as a potential vector of disease that is of concern to the community. (shrink)

This paper examines the characteristics of infectious diseases that raise special medical and social ethical issues, and explores ways of integrating both current bioethical and classical public health ethics concerns. Many of the ethical issues raised by infectious diseases are related to these diseases’ powerful ability to engender fear in individuals and panic in populations. We address the association of some infectious diseases with high morbidity and mortality rates, the sense that infectious diseases are caused by invasion or attack on (...) humans by foreign micro‐organisms, the acute onset and rapid course of many infectious diseases, and, in particular, the communicability of infectious diseases. The individual fear and community panic associated with infectious diseases often leads to rapid, emotionally driven decision making about public health policies needed to protect the community that may be in conflict with current bioethical principles regarding the care of individual patients. The discussion includes recent examples where dialogue between public health practitioners and medical‐ethicists has helped resolve ethical issues that require us to consider the infected patient as both a victim with individual needs and rights and as a potential vector of disease that is of concern to the community. (shrink)

Bradley's rich and complex version of Absolute Idealism plays a key role not only in Idealist philosophy, politics, and ethics, but also in the development of modern logic, analytical philosophy, and pragmatism, as well as in the thinking of such figures as R. G. Collingwood and A. N. Whitehead. Topics covered include: the history of Idealism in the twentieth century; Bradley's relation to figures such as Bernard Bosanquet, C. A. Campbell, Brand Blanshard, John Watson, John Dewey, and others; Bradley's influence (...) on twentieth-century empiricism, modern logic, and analytical philosophy; and his significance for contemporary debates in epistemology and ethics. (shrink)

Mr. Mathien asks for evidence that there is Canadian philosophy in a special sense. He is not concerned with questions about whether people who were Canadians, or lived out much or most of their working lives in Canada, wrote philosophy which deserves to be taken seriously. Rather, he asks whether what has gone on in Canada by way of philosophy can be assembled in such a way as to make a coherent discipline.

I shall argue that Bradley needs a way of expressing logical tensions between apparently conflicting judgements, a way which will render them intelligible and non-contradictory. I shall also argue that the method he demands must, to meet his own standards, remain faithful to his belief that all philosophy — even logic — has to be anchored in experience. But it must also preserve certain basic logical notions about contradiction. The method cannot be either what is usually called the Hegelian dialectic (...) or the dialectic of relations of which Ralf Church speaks. It is, however, in important respects remarkably close to the procedure that Duns Scotus develops in his account of the disjunctive transcendentals. (shrink)

The humanities create communities of meaning and the means to unify knowledge. Poets and novelists offer new insights into our shared mind. History provides our continuity. Philosophy struggles to unite our scientific knowledge with our understanding of values. Each discipline creates its own perspective and they often turn inward, creating new divisions. Yet a global view of the humanities is our hope of finding the means to live together in peace. But the argument in this article suggests that a philosophical (...) understanding of the basic concepts with which we order our claims about the world can provide a successful response. (shrink)

Since testing for HIV infection became possible in 1985, testing of pregnant women has been conducted primarily on a voluntary, ‘opt-in’ basis. Faden, Geller and Powers, Bayer, Wilfert, and McKenna, among others, have suggested that with the development of more reliable testing and more effective therapy to reduce maternal-fetal transmission, testing should become either routine with ‘opt-out’ provisions or mandatory. We ask, in the light of the new rapid tests for HIV, such as OraQuick, and the development of antiretroviral treatment (...) that can reduce maternal-fetal transmission rates to <2%, whether that time is now. Illustrating our argument with cases from the United States (US), Kenya, Peru, and an undocumented Mexican worker in the US, we show that when testing is accompanied by assured multi-drug therapy for the mother, the argument for opt-out or mandatory testing for HIV in pregnancy is strong, but that it is problematic where testing is accompanied by adverse events such as spousal abuse or by inadequate intrapartum or follow-up treatment. The difference is not a ‘double standard’, but reflects the presence of conflicts between the health interests of the mother and the fetus – conflicts that would be abrogated by the assurance of adequate, continuing multi-drug therapy. In light of these conflicts, where they still occur, careful processes of informed consent are appropriate, rather than opt-out or mandatory testing. (shrink)

In this very readable and challenging work, Armour's approach is three-sided: to examine Hegel's objections to elements of Spinoza's accounts of knowledge and reality, to analyze the problems in Hegel's own system, and to propose a system that resolves some of these questions. Throughout, Armour is clear and thorough in his analysis, and his proposed system should engender valuable discussion among scholars. It is a treat to see metaphysics still being practiced, in spite of recent claims by many (...) analytic philosophers that this particular area of philosophical thought is dead. (shrink)

The thesis that enquiries into the nature and existence of God and enquiries into nature itself should be kept separate has gained new life from disputes about biology, but the development of physics and its relation to mathematics gives force to the idea that nature is more like a book to be read than it is like a collection of objects with no intrinsic meaning. The more one sees nature as a book to be read the more one sees it (...) as intrinsically intelligible. Intelligibility need not imply intelligence but the relation between the two is nonetheless a legitimate subject for investigation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:688 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER 1995 ters by Robert Payne and Gilbert Sheldon. (To my knowledge the only library in the United States that has The Theologian and Ecclesia.,tic is The Newbury Library in Chicago.) There are also letters in A Collection of Letters Illustrative of the Progress of Science, ed. J. Halliwell (London, 1840. Scholars in recent years have complained, usually justifiably, about the (...) cost of the books they need for their research. While $78.00 per volume is a lot of money, it would be well spent by anyone with a serious interest in the person or the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. These volumes, judiciously building upon the great labors of previous scholars, are the single most important contribution to Hobbes scholarship in the twentieth century. A. P. MARTINICH University of Texas at Austin Jeff Jordan, editor. Gambling on God: Essays on Pascars Wager. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994. Pp. viii + 164. Cloth, $49.oo. Paper, $19.95. Jeff Jordan has put together nine essays which give those who want to gamble on God something to think about. Though only three of them are really about Pascalk wager, all of them are worth reading. The most entertaining paper is Roy A. Sorensen's "Infinite Decision Theory." Sorensen confronts the St. Petersburg Paradox, which stems from the fact that there are available wagers with a potentially infinite payoff on which no one would bet $ao. Suppose you are offered $2n for each throw of a standard balanced coin until a head turns up. N = the number of tosses. It could be a long time--forever--before heads turns up. By the time n = loo you would have a bag of gold bigger than the sun. But Sorensen says the right bet is at least $23,but not much more. It is also true that since we don't know which actions God will reward, any human action has a possible infinite payoff and since all such actions have the same potential payoff none is better than the others. (Some god was moved to save Coleridge's Ancient Mariner, who had kindly thoughts about water-snakes.) Sorensen also notes that it is often said (Pascal would have agreed) that persons can be of infinite worth. If so, is rescuing one drowning person as good as rescuing five? The total worth seems to be the same. (Luckily, if Cantor is to be believed, there are larger and smaller infinities.) Sorensen ends inconclusively, but he is right that decision theory needs to address the infinite. Pascal would have had something to say. He thought that his bet was morally good. To bet on God is to act as if God exists. One who treats everyone as saved behaves as if God exists. (You don't know who is saved, but if you treat the saved as damned God will be annoyed whereas if you treat the damned as saved you won't detract from their ultimate penalty.) You don't have to bet $3, you only have to do what you ought to do anyway. The incremental cost of the bet appears to be zero. Anyhow, Pascal thought that it was not the infinite payoff (in the sense of a life of bliss) which provided the main motive for the bet but the fact that the required action was one's moral duty. Moreover, nook REVIEWS 689 if everyone behaves as if everyone is saved the result is a world in which God could appear and not be crucified. To be sure, there is a chance of an infinite life. Pascal believed human beings are potentially infinite--as is shown by our capacity for extending our knowledge to the infinite--but we are also potentially nothing, as is shown by the fact that the person never really appears in our scientific accounts. It is through God that our infinity is to be achieved, and so betting on God is also betting on ourselves in a perfectly intelligible way. This involw~s a notion of infinity not explored in any of these essays, which makes it possible to share with God without changing the divine nature... (shrink)

Bernard Bosanquet insisted that the truth of “moral socialism” — the doctrine that we all form part of a mutually dependent community and that we all have an obligation to put the common good ahead of our personal self-interest — follows necessarily from what we know about the nature of reality and from the logic of ethics. “Economic socialism”, the doctrine, in his view, that there ought to be a central bureaucracy on which all should depend for our continued well-being, (...) indeed, perhaps, for our very existence, is, he urged, the antithesis of moral socialism and is, in fact, a peculiar form of individualism. (shrink)

Arguments about the existence of a being who is infinite and perfect involve claims about a being who must appear in all the orders and dimensions of reality. Anything else implies finitude. Ideas about goodness seem inseparable from arguments about the existence of God and Kant's claim that such arguments ultimately belong to moral theology seems plausible. The claim that we can rely on the postulates of pure practical reason is stronger than many suppose. But one must show that a (...) being who is infinite and perfect is even possible, and any such being must be present in the physical world as well as in what Pascal called the orders of the intellect and morality. Indeed, locating God in the various orders without creating conflicts is problematic. Such arguments are necessarily difficult and sometimes self-defeating but I argue in this paper that there is a promising path. (shrink)

It has often been suggested – recently again by Michael Goulder in a debate with John Hick – that what traditionally was called the problem of ‘particular providence’, the problem of God's selective interference in the ongoing affairs of the world, is so acute as to render any form of rational theism impossible. In the same debate Hick argues for a ‘minimalist’ position which allows divine intervention only in the form of a general, radiated, goodness and benevolence on which human (...) beings may draw. In this paper I want to show that reason permits and some evidence suggests another possibility – the possibility that God intervenes through the inner life and perhaps by establishing the cast of characters. I shall construct this alternative usingideas developed from Cardinal Newman and Matthew Arnold. (shrink)

Religious discourse is in some way about the world, but its relation to other kinds of discourse – scientific historical, and moral – is a matter of dispute. Suggestions to avoid conflict with other kinds of discourse – the suggestion that religion invokes a distinct ‘language game’ and the suggestion that it should be taken as ‘basic’ for instance – have not, I argue, been successful. Essentially religion is involved in orienting us to the world and our goals, and orientation (...) has its own concerns. I ask what would be needed for successful orientation and suggest that talk about God my include elements which are essential for orientation. The argument suggests that the object of our orientation transcends the usual distinctions between the subjective and the objective. Perhaps this is the idea of the beatific vision. (shrink)

Green believed that, underlying the structure of human experience, there is an immanent God, gradually realised in the world through the processes of history. He believed in progress, and he sometimes spoke of it as “moral progress.” Talk of the history of moral progress came easily to him. No less than Rané Rapin, the seventeenth century Jesuit who told us that we should read history in a way which showed us its capacity for moral enlightenment, Green believed in hope.

Intellectually, the Nineteenth Century was marked by a struggle for a world vision — a struggle which shows itself in the minds and works of the British poets who often sought to reconcile science and religion. Blake feared that sophisticated concepts were destroying our contact with reality. Coleridge drew on Plato, Kant and Hegel and wrestled with the materialism of Hartley. Shelley used ideas from Plato and Berkeley. Wordsworth sought a visio if nature in which people could be comfortable. Hopkins (...) sought the idea of individuality in Duns Scotus. Idealist attempts to reconcile competing visions provided some of the conceptual frameworks, and all the poets responded to the debates about the sources of values. (shrink)

Of the half dozen crucial arguments around which McTaggart’s The Nature of Existence centers, one is borrowed from Russell. It seeks to show that we are directly acquainted with a spiritual particular which is the referent of the pronoun “I,” or, as McTaggart put it, “the self is known to itself by direct perception.”.

Bernard Bosanquet was an idealist with a taste for the rich complexities of ordinary human life, an appreciation for logic and science, and a dedication to experience. He was also fond of Plato, but I think he was a Platonist of a special kind, close to the Cambridge Platonism which Locke mixed with his own empiricism and which figures in the thinking of Isaac Newton. Of the partisans of the Absolute, Bosanquet is certainly the easiest to defend against the anti-metaphysical (...) philosophers of the twentieth century. Among moderate sympathisers with metaphysics one may still find philosophers whose thought resembles his in important respects. Though she was probably not aware of it, elements of his philosophy are very close to certain doctrines recently expounded by Iris Murdoch. And the idealism of Nicholas Rescher is not so distant. (shrink)

This paper argues that there are still clues in the ideas of Ralph Cudworth that enable us to develop a philosophical concept of God capable of addressing many of the perplexities of our own time. The association of love with the ultimately real emerges in Cudworth as a viable philosophical idea. It is argued further that the only successful idealist philosophy of religion is one which makes goodness paramount, and that only its concrete manifestation as love can make the notion (...) of God intelligible, as can be seen today in the works of Jean-Luc Marion. Résumé On tente de démontrer ici que les idées de Ralph Cudworth permettent de développer un concept philosophique de Dieu qui répond à plusieurs des perplexités de notre temps. L’association de l’amour et du réel ultime s’avère chez Cudworth une idée philosophique viable. Il y a lieu de se demander si la seule philosophie de la religion idéaliste réussie ne serait pas celle qui accorde la primauté au bien, et si ce n’est sa manifestation concrète comme amour qui seule puisse rendre intelligible le concept de Dieu, comme on le voit aujourd’hui dans l’oeuvre de Jean-Luc Marion. (shrink)

There are several forms of the Ontological Argument, but it is more or less fair to say that all hang on the contention that the notion of a perfect being entails the existence of that being, since existence is involved in perfection. My first interest is in the word "perfect." The word, I think, is usually vague but it seems to me that, in the context of the proof, it has a meaning which turns out to be much more pedestrian (...) than we would suspect. The argument, if it is valid, must assert that any perfect being would have to have every possible characteristic. It alleges that existence is a characteristic and it is, of course, over this that most debate has centered. It seems clear, however, that "perfect," as employed in the argument, merely means what we would call "complete" in less august transactions. In some forms of the proof, indeed, this is made somewhat clearer since the expression "greatest possible" being is substituted for "perfect." Ordinarily, no one would be tempted to pass lightly from the notion of "that which is complete" to the notion of "the deity." Both "perfect" and "greatest possible" appear to have moral connotations and "complete" usually does not. The slide, however, is made easier by the recurrent notion that evil is not a positive quality but merely the absence of another positive quality, usually goodness. If this view is held, it certainly does follow that whatever is "complete" must be "perfect" in the moral sense as well as in the other usual senses. It is not, here, my concern to pass judgment on this notion. I am, at the moment, merely trying to trace possible sources of confusion in the argument. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Leslie Armour is the author of numerous books and essays on epistemology, metaphysics, logic, Canadian philosophy and Blaise Pascal, as well as on ethics, social and political philosophy, the history of philosophy (especially seventeenth-century philosophy) and social economics. A fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, he has worked as a reporter for The Vancouver Province, briefly as a sub-editor at Reuters News Agency, and for several years as a columnist and feature writer for London Express News and (...) Feature Services. He has taught at universities in Montana, California, Ohio and Ontario. Now a researchprofessor of philosophy at the Dominican University College, Ottawa, an emeritus professor at the University of Ottawa, and editor of the International Journal of Social Economics, he and his wife, Diana, divide their time between Ottawa and London, U.K. (shrink)