BackgroundHealth research often uses health information, a subcategory of personal information, collected during clinical encounters. Conditions under which such health information can be used for the secondary purpose of research are set out in state, national and international law. In Australia, consent is required or the relevant conditions for a waiver of consent must be met and approved by a human research ethics committee (HREC). Consent for use of health information for research is rarely sought at an emergency department (ED) (...) presentation. Research often occurs after the index visit and gaining consent can be difficult. Waiver of consent provisions are frequently used, but acceptability of this approach to patients is unclear.ObjectiveTo identify ED patients’ knowledge and attitudes towards the use of health information for research, consent preferences and acceptability of waiver of consent.MethodsAn online, anonymous survey of adult patients attending two large EDs in Melbourne, Australia.Results103 patients completed the survey. We found that 52% were unaware that health information might be used for research. A majority (77%) felt that HREC approval for use of health information without consent was acceptable. However, 36% would prefer to be contacted regarding consent.ConclusionThese findings suggest a lack of awareness that health information can be used for research and that waiver of consent is acceptable, but not necessarily preferred, in most of the ED patient population. Efforts to increase awareness and provide opportunities to express preferences about health information use for research are needed. (shrink)

"Simplicius starts with a survey of previous commentators and an introductory set of questions about Aristotle's philosophy and about the Categories in particular. The commentator, he says, needs to present Plato and Aristotle as in harmony in most things."-- Publisher description.

Case-based instruction is a stable feature of ethics education, however, little is known about the attributes of the cases that make them effective. Emotions are an inherent part of ethical decision-making and one source of information actively stored in case-based knowledge, making them an attribute of cases that likely facilitates case-based learning. Emotions also make cases more realistic, an essential component for effective case-based instruction. The purpose of this study was to investigate the influence of emotional case content, and complementary (...) socio-relational case content, on case-based knowledge acquisition and transfer on future ethical decision-making tasks. Study findings suggest that emotional case content stimulates retention of cases and facilitates transfer of ethical decision-making principles demonstrated in cases. (shrink)

Higher order cognitive processes, including ethical decision making (EDM), are influenced by the experiencing of discrete emotions. Recent research highlights the negative influence one such emotion, anger, has on EDM and its underlying processes. The mechanism, however, by which anger disrupts the EDM has not been investigated. The current study sought to discover whether cognitive appraisals of an emotion-evoking event are the driving mechanisms behind the influence of anger on EDM. One primary (goal obstacle) and one secondary (certainty) appraisal of (...) anger were examined. Study results suggest that appraisals of certainty are the driving mechanism behind the negative relationship between anger and EDM. Certainty appraisals led to less application of EDM-promoting strategies and more unethical social motives. Findings further highlight the value of investigating appraisals of emotional events, given their cognitive nature, for their potential effects on cognitive operations, such as EDM. Future directions and implications are discussed. (shrink)

This book explains the Problem of Truth’s Value and offers a virtue-theoretic solution to it. The Problem of Truth’s Value arises because it is hard to reconcile good theories of truth’s nature with good theories of why we should value truth. Some theories build value into the very nature of truth, but they tend to obscure the connection between what is true and how things are in the world. Other theories treat truth as a purely descriptive feature of claims. They (...) struggle to explain how such a feature could make something good or right to believe. To solve the problem, this book proposes a “Strong Virtue Theory” of truth’s value. On that theory, truth is worth caring about, but not because of any pre-existing value that inheres in states of true belief. Instead, truth is worth caring about because caring about truth is a moral virtue; it is part of being a morally good person. The book offers an account of Truthfulness as a moral virtue, independent of any value that inheres in states of true belief. It also criticizes several alternative ways of explaining truth’s value. Those alternatives include the idea that truth is inherently normative, the idea that truth makes beliefs intrinsically or instrumentally valuable, and the idea that truth confers a special sort of “epistemic value” on beliefs. (shrink)

Nosso objetivo neste artigo é o de lançar luz sobre alguns aspectos das concepções de Gödel acerca da percepção de conceitos. Começamos investigando a natureza e o papel da analogia entre percepção sensível e percepção de conceitos. A seguir, examinamos as conexões entre percepção de conceitos, razão e compreensão, tentando mostrar que a percepção de conceitos é compreensão de conceitos. Por fim, examinamos aqueles aspectos da concepção de Gödel em que a percepção de conceitos de fato se aproxima perigosamente da (...) ideia de um "olho da mente". Contudo, argumentamos que esses aspectos problemáticos não são intrínsecos à noção de percepção de conceitos, mas sim resultam de uma má compreensão da distinção entre conceito e objeto. Our goal in this article is to illuminate some aspects of Gödel's conception of the perception of concepts. We begin by investigating the nature and function of Gödel's analogy between sense perception and perception of concepts. After that, we examine the connections between perception of concepts, reason, and understanding, trying to show that the perception of concepts consists in the understanding of concepts. Finally, we examine those aspects of Gödel's conception where the perception of concepts actually comes dangerously close to the idea of a "mind's eye". However, we argue that these problematic aspects are not intrinsic to the notion of perception of concepts, but result from a misunderstanding of the distinction between concept and object. (shrink)

Several of the contributions to the Lynch et al. Special issue make the claim that conversation-analytic research into epistemics is ‘routinely crafted at the expense of actual, produced and constitutive detail, and what that detail may show us’. Here, we seek to address the inappositeness of this critique by tracing precisely how it is that recognizable actions emerge from distinct practices of interaction. We begin by reviewing some of the foundational tenets of conversation-analytic theory and method – including the relationship (...) between position and composition, and the making of collections – as these appear to be primary sources of confusion for many of the contributors to the Lynch et al. Special Issue. We then target some of the specific arguments presented in the Special Issue, including the alleged ‘over-hearer’s’ writing of metrics, the provision of so-called ‘alternative’ analyses and the supposed ‘crafting’ of generalizations in epistemics research. In addition, in light of Lynch’s more general assertion that conversation analysis has recently been experiencing a ‘rapprochement’ with what he disparagingly refers to as the ‘juggernaut’ of linguistics, we discuss the specific expertise that linguists have to offer in analyzing particular sorts of interactional detail. The article as a whole thus illustrates that, rather than being produced ‘at the expense of actual, produced and constitutive detail’, conversation-analytic findings – including its work in epistemics – are unambiguously anchored in such detail. We conclude by offering our comments as to the link between CA and linguistics more generally, arguing that this relationship has long proven to be – and indeed continues to be – a mutually beneficial one. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider the implications of Grace de Laguna and Joel Katzav's work for the charge of conservatism against the analytic tradition. We differentiate that conservatism into three kinds: starting place; path dependency; and modesty. We also think again about gender in philosophy, consider the positive account of speculative philosophy presented by de Laguna and Katzav in comparison to some other naturalist trajectories, and conclude with a brief Australian addendum that reflects on a similar period in our own (...) country which was also associated with the professional institutionalisation of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Organizational leaders face environmental challenges and pressures that put them under ethical risk. Navigating this ethical risk is demanding given the dynamics of contemporary organizations. Traditional models of ethical decision-making (EDM) are an inadequate framework for understanding how leaders respond to ethical dilemmas under conditions of uncertainty and equivocality. Sensemaking models more accurately illustrate leader EDM and account for individual, social, and environmental constraints. Using the sensemaking approach as a foundation, previous EDM models are revised and extended to comprise a (...) conceptual model of leader EDM. Moreover, the underlying factors in the model are highlighted—constraints and strategies. Four trainable, compensatory strategies (emotion regulation, self-reflection, forecasting, and information integration) are proposed and described that aid leaders in navigating ethical dilemmas in organizations. Empirical examinations demonstrate that tactical application of the strategies may aid leaders in making sense of complex and ambiguous ethical dilemmas and promote ethical behavior. Compensatory tactics such as these should be central to organizational ethics initiatives at the leader level. (shrink)

An epistemic duty would be a duty to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgment from a proposition, and it would be grounded in purely evidential or epistemic considerations. If I promise to believe it is raining, my duty to believe is not epistemic. If my evidence is so good that, in light of it alone, I ought to believe it is raining, then my duty to believe supposedly is epistemic. I offer a new argument for the claim that there are no (...) epistemic duties. Though people do sometimes have duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgment from propositions, those duties are never grounded in purely epistemic considerations. (shrink)

We might suppose it is not only instrumentally valuable for beliefs to be true, but that it is intrinsically valuable – truth makes a non-derivative, positive contribution to a belief's overall value. Some intrinsic goods are better than others, though, and this article considers the question of how good truth is, compared to other intrinsic goods. I argue that truth is the worst of all intrinsic goods; every other intrinsic good is better than it. I also suggest the best explanation (...) for truth's inferiority is that it is not really an intrinsic good at all. It is intrinsically neutral. (shrink)

Whenever the name Edmund Husserl appears in the context of nursing research, what correctly comes to mind is the phenomenological approach to qualitative methodology. Husserl is not only considered the founder of phenomenology, but his broad concept development also contributed to the demise of positivism and inspired fruitful approaches to the social sciences. In this spirit of inspiration, it must be expressed that Husserl's theory of wholes and parts, and particularly his differentiation of parts into ‘pieces’ and ‘moments’, is very (...) helpful in guiding the selection of research methods across the board in nursing science. The purpose of this paper is to highlight a frame of reference for nursing researchers to use in examining the essential nature of that which is being studied. This frame of reference is the Husserlian philosophy of ‘pieces’ and ‘moments’ in relation to the whole. ‘Pieces’ are independent parts of the whole that are subject to isolability in study, whereas ‘moments’ are nonindependent parts, which cannot be detached, presented, or studied apart from the whole. The intent is to propose this frame of reference as a philosophical base from which nursing researchers may better select among paradigms and methodological approaches in regard to the essential nature (‘pieces’ or ‘moments’) of that which they are researching. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Epistemic duties would be duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgement from propositions, and they would be grounded in purely evidential considerations. I offer a new argument for the claim that there are no epistemic duties. Though people may have duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgement from propositions, those duties are never grounded in purely epistemic considerations. Rather, allegedly epistemic duties are a species of moral duty.RÉSUMÉ: Les fonctions épistémiques sont censées désigner le fait de croire ou de (...) ne pas croire des propositions, ou de suspendre notre jugement, et seraient fondées uniquement sur la prise en compte de l’évidence. Je présente un nouvel argument soutenant que les fonctions épistémiques n’existent pas. Bien que nous devions recourir aux fonctions de croire ou de ne pas croire des propositions, ou de suspendre notre jugement, ces fonctions ne sont jamais fondées sur d’uniques considérations épistémiques. Ce que l’on reconnaît comme des fonctions épistémiques appartient plutôt à l’espèce des fonctions morales. (shrink)

The following four assumptions plausibly describe the ideal rational agent. (1) She knows what her beliefs are. (2) She desires to believe only truths. (3) Whenever she desires that P → Q and knows that P, she desires that Q. (4) She does not both desire that P and desire that ~P, for any P. Although the assumptions are plausible, they have an implausible consequence. They imply that the ideal rational agent does not believe and desire contradictory propositions. She neither (...) desires the world to be any different than she thinks it is, nor thinks it is any different than she desires it to be. The problem of preserving our intuitions about desire, without embracing the implausible conclusion, is what I call “the Wishful Thinking Puzzle.” In this paper, I examine how this puzzle arises, and I argue that it is surprisingly difficult to solve. Even the decision theoretic conception of desire is not immune to the puzzle. One approach, the contrastive conception of desire, does avoid the puzzle without being ad hoc, but it remains too inchoate to win our full confidence. (shrink)

ABSTRACT According to a prominent objection, deflationist theories of truth can’t account for the explanatory connection between true belief and successful action [Putnam 1978]. Canonical responses to the objection show how to reformulate truth-involving explanations of particular successful actions, so as to omit any mention of truth [Horwich 1998]. According to recent critics, though, the canonical strategy misses the point. The deflated paraphrases lack the generality or explanatory robustness of the original explanatory appeals to truth [Kitcher 2002; Lynch 2009; Gamester (...) 2018]. This article diagnoses the canonical response’s failure and shows how deflationists can make sense of appeals to truth in explaining practical success, in all of their generality and robustness, without construing truth as a substantial property. (shrink)

This paper argues against the almost universally held view that truth is an instrumentally valuable property of beliefs. For truth to be instrumentally valuable in the way usually supposed, it must play a causal role in the satisfaction of our desires. As it happens, truth can play no such role, because it is screened off from causal relevance by some of the truth-like properties first discussed by Stephen Stich. Because it is not causally relevant to the success of our actions, (...) truth is not instrumentally valuable in the way usually supposed. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher has argued for a causal correspondence view of truth, as against a deflationary view, on the grounds that the former is better poised than the latter to explain systematically successful patterns of action. Though Kitcher is right to focus on systematically successful action, rather than singular practical successes, he is wrong to conclude that causal correspondence theories are capable of explaining systematic success. Rather, I argue, truth bears no explanatory relation to systematic practical success. Consequently, the causal correspondence (...) view is not in a better position to explain success than the deflationary view; theories of truth are the wrong place to look for explanations of systematic practical success. (shrink)

This paper argues against the realization principle, which reifies the realization relation between lower-level and higher-level properties. It begins with a review of some principles of naturalistic metaphysics. Then it criticizes some likely reasons for embracing the realization principle, and finally it argues against the principle directly. The most likely reasons for embracing the principle depend on the dubious assumption that special science theories cannot be true unless special science predicates designate properties. The principle itself turns out to be false (...) because the realization relation fails the naturalistic test for reality: it makes no causal difference to the world.Footnote11This paper resulted from work done at John Heil's 2006 Mind and Metaphysics NEH Summer Seminar at Washington University in St. Louis. An early version of it was presented in a special symposium on realization at the 2007 meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. I owe thanks to all the participants in both events for helpful discussions, and I owe particular thanks to Ken Aizawa, Torin Alter, Jason Ford, Carl Gillett, John Heil, Nicholas Helms, Pete Mandik, John Post, Gene Witmer, Michelle Wrenn, Tad Zawidzki, and two anonymous referees for the AJP. (shrink)

This paper considers Salman Rushdie’s location as a migrant writer of the postcolonial generation while looking at criticism on his writing style by foregrounding ways in which Rushdie writes about history, reality and identity in Midnight’s Children. Underlying Rushdie’s deconstructive playfulness is a radical political spirit envisioning a humanism beyond the rigid constructions of a self/other duality, Hindu/Muslim identity, or Eastern/Western dichotomy. Furthermore, Rushdie opens up a discourse on being and belonging as a legitimate place/space for those stranded in that (...) “strange middle ground, trapped between belief and disbelief.” According to Rushdie, this space, this middle ground, which he terms the “third principle,” could be tapped to decolonize place as well as minds. The paper also analyzes how Rushdie uses the metaphors of the “whole” and “hole” in Midnight’s Children to show he writes the story of the colonial, national and postcolonial condition from the place of the personal, where personal body politics meets the geographic body politics of a whole Indian sub-continent. (shrink)

This paper considers Salman Rushdie’s location as a migrant writer of the postcolonial generation while looking at criticism on his writing style by foregrounding ways in which Rushdie writes about history, reality and identity in Midnight’s Children. Underlying Rushdie’s deconstructive playfulness is a radical political spirit envisioning a humanism beyond the rigid constructions of a self/other duality, Hindu/Muslim identity, or Eastern/Western dichotomy. Furthermore, Rushdie opens up a discourse on being and belonging as a legitimate place/space for those stranded in that (...) “strange middle ground, trapped between belief and disbelief.” According to Rushdie, this space, this middle ground, which he terms the “third principle,” could be tapped to decolonize place as well as minds. The paper also analyzes how Rushdie uses the metaphors of the “whole” and “hole” in Midnight’s Children to show he writes the story of the colonial, national and postcolonial condition from the place of the personal, where personal body politics meets the geographic body politics of a whole Indian sub-continent. (shrink)