The role to be played by multi-stakeholder partnerships in addressing the ‘wicked problems’ of sustainable development is made explicit by the seventeenth Sustainable Development Goal. But how do these partnerships really work? Based on the analysis of four sustainability-oriented innovation initiatives implemented in Belgium, Italy, Germany, and France, this study explores the roles and mechanisms that collaborating actors may enact to facilitate the pursuit of sustainable development, with a particular focus on non-profit organizations. The results suggest that collaborative innovations for (...) sustainability contribute simultaneously to the fulfilment of different Sustainable Development Goals, reaching beyond their original intent, and that the value being created has the potential to reinforce such roles and mechanisms. These partnerships are prompted and managed by non-profit organizations that act as metagovernors of collaborative innovation processes as they play the roles of cultural spreaders, enablers, relational brokers, service provides, and influencers. These findings will help policy-makers and practitioners in the public and non-profit sector to identify and utilize emerging opportunities for value creation through collaborative innovation, and to better design existing and prospective collaborative efforts aimed at sustainable objectives, thereby supporting progress towards the implementation of Agenda 2030. (shrink)

Introduction: A general trend in the psychological literature suggests that guilt contributes to morality more than shame does. Unlike shame-prone individuals, guilt-prone individuals internalize the causality of negative events, attribute responsibility in the first person, and engage in responsible behavior. However, it is not known how guilt- and shame-proneness interact with the attribution of responsibility to others. -/- Methods: In two Web-based experiments, participants reported their attributions of moral culpability (i.e., responsibility, causality, punishment and decision-making) about morally ambiguous acts of (...) killing in different conditions. In Study 1 the vignettes were presented in the 1st person, while in Study 2 in the 3rd person. To test proneness to guilt and shame, we utilized the GASP scale, which differentiates between the affective and behavioral components of each emotion. Statistical analyses were performed in Matlab and R. -/- Results: We found that guilt- and shame-proneness were associated with the severity of attributions in both the first and the third person, but the effect was strong only in the guilt case (both subtypes) and shame-affect case, and not in the shame-behavior case. We call this the Moralizing Effect. -/- Discussion: We wonder whether our finding that guilt-prone people tend to attribute a higher degree of culpability to others is really consistent with the view that guilt motivates people to choose the “moral paths in life”. This echoes views about the harmful aspects of guilt, which have been expressed historically in philosophy, for example, by Friedrich Nietzsche. (shrink)

There is a substantial difference between our way of "philosophizing", born out of Descartes' clear and well-defined thinking and bent on building alternative (aut-aut) models, and the classical (especially Platonic-Aristotelian) way where a constant use of technical and methodical pluralism serves to juxtapose different (et-et) schemes necessary to grasp an intrinsically one-manifold reality. The ancient Philosophers bring a great wealth of schemes into play, albeit in different forms. This is to say that one could also come across statements that are (...) clearly mismatched and sometimes even at odds with one another, without either giving rise to a real contradiction or (even less so) a quasi relativistic viewpoint. Quite the contrary, an approach of this kind focuses on the necessary knowledge of a reality which, however, is multiform. By assuming this interpretative paradigm and applying it to some of the most pivotal reflections of the Sophists, Plato and Aristotle, the Authors of the contributions herein provide a number of particularly eloquent examples of that typically "Greek" movement, which is to proceed steadily by association of possibilities, rejecting the either/or solicitations and hinging their reflections upon the more open and dynamic "and-and" combination. The authors believe that many of the puzzles of Ancient philosophy that have involved and divided scholars can acquire a new and convincing explanation with this paradigm. (shrink)

Nations usually define themselves in positive terms; they proclaim themselves strong and victorious, or developed and prosperous. But what does it mean when the opposite is true - when negative feelings like regret, nostalgia, melancholy and fatalism are said to be the true essence of a culture? And what does it mean when these feelings are encapsulated in a single, untranslatable word?Bringing together three such word-concepts from Europe's periphery - saudade in Portugal, the Czech litost of Milan Kundera and Orhan (...) Pamuk's of Istanbul - this book investigates claims that they embody the historical experiences and character of a people. In each case, it explores the historical, cultural and psychological mechanisms behind the invention of negative autostereotypes to offer new ways of thinking about individual and collective identities. This eclectic and broad-ranging study is not only a historical survey of emotions, but also a meditation on hope, belonging and the search for authenticity in the modern age. (shrink)

This paper examines an argument by Schaffer (2017) that aims to prove how, contrary to what many philosophers hold, there is no special explanatory gap occurring in the connection between the physical and the phenomenal. This is because a gap of the same kind can be found in every connection between a more fundamental and a less fundamental level of reality. These gaps lurk everywhere in nature. For Schaffer, they can be bridged by means of substantive metaphysical principles such as (...) grounding principles. He thus puts forward a version of grounding-based physicalism, which is supposed to provide this kind of substantive bridge principle. My main contention is as follows: even if Schaffer’s argument indeed proves the existence of a gap in every connection between fundamental and derivative entities, and such gaps can be bridged by means of grounding principles, a different gap remains open in the psycho-physical connection. (shrink)

This article points out the criteria necessary in order for a qualitative scientific method to qualify itself as phenomenological in a descriptive Husserlian sense. One would have to employ description within the attitude of the phenomenological reduction, and seek the most invariant meanings for a context. The results of this analysis are used to critique an article by Klein and Westcott , that presents a typology of the development of the phenomenological psychological method.

Health care systems can positively influence our personal decision-making and health-related behavior only if we trust them. I propose a conceptual analysis of the trust relation between the public and a healthcare system, drawing from healthcare studies and philosophical proposals. In my account, the trust relation is based on an epistemic component, epistemic authority, and on a value component, the benevolence of the healthcare system. I argue that it is also modified by the vulnerability of the public on healthcare matters, (...) and by the system’s credibility. I apply my proposed analysis of public trust in health care systems to the phenomenon of vaccine hesitancy, a tendency to question vaccine policies, and to seek alternative vaccine schedules or to refuse vaccination. Understanding the role of trust and its components can be key to understanding the phenomenon. (shrink)

This book provides an introduction to the study of words, their main properties and how we use them to create meaning. It offers a detailed description of the organizational principles of the lexicon, and of the categories used to classify various lexical phenomena, including polysemy, meaning variation, behaviour in composition, and the interface with pragmatics. Elisabetta Ježek uses empirical data from digitalized corpora and speakers' judgements, combined with the formalisms developed in the field of general and theoretical linguistics, to (...) propose representations for each of these phenomena. The book's clear structure and accessible approach make it an ideal textbook for all students of linguistics and a valuable resource for scholars and students of language in the fields of cognitive science and philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, we first want to defend the idea that reference intentionality is the relation of constitution holding between an intentional state, a thought, and the object it is about, its intentional object. As such, reference intentionality is for a thought an essential property, whose predication to that thought is true in virtue of the nature of such a thought. We will take this to be one of the main lessons of serious externalism, according to which the intentional object (...) occurs in the individuation conditions of the thought about it. Moreover, we want to draw some consequences of this idea. First, in conformity with serious externalism we will claim that an objectual thought is nothing but its intentional object in a cogitative modality, which is nothing but a certain motivational role for that object to play with respect to a subject. Second, we will claim that one such thought, both as a type and as a token, is an abstract particular, respectively a kind and a relational trope. (shrink)

This book provides an introduction to the study of words, and how we use words to create meaning. It offers an accessible description of the main properties of words and the organizational principles of the lexicon, based on theoretical accounts and extensive empirical data.

In his recent book, Age of Anger, Pankaj Mishra considers the uncoordinated bursts of violence that have punctuated the world since the fall of the Berlin Wall as tangible manifestations of the latest wave of crisis in liberal modernity. Rather than fostering peace and prosperity across the globe, he argues, the economic globalization of the last half century has created a claustrophobic and unequal world populated by frustrated individuals prone to anger and revenge. "The result is, as Hannah Arendt feared, (...) 'a tremendous increase in mutual hatred and a somewhat universal irritability of everybody against everybody else,' or ressentiment, … an existential resentment of other people's being, caused by an intense mix... (shrink)

The phenomenon of "social alchemy", containing the idea of the possibility of creating a new man and a new world and passing through all radical thought, especially of the New and Modern times, had and has a habit of pouring out into violence, in the broadest sense of the word, — from the guillotine and concentration camps to modern "information colonization of consciousness". Having received technological support, when digital technologies and new communication systems cover almost the entire world community, leaving (...) no one outside of their comprehensive influence, the phenomenon of "social alchemy" has acquired a qualitatively different, special and global significance. At the same time, the goals, means and actors have changed, only its radical component has remained unchanged, striving to transform society and build such social, political and economic structures and relations, that would correspond to certain ideas of some elites (economic, political, intellectual) about what should the global world be like in order to ensure their interests to the greatest extent. (shrink)

We show that there exist downwards properly $\Sigma _{2}^{0}$ (in fact noncuppable) e-degrees that are not high. We also show that every high e-degree bounds a noncuppable e-degree.

Trolley-like dilemmas are other cases of what Bermúdez refers to as (conscious) quasi-cyclical preferences. In these dilemmas, identical outcomes are obtained through morally non-identical actions. I will argue that morality is the context where descriptive invariance and ecological relevance may be crucially distinguished. Logically irrational moral choices in the short term may promote greater social benefits in the longer term.

Baccarini and Malatesti (2017) defend the idea that we must use coercively biomedical means to enhance the morality of a specific group of individuals: psychopaths, diagnosed through the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) standards (Hare, 2003). Their argument is theoretical, thus it goes independently from the actual effectiveness of existent treatments, and it is based on a logical reasoning. Moral bioenhancement (MB) means include psychotropic drugs, brain stimulations, neurosurgeries, genetic editing, etc. -/- In short, the authors apply Gerald Gaus' account of open (...) justification (Gaus, 1996, 2011), according to which “a prescription addressed to an agent is a reasoning that includes premises that consider the system of reasons (such as beliefs, preferences, etc.) of that agent” (Baccarini and Malatesti, 2017, p. 1). In their view, coercive MB of psychopaths is morally sound and deducible by reasons within the psychopath's cognitive-affective system—even if the psychopath needs not to be able to consciously or sincerely endorse them. We believe that this argument is flawed. In sum, we argue that the psychopath's cognitive-affective system would consistently justify reasons against mandatory MB to herself, even if she wishes differently for others, and that the prescription cannot be extended. (shrink)

A growing body of scholarship has documented the experiences of different groups of migrants involved in the maintenance and development of transnational families worldwide showing that proximity is not a prerequisite of family life and that families can successfully be done from a distance. While most work deals with the experiences of labour migrants less attention has been paid to forced migrants. Still little is known about families that fail to operate transnationally and are broken by the migration experience. For (...) instance, when can we say that this type of family cannot be sustained? This article, drawing on the transnational motherhood literature and on Zontini previous study on Filipino labour migrants in Southern Europe, highlights the factors that shape transnational parenting. The authors then use this framework to explore the experiences of a group of Zimbabwean asylum seeking mothers in the UK. In doing so, the authors point out some of the specificities of this particular group; highlighting the differentiated impact of transnationalism and contributing to refining the literature on transnational parenthood. (shrink)

The paper demonstrates that a detailed analysis of Hegel’s criticism of rationalist metaphysics in the “Vorbegriff” (Preliminary Conception) chapter of the Encyclopedia Logic can shed light on the following critical features of Hegel’s metaphysics: (1) advancing semantic holism as an alternative to semantic atomism; (2) renouncing the projection of a substance-attribute formal structure onto actuality; (3) dismissing sense perception as the source of conceptual content; and (4) rejecting dualist ontology.

This book argues that the Doctrine of the Concept is the centerpiece of Hegel’s philosophical system and, through a close analysis of this final part of the Science of Logic, presents a detailed account of the key features of Hegel’s ontology.

È possibile perseguire intenzionalmente la speranza o si tratta di una postura interiore che sfugge alla volontà? E se scaturisce da una ricerca, può essere trasmessa, sollecitata?Declinata in una pratica da perseguire nella relazione di aiuto? È realistico considerare la capacità di schiudere nuove possibilità per abitare con senso la vita, una competenza professionale del lavoro di cura? Nell’intento di dare risposta a questi interrogativi la riflessione attraversa il pensiero di alcuni tra i maggiori filosofi del Novecento, secondo un orientamento (...) fenomenologico che prende le mosse dall’esperienza vissuta.Is it possible to “intentionally” pursue the hope or is it an inner attitude beyond anyone’s will? And if it derives from a research, can it be transmitted, aroused? Can it be declined as a practice to be followed in a helping relationship? Is it realistic to consider the capacity of disclosing new possibilities of living a meaningful as a professional skill in care job?The intention of giving an answer to these questions crosses the beliefs of some of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century, in compliance with a phenomenological orientation taking its moves from lived experience. (shrink)

The mathematical scenario in Italy during the Late Middle Ages and the Renaissance is mainly dominated by the treatises on the abacus, which developed together with the abacus schools. In that context, between approximately the last thirty years of the fourteenth century and the first twenty years of the sixteenth century, the manuscript and printed tradition tell us of queries and challenges, barely known or totally unknown, in which the protagonists were abacus masters. We report in this work on the (...) most significant examples and draw out interesting cues for thoughts and remarks of a scientific, historical and biographical nature. Five treatises, written in the fifteenth and sixteenth century, have been the main source of inspiration for this article: the Trattato di praticha d’arismetricha and the Tractato di praticha di geometria included in the codices Palat. 573 and Palat. 577 (c. 1460) kept in the Biblioteca Nazionale of Florence and written by an anonymous Florentine disciple of the abacist Domenico di Agostino Vaiaio; another Trattato di praticha d’arismetrica written by Benedetto di Antonio da Firenze in 1463 and included in the codex L.IV.21 kept in the Biblioteca Comunale of Siena; the Tractatus mathematicus ad discipulos perusinos written by Luca Pacioli between 1477 and 1480, manuscript Vat. Lat. 3129 of the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana; and Francesco Galigai’s Summa de arithmetica, published in Florence in 1521. (shrink)

Numerous studies suggest that both emotion knowledge and language abilities are powerfully related to young children’s theory of mind. Nonetheless, the magnitude and direction of the associations between language, emotion knowledge, and theory-of-mind performance in the first years of life are still debated. Hence, the aim of this study was to assess the direct effects of emotion knowledge and language on theory-of-mind scores in 2- and 3-year-old children. A sample of 139 children, aged between 24 and 47 months (M = (...) 35.5 months; SD = 6.73), were directly administered measures of emotion knowledge, theory of mind, and language. We conducted structural equation modeling (SEM) to evaluate the effects of these variables within a single comprehensive framework, while also controlling for any effects of age and gender. The proposed structural equation model provided an excellent fit for the data, indicating that both children’s emotion knowledge and their language ability had direct positive effects on theory of mind scores. In addition, age was found to wield statistically significant effects on all the variables under study, whereas gender was not significantly associated with any of them. These findings suggest the importance of fostering young children’s emotion knowledge and language with a view to enhancing their comprehension of mental states. (shrink)

At present, psychiatric disorders are characterized descriptively, as the standard within the scientific community for communication and, to a certain extent, for diagnosis, is the DSM, now at its fifth edition. The main reasons for descriptivism are the aim of achieving reliability of diagnosis and improving communication in a situation of theoretical disagreement, and the Ignorance argument, which starts with acknowledgment of the relative failure of the project of finding biomarkers for most mental disorders. Descriptivism has also the advantage of (...) capturing the phenomenology of mental disorders, which appears to be essential for diagnosis, though not exhaustive of the nature of the disease. I argue that if we rely on the distinction between conceptions (procedures of identification) and concepts (reference-fixing representations), which was introduced in the philosophical debate on the nature of concepts, we may understand a limited but valid role for descriptive characterizations, and reply to common objections addressed by those who advocate a theoretically informed approach to nosology. (shrink)

In adapting Husserl’s philosophical phenomenological method to conduct research in psychology I included Husserl’s two methodical steps, the epochē and the reduction, as part of the scientific procedure. Zahavi objected to my use of those steps. This article is a response to his objections and it is a reaffirmation of the necessity of the epochē and reduction for Husserlian phenomenological psychological research. A description of Husserl’s acknowledged types of psychology and a description of his transcendental phenomenology are also presented along (...) with two outlines of how Husserlian phenomenological research could be conducted. (shrink)

A Kuhnian reformulation of the recent debate in psychiatric nosography suggested that the current psychiatric classification system (the DSM) is in crisis and that a sort of paradigm shift is awaited (Aragona, 2009). Among possible revolutionary alternatives, the proposed fi ve-axes etiopathogenetic taxonomy (Charney et al., 2002) emphasizes the primacy of the genotype over the phenomenological level as the relevant basis for psychiatric nosography. Such a position is along the lines of the micro-reductionist perspective of E. Kandel (1998, 1999), which (...) sees mental disorders reducible to explanations at a fundamental epistemic level of genes and neurotransmitters. This form of micro-reductionism has been criticized as a form of genetic-molecular fundamentalism (e.g. Murphy, 2006) and a multi-level approach, in the form of the burgeoning Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, was proposed. This article focuses on multi-level mechanistic explanations, coming from Cognitive Science, as a possible alternative etiopathogenetic basis for psychiatric classification. The idea of a mechanistic approach to psychiatric taxonomy is here defended on the basis of a better conception of levels and causality. Nevertheless some critical remarks of Mechanism as a psychiatric general view are also offered. (shrink)

In this paper, the role played in learning to argue by an essential and yet under-researched epistemic and argumentative norm is discussed, namely, the consistency requirement. An argumentative intervention is presented, that is designed to enhance the understanding of this norm among high school students, to enable them to recognize contradictions in the process of argumentation and to familiarize them with the argumentative strategies related to the reductio ad absurdum. There follows a description of how the designed intervention was implemented (...) in two Italian high schools, which served as an exploratory case study, and the results obtained are discussed. (shrink)

There is a lot of conceptual engineering going on in medical research. I substantiate this claim with two examples, the medical debate about cancer classification and about obesity as a disease I also argue that the proper target of conceptual engineering in medical research are experts’ conceptions. These are explicitly written down in documents and guidelines, and they bear on research and policies. In the second part of the chapter, I propose an externalist framework in which conceptions have both the (...) explanatory power of psychological concepts and that of semantic concepts. It is likely, however, that human activities and practices distinct from medical research, and regulated by different practices and epistemic rules, call for different targets for conceptual engineering. I conclude with indicating an open agenda of problems for philosophers of medicine interested in conceptual engineering. (shrink)

According to Frege a proposition—or, in his terms, a thought—is an abstract structured entity constituted by senses which satisfies, at least, the three following properties: it can be semantically assessed as true or as false, it is the object of so called propositional attitudes and it can be grasped. What Frege meant by 'grasping' is the peculiar way in which we can have epistemic access to propositions. The possibility for propositions to be grasped is put by Frege as a warrant (...) for their existence: to challenge their graspability would amount to jeopardise their ontological reality. But is it true, as Frege uncritically maintained, that the "graspability requirement" is satisfied as far as propositions (as he conceived them) are concerned? This is the topic of the present work. A negative answer to the above mentioned question has been given in recent time by the representatives of what has come to be labelled the "cognitive turn" in analytical philosophy. People such as Fodor and Johnson-Laird patently denied the possibility for propositions, conceived à la Frege, to be accessed by the grasping relation. What grounds their position is, to put it roughly, the following train of thought: in order for something to be the target of the grasping relation it must enter the mind. Nothing which is different from a mental entity can enter the mind. Therefore, what can be grasped must be mental. The upshot of this move implies, among other things, the rejection of that radical anti-psychologism which was characteristic of the forefathers of the analytical tradition. In our work we shall try to resist their conclusion by showing that it is not necessary to zero the distinction between propositions and mental entities in order to provide an adequate account of the grasping relation. What one has to give up, instead, is only Frege's late Platonism of the "third realm" which, in our view, is a wholly unnecessary and dispensable accretion of his picture. For, as we shall show, if Platonism is in place it is difficult to provide an account of the grasping relation which makes no use of the "representationalist hypothesis" — i.e. of the hypothesis that ideas mediate our access to whatever can be given to us. But representationalism, once in place, makes the theoretical role of the notion of sense dispensable or purely additional. (shrink)