Activation of resting T lymphocytes through the T cell antigen receptor complex is initiated by critical phosphorylation and dephosphorylation events that regulate the function and interaction of a number of signaling molecules. Key elements in these reactions are members of the Src, Syk and Csk families of protein tyrosine kinases (PTKs) and the phosphotyrosine phosphatases (PTPases) that regulate and/or counteract them, such as CD45. The PTKs can autophosphorylate and phosphorylate each other at multiple sites and, as the result of these (...) interactions, they are induced to phosphorylate other cellular proteins. These phosphorylation events lead to modulation of enzymatic activities and/or serve as binding sites for other signaling molecules having phosphotyrosine‐binding Src homology 2 (SH2) domains. As a result, these proteins translocate to the receptor complexes and are juxtaposed to the kinases that phosphorylate them. Some of the SH2‐domain‐containing polypeptides lack enzymatic activities and, instead, serve as adapter molecules that couple the signal to downstream effectors, such as regulators of the Ras proteins, and further into serine/threonine‐specific protein kinase cascades. Through largely unknown steps these reactions lead to the transcription of previously silent genes, activation of lymphocyte effector functions, progression through the cell cycle and cell proliferation. (shrink)

Georg Simmel: an introduction by K. P. Etzkorn.--The conflict in modern culture.--On the concept and tragedy of culture.--A chapter in the philosophy of value.--Sociological aesthetics.--On aesthetic quantities.--On the third dimension in art.--The dramatic actor and reality.--Psychological and ethnological studies on music.

Existe una conexión interna de teoría y praxis que se pone de manifiesto en la acción. Ésta no es el resultado de un traspaso dialéctico de un determinado saber a un actuar cualquiera, sino un movimiento que implica un saber que, en sí mismo, es práctico, por cuanto contiene de suyo el momento de la ejecución del fin que se propone. Vida teorética y vida práctica no constituyen una alternativa, sino una gradación: en ello consiste el Ethos de la acción (...) humana. La ética aristotélica remonta a esta mediación recíproca de teoría y praxis, no sólo la posibilidad de la vida individual, sino, ante todo, de la vida de la comunidad. Sobre esta mediación se cumple el tránsito directo de la ética a la política en el pensamiento aristotélico. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

For Descartes, minds were essentially non-extended things. Contemporary cognitive science prides itself on having exorcised the Cartesian ghost from the biological machine. However, it remains committed to the Cartesian vision of the mental as something purely inner. Against the idea that the mind resides solely in the brain, advocates of the situated and embodied nature of cognition have long stressed the importance of dynamic brain-body-environment couplings, the opportunistic exploitation of bodily morphology, the strategic performance of epistemically potent actions, the generation (...) and use of external representations, and the cognitive scaffolding provided by artifacts and social-cultural practices. According to the “extended mind” thesis, a significant portion of human cognition literally extends beyond the brain into the body and its environment. My goal in this book is to clarify the nature and scope of this thesis, and to defend its central insight that cognition is not confined to the boundaries of the biological individual. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop an understanding of recognition in terms of individuals’ capacity for conflict. Our goal is to overcome various shortcomings that can be found in both the positive and negative conceptions of recognition. We start by analyzing paradigmatic instances of such conceptions—namely, those put forward by Axel Honneth and Judith Butler. We do so in order to show how both positions are inadequate in their elaborations of recognition in an analogous way: Both fail to make intelligible the (...) fundamental nexus between relations of recognition and individuals’ capacity for conflict. We then move on to reconsider aspects of Hegel's view of recognition—ones that, from our viewpoint, have been unjustly neglected in the debate about recognition: his focus on the constitution of relations of recognition in conflict and on the status of being an author of acts of recognition. On this basis, we then spell out in a more systematic way what we take to be a more convincing conception of recognition. This puts us in the position to gesture at some consequences of this conception in practical contexts, above all with regard to the justification, role and structure of political institutions. (shrink)

This innovative study focuses on the Kantian theory of international relations, a subject which has frequently been either ignored or misunderstood. Kant was criticized by contemporaries who asserted that his political ideas were idealistic and impractical. He countered this accusation by evolving a political philosophy which formed a link between the theoretical doctrine of pure law and the actualities of the real world. The author argues that Kant’s theory of international relations can be read as an attempt to bring reason (...) and history together. Kant tries to apply the a priori principles of reason to history in general, and to the political conditions of the late eighteenth century in particular, and this volume examines the way in which he attempts to mediate between theory and practice. In this stimulating and lucid work, Cavallar provides one of the first comprehensive examinations in English of Kant’s theory of international right. (shrink)

The best of Hegel's early writings, with an introduction on Hegel's philosophical development.

The article presents the conceptual groundwork for an understanding of the essentially improvisational dimension of human rationality. It aims to clarify how we should think about important concepts pertinent to central aspects of human practices, namely, the concepts of improvisation, normativity, habit, and freedom. In order to understand the sense in which human practices are essentially improvisational, it is first necessary to criticize misconceptions about improvisation as lack of preparation and creatio ex nihilo. Second, it is necessary to solve the (...) theoretical problems that derive from misunderstandings concerning the notions of normativity, habit, and freedom – misunderstandings that revolve around the idea that rationality is a form that is developed out of itself and thus works in a way similar to algorithms. One can only make sense of normativity, habit, and freedom if one understands that they all involve conflictual relationships with the world and with others, which in turn enables one to adequately take into account their constitutive connection to improvisation, properly understood. In outlining these conceptual connections, we want to prepare the foundations for an explanation of rational practices as improvisational practices. The article concludes by stating that human rational life is improvisatory because the conditions of human practice arise out of practice itself. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Untersuchung verfolgt hauptsachlich systematische Zwecke. Sie verlaBt jedoch an keiner Stelle den Weg einer Interpretation der Phanomenologie der Erfahrbarkeit fremder Subjektivitat im Ge­ samtzusammenhang des Husserlschen Projektes einer transzendental­ phanomenologischen Philosophie aufder Grundlage der aus dem Nach­ laB verOffentlichten Schriften zu einer Phanomenologie der Intersubjek­ tivitat. Das systematische Ziel gibt jedoch die Erlaubnis, aus den ge­ danklichen Bestanden dieses Werkes einen philosophischen Gedanken­ gang zu entwickeln, der in vielem nicht mit den bisherigen Auslegungen iibereinstimmt. Die Untersuchung ist nicht (...) in erster Linie bemiiht, den Text nur getreulich nachzuzeichnen, sondern nimmt Gewichtungen vor und stellt Zusammenhange her, die es erlauben, zu einem neuen Entwurf zu kommen, der in mancher Hinsicht so nicht in den zu Husserls Lebzei­ ten veroffentlichten Texten steht. Die Aufgabe lautet folglich: auf der Grundlage von Husserls NachlaB-Texten zum Thema Intersubjektivitat eine philosophische Theorie auszuarbeiten, die iiber ein historisches In­ teresse hinaus systematische Bedeutung gewinnen kann. Aufgrund des systematischen und rekonstruktiven Interesses bleibt im folgenden die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Husserlschen Denkens weitgehend unberiicksichtigt. Dariiber hinaus beschrankt sich die Un­ tersuchung auf das transzendentalphilosophische Stadium der Husserl­ schen Philosophie und beschaftigt sich nicht mit dem Versuch einer rein deskriptiven Phanomenologie. Fiir die Interpretationen werden ohne Ausnahme nur die bereits verOffentlichten Schriften einschlieBlich der in den Gesammelten Werken edierten Texte aus Husserls NachlaB be­ nutzt. (shrink)

In moral epistemology, the method of reflective equilibrium is often characterized in terms of intuitions or understood as a method for justifying intuitions. An analysis of reflective equilibrium and current theories of moral intuitions reveals that this picture is problematic. Reflective equilibrium cannot be adequately characterized in terms of intuitions. Although the method presupposes that we have initially credible commitments, it does not presuppose that they are intuitions. Nonetheless, intuitions can enter the process of developing a reflective equilibrium and, if (...) the process is successful, be justified. Since the method of reflective equilibrium does not essentially involve intuitions, it does not constitute a form of intuitionism in any substantial sense. It may be classified as intuitionist only in the minimal sense of not reducing justification to a matter of inference relations alone. (shrink)

This book uncovers Kant s hidden theory of cosmopolitan education within the framework of his overall practical philosophy. The Kant brought out here turns out to be very different from current mainstream appropriations, which erroneously consider him one of the founding fathers of the new cosmopolitanism. Kant s Embedded Cosmopolitanism is a valuable source for students of political philosophy, cosmopolitanism, and Kant s ethics.".

Vier Metaphysische Kapitel :1. Die Transzendenz des Lebens2. Die Wendung zur Idee3. Tod und Unsterblichkeit4. Das individuelle Gesetz.

Social scientists, political scientists and philosophers debate key concepts such as democracy, power and autonomy. Contested concepts like these pose questions: Are terms such as “democracy” hopelessly ambiguous? How can two theorists defend alternative accounts of democracy without talking past each other? How can we understand debates in which theorists disagree about what democracy is? This paper first discusses the popular strategy to answer these questions by appealing to Rawls’s distinction between concepts and conceptions. According to this approach, defenders of (...) rival conceptions of, e.g. justice can disagree without talking past each other because they share the concept of justice. It is argued that this idea is attractive but limited in application and that it fails to do justice to the dynamic and normative aspects of concept formation. Reflective equilibrium is then suggested as an alternative approach. It replaces the static contrast between a conceptual ‘core’ and competing conceptions by a dynamic perspective of concept formation as a partly normative undertaking: pre-theoretic language use and commitments can provide a shared starting point for developing alternative accounts which yield different concepts of, e.g. justice. This perspective provides a new understanding of how it is possible that different theorists defend rival accounts of, e.g. justice, without talking past each other. (shrink)

The complete translation of Simmel's classic work in which he provides us with a dazzling and wide-ranging discussion of the social, psychological and philosophical aspects of the money economy.

Presented alongside these seminal essays are aphoristic fragments from Simmel’s last journal, providing a beguiling look into the mind of one of the twentieth century’s greatest thinkers.

TRANSLATORS PREFACE THE PRESENT TRANSLATION OF GEORG SIMMEL'S Schopen- hauer und Nietzsche: Ein Vortragszyklus (1907), ...

Wie kaum ein anderes Gefühl ist Mitleid von Unsicherheiten geprägt: Der Begriff »Mitleid« wird widersprüchlich verwendet - aber auch das Gefühl selbst kann schwanken. Dies wirft Fragen der Angemessenheit auf. Georg Sillers genaue Lektüre Ludwig Wittgensteins zeigt, dass solche Unbestimmtheiten jedoch nicht als Defizite gesehen werden müssen: Erstens sind psychologische Begriffe in ihrer Bedeutungsvielfalt Teil unserer Lebensform und damit mehr als die Bezeichnung von Zuständen, zweitens stellt schwankendes Mitleid eine ganz eigene Haltung dar - und zwar häufig die des (...) Respekts. Diese Perspektive ermöglicht neue Zugriffe auf Aristoteles, Nietzsche, Brecht, Arendt sowie die Neuropsychologie - und nicht zuletzt auf Wittgenstein selbst. (shrink)

La position de l'Allemagne impériale soucie Georg Simmel : où doit-elle se situer vis-à-vis de la catastrophe survenant dans la vieille Europe disloquée, et à l'heure de son «américanisation»? Il s'exprime ici moins en universitaire qu'en penseur du lien social, à qui les formes et l'intensité de la guerre en cours imposent une difficile épreuve de vérité. Epreuve personnelle aussi, car la Grande Guerre oppose les philosophes de la même école de pensée - comme on le voit en lisant (...) les pages de Simmel en regard des adresses de Bergson à ses collègues académiciens, puis à l'opinion américaine. (shrink)

This chapter suggests a scheme of reconstruction, which explains how scenarios, questions and arguments figure in thought experiments. It then develops a typology of ethical thought experiments according to their function, which can be epistemic, illustrative, rhetorical, heuristic or theory-internal. Epistemic functions of supporting or refuting ethical claims rely on metaethical assumptions, for example, an epistemological background of reflective equilibrium. In this context, thought experiments may involve intuitive as well as explicitly argued judgements; they can be used to generate moral (...) commitments, to explore consequences of moral theories, and to show inconsistencies within or between moral commitments and moral theory; but the results of thought experiments by themselves do not settle what is epistemically justified and may also be rejected. Finally, some prominent challenges are discussed: do unrealistic scenarios undermine epistemic thought experiments? Are ethical thought experiments misleading? Do they rely on weak analogies? Are there specifically moral objections to ethical thought experiments? (shrink)

Logik ist nach dem traditionellen Verständnis eine ars iudicandi, eine Kunst, die Gültigkeit von Schlüssen zu prüfen. Da mit die normalen Mittel der modernen Logik zu diesem Zweck eingesetzt werden können, müssen erst Formeln an die Stelle von Sätzen treten: umgangssprachliche Schlüsse müssen adäquat formalisiert werden. Die richtige Formel entwickelt ein theoretisches Konzept des Formalisierens und praktisch anwendbare Adäquatheitskriterien für Formalisierungen. Dabei werden zentrale Fragen der Philosophie der Logik unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Zusammenspiels von Umgangssprache und Formalismus untersucht. Die ausführliche (...) und systematische Diskussion von Formalisierungstests bietet eine wichtige Ergänzung zu den traditionellen Logiklehrbüchern. (shrink)

While neuroscience has made enormous progress in understanding the brain, the implications of these empirical findings for ontological questions in philosophy including the mind–body problem remain yet unclear. In the first paper, I discussed the model of brain that as implied and supported by the empirical data. This leads me now to the question of an empirically plausible ontology of brain. Therefore, the aim in this second paper is the ontological characterization of the brain in terms of a process-based ontology (...) that avoids what Whitehead described as “simple location” and “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”. The discussion of the model of the brain is complemented by developing a process-based ontological characterization of the brain. Specifically, as based on Whitehead, I argue that “simple location” of the brain as thing or object in time and space amounts to nothing but an abstraction rendering what Whitehead described as “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”. Instead of describing the brain as static, non-temporal and isolated thing or object, I characterize the brain ontologically by dynamic, temporal, and relational processes. This leads me to a process-based ontology of brain which may be specified in spatiotemporal terms. Since the world’s larger spatiotemporal range or scale contains, e.g., nests, the smaller one of the brain, I characterize their ontological relationship by “spatiotemporal nestedness” and “spatiotemporal directedness”. Such spatiotemporal relationship between world and brain precludes the confusion between the world as whole and the brain as part, e.g., “mereological confusion”. I conclude that process-based or better, more specifically, spatiotemporal ontology of the brain and its relationship to the world may offer novel views on the question for the ontological relationship between mind and brain, e.g., the mind–brain problem, by converting or reformulating it as “world-brain problem”. (shrink)

The basic idea of logical expressivism in the Brandomian tradition is that logic makes inferential relations explicit and thereby accessible to critical discussion. But expressivists have not given a convincing explanation of what the point of logical theories is. Peregrin provides a starting point by observing a distinction between making explicit and explication in Carnap’s sense of replacing something unclear and vague by something clear and exact. Whereas logical locutions make inferential relations explicit within a language, logical theories use formal (...) languages to explicate inferential roles and meanings of ordinary-language expressions. But Peregrin also holds that the whole point of logical theories is to provide perspicuous models of inferential structures in ordinary language practice. This turns explication into a mere continuation of making explicit by other means, and it leads to a one-sided conception of logic which has no room for evaluating inferential practice in light of logical theories. As a more convincing alternative, I suggest that expressivists rely on the method of reflective equilibrium. This approach is closely related to Carnapian explication, but it has the potential of correcting informal inferential practice without dubious ambitions to replace ordinary languages by logical formalisms. (shrink)

This chapter provides an overview of the issues involved in recent debates about the epistemological relevance of emotions. We first survey some key issues in epistemology and the theory of emotions that inform various assessments of emotions’ potential significance in epistemology. We then distinguish five epistemic functions that have been claimed for emotions: motivational force, salience and relevance, access to facts and beliefs, non-propositional contributions to knowledge and understanding, and epistemic efficiency. We identify two core issues in the discussions about (...) such epistemic functions of emotions: First, even though it is plausible that emotions are involved in epistemic processes, it may be doubted whether they really matter for the normative question of what counts as knowledge or justified belief. Second, some of the epistemic functions claimed for emotions in general may only be attributed to some specifically epistemic emotions, which have been present all along in traditional epistemology, albeit under different labels such as ‘intuitions’. (shrink)

Georg Simmel: an introduction by K. P. Etzkorn.--The conflict in modern culture.--On the concept and tragedy of culture.--A chapter in the philosophy of value.--Sociological aesthetics.--On aesthetic quantities.--On the third dimension in art.--The dramatic actor and reality.--Psychological and ethnological studies on music.

A growing number of professional associations and occupational groups are creating codes of ethics with the goal of guiding their members, protecting service users, and safeguarding the reputation of the profession. There is a great deal of literature dealing with the question to what extent ethical codes can achieve their desired objectives. The present paper does not contribute to this debate. Its aim is rather to investigate how rational it is to comply with codes of conduct. It is natural and (...) virtually inevitable for a reflective person to ask why one should pay any attention to ethical codes, in particular if following a code is not in one’s own interest. In order to achieve the aim of this paper, I shall (in “Quasi-reasons for complying with an ethical code” section) discuss reasons that only appear to be reasons for complying with a code. In “Code-independent reasons” section, I shall present genuine practical reasons that, however, turn out to be reasons of the wrong kind. In “Code-dependent reasons” section finally presents the most important reasons for complying with ethical codes. The paper argues that while ethical codes do not necessarily yield reasons for action, professionals can have genuine reasons for complying with a code, which may, however, be rather weak and easily overridden by reasons for deviating from the code. (shrink)