Johann Gottlieb Fichte hielt im Sommer 1805 in Erlangen öffentliche Vorlesungen zum Thema 'Über das Wesen des Gelehrten und seine Erscheinungen im Gebiete der Freiheit'. In diesen Vorlesungen erläuterte Fichte sein Verständnis des Wesens und der Aufgabe des Gelehrten und führte in seine Philosophie ein. Dieser Text ist ein wichtiges Zeugnis nicht nur für die Entwicklung von Fichtes Philosophie, sondern auch für die Geschichte des Deutschen Idealismus und das Verständnis von Bildung und Wissenschaft im frühen 19. Jahrhundert. Dieser Band enthält (...) den Text von J. G. Fichtes 'Über das Wesen des Gelehrten' (1805) zusammen mit Interpretationen, die Fichtes Vorlesungen im Rahmen seines eigenen Werkes und im Kontext der Philosophie- und Geistesgeschichte verorten. Mit Beiträgen von Paul Cobben, Alfred Denker, Elisabeth Kessler, C. Jeffery Kinlaw, Wilhelm Metz, Angelica Nuzzo, Ernst-Otto Onnasch, Tom Rockmore, Annette Sell, Michael Vater, Richard Velkley, Franziskus von Heereman, Holger Zaborowski u.a. (shrink)

Über das Wesen des Gelehrten, und seine Erscheinungen im Gebiete der Freiheit (1805) von Johann Gottlieb Fichte -- Vorrede -- Erste Vorlesgun: Plan des Ganzen -- Zweite Vorlesung: Nähere Bestimmung des Begriffs der göttlichen Idee -- Dritte Vorlesung: Vom angehenden Gelehrten überhaupt; insbesondere vom Talente und Fleisse -- Vierte Vorlesung: Von der Rechtschaffenheit im Studiren -- Fünfte Vorlesung: Wie die Rechtschaffenheit des Studirenden sich äussere -- Sechste Vorlesung: Ueber die akademische Freiheit -- Siebente Vorlesung: Vom vollendeten Gelehrten im Allgemeinen -- (...) Achte Vorlesung: Vom Regenten -- Neunte Vorlesung: Vom mündlichen Gelehrte=Lehrer -- Zehnte Vorlesung: Vom Schriftsteller -- Menschliche Bildung und göttliche Idee. Über Struktur und Gedankengang von Fichtes Erlanger Vorlesungen Über das Wesen des Gelehrten / Annette Sell -- Über das Wesen des Gelehrten im Kontext der Wissenschaftslehre / C. Jeffery Kinlaw -- Fichte on Bestimmung and Wesen des Gelehrten / Angelica Nuzzo -- Fichte's Über das Wesen des Gelehrten, or the educated man as the salt of the Earth / Tom Rockmore -- Werkzeuge? Zur Herrschaft der Gelehrten im Kontext des Fichteschen Spätwerks / Franziskus von Heereman -- J.G. Fichtes Über das Wesen des Gelehrten und die Bestimmung des magister bei Thomas von Aquin / Wilhelm Metz -- Wie sich der Philosoph bei Descartes und Fichte zu sich selbst verhält / Elisabeth Kessler -- The ghosts of Kantian philosophy in Fichte's Über das Wesen des Gelehrten / Richard Velkley -- Reinhold über die Bildung eines neuen Menschen / Ernst-Otto Onnasch -- Die innerliche Verknüpfung von "objektiver Wissenschaft" und "subjektiver Bildung". Wilhelm von Humboldts Universitätsidee - mit einem Ausblick auf sein Kritik an Fichtes Überlegungen zum Gelehrten und zur Universität / Holger Zaborowski -- Die Todesangst als die Vermittlung zur absoluten Idee / Paul Cobben -- Fichte and Schelling / Michael Vater -- Fichtes Über das Wesen des Gelehrten und Heidegger / Alfred Denker. (shrink)

"Fritsche's book, which is closely researched, carefully argued, and philologically rigorous, will become an indispensable point of reference for further debates on Heidegger's ambiguous political and ethical legacy."—Richard Wolin, author of The Politics of Being "Unquestionably, Fritsche has a highly unusual command of the Heideggerian idiom, which he uses to very good effect."—Tom Rockmore, author of On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy.

This paper examines a looming reproducibility crisis in the core of the hard sciences. Namely, it concentrates on molecular modeling and simulation (MMS), a family of methods that predict properties of substances through computing interactions on a molecular level and that is widely popular in physics, chemistry, materials science, and engineering. The paper argues that in order to make quantitative predictions, sophisticated models are needed which have to be evaluated with complex simulation procedures that amalgamate theoretical, technological, and social factors (...) – leading to problems with reproducibility. Thus, for methodological reasons, the predictive success causes a reproducibility problem. (shrink)

Episodic representations can be entertained either as “remembered” or “imagined”—as outcomes of experience or as simulations of such experience. Here, we argue that this feature is the product of a dedicated cognitive function: the metacognitive capacity to determine the mnemicity of mental event simulations. We argue that mnemicity attribution should be distinguished from other metacognitive operations (such as reality monitoring) and propose that this attribution is a “cognitive gadget”—a distinctively human ability made possible by cultural learning. Cultural learning is a (...) type of social learning in which traits are inherited through social interaction. In the case of mnemicity, one culturally learns to discriminate metacognitive “feelings of remembering” from other perceptual, emotional, action-related, and metacognitive feelings; to interpret feelings of remembering as indicators of memory rather than imagination; and to broadcast the interpreted feelings in culture- and context-specific ways, such as “I was there” or “I witnessed it myself.” We review evidence from the literature on memory development and scaffolding, metacognitive learning and teaching, as well as cross-cultural psychology in support of this view before pointing out various open questions about the nature and development of mnemicity highlighted by our account. (shrink)

Both thought experiments and simulation experiments apparently belong to the family of experiments, though they are somewhat special members because they work without intervention into the natural world. Instead they explore hypothetical worlds. For this reason many have wondered whether referring to them as “experiments” is justified at all. While most authors are concerned with only one type of “imagined” experiment – either simulation or thought experiment – the present chapter hopes to gain new insight by considering what the two (...) types of experiment share, and what they do not. A close look reveals at least one fundamental methodological difference between thought and simulation experiments: while thought experiments are a cognitive process that employs intuition, simulation experiments rest on automated iterations of formal algorithms. It will be argued that this difference has important epistemological ramifications. (shrink)

The thesis addresses the nature of causation. It is argued that causation exists and is as local as its causes and effects. As a consequence, the position advocated is contrary to the as yet prevailing view that no 'causal tie' between cause and effect exists. Moreover, it is suggested that this tie can be perceived. The essay attempts to elucidate the nature of causes, effects, and causal mechanisms. It is argued that they are facts rather than particulars or universals. Furthermore (...) it is suggested that these facts can be conceived of as tropes. Finally, in the light of this thesis a few traditional issues are discussed: what is the relation between causation and explanation? How should we conceive of causal laws? Does the idea of mechanisms with different degrees of reliability further our understanding of the determinism/indeterminism issue? (shrink)

The English language has adopted the word Tardis for something that looks simple from the outside but is much more complicated when inspected from the inside. The word comes from a BBC science fiction series, in which the Tardis is a machine for traveling in time and space, that looks like a phone booth from the outside. This paper claims that simulation models are a Tardis in a way that calls into question their transferability. The argument is developed taking Molecular (...) Modeling and Simulation as an example. There, simulation models are force fields that describe the molecular interactions and that look like simple and highly modular mathematical expressions. To make them work, they contain parameters that are adjusted to match certain data. The role of these parameters and the way they are obtained is seriously under-appreciated. It is constitutive for the model and central for its applicability and performance. Hence, the model is more than it seems so that working with adjustable parameters deeply affects the ontology of simulation models. This is particularly crucial for the transferability of the models: the information on how a model was trained is like luggage the model must carry on its voyage. (shrink)

Modularity is a key concept in building and evaluating complex simulation models. My main claim is that in simulation modeling modularity degenerates for systematic methodological reasons. Consequently, it is hard, if not impossible, to accessing how representational structure and dynamical properties of a model are related. The resulting problem for validating models is one of holism. The argument will proceed by analyzing the techniques of parameterization, tuning, and kludging. They are – to a certain extent – inevitable when building complex (...) simulation models, but corrode modularity. As a result, the common account of validating simulations faces a major problem and testing the dynamical behavior of simulation models becomes all the more important. Finally, I will ask in what circumstances this might be sufficient for model validation. (shrink)

Much of the debate on the ethics of self-driving cars has revolved around trolley scenarios. This paper instead takes up the political or institutional question of who should decide how a self-driving car drives. Specifically, this paper is on the question of whether and why passengers should be able to control how their car drives. The paper reviews existing arguments—those for passenger ethics settings and for mandatory ethics settings respectively—and argues that they fail. Although the arguments are not successful, they (...) serve as the basis to formulate desiderata that any approach to regulating the driving behavior of self-driving cars ought to fulfill. The paper then proposes one way of designing passenger ethics settings that meets these desiderata. (shrink)

In this article, we discuss recent evidence from experimental economics on the impact of social preferences on workplace behavior. We focus on situations in which a single employer interacts with multiple employees. Traditionally, equity and efficiency have been seen as opposing aims in such work environments: individual pay-for-performance wage schemes maximize of efficiency but might lead to inequitable outcomes. We present findings from laboratory experiments that show under which circumstances partially incomplete contracts can create equitable work environments while at the (...) same time reaching surprisingly efficient outcomes. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie Jahrgang: 58 Heft: 1 Seiten: 16-38.

The paper is a critical comment on D. Hoffman. The Scrambling Theorem: A simple proof of the logical possibility of spectrum inversion. Consciousness and Cognition, 2006, 15, 31–45.

IN NEWMAN’S EPISTEMOLOGY CERTITUDE IS THE LIMIT OF CUMULATED CONVERGING PROBABILITIES. IT IS REFLEX ASSENT WHICH IS PROVED BY MENTAL IMPLICIT REASONING, WHOSE VERBAL FORMULATION IS SOMETHING SECONDARY. ASSENT IS NOT AN AUTOMATIC RESULT OF SYLLOGISMS. PERFECTION OF PERSONAL FACULTY OF REASONING IN CONCRETE MATTER IS THE ILLATIVE SENSE, WHICH INCLUDES PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ETHICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS AND USES ANTECEDENT PROBABILITIES. RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY: PHENOMENA OF CONSCIENCE MANIFEST A DIVINE LAWGIVER. PHENOMENA OF THE SENSE OF GUILT AND LONGING FOR ATONEMENT POINT TO DIVINE (...) INTERVENTION AND REVELATION. SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE: RUDIMENTS IN HIS THEORY OF DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT. INFLUENCES AND PARALLELS DO NOT TOUCH NEWMAN’S ORIGINALITY. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn the Black Notebooks, Heidegger ascribes in 1938/9 to the Jewish race an “empty rationality and calculative ability,” in his view the cause of its “worldlessness.” To assess this characterisation, I present Heidegger’s theories of history as a decline in Being and Time and in his later history of Being. For this purpose, I discuss his notions of Rechnen, Machenschaft, and Geviert, several existentialia from Being and Time, and Heidegger’s identification of modern machination and modern technology. Furthermore, I examine Heidegger’s (...) attitude toward the Jews and the Holocaust. I present his alignment of the unconcealment of modernity and the Jewish race, and compare his theory of machination with the texts “Positionality” and “The Question concerning Technology”. Heidegger’s notes about the Jews in the Black Notebooks after 1944 confirm that he tried “to silence Auschwitz silently,” as I already argued in a paper from 1995. (shrink)

Interdisciplinary research within the field of sustainability studies often faces incompatible ontological assumptions deriving from natural and social sciences. The importance of this fact is often underrated and sometimes leads to the wrong strategies. We distinguish between two broad approaches in interdisciplinarity: unificationism and pluralism. Unificationism seeks unification and perceives disciplinary boundaries as conventional, representing no long-term obstacle to progress, whereas pluralism emphasizes more ephemeral and transient interdisciplinary connections and underscores the autonomy of the disciplines with respect to one another. (...) Both approaches have their merits and pitfalls. Unification runs the risk of scientific imperialism, while pluralism can result in insurmountable barriers between disciplines. We made a comparison of eight distinct interdisciplinary attempts at integration of knowledge across social and natural sciences. The comparison was carried out as four pairwise comparisons: environmental economics versus ecological economics, environmental history versus historical ecology, resilience theory versus political ecology, and socio-biology versus actor-network theory. We conclude by showing that none of these prominent eight interdisciplinary fields in and of itself manages to provide, in a satisfactory way, such an integrated understanding of sustainability. We argue for pluralism and advocate complex ways of articulating divergent ontological assumptions. This is not equivalent to pursuing knowledge unification either through scientific imperialism or by catering to the requirements of narrow practical utility. It means prioritizing interdisciplinary integration by simultaneously acknowledging the role of societal and natural factors in accounting for sustainability issues. (shrink)

In this paper, we show that reproducibility is a severe problem that concerns simulation models. The reproducibility problem challenges the concept of numerical solution and hence the conception of what a simulation actually does. We provide an expanded picture of simulation that makes visible those steps of simulation modeling that are numerically relevant, but often escape notice in accounts of simulation. Examining these steps and analyzing a number of pertinent examples, we argue that numerical solutions are importantly different from usual (...) mathematical solutions. They are do not merely approximate the latter, but introduce new problems, including issues of artificiality, stability, and well-posedness. Consequently, simulation modelling can attain reproducibility only to a certain degree because it is working with numerical solutions. (shrink)

To what extent does the common claim that childhood is ‘socially constructed’ affect the ethical debate on the ‘intrinsic’ and ‘special’ goods of childhood? Philosophers have referred to this kind of goods in their critique of overly adult-centred and future-oriented conceptions of childhood. The view that some goods are child-specific, in the sense that they are only good for children, not for adults, seems to presuppose an understanding of what children ‘are’, and how they differ from adults. However, if the (...) social-constructionist view is accepted, it cannot be assumed that childhood is a given. This essay claims that the social-constructionist understanding of childhood does not undermine the debate on the moral status and the goods of childhood, but that nevertheless important lessons can be drawn from the insight that childhood, as we know it, is not a natural and universal phenomenon. (shrink)

The Remmelink Committee published its report on medical decisions at the end of life in the Netherlands in September 1991. As a result, the Dutch debate about physician aid‐in‐dying has been broadened to include life‐terminating acts that have not been explicitly requested by the patient.

This contribution defends two claims. The first is about why thought experiments are so relevant and powerful in mathematics. Heuristics and proof are not strictly and, therefore, the relevance of thought experiments is not contained to heuristics. The main argument is based on a semiotic analysis of how mathematics works with signs. Seen in this way, formal symbols do not eliminate thought experiments (replacing them by something rigorous), but rather provide a new stage for them. The formal world resembles the (...) empirical world in that it calls for exploration and offers surprises. This presents a major reason why thought experiments occur both in empirical sciences and in mathematics. The second claim is about a looming aporia that signals the limitation of thought experiments. This aporia arises when mathematical arguments cease to be fully accessible, thus violating a precondition for experimenting in thought. The contribution focuses on the work of Vladimir Voevodsky (1966–2017, Fields medalist in 2002) who argued that even very pure branches of mathematics cannot avoid inaccessibility of proof. Furthermore, he suggested that computer verification is a feasible path forward, but only if proof is not modeled in terms of formal logic. (shrink)

Accounts of ontic explanation have often been devised so as to provide an understanding of mechanism and of causation. Ontic accounts differ quite radically in their ontologies, and one of the latest additions to this tradition proposed by Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver reintroduces the concept of activity. In this paper I ask whether this influential and activity-based account of mechanisms is viable as an ontic account. I focus on polygenic scenarios—scenarios in which the causal truths depend on (...) more than one cause. The importance of polygenic causation was noticed early on by Mill (1893). It has since been shown to be a problem for both causal-law approaches to causation (Cartwright 1983) and accounts of causation cast in terms of capacities (Dupré 1993; Glennan 1997, pp. 605-626). However, whereas mechanistic accounts seem to be attractive precisely because they promise to handle complicated causal scenarios, polygenic causation needs to be examined more thoroughly in the emerging literature on activity-based mechanisms. The activity-based account proposed in Machamer et al. (2000, pp. 1-25) is problematic as an ontic account, I will argue. It seems necessary to ask, of any ontic account, how well it performs in causal situations where—at the explanandum level of mechanism—no activity occurs. In addition, it should be asked how well the activity-based account performs in situations where there are too few activities around to match the polygenic causal origin of the explanandum. The first situation presents an explanandum-problem and the second situation presents an explanans-problem—I will argue—both of which threaten activity-based frameworks. (shrink)

Thought experiments and simulation experiments are compared and contrasted with each other. While the former rely on epistemic transparency as a working condition, in the latter complexity of model dynamics leads to epistemic opacity. The difference is elucidated by a discussion of the different kinds of iteration that are at work in both sorts of experiment.

This paper examines cave environments as unique spaces of knowledge production and shows how visualizations of natural cavities in maps came to be powerful tools in scientific reasoning. Faced with the challenge of limited vision, mapmakers combined empiricism and imagination in an experimental setting and developed specific translation strategies to deal with the uncertain origin of underground objects and the shifting boundaries between the known and the unknown. By deconstructing this type of cartographic representation, which has barely been studied, this (...) paper furnishes surprising insights into the scholarly practices and tools used to deal with this considerable epistemic uncertainty and to signal credibility and trust to potential users. The array of maps used for this study includes both archival and published sources, depicting caves in Europe, America and Siberia. (shrink)

This chapter examines the deep connections between biological organization, agency, and evolution by natural selection. Using Griesemer’s account of the reproducer, I argue that the basic unit of evolution is not a genetic replicator, but a complex hierarchical life cycle. Understanding the self-maintaining and self-proliferating properties of evolvable reproducers requires an organizational account of ontogenesis and reproduction. This leads us to an extended and disambiguated set of minimal conditions for evolution by natural selection—including revised or new principles of heredity, variation, (...) and ontogenesis. More importantly, the continuous maintenance of biological organization within and across generations implies that all evolvable systems are agents or contain agents among their parts. This means that we ought to take agency seriously—to better understand the concept and its role in explaining biological phenomena—if we aim to obtain an organismic theory of evolution in the original spirit of Darwin’s struggle for existence. This kind of understanding must rely on an agential perspective on evolution, complementing and succeeding existing structural, functional, and processual approaches. I sketch a tentative outline of such an agential perspective and present a survey of methodological and conceptual challenges that will have to be overcome if we are to properly implement it. (shrink)

Thinking about organisms as if they were rational agents which could choose their own phenotypic traits according to their fitness values is a common heuristic in the field of evolutionary theory. In a 1998 paper, however, Elliott Sober has emphasized several alleged shortcomings of this kind of analogical reasoning when applied to the analysis of social behaviors. According to him, the main flaw of this heuristic is that it proves to be a misleading tool when it is used for predicting (...) the evolution of cooperation. Here, I show that these charges raised against the heuristic use of this analogy are misguided. I argue, contra Sober, that such a heuristic turns out to be a perfect predictive tool in all relevant contexts where cooperation can at least evolve. Moreover, I argue that it constitutes a powerful and sufficient methodological framework for the analysis of social evolution. (shrink)

This essay starts from the observation that the issue of talent, in relation to the problem of distributive justice, can be approached from two different angles. First, it is common to discuss the justificatory function of talent, that is, its role in the justification of educational or social inequalities. In addition, however, this essay proposes to look at practices of talent ascription and their causal role in the distribution of educational prospects. These practices tend to exacerbate educational inequalities due to (...) social background, especially when they are tied to selective educational settings. There is reason to avoid talent-based selection in education, in order to contain the negative effects of practices of talent ascription. (shrink)