RESUMO: Em grande medida, os estudos sobre a constituição do arcabouço teórico do lacanismo têm ocorrido ao largo do exame de sua historicidade. Essa negligência reforça o ocultamento do processo social que levou a produção lacaniana a uma profunda integração entre a formalização e a etificação da teoria. Esse processo não pode ser compreendido sem a contextualização crítica da conjuntura política que cercou a proposta e a existência da École Freudienne de Paris, fundada por Lacan, em 1964. A estreita convivência (...) com os jovens militantes dos grupos da esquerda extraparlamentar da época, notadamente os maoístas, e a assimilação de suas problematizações fizeram do pensamento lacaniano e da EFP o espaço de objetivação de um discurso movido pela paráfrase política e seus efeitos de engajamento. Este artigo pretende expor as linhas de estruturação político-social dos conceitos forjados por Lacan, em meio à instituição e à consolidação de sua Escola. ABSTRACT: To a great extent the studies of the constitution of the Lacanism theoretical framework have occurred off the examination of its historicity. This neglect strengthens the concealment of the social process that led the Lacanian production to a deep integration between the theory formalization and the theory ethification. This process can not be understood without grasping the context of the political environment that surrounded the proposal and the existence of École Freudienne de Paris, founded by Lacan in 1964. The close contact with the young militants of the extra-parliamentary left groups of the time, notably the Maoists, and the assimilation of the problems they rose made the Lacanian thought and EFP the place of objectification of a speech moved by the political paraphrase and their engagement effects. This article aims to expose the lines of political and social structure of concepts forged by Lacan through the establishment and consolidation of his School. (shrink)

The practical difficulties that trouble any effort to discuss “pluralism” in American literary studies can be glimpsed in the following exchange. In a 1980 interview in the Literary Review of Edinburgh, Ken Newton put this question to Derrida:It might be argued that deconstruction inevitably leads to pluralist interpretation and ultimately to the view that any interpretation is as good as any other. Do you believe this and how do you select some interpretations as being better than others?Derrida replied:I am not (...) a pluralist and I would never say that every interpretation is equal but I do not select. The interpretations select themselves. I am a Nietzschean in that sense. You know that Nietzsche insisted on the fact that the principle of differentiation was in itself selective. The eternal return of the same was not repetition, it was a selection of the more powerful forces. So I would say that some are more powerful than others. The hierarchy is between forces and not between true and false.1­­The irony of Newton’s identification of pluralism with the very interpretive irresponsibility that it accuses others—Derrida foremost among them—of embracing is certainly not lost on those critics who call themselves pluralists; it comes as no surprise to them that Derrida declines to join their company. Nevertheless, the breezy gloss of pluralism as “the view that any interpretation is as good as any other” is bound to seem plausible to the large numbers of readers for whom the word denotes a generalized tolerance the refusal of dogmatism. That Derrida should be called upon to dissociate himself from pluralism is in fact symptomatic of the profound confusion surrounding the term. At present, the pervasiveness of such loose talk compels pluralists to defend themselves regularly against this kind of misinterpretation. Thus, the colloquial reading of pluralism that construes it as mere relativism, the absence of principled constraints, is frequently acknowledged, if only to be rejected. Even Bruch Erlich must emphasize that pluralism does not want “a totally free critical market, for that involves the proliferation of a hundred flowers, what Booth dismissively terms ‘chaotic warfare.’ ”2 1. James Kearn and Ken Newton, “An Interview with Jacques Derrida,” Literary Review 14 , p.21.2. Bruce Erlich, “Amphibolies: On the Critical Self-Contradictions of ‘Pluralism,’ ” this volume, p. 527; all further references to this essay will be included in the text. Ellen Rooney teaches English and women’s studies at Brown University. She is currently at work on a study entitled Seductive Reasoning: Pluralism and the Problematic of General Persuasion. (shrink)

I argue for three conclusions. First, responsibility skeptics are committed to the position that the criminal justice system should adopt a universal nonresponsibility excuse. Second, a universal nonresponsibility excuse would diminish some of our most deeply held values, further dehumanize criminals, exacerbate mass incarceration, and cause an even greater number of innocent people (nonwrongdoers) to be punished. Third, while Saul Smilansky's ‘illusionist’ response to responsibility skeptics – that even if responsibility skepticism is correct, society should maintain a responsibility‐realist/retributivist criminal justice (...) system – is generally compelling, it would not work if a majority of society were to convert, theoretically and psychologically, to responsibility skepticism. In this (highly improbable) scenario, and only in this (highly improbable) scenario, the criminal justice system would need to be reformed in such a way that it aligned with the majority's responsibility‐skeptical beliefs and attitudes. (shrink)

’Tis vain to talk of adding quantities which after the addition will continue to be as distinct as they were before; one man’s happiness will never be another man’s happiness: a gain to one man is no gain to another: you might as well pretend to add 20 apples to 20 pears.

Game theory has proved a useful tool in the study of simple economic models. However, numerous foundational issues remain unresolved. The situation is particularly confusing in respect of the non-cooperative analysis of games with some dynamic structure in which the choice of one move or another during the play of the game may convey valuable information to the other players. Without pausing for breath, it is easy to name at least 10 rival equilibrium notions for which a serious case can (...) be made that here is the “right” solution concept for such games. (shrink)

The growing availability and consumption of Fairtrade products is recognised as one of the most widespread ethically inspired market developments, and as an example of activist-driven change within the wider marketing system. The Fairtrade Towns movement, now operating in over 1700 towns and cities globally, represents a comparatively recent extension of Fairtrade marketing driven by local activists seeking to promote positive change in production and consumption systems. This paper briefly explores the conventional framing of the role that ethically related activism (...) plays in the operation of markets and in influencing market participants. It then presents key insights gathered from a grounded theory exploration of Fairtrade Towns as activist-driven marketing systems, revealing the atypical nature of the activism involved. The findings demonstrate how local activists leverage their social networks to exert pressure and generate support to promote ethical consumption. The study suggests that Fairtrade Towns offer a new role for activists as Fairtrade itself becomes more mainstream, and considers the role they are fulfilling as ‘informal’ local marketers. The marketing dynamics revealed represent a complex and distinctive form of relational activism that seeks to build Fairtrade markets and highlight their positive benefits, with potential lessons for other local ethical market-building efforts in future. (shrink)

The problem of semantic content is the problem of explicating those features of brain processes by virtue of which they may properly be thought to possess meaning or reference. This paper criticizes the account of semantic content associated with fodor's version of cognitive science, And offers an alternative account based on mathematical communication theory. Its key concept is that of a neuronal representation maintaining a high-Level of mutual information with a designated external state of affairs under changing conditions of perceptual (...) presentation. (shrink)

I argue that the three strongest arguments against metaphysical libertarianism—the randomness objection, the constitutive luck objection, and the physicalist objection—are actually unsuccessful and therefore that metaphysical libertarianism is more plausible than the common philosophical wisdom allows. My more positive thesis, what I will refer to as “Agent Exceptionalism,” is that, when making decisions and performing actions, human beings can indeed satisfy the four conditions of metaphysical libertarianism: the control condition, the rationality condition, the ultimacy condition, and the physicalism condition.

In this article I shall give a brief account of psychoanalytic listening. I shall then consider the ontology of such listening to a session and compare it to the ontology of attending to paintings and poems. Psychoanalysts are interested not merely in what is understood through listening but in the process of listening. I shall proceed to ask how possible it is to represent that process. Finally, I raise some questions about how the capacity to listen psychoanalytically might be taught (...) or passed on. (shrink)

In recent years, certain analytic proposals have been appealed to that are incompatible with fundamental principles of structure−building that appear attractive. One such principle is Extension (Chomsky,1995), which ensures that what counts as the top of the tree at a given point in a derivation restricts the class of possible operations that can apply at that point. Another principle I will show to be desirable is Insularity, which bans on interarboreal movement.

In this essay I will explore the syntactic expression of the notion ‘clause’ by focusing on some syntactic and semantic properties of bare infinitive (BI) complements to perception verbs in English. I shall argue briefly that perception BI complements must be clausal, and then turn in more detail to the issue of what sort of clause the BI complement must be. It will be established that the categorical nature of the perception BI complement as IP or VP is contingent on (...) selectional properties of the perception verb, properties which may be contextually influenced by modality and negation. More specifically, an interpretative distinction between ‘vision’ and ‘non-vision’see first suggested by Napoli (1988) will be shown, contrary to her proposal, to provide the key to the contrast in the selection of clausal types. The IP/VP distinction will be shown to correlate with the viability of interpretations for the BI clause that are ‘temporally independent’ of the matrix clause. Given the IP/VP distinction, it will be demonstrated further that the peculiarly limited distribution of the expletive formativethere in BI complements may be predicted from independently motivated syntactic principles that determine clausal structure. (shrink)

It is argued that most anaphors have semantic content and that the semantic content of a given anaphoric atom plays an active role in determining both its distribution and the interpretation of the sentences in which it is employed. It is first demonstrated that semantic distinctions between semantically relational anaphoric atoms predict differences between their distributions. It is then argued that all of the semantically relational anaphoric atoms respect Principle A, while semantically contentless anaphors often do not.

This essay is a contribution to the discussion, now going on for many years, concerning what sorts of identity relations should be represented in the syntax and semantics of formal grammar and what properties those relations should have. In what follows, I will use the neutral cover term coconstrual to refer identity relations of one sort or another between nominals when no particular syntactic or semantic analysis is presupposed (among which are dependent identity, covaluation and coreference). The central claim made (...) here is (I), with its consequence in (Ia) and the far-from-innocent background assumption in (II). Most of my argumentation is designed to establish (Ia) to argue that it should be understood as the natural consequence of (I) and with respect to strict readings in ellipsis contexts. Although I will also argue for (II), I rely on Safir (2004b) for a more general defense of it. (shrink)

In this article, we assess the heuristic power of Greek geometrical analysis by trying to reconstruct some analyses of extant propositions of which only the demonstration is found in the text. We have reconstructed the analysis of the trisection of an angle, the property of the tangent to the parabola, to the hyperbola/ellipse, and to the spiral line. In all of these cases, the results and the demonstrations can be found by the analysis alone, without arguments by analogy with other (...) figures or kinematic considerations. We have thus concluded that analysis is a much more powerful tool than is usually assumed to be. We have also examined a part of Apollonius’ Cutting off of a ratio and confirmed that the number of possible cases to be distinguished in analysis tended to increase because the geometric objects and the magnitudes related to them were always considered in the geometric arrangement in which they appear. We suggest that the absence of an algebraic approach that would have detached the magnitudes from their geometrical context may have been one of the major obstacles to further development of Greek geometry. (shrink)

At the time of this writing, a widely publicized, waived-consent trial is underway. Sponsored by Northfield Laboratories, Inc. (Evanston, IL) the trial is intended to evaluate the emergency use of PolyHeme®, an oxygen-carrying resuscitative fluid that might prevent deaths from uncontrolled bleeding. The protocol allows patients in hemorrhagic shock to be randomized between PolyHeme® and saline in the field and, still without consent, randomized between PolyHeme® and blood after arrival at an emergency department. The Federal regulations that govern the waiver (...) of consent restrict its applicability to circumstances where proven, satisfactory treatments are unavailable. Blood - the standard treatment for hemorrhagic shock - is not available in ambulances but is available in hospitals. The authors argue that the in-hospital stage of the study fails to meet ethical and regulatory standards. (shrink)

Članek je razdeljen na dva dela. V prvem delu je obravnavan aktivni značaj gledanja. Ta je tako aktiven, da angažira naše celotno bitje v izkustvenem polju. V drugem delu je nasprotno poudarjena aktivna moč sveta: neprosojni pojav, ki poseduje to močno privlačnost, se imenuje v japonščini »oko« – ravno tako kot organ vida. Po teh analizah je obravnavana specifičnost vida med petimi čutili.

ABSTRACT This essay argues that historians of science who seek to embody our oxymoronic self-description must confront both contradictory terms that define our common enterprise—that is, both “history” and “science.” On the history/methods side, it suggests that we embrace the heterogeneity of our institutional arrangements and repudiate the homogeneous disciplinary model sometimes advocated by Thomas Kuhn and followed by art history. This implies that rather than treating the history of science as an end in itself, we consider it a means (...) to a variety of historical ends, think of ourselves as a tool-making community, and jettison moralistic assertions of scientific exceptionalism. To do so, this essay argues—on the science/subject side—that we rebrand the subject of our historical inquiry as “episcience,” a neologism that stands in relation to “science” as the new field of epigenetics does to the old genetics. Episcience encompasses both the material activities of the relevant sciences and their “surround” (environment, milieu, Umgebung) to reframe knowledge making to include the material processes that put science “in play” and make its findings matter beyond science. The essay concludes that “the history of science” is an oxymoron that makes sense to the extent that its practitioners acknowledge that the history of science is important not just because science is important, but because its history is. (shrink)

If some external enforcement agency compels us to honor deals reached in the original position, then Harsanyi has shown that the outcome will be utilitarian. Under the same hypotheses, Rawls claims that the outcome will be egalitarian. This chapter confirms that Harsanyi is correct. It goes on to use the concept of an empathy equilibrium to predict the standard of interpersonal comparison needed to operate a utilitarian norm that will evolve in the medium run.

Savage denied that Bayesian decision theory applies in large worlds. This paper proposes a minimal extension of Bayesian decision theory to a large-world context that evaluates an event E\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$E$$\end{document} by assigning it a number π\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\pi $$\end{document} that reduces to an orthodox probability for a class of measurable events. The Hurwicz criterion evaluates π\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\pi $$\end{document} (...) as a weighted arithmetic mean of its upper and lower probabilities, which we derive from the measurable supersets and subsets of E\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$E$$\end{document}. The ambiguity aversion reported in experiments on the Ellsberg paradox is then explained by assigning a larger weight to the lower probability of winning than to the upper probability. However, arguments are given here that would make anything but equal weights irrational when using the Hurwicz criterion. The paper continues by embedding the Hurwicz criterion in an extension of expected utility theory that we call expectant utility. (shrink)

The issue whether there is any necessary connection between time and change turns, I argue, on the problem of what constitutes an accurate measurement of how much time passes. Given a plausible hypothesis about how time is measured, Shoemaker’s well known argument that time can pass without change can be seen to be unsound. But Shoemaker’s conclusion is not therefore false. The same hypothesis about time measurement supports a revised version of Shoemaker’s argument, and the revised argument does establish that (...) the passage of a quantity of time does not require that change occur during that time. Though Shoemaker’s conclusion is vindicated, it does not follow that there is no necessary connection at all between time and change. On the contrary, there is a connection which is simply of a different kind from the one Shoemaker had in mind. (shrink)

This paper summarizes a theory of fairness that replaces the metaphysical foundations of the egalitarian theory of John Rawls and the utilitarian theory of John Harsanyi with evolutionary arguments. As such, it represents an attempt to realize John Mackie’s call for a theory based on the data provided by anthroplogists and the propositions proved by game theorists. The basic claim is that fairness norms evolved as a device for selecting one of the infinity of efficient equilibria of the repeated game (...) of life played by our prehuman ancestors. (shrink)

I explicate the conditions required for criminal responsibility, provide an overview of criminal defenses, distinguish criminal responsibility from both tort liability and moral responsibility, and explicate the current state of the insanity defense.

This paper offers an experimental test of a version of Rubinstein’s bargaining model in which the players’ discount factors are unequal. We find that learning, rationality, and fairness are all significant in determining the outcome. In particular, we find that a model of myopic optimization over time predicts the sign of deviations in the opening proposal from the final undiscounted agreement in the previous period rather well. To explain the amplitude of the deviations, we then successfully fit a perturbed version (...) of the model of myopic adjustment to the data that allows for a bias toward refusing inequitable offers. (shrink)

When do we care for others as we care for ourselves? William Hamilton showed that we should be expected to care for our family members in proportion to our degree of relationship to them. Such reasoning explains why eusociality evolved independently at least twelve times in the order Hymenoptera, which includes ants, bees, and wasps, but only three times elsewhere in the animal kingdom. It also verifies Thomas Hobbes' answer to the question: Why cannot mankind live sociably one with another (...) as bees or ants? (shrink)

Among other things, Baumard et al.'s considers the enforcement and establishment of moral norms, the interpersonal comparison of welfare, and the structure of fairness norms. This commentary draws attention to the relevance of the game theory literature to the first and second topic, and the social psychology literature to the third topic.

This chapter presents an overview of the book. It argues that the metaphysical approach to ethics is a failure and that the time has come to take a scientific view of morality. A social contract is taken to be the set of common understandings that allow the citizens of a society to coordinate. Such social contracts are seen as the product of biological and cultural evolution. To survive, a social contract must therefore be an equilibrium in the repeated game of (...) life played by a society. Since the folk theorem of repeated game theory says that there are large numbers of such equilibria, fairness norms then become explicable as an equilibrium selection device that selects one of the many efficient equilibria of a society's game of life. It is suggested that the deep structure of such fairness norms is captured by John Rawls' notion of the original position, and is therefore universal in the human species. On the other hand, the standard of interpersonal comparison needed as an input to the original position is culturally determined. (shrink)