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Laura Soter [3]Laura K. Soter [3]
  1.  99
    A defense of back-end doxastic voluntarism.Laura Soter - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Doxastic involuntarism—the thesis that we lack direct voluntary control (in response to non-evidential reasons) over our belief states—is often touted as philosophical orthodoxy. I here offer a novel defense of doxastic voluntarism, centered around three key moves. First, I point out that belief has two central functional roles, but that discussions of voluntarism have largely ignored questions of control over belief's guidance function. Second, I propose that we can learn much about doxastic control by looking to cognitive scientific research on (...)
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  2. Acceptance and the ethics of belief.Laura K. Soter - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (8):2213-2243.
    Various philosophers authors have argued—on the basis of powerful examples—that we can have compelling moral or practical reasons to believe, even when the evidence suggests otherwise. This paper explores an alternative story, which still aims to respect widely shared intuitions about the motivating examples. Specifically, the paper proposes that what is at stake in these cases is not belief, but rather acceptance—an attitude classically characterized as taking a proposition as a premise in practical deliberation and action. I suggest that acceptance’s (...)
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  3.  31
    Mental Disorders as Failures of Attention.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Laura K. Soter & Jesse S. Summers - 2024 - Critica 56 (167):17-44.
    The DSM–5 characterizes mental disorders as significant disturbances in cognition, emotion, or behavior. But what might unite the disturbances on this list? We hypothesize that mental disorders can all be meaningfully characterized as failures of attention. We understand these as failures to distribute attention in the way one has most reason to, and we include both failures of tendency and of ability. We discuss six examples of mental disorders and offer a preliminary gloss of how to recast each as centrally (...)
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  4.  24
    Cultural schemas: What they are, how to find them, and what to do once you’ve caught one.Andrei Boutyline & Laura Soter - 2021 - American Sociological Review 4 (86):726-758.
    Cultural schemas are a central cognitive mechanism through which culture affects action. In this article, we develop a theoretical model of cultural schemas that is better able to support empirical work, including inferential, sensitizing, and operational uses. We propose a multilevel framework centered on a high-level definition of cultural schemas that is sufficiently broad to capture its major sociological applications but still sufficiently narrow to identify a set of cognitive phenomena with key functional properties in common: cultural schemas are socially (...)
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  5.  37
    What we would (but shouldn't) do for those we love: Universalism versus partiality in responding to others' moral transgressions.Laura K. Soter, Martha K. Berg, Susan A. Gelman & Ethan Kross - 2021 - Cognition 217 (C):104886.
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  6.  39
    Acceptance, Belief, and Partiality: Topics in Doxastic Control, the Ethics of Belief, and the Moral Psychology of Relationships.Laura Soter - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Michigan - Flint
    This dissertation contains a philosophical project and a psychological project. Together, they explore two central themes, and the relation between them: (1) doxastic control and the ethics of belief, and (2) the moral and epistemic import of close personal relationships. The philosophical project (Chapters 1 and 2) concerns a central puzzle in the ethics of belief: how can we make sense of apparent obligations to believe for moral or practical reasons, if we lack the ability to form beliefs in response (...)
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