This latest work from one of the world's leading political philosophers will appeal to audiences from a variety of fields, including philosophy, political science, women's studies, ethnic studies, sociology, and communications studies.

This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 2003, given by Iris Marion Young, an American philosopher.

"... some very serious critiques of French existential phenomenology and post-structuralism... the contributors offer some refreshingly new insights into some tried and 'true' philosophical texts and more recent works of literary theory." -- Philosophy and Literature "By bridging the gap between 'analytic' and 'continental' philosophy, the authors of The Thinking Muse: Feminism and the Modern French Philosophy largely overcome the cultural polarity between 'male thinker' and 'female muse'." -- Ethics "These engaging essays by American Feminists bring toether feminist philosophy, existential (...) phenomenology, and recent currents in French poststructuralist thought. The editors provide an excellent introductory overview, making this an ideal book for courses in feminist theory and philosophy and modern French thought." -- Philosopher's Index "The concerns raised in this volume are substantial.... a solid addition to the canon of American feminist philosophy." -- Philosophy and Literature "... a forum for feminist appropriations of existential and post-structuralist philosophy." -- Canadian Philosophical Reviews Marking a radical shift in the traditional philosophical separation between muse (female) and thinker (male), The Thinking Muse revises the scope and methods of philosophical reflection. These engaging essays by American feminists bring together feminist philosophy, existential phenomenology, and recent currents in French poststructuralist thought. (shrink)

The "Protagoras," like several of the Dialogues of Plato, is put into the mouth of Socrates, who describes a conversation which had taken place between himself and the great Sophist at the house of Callias-'the man who had spent more upon the Sophists than all the rest of the world'-and in which the learned Hippias and the grammarian Prodicus had also shared, as well as Alcibiades and Critias, both of whom said a few words-in the presence of a distinguished company (...) consisting of disciples of Protagoras and of leading Athenians belonging to the Socratic circle. The dialogue commences with a request on the part of Hippocrates that Socrates would introduce him to the celebrated teacher. He has come before the dawn had risen-so fervid is his zeal. Socrates moderates his excitement and advises him to find out 'what Protagoras will make of him, ' before he becomes his pupil. Presented here is the classic introduction and translation of Benjamin Jowett. (shrink)

Students in an undergraduate legal and ethical issues course continually told the authors that they did not have time to study for the course because they were busy studying for their clinical courses. Faculty became concerned that students were failing to realize the value of legal and ethical concepts as applicable to clinical practice. This led the authors to implement a transformational learning experience in which students applied legal and ethical course content in a high-fidelity human simulation (HFHS) scenario. A (...) preliminary evaluation compared the new HFHS experience with in-person and online student groups using the same case. Based on both student and faculty perceptions, the HFHS was identified as the best of the three approaches for providing a transformational learning experience regarding legal and ethical content. (shrink)

The possible and revelation -- The saturated phenomenon -- Metaphysics and phenomenology: a relief for theology -- "Christian philosophy": hermeneutic or heuristic? -- Sketch of a phenomenological concept of the gift -- What cannot be said: Apophasis and the discourse of love -- The banality of saturation -- Faith and reason.

The question of ontological foundation has undergone a noteworthy revival in recent years: metaphysicians today quarrel about how exactly to understand the asymmetrical and hyperintensional relationship of grounding. One of the reasons for this revival is that the old quantificationalist meta-ontology inherited from Quine has been effectively criticised by leading philosophers favourable to a meta-ontology, the aim of which is to come to know “which facts/items ground (constitute the base of) which other facts/items”, thus to examine the relation of ontological (...) dependence between beings (e.g. chemical properties depend on physical properties, the economic situation on the behaviour of individuals etc.), i.e. to explore the hierarchical structure of reality. I shall not discuss here the relationship of grounding in itself, but make some historical-formal remarks on the properties of the ultimate ontological foundational item itself and its aporetic nature. To do so I explore various more or less exotic philosophical ecosystems in the following order: Heidegger (Seyn), Plato (ἕν), Wáng Bi (道, dào). On the way I shall propose a new interpretation both of certain hypotheses in the Parmenides and of the nature of the opposition between Wáng Bì and Guō Xiàng in regard to the logical grammar of the expression “nothing (無, wú)” (transl. J. Dudley). (shrink)

Les phénomènes apparaissent-ils toujours selon la calme adéquation en eux de l'intuition avec la signification, voire, plus souvent, avec un déficit d'intuition? Ou bien certains - les phénomènes saturés - n'apparaissent-ils pas plutôt grâce au surcroît irrépressible de l'intuition sur tous les concepts et toutes les significations que l'on voudrait leur assigner? Cette question avait surgi du principe " Autant de réduction, autant de donation " (dans Réduction et donation. Recherches sur Husserl, Heidegger et la phénoménologie, 1989) et conduit à (...) dégager la donation, telle qu'elle déplie ce qui se donne et ce qui se montre (avec Etant donné. Essai d'une phénoménologie de la donation, 1997). Reste, une fois ces acquis répétés, à étudier en eux-mêmes chacun des quatre types de phénomènes saturés : l'événement (saturé selon la quantité), l'idole ou tableau (saturé selon la qualité), la chair (saturée selon la relation) et enfin l'icône ou visage d'autrui (saturée selon la modalité). Il devient alors pensable d'étudier leur combinaison dans ce qu'on doit thématiser comme saturé à la puissance, un paradoxe des paradoxes - le phénomène de révélation. En l'occurrence, il s'agit de comprendre (contre une féconde critique de J. Derrida) les trois moments de la théologie mystique (affirmation, négation, hyperbole) non seulement comme l'accomplissement d'un phénomène saturé exemplaire, mais encore comme la répétition de toute phénoménalité de l'excès. De surcroît donc. Parce qu'il s'agit de l'excès du donné qui se montre. Parce qu'il s'agit aussi de l'exposer une nouvelle fois. J.-L.M. (shrink)

I argue that there is a tension between the claim that at least some kinds in the special sciences are multiply realized and the claim that the reason why kinds are prized by science is that they enter into a variety of different empirical generalizations. Nevertheless, I show that this tension ceases in the case of ‘cultural homologues’—such as specific ideologies, religions, and folk wisdom. I argue that the instances of such special science kinds do have several projectable properties in (...) common due to their shared history of reproduction, and that the social learning involved means that we should also expect these kinds to be multiply realized. (shrink)

Metaphysicians who are aware of modern physics usually follow Putnam (1967) in arguing that Special Theory of Relativity is incompatible with the view that what exists is only what exists now or presently. Partisans of presentism (the motto ‘only present things exist’) had very difficult times since, and no presentist theory of time seems to have been able to satisfactorily counter the objection raised from Special Relativity. One of the strategies offered to the presentist consists in relativizing existence to inertial (...) frames. This unfashionable strategy has been accused of counterfeiting, since the meaning of the concept of existence would be incompatible with its relativization. Therefore, existence could only be relativistically invariant. In this paper, I shall examine whether such an accusation hits its target, and I will do this by examining whether the different criteria of existence that have been suggested by the Philosophical Tradition from Plato onwards imply that existence cannot be relativized. (shrink)

In this essay I follow one argument strand from Linda Singer's Erotic Welfare. How can we have a forward-looking and affirmative ideal of sexual freedom when the AIDS panic has altered the sexual landscape and instigated new justifications for oppressive sexual disciplines? How can we be sexual subjects when processes of commodification and disciplinary practices have constrained sexual expression while proliferating sexual fetishes? These are some of the questions this book formulates, without answering.

Current legal practice holds that a diagnosis of psychopathy does not remove criminal responsibility. In contrast, many philosophers and legal experts are increasingly persuaded by evidence from experimental psychology and neuroscience indicating moral and cognitive deficits in psychopaths and have argued that they should be excused from moral responsibility. However, having opposite views concerning psychopaths’ moral responsibility, on the one hand, and criminal responsibility, on the other, seems unfortunate given the assumption that the law should, at least to some extent, (...) react to the same desert-based considerations as do ascriptions of moral responsibility. In response, Stephen Morse has argued that the law should indeed be reformed so as to excuse those with severe psychopathy from blame, but that psychopaths that have committed criminal offences should still be subject to some legal repercussions such as civil commitment. We argue that consequentialist and norm-expressivist considerations analogous to those that support punishing psychopaths or at least retaining some legal liability, might also be drawn on in favour of holding psychopaths morally accountable. (shrink)

In this study, we investigated the relationships between judgments of intentionality and moral evaluation in individuals with High Functioning Autism (HFA) or Asperger Syndrome (AS). HFA or AS are neurodevelopmental disorders characterised by severe deficits in communication and social functioning. Impairments in Theory of Mind (ToM), i.e., the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and to others, are thought to be the core features of autism. Of all mental states, the concept of ‘intentional action’ is particularly important. People normally (...) distinguish between actions that are performed intentionally and those that are performed unintentionally and this distinction plays a crucial role in social understanding and moral judgment. Recently, Knobe (Analysis 63: 190–193, 2003a ), (Philosophical Psychology 16: 309–324, 2003b ) showed that people’s moral evaluations might serve as input to the process by which people intuitively arrive at the intentionality judgments. Here, by using two pairs of vignettes, the Knobe’s Harm/Help cases and Murder/Bull’s-eye cases, we showed that, as already observed in typical population, in individuals with HFA/AS judgment of intentional action is informed by the moral appreciation of the action outcome. However, the two groups differed on praise judgments and moral justifications, suggesting that these processes were poorly influenced by the agent’s psychological states. We concluded that, although under certain circumstances, individuals with HFA/AS and people with typical development have similar intuitive judgments of intentionality, over-assignment of praise judgments and the reduced use of folk-psychological concepts in moral judgment likely reflect difficulties using intentionality information for moral reasoning. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the transmission of some ideas of the pragmatist tradition to Wittgenstein, in his ‘middle period,’ through the intermediary of F. P. Ramsey, with whom he had numerous fruitful discussions at Cambridge in 1929. I argue more specifically that one must first come to terms with Ramsey’s own views in 1929, and explain how they differ from views expressed in earlier papers from 1925-27, so a large part of this paper is devoted to this task. One (...) is then in a better position to understand the impact of Ramsey’s astute critique of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in conjunction with his pragmatism, and explain how it may have set into motion the ‘later’ Wittgenstein. I then argue that Ramsey introduced his notion of ‘variable hypothetical’ as a rule, not a proposition, on pragmatist grounds and that Wittgenstein picked this up in 1929, along with a more ‘dynamic’ view of meaning than the ‘static’ view of the Tractatus, and that this explains in part Wittgenstein’s turn to his ‘later philosophy.’. (shrink)

This volume contains thirteen papers that were presented at the 2017 Annual Meeting of the Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Mathematics/Société canadienne d’histoire et de philosophie des mathématiques, which was held at Ryerson University in Toronto. It showcases rigorously reviewed modern scholarship on an interesting variety of topics in the history and philosophy of mathematics from Ancient Greece to the twentieth century. A series of chapters all set in the eighteenth century consider topics such as John Marsh’s techniques (...) for the computation of decimal fractions, Euler’s efforts to compute the surface area of scalene cones, a little-known work by John Playfair on the practical aspects of mathematics, and Monge’s use of descriptive geometry. After a brief stop in the nineteenth century to consider the culture of research mathematics in 1860s Prussia, the book moves into the twentieth century with an examination of the historical context within which the Axiom of Choice was developed and a paper discussing Anatoly Vlasov’s adaptation of the Boltzmann equation to ionized gases. The remaining chapters deal with the philosophy of twentieth-century mathematics through topics such as an historically informed discussion of finitism and its limits; a reexamination of Mary Leng’s defenses of mathematical fictionalism through an alternative, anti-realist approach to mathematics; and a look at the reasons that mathematicians select specific problems to pursue. Written by leading scholars in the field, these papers are accessible to not only mathematicians and students of the history and philosophy of mathematics, but also anyone with a general interest in mathematics. (shrink)

René Girard’s breakthrough consists in uncovering the mechanism of violence, namely the mimesis and rivalry it permits. Yet, mimetic violence still leaves the very origin of evil and murder unquestioned. Here Lévinas plays a decisive role: the call to murder only becomes possible as one of the versions of the call of the face, the call of the other. This is what Girard should have taken up in order to clarify his final allusions to a “good mimesis”—this other, properly Christic, (...) possibility of the call of the face. (shrink)

After sketching an argument for radical anti-realism that does not appeal to human limitations but polynomial-time computability in its definition of feasibility, I revisit an argument by Wittgenstein on the surveyability of proofs, and then examine the consequences of its application to the notion of canonical proof in contemporary proof-theoretical-semantics.

En este texto Jean-Luc Marion ofrece una lectura crítica de la interpretación derridiana de Dionisio, aclarando su propia posición respecto de la teología mística. A partir de un análisis de cada una de las cuatro objeciones presentadas por Derrida, Marion presenta la tercera vía, la vía de la de-nominación; analiza el estatus de la alabanza y de la plegaria; distingue la mística de la metafísica de la presencia y de la ontoteología; y delinea los rasgos del fenómeno de (...) la revelación. (shrink)

Il m’est agréable de pouvoir m’appuyer sur ce que Claudia Serban vient de dire, non seulement parce qu’elle l’a peut-être mieux exposé que je ne l’avais moi-même fait, mais parce qu’elle me dispense, en partie du moins, de me répéter. Gratitude de la paresse, plus encore que de la vanité. Revenons pourtant un instant sur cette salle où se tient notre séminaire. Apparemment, réellement donc, il s’agit d’une salle de cours, une salle de conférence, comme tant d’autres à l’École et (...) dans tous les... (shrink)

What an honor to have political and educational theorists of such caliber take up ideas from my work! What a daunting task to try to respond! My remarks will touch on the following questions: What are some key issues of distributive justice in education today? Why does defining justice in terms of oppression and domination imply that issues of justice cannot be reduced to distribution? How does normalization constitute a major process enacting oppression, and what does this imply for education? (...) What does it mean to include marginalized groups in economic opportunity and democratic process, and how can educational institutions foster such inclusion? Why do issues of religion and other forms of cultural expression belong to a distinct category of justice? Are values of freedom of expression and tolerance in tension with the project of democratic inclusion? How shall we consider transnational issues of educational justice? (shrink)

The aim of J.-L. Marion’s article is to revisit the important debate on the place of Augustine in the history of metaphysics. Often, quibbles arise upon considering the use of substance (substantia) by Augustine, not only as approximative of essentia and as synonymous with ousia, but in deciding whether in so doing Augustine effectuates a ‘metaphysical turn’. While he elsewhere argues that Augustine is a pre-metaphysical thinker, in this article Marion focuses on showing the diverse range of usages (...) of the term substance in the Augustinian corpus. Marion observes: first, whenever substance seems a fixed definition, the term allows for equivocity; second, God is substance in an indeterminate sense or by negation; third, human beings are substances fundamentally to capture the mutability of human existence. As such, Marion concludes, the Augustinian use of substance is insufficient to inelude Augustine in the history of metaphysics. (shrink)

This text is based on the lecture held by Jean-Luc Marion at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, on December 4., 2015. By thematizing the?limits of phenomenality?, Marion analyzes what exceeds the horizon of objectivity and the framework of subjectivity. By relying on some of the most important philosophers of the history of metaphysics, Marion offers an alternative way, namely, a phenomenology of givenness that focuses on saturated phenomena. nema.

An introduction to Jean-Luc Marion's philosophical and theological work in the form of a conversation with the author. Marion reflects on major 20th century French figures and their varied influence on his work, while giving an overview of his writings in the history of philosophy, theology, and phenomenology.

Der auf Kants kritischer Philosophie fußenden Philosophengeneration galt Herder als hoffnungslos anachronistischer, vorkritischer Philosoph, dessen Denken für das eigene philosophische Programm keine Relevanz zukomme. Das im folgenden dokumentierte Projekt geht demgegenüber von der Hypothese aus, daß Herder in die Vorgeschichte der Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus gehört, daß er Vorläufer und Weggenosse der nachkantischen Philosophengeneration war. Der vorliegende Band versammelt Arbeiten, die zur Begründung und Diskussion dieser Auffassung in unterschiedlicher Weise beitragen: es geht um die Konturierung der für diese Thematik relevanten (...) Aspekte von Herders eigenem Denken, um die Erschließung der gemeinsamen philosophischen und wissenschaftshistorischen Grundlagen des Herderschen Denkens und der Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, nicht zuletzt geht es um die Erarbeitung der Rezeption von Herders Philosophie in der nachkantischen Philosophengeneration. (shrink)

L'interpretation des Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii souleve un probleme specifique. La plupart des critiques ont tente de le comprendre a partir de la problematique du Discours de 1637. D'ou d'evidentes impasses, puisque les concepts originaux des Regulae, precisement, disparaissent dans le moment posterieur qu'ils ont rendu pourtant possible. Il restait une voie: determiner les Regulae comme un dialogue avec un interlocuteur jamais nomme, avec lequel la pensee du jeune Descartes, a l'aurore d'elle-meme, devait s'expliquer pour devenir cartesienne; cet interlocuteur, c'est (...) Aristote. En retrouvant les textes aristoteliciens qu'interrogent chacune des Regulae on degage une polemique. Elle contribue deja a eclairer le point de depart de la doctrine cartesienne de la science. Mais il y a plus: l'epistemologie ne s'etablit pas en refutant une autre epistemologie, mais en recusant l'ontologie d'Aristote. Descartes conquiert donc, avec son epistemologie, rien moins qu'une ontologie, ontologie grise, parce qu'elle ne s'avoue pas comme telle. (shrink)

“I didn’t know what I was doing”. “I was totally out of control.” Since we accept and reject such excuses all the time in practice—and frequently do so with great confidence—we might be expected to have grasped what it means for a volitional excuse to be valid in general and to have developed a well thought out set of criteria for judging the validity of such excuses in practice. But, as it turns out, we have not done either of these (...) things. Hence, we are not now able to argue openly about the validity of particular pleas of ignorance and mental incompetence in practice. I set out to remedy this situation below by articulating the nature of volitional excuses in general and by underscoring the role that our moral expectations play in the validation process.I begin in Part One by exploring the nature of volitional excuses themselves. I argue that volitional excuses are not, as we sometimes assume, heuristic devices for discovering that an individual freely willed her bad actions in some. (shrink)