The article deals with the aesthetic dimension of humour. The author starts with Hannah Arendt’s distinction between labour as a set of tasks necessary for the reproduction of biological life and praxis as an expression of freedom. In the same way the humour would be detached from the “working communication” of everyday life. Humour represents a “break” with ordinary modes of communication. This is done through “transpositions”, which can take the form of objectual transpositions (which play on (...) the equivocal references of a term), verbal transpositions (which contrast the uttered hypertext with a more usual hypotext; self-deprecation is a special case of verbal transposition) or metacognitive transpositions (like the “lapalissade”). The aesthetic value of humour is increased by the simplicity of the means used to obtain the contrast. (shrink)

The paper argues that an account of understanding should take the form of a Carnapian explication and acknowledge that understanding comes in degrees. An explication of objectual understanding is defended, which helps to make sense of the cognitive achievements and goals of science. The explication combines a necessary condition with three evaluative dimensions: An epistemic agent understands a subject matter by means of a theory only if the agent commits herself sufficiently to the theory of the subject matter, and (...) to the degree that the agent grasps the theory (i.e., is able to make use of it), the theory answers to the facts and the agent’s commitment to the theory is justified. The threshold for outright attributions of understanding is determined contextually. The explication has descriptive as well as normative facets and allows for the possibility of understanding by means of non-explanatory (e.g., purely classificatory) theories. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that besides knowledge of facts or truths, there is also knowledge of things–for example, we say that we know people or know places. We could call this "objectual knowledge". In this paper, I raise doubts about the idea that there is a sui generis objectual knowledge that is distinct from knowledge of truths.

The paper argues that an account of understanding should take the form of a Carnapian explication and acknowledge that understanding comes in degrees. An explication of objectual understanding is defended, which helps to make sense of the cognitive achievements and goals of science. The explication combines a necessary condition with three evaluative dimensions: an epistemic agent understands a subject matter by means of a theory only if the agent commits herself sufficiently to the theory of the subject matter, and (...) to the degree that the agent grasps the theory (i.e., is able to make use of it), the theory answers to the facts and the agent’s commitment to the theory is justified. The threshold for outright attributions of understanding is determined contextually. The explication has descriptive as well as normative facets and allows for the possibility of understanding by means of non-explanatory (e.g., purely classificatory) theories. (shrink)

Should we regard Jennifer Lackey’s ‘Creationist Teacher’ as understanding evolution, even though she does not, given her religious convictions, believe its central claims? We think this question raises a range of important and unexplored questions about the relationship between understanding, factivity and belief. Our aim will be to diagnose this case in a principled way, and in doing so, to make some progress toward appreciating what objectual understanding—i.e., understanding a subject matter or body of information—demands of us. Here is (...) the plan. After some ground clearing in §1, §2 outlines and motivates a plausible working model—moderate factivity—for characterising the sense in which objectual understanding should be regarded as factive. §3 shows how the datum that we can understand false theories can, despite initial suggestions to the contrary, be assimilated straightforwardly within the moderate factivity model. §4 highlights how the inverse kind of case to that explored in §3—viz., a variant of Lackey’s creationist teacher case—poses special problems for moderate factivity. With reference to recent work on moral understanding by Hills, §5 proposes a solution to the problem, and §6 attempts to diagnose why it is that we might originally have been led to draw the wrong conclusion. (shrink)

This major new book offers a highly original account of ethical and political subjectivity in contemporary culture. It makes a strong case for a non-unitary or nomadic conception of the subject, in opposition to the claims of ideologies such as conservatism, liberal individualism and techno-capitalism. Braidotti takes a bold stand against moral universalism, while offering a vigorous defence of nomadic ethics against the charges of relativism and nihilism. She calls for a new form of ethical accountability that takes "Life" as (...) the subject, not the object, of enquiry. This ethics is presented as a fundamental reconfiguration of our being in the world and it calls for more conceptual creativity in the production of worldviews that can better enable us to behave ethically in a technologically and globally mediated world. The nomadic ethical subject negotiates successfully the complex tension between the multiplicity of political forces on the one hand and the sustained commitment to emancipatory politics on the other. _Transpositions_ provides an intellectually rich guide to the leading critical debates of our time and will be of great interest to scholars and students throughout the humanities and social sciences. (shrink)

Propositionalism is the view that all intentional states are propositional states, which are states with a propositional content, while objectualism is the view that at least some intentional states are objectual states, which are states with objectual contents, such as objects, properties, and kinds. This paper argues that there are two distinct ways of understanding propositionalism and objectualism: (1) as views about the deep nature of the contents of intentional states, and (2) as views about the superficial character (...) of the contents of intentional states. I argue that we should understand the views in the second way. I also argue that the propositionalism debate is fairly independent from debates over the deep nature of intentionality, and that this has implications for arguments for propositionalism and objectualism from claims about the nature of intentional content. I close with a short discussion of how related points apply to the debate over singular content. (shrink)

Kai Wehmeier’s Wittgensteinian Predicate Logic is a formulation of first-order logic under the exclusive interpretation of the quantifiers. W-logic has a distinguished relation constant for co-reference but no sign for objectual identity. Wehmeier denies that objectual identity exists on the grounds that it cannot be a genuine binary relation. Fortunately W-logic is equi-expressive with standard first-order logic with identity and it appears that objectual identity is dispensable across the broader logical enterprise. This paper challenges the latter claim (...) as objectual identity seems to be needed in the exclusive interpretation of quantified modal logic, specifically, for implementing certain kinds of de re quantification. (shrink)

When thinking about the notion of essence or of an essential feature, philosophers typically focus on what I will call the notion of objectual essence. The main aim of this paper is to argue that beside this familiar notion stands another one, the notion of generic essence, which contrary to appearance cannot be understood in terms of the familiar notion, and which also fails to be correctly characterized by certain other accounts which naturally come to mind as well. Some (...) of my objections to these accounts are similar to some of Kit Fine’s compelling objections to the standard modal account of (objectual) essence (Fine 1994). In the light of these objections, Fine advances the view that it is metaphysical necessity which has to be understood in terms of essence, rather than the other way around, and takes essence to be unanalyzable. When formulatinghis view, Fine had only objectual essence in mind (or had both concepts in mind, but assumed that the generic is a special case of the objectual), and for that reason, I will argue, his account fails. I will suggest that Fineans should modify their view, and take it that metaphysical necessity is to be understood in terms of the two notions of essence—a view I myself find appealing. Finally, I will end by suggesting a further move which reduces the objectual to the generic, making metaphysical necessity reducible to generic essence alone—a move with which I myself have some sympathy. (shrink)

A de re objectual subject matter is a subject matter of the form how a1, a2 … are, whereas a de dicto objectual subject matter is a subject matter of the form how Fs are. An objectual subject matter is either a de re or de dicto objectual subject matter. This paper provides a systematic theory of aboutness towards objectual subject matters which, if correct, illuminates both the nature of intrinsicality and the general nature of (...) aboutness. In addition to the familiar distinction between partial and complete aboutness, I argue that there is a further orthogonal distinction between pervasive and hereditary aboutness, resulting in four ways in which a sentence, proposition or state of affairs can be about an objectual subject matter. I state and defend a number of basic principles concerning these varieties of aboutness as they apply to objectual subject matters and propose non-reductive analyses of them in terms of each other. I also propose an analysis of aboutness towards de re objectual subject matters in terms of aboutness towards de dicto objectual subject matters and put forward an attractive solution to a puzzle regarding aboutness due to Nelson Goodman. (shrink)

Research is a process that leads to new insights rupturing the existent fabric of knowledge. To prevent this process from disintegrating, its coherence must be assured. Under the heading transposition, seventeen artists, musicians, and theorists explain how one thing may turn into another in a spatio-temporal play of identity and difference that has the power to expand into the unknown. While it does not attempt to define the still evolving field of artistic research, through the idea of transposition this book (...) aims to grasp a quality increasingly important to artistic practice because representational approaches have been losing traction. Taking to heart the lessons of deconstruction, new modes of epistemic relationships are being invented that include aesthetic dimensions. Working with materially concrete positions in a manner familiar to artists can ensure that knowledge does not decay into relativism. (shrink)

A fundamental issue conceived out of the development of epistemology of education has to do with what epistemic state/s education ought to aim for. We offer a solution to this problem, one that deviates from truth, critical thinking, and intellectual virtues which have already been positioned as compelling solutions on their own. Instead, we argue that it is objectual understanding, from the framework of Jonathan Kvanvig, that best suits the place of primacy in epistemic educational aims. The paper’s structure (...) finds order and consistency with how the problem is treated as mentioned above. Section 1 introduces the different types of understanding in epistemology. In section 2, the epistemic value of objectual understanding is established, along with a defense of this epistemic state from the problems encountered for other positions. The second section also includes a discussion of the compatibility of objectual understanding with other epistemic aims of education. In section 3, we proceed to examine the influence of having addressed the epistemic aims debate to the educational concepts of curriculum, teaching, and learning. (shrink)

Analytic Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 1, Page 33-56, March 2021.

Kantian Transpositions presents an important new reading of Jacques Derrida’s writings on religion and ethics. Eddis Miller argues that Derrida’s late texts on religion constitute an interrogation of the meaning and possibility of a “philosophy of religion.” It is the first book to fully engage Derrida’s claim, in “Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of Reason Alone” to be transposing the Kantian gesture of thinking religion “within the limits of reason alone.” Miller outlines the (...) terms of this “transposition” and reads Derrida’s work as an attempt to enact such a transposition. Along the way, he stakes out new ground in the debate over deconstruction and ethics, showing—against recent interpretations of Derrida’s work—that there is an ethical moment in Derrida’s writings that cannot be understood properly without accounting for the decisive role played by Kant’s ethics. The result is the most sustained demonstration yet offered of Kant’s indispensible contribution to Derrida’s thought. (shrink)

For Anselm Kiefer, his painting shows that, that something exists “shows that there is also nothingness.” The moment of visibility is also the moment of our exposure in/with/through nothing (in a gerundive sense) elemental in the happening of the visible. Painting bears ways of exposing the becoming of the visible and ultimately of consciousness, both sensible and intellectual, in/through/with emptying and nothing, i.e., in the happening of the seer and the seen, in that coming into being of existing, we are (...) exposed to the insight that “there is also nothingness.” The paper offers a series of transpositions, a series of ways of experiencing visibility and vision found in looking at specific images and paintings. The transpositions expose us to blindness, emptying, gaps, and loss in the happening of the visible, which, in displacing the certainty of rational subjective seeing/consciousness, lead to the quickening of vision and the visible anew. (shrink)

Some philosophers claim that perception immediately and prima facie justifies belief in virtue of its phenomenal character (Huemer, Skepticism and the veil of perception. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2001; Pryor, There is immediate justification. In: Steup M, Sosa E (eds) Contemporary debates in epistemology. Blackwell, London (2014), pp. 181–202, 2005). To explain this special justificatory power, some appeal to perception’s presentational character: the idea that perceptual experience presents its objects as existing here-and-now (Chudnoff, Intuition. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013; Berghofer, (...) Husserl Stud 34(2):145–170, 2018). As some philosophers have noted, if perception justifies in virtue of its presentational character alone, the kind of content perception has should not matter for perceptual justification; more precisely, it should not matter whether perceptual content is propositional or not (e.g., Smithies, The epistemic role of consciousness. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019; Kriegel, Australas J Philos, 2021). However, most philosophers tend to resist this conclusion, holding that perception must be propositional in order to justify, on the ground that all our model of justification are propositional (e.g., Gauker, Philos Perspect 26(1):19–50, 2012). This paper challenges this claim. The paper consists of a negative and a positive part. In the negative part, I discuss and reject the master argument for the propositionality of perception; the conclusion is that propositional content is neither sufficient nor necessary to explain perception’s justificatory power. In the positive part, I take this conclusion seriously and outline an objectual model of perceptual justification. I define objectual attitudes as mental states whose content is not a full proposition, but a sub-propositional representational item, such as the representation of objects, properties, and kinds (Grzankowski and Montague, Non-propositional intentionality. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018), and show that it is plausible that some perceptions and some beliefs are attitudes of this kind. I then argue that objectual perceptual experiences have the right kind of phenomenal character and the right kind of structure to serve for immediate prima facie justification. I conclude by defending my objectual model from three objections. (shrink)

In this note, I would like to focus on the two central distinctions Inan draws between varieties of ignorance. One is the distinction between “objectual” and “propositional” ignorance, and the other is the distinction between “truth-ignorance” and “fact-ignorance,” which is a distinction between two types of propositional ignorance. According to Inan, appreciating these distinctions allow us to see what is wrong with the “received view,” according to which ignorance (or awareness of it) is “always about truth,” and enables us (...) to “overcome our [philosophers’] propositional-bias.” I will argue for two theses. First, fact-ignorance appears to be a form of objectual ignorance; and, if this is so, there are no two distinctions but only one distinction that Inan in effect offers, which is between objectual and propositional ignorance. Second, what Inan calls “the received view” can raise some reasonable worries about objectual ignorance that are not taken into account by him. (shrink)

This article argues that two words in line 8.612 of the Aeneid, promissa and perfecta, have been transposed since the poem's composition, and that the restoration of their correct order yields a preferable sense. This corruption would have happened at an early stage in the poem's transmission, but there is some reason to believe that Servius’ comment on the verse reflects its original state.

We demonstrate how to validly quantify into hyperintensional contexts involving non-propositional attitudes like seeking, solving, calculating, worshipping, and wanting to become. We describe and apply a typed extensional logic of hyperintensions that preserves compositionality of meaning, referential transparency and substitutivity of identicals also in hyperintensional attitude contexts. We specify and prove rules for quantifying into hyperintensional contexts. These rules presuppose a rigorous method for substituting variables into hyperintensional contexts, and the method will be described. We prove the following. First, it (...) is always valid to quantify into hyperintensional attitude contexts and over hyperintensional entities. Second, factive empirical attitudes validate, furthermore, quantifying over intensions and extensions, and so do non-factive attitudes, both empirical and non-empirical , provided the entity to be quantified over exists. We focus mainly on mathematical attitudes, because they are uncontroversially hyperintensional. (shrink)

L’article examine la façon dont Hegel traite la représentation des attributs divins, avec référence particulière à deux questions traditionnelles : la question de leur compatibilité réciproque et le problème de l’univocité ou équivocité entre les prédicats humains et divins. Les hypothèses défendues sont les suivantes : la prétention de connaître Dieu en lui attribuant plusieurs prédicats constitue selon Hegel l’erreur fondamentale de la théologie rationnelle ; néanmoins, Hegel ne considère pas tous les attributs divins comme représentations dépourvues de noyau spéculatif (...) et donc simplement destinées à disparaître, avec le passage du niveau de la Représentation au niveau du Concept ; il affirme plutôt la correspondance des prédicats de toute-puissance, bonté, justice et sagesse, avec les déterminations du Concept ; la transposition spéculative de ces attributs divins est une partie intégrante de la « véritable théodicée » de Hegel, car elle représente une réplique – alternative à celle de Leibniz – par rapport à l’anti-théodicée de Pierre Bayle, centrée sur l’affirmation d’une contradiction insoluble entre la bonté, la toute-puissance et la justice divines ; enfin, l’éclaircissement du lien dialectique que Hegel établit entre justice et sagesse divines – à travers leur transposition spéculative – permet de mieux saisir la façon dont il conçoit le rapport entre justice humaine et justice divine, qui est ici examinée à travers une analyse de l’interprétation hégélienne du livre de Job. (shrink)

Jonathan Kvanvig has argued that “objectual” understanding, i.e. the understanding we have of a large body of information, cannot be reduced to explanatory concepts. In this paper, I show that Kvanvig fails to establish this point, and then propose a framework for reducing objectual understanding to explanatory understanding.

We discuss, within the framework provided by a recently developed variational method, transposition-invariant field equations for unified field theories. Systems that are, in addition, invariant under Weyl-type gauge transformations or lambda transformations are derived. It is found that in a weak field limit two of the systems contain the equations of general relativity and the covariant Maxwell equations for a charge-free region.

Vaidya has recently argued that while Husserl’s method for acquiring knowledge of essence through use of our imagination is subject to a vicious epistemic circle, we can still use the method to successfully attain objectual understanding of essence. In this paper, I argue that the Husserlian objectual understanding-based epistemology envisaged by Vaidya suffers from a similar epistemic circularity as its knowledge-based foil. I argue that there is a straight-forward solution to this problem, but then raise three serious problems (...) for an amended version of Vaidya’s proposal and any similar Husserlian epistemology of essence. The paper closes with some general reflections on applying the Husserlian method to the contemporary notion of essence and on the idea of refocusing the epistemology of essence on understanding instead of knowledge. (shrink)

Higher plant nuclear genomes contain many families of dispersed repeats that change during evolution. Recent evidence from studies on genetically defined transposable elements raises the possibility that many of the dispersed repeats are remnants of such elements. Transposition of DNA has also occurred between mitochondria, chloroplasts and nuclei, a fact that underlines the major role played by DNA transposition in determining the structure of plant genomes.

Duncan Pritchard (2008, 2009, 2010, forthcoming) has argued for an elegant solution to what have been called the value problems for knowledge at the forefront of recent literature on epistemic value. As Pritchard sees it, these problems dissolve once it is recognized that that it is understanding-why, not knowledge, that bears the distinctive epistemic value often (mistakenly) attributed to knowledge. A key element of Pritchard’s revisionist argument is the claim that understanding-why always involves what he calls strong cognitive achievement—viz., cognitive (...) achievement that consists always in either (i) the overcoming of a significant obstacle or (ii) the exercise of a significant level of cognitive ability. After outlining Pritchard’s argument, we show (contra Pritchard) that understanding-why does not essentially involve strong cognitive achievement. Interestingly, in the cases in which understanding-why is distinctively valuable, it is (we argue) only because there is sufficiently rich objectual understanding in the background. If that’s right, then a plausible revisionist solution to the value problems must be sensitive to different kinds of understanding and what makes them valuable, respectively. (shrink)

After having been for some while the butt of conservative critics, verse transpositions in Propertius have, mainly thanks to the work of G. P. Goold, again become respectable among scholars. In his edition of Catullus, Tibullus, and Propertius J. J. Scaliger , the great archeget of the method, had subjected the other great elegist of Propertius’ generation to the same treatment,2 and in fact one of Scaliger's transpositions is supported by external evidence: 1.5.71–6 belong after 6.32; this is (...) confirmed by Ovid's imitation in Trist. 2.447ff. Trist. 2. 459–60 echo Tib. 1.6.31f. and 5.73 . That Ovid should have brought together in one distich verses from two different Tibullian poems may not seem wholly impossible, but much less likely than that the lines in Tibullus were also consecutive, in particular because the distich immediately preceding 459f. clearly refers to the situation of Tib. 1.6. (shrink)

125. The madman. Have you not heard of that madman who lighted a lantern at the bright sunshine of the morning, ran to the market, and began ceaselessly screaming: "I seek God! I seek God!"?This present essay is a shortened and adapted version of the first chapter of a large book of mine devoted to a comparison between ancient Greece and Christianity, shortly to be published in English by Michigan State University Press. Its theoretical core is the idea of mediation, (...) that is to say, the intangible connective element acting as a medium capable of linking humans to the world and the divine sphere that made the world possible in ancient times2. All this is related to our experience of object meant not only as a... (shrink)

In science and philosophy, a relatively demanding notion of understanding is of central interest: an epistemic subject understands a subject matter by means of a theory. This notion can be explicated in a way which resembles JTB analyses of knowledge. The explication requires that the theory answers to the facts, that the subject grasps the theory, that she is committed to the theory and that the theory is justified for her. In this paper, we focus on the justification condition and (...) argue that it can be analyzed with reference to the idea of a reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

We show that the representability of cylindric algebras by relativized set algebras depends on the scope of the operation transposition which can be defined on the algebra. The existence of “partial transposition” assures this kind of representability of the cylindric algebra . Further we characterize those cylindric algebras in which the operator transposition can be introduced.

In today’s world, there are more than 5000 languages and dialects in use, of which only 100 may be considered of major importance. As Dreyfuss (1972) states, inter-communication amongst them has proved not just difficult but impossible. Because a universal language would be the solution to this problem, over 800 attempts have in fact been made in the last 1000 years to develop an official second language that in time could be adopted by all major countries. Some of the most (...) recognized examples are Esperanto, Interlingua, Ido and Volapuk. However, all of them combine elements of existing languages and rely on the Roman alphabet, which reduces their applicability to certain regions of the world. The aim of this project is to explore the world of pictographic communication and develop an effective system for conveying information/knowledge on a universal scale. This would potentially bridge linguistic and cultural gaps, transcending boundaries, and thereby creating a broader vision of multiculturalism. In this sense, we find useful the notion of ‘semantography’, from the Greek word semanticos, significant meaning, and graphin, to write. The term was coined by Charles K. Bliss in 1947 to define his development of a non-alphabetical symbol writing system, based on the principles of ideographic writing and chemical symbolism. Semantography was the name of Charles K. Bliss’ proposed book for the Blissymbolic communication system. (shrink)