Reflection Principles are commonly thought to produce only strong axioms of infinity consistent with V = L. It would be desirable to have some notion of strong reflection to remedy this, and we have proposed Global Reflection Principles based on a somewhat Cantorian view of the universe. Such principles justify the kind of cardinals needed for, inter alia , Woodin’s Ω-Logic.

We all think we know who Batman and Superman are. They are polar opposites who both happen to wear their underwear over spandex pants, or at least they once did. So, for comic purists and fans of the cinematic DC Universe it may seem bold to claim that Batman is a true superhero and that Superman is not a true superhero. As a matter of a fact, we want to claim something even stronger: something we will prove independently, without only (...) comparing them and without having to worry if one comic character happens to depend on the other. We plan to demonstrate that it is not a matter of comparison between Batman and Superman when it comes to the concept: a true superhero. There is something else that is crucial for each comic character that makes one a true superhero, whereas the other is not—and we are going to reveal what this is exactly. (shrink)

Inleidend overzicht van de wijsgerige ethiek.

Scientific realists have suggested that changes in our scientific communities over the course of their history have rendered those communities progressively less vulnerable to the problem of unconcieved alternatives over time. I argue in response not only that the most fundamental historical transformations of the scientific enterprise have generated steadily mounting obstacles to revolutionary, transformative, or unorthodox scientific theorizing, but also that we have substantial independent evidence that the institutional apparatus of contemporary scientific inquiry fosters an exceedingly and increasingly theoretically (...) conservative form of that inquiry. I conclude that contemporary scientific communities are actually more vulnerable to the problem of unconceived alternatives than their historical predecessors, and I briefly suggest how we might seek to pursue scientific inquiry in a less theoretically conservative way. (shrink)

In his Violence and the Sacred, literary critic René Girard presented a bold thesis that revealed his increasing preoccupation with philosophical anthropology. There he claims that all societies are founded in violence that arises from unconscious imitation and subsequent rivalry. Sacred ritual is a means of avoiding, attenuating, or postponing this discord resulting from what he calls "mimetic appropriation." If his contentions in the earlier book seemed striking and original, their correlatives in the present volume are even more radical. In (...) it he adopts the dialogue form with interlocutors Oughourlian and Lefort; the text consists partly of edited transcriptions of their discussions and partly of inserted passages from Girard's writings. (shrink)

Until recently, the philosophy of history has involved large patterns spanning many centuries and covering phenomena on a large scale of integration. In the last decade, however, the focus has shifted to concerns more in line with Collingwood than with Toynbee. The question of what constitutes historical explanation, for example, has taken on a new look. One reason is that historians themselves have begun to forsake the ideal of history as a social science for the old-fashioned notion of history as (...) narrative. Another is that structuralists and semiologists have shown a great interest in exploring the nature of storytelling. Philosophers and practicing historians like Louis Mink, Hayden White, Peter Munz, or Frederick Olafson have turned from the model of the sciences-especially as reflected in the Annales school or the American strain of cliometrics--and found more viable possibilities in literary criticism. Thus they return history to the bosom of the humanities, sometimes even describing it without shame as a form of literature. Two journals, Clio and History and Theory have been hospitable to this point of view; and the hospitality has been repaid in kind by the editors of New Literary History, in whose pages some of the same writers have appeared. Contemporary with the literary critics who have marked out a new field called "narratology," these theorists have begun to explore concepts like plot, theme, and style; they are interested in defining event not as something that really was but as something that is historical because it can be talked about in a certain way. (shrink)

인간의 이성적 의식과 법의 관계를 밝히고 법의 해석 과 판단에 인간의 의식이 어떻게 작용하는가를 고찰 한 저술. 제1부에서는 법의 형이상학적인 측면에서 법의 실체, 그리스의 법, 데카르트의 법, 로크와 법, 칸트와 법, 헤겔과 법, 아담스미스의 법의 경제, 중국의 도덕과 법사상을 다루었다. 제2부에서는 심리학적 분석으로 헌법의 심리학적 해석, 법의 판결절차, 증거법, 형법과 죄, 청소년과 가족법, 조세법, 플라톤의 법, 칸트의 도덕론의 경험적 확인, 헤겔의 자아와 노동법, 법의 4차원에 대해 다뤘다.

George Berkeley is one of the greatest and most influential modern philosophers. In defending the immaterialism for which he is most famous, he redirected modern thinking about the nature of objectivity and the mind's capacity to come to terms with it. Along the way, he made striking and influential proposals concerning the psychology of the senses, the workings of language, the aims of science, and the scope of mathematics. In this Companion volume a team of distinguished authors not only examines (...) Berkeley's achievements but also his neglected contributions to moral and political philosophy, his writings on economics and development, and his defense of religious commitment and religious life. The volume places Berkeley's achievements in the context of the many social and intellectual traditions - philosophical, scientific, ethical, and religious - to which he fashioned a distinctive response. (shrink)

One diagnosis of what is wrong with the Knowledge Argument rests on the Ability Hypothesis. This couples an ability analysis of knowing what an experience is like together with a denial that phenomenal propositions exist. I argue against both components. I consider three arguments against the existence of phenomenal propositions and find them wanting. Nevertheless I deny that knowing phenomenal propositions is part of knowing what an experience is like. I provide a hybrid account of knowing what an experience is (...) like which is the coherent expression of a single idea: knowing what an experience is like is knowing what it would be like to have the phenomenal content of the experience as the content of an experience one is currently having. I explain how my conclusions indicate that the focus of discussion should be on the alleged explanatory gap between phenomenal facts and physical facts and not on the Knowledge Argument. The latter is a poor expression of the difficulty Physicalists face. (shrink)

Typical discussions of virtual reality (VR) fixate on technology for providing sensory stimulation of a certain kind. They thus fail to understand reality as the place wherein we live and work, misunderstanding it instead as merely a sort of presentation. The first half of the paper examines popular conceptions of VR. The most common conception is a shallow one according to which VR is a matter of simulating appearances. Yet there is, even in popular depictions, a second, more subtle conception (...) according to which VR is a matter of facilitating new kinds of interaction. The latter half of the paper turns to questions about the contemporary technology of Internet chatrooms. The fact that chatrooms can be used in certain ways suggests something about the prospects for VR. The penultimate section asks whether chatrooms may legitimately be thought of as places. (In a sense, they may.) The final section asks whether cybersex may legitimately be thought of as sex. (Again, yes.) Chatroom technology thus provides an argument for the second conception of VR over its much ballyhooed rival. (shrink)

There has been an increase in recent years in the use of empirical methods in healthcare ethics. Appeals to empirical data cannot answer moral questions, but insights into the knowledge, attitudes, experience, preferences and practice of interested parties can play an important part in the development of healthcare ethics. In particular, while we may establish a general ethical principle to provide explanatory and normative guidance for healthcare professionals, the interpretation and application of such general principles to actual practice still requires (...) interpretation and judgement. And many situations in healthcare practice are complex and may involve a variety of principles, each of which may conflict with the others. Simple surveys or interview studies may not be sufficient if we wish to develop a nuanced approach to ethical practice that can be set out in guidelines, codes or directives. We do not resolve moral questions by plebiscite. In this paper, the authors argue for the use of consensus methods to develop shared understanding of ethical practice, and they argue further for the combination of the Delphi method with the use of vignettes to illustrate the kind of situations that may occur in practice. They develop their argument in part by reference to their experience of using this approach in their recent research. (shrink)