La lexicographie bilingue grec moderne-français / français-grec moderne reflète la position paradoxale de chaque langue : si l'apprentissage du grec moderne en France ne répond à aucun impératif, en revanche le français est, en Grèce, la seconde langue vivante obligatoire dès le secondaire. Les dictionnaires bilingues sont massivement rédigés et édités en Grèce, et destinés à des apprenants grecs. La question se pose alors de savoir dans quelle mesure leur conception résulte effectivement de l'observation des données lexicales des langues en (...) présence, et si cette observation n'est pas doublée, filtrée par une pré-appropriation qui apprêterait le matériau à la langue-cible pour en faciliter l'apprentissage. Le présent travail vise à ouvrir la réflexion sur les stratégies d'appropriation linguistiques et culturelles à l'œuvre dans la lexicographie bilingue. Une de ces stratégies consiste à conformer le matériau d'entrée à certaines caractéristiques structurelles de L2. Notre axe d'observation portera sur la dichotomie entre construction synaptique et construction morphologique, qui permet d'opposer les deux langues sur un axe macrostructurel. (shrink)

The last two decades have seen the proliferation of the empirical study of philosophy. This dissertation defends the practice and argues that to understand the way contingent features of the practice of philosophy affect the epistemic standing of philosophers, we need to draw upon a wider and more varied set of empirical data than is sometimes supposed. To explore this, the dissertation focuses on two places where the practices of the discipline of philosophy have an effect on (...) the epistemology of philosophy. -/- First, the dissertation discusses the interaction between notable works of philosophy and their readers. In particular, it critiques the method of defending the epistemic standing of philosophers through careful examination of notable works of philosophy to discern the methods in the text. Ultimately this method is epistemically unmotivated. It is instead far more important to study how people have interacted and reacted to works of philosophy. -/- Second, the dissertation defends the use of lexicography in philosophy. Using "intuition" as a case study, the dissertation argues metasemantically and lexicographically that philosophers often use common words with meanings unique to philosophy. -/- Through both discussions it is argued that experimental philosophers and epistemologists of philosophy need to drastically expand the sorts of data they collect and consider in their theorizing. -/- ​. (shrink)

Henri Bergson (1859–1940), the most prominent member of nineteenth-century French spiritualism, is the first philosopher who explicitly defined philosophy as a practice which consists in posing problems anew and in creating concepts. In this article, I will try to reconstruct the progressive importance acquired by the terms ‘problem’ and ‘concept’ in nineteenth-century French philosophy and how they combined in Bergson’s theories about creativity, invention and novelty. I will argue that Bergson’s conception of philosophy as a creative intellectual (...) practice was the result of a negotiation, inside a pre-existent spiritualist framework, between, on the one hand, neo-Kantianism and, on the other hand, evolutionism which strongly influenced empirical psychology and the emerging social sciences. Bergson’s solution, influenced by the evolution of mathematics and literary theory, was just one of the possible options, and the main alternative to a new form of transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Making of Contemporary Indian Philosophy: Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya ed. by Daniel Raveh and Elise Coquereau-SaoumaMuzaffar Ali (bio)The Making of Contemporary Indian Philosophy: Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya. Edited by Daniel Raveh and Elise Coquereau-Saouma. London: Routledge, 2023. Pp. xiii+ 263. Hardcover £120, isbn 978-0-367-70981-5. Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya (KCB) is more than the seminal essay, "Svaraj in Ideas," through which academicians, politicians, postcolonial/decolonial thinkers and too often philosophers usually identify and (...) fossilize him. That, in my opinion, is the characteristic message of this volume. The message attains significance when calls for decolonization result in the sacrifice of actual philosophical legacy and resources to 'mere polity talk'. KCB, and with him other philosophers, need to be rescued from this 'mere polity talk', and the current volume rightly navigates in that direction. Setting the tone, The Making of Contemporary Indian Philosophy: Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya states that KCB is a significant yet unsung piece in the "jigsaw puzzle" of contemporary Indian philosophy (CIP). It rightly acknowledges KCB as the father of CIP, a distinct-yet-neglected genre of Indian philosophy "that draws on both classical Indian philosophical sources and Western materials, old and new" (p. 3). With a focus on KCB, the volume attempts to get back to and deliberate on the spectrum of his philosophy with two aims: a) To rediscover the philosophical significance and novelty of his philosophy where the classics of Indian philosophy and the modern avatars of European philosophy are made to speak to each other, and, b) To re-turn the attention of a global philosophical landscape that remains dominated by classical Indian philosophy and modern Western philosophy towards the present, "the now," of Indian philosophy in CIP, which was set in motion by KCB at the beginning of the twentieth century. The volume is divided into five sections. The first section, "Entrée" includes Daniel Raveh's "Introduction" and Daya Krishna's essay on KCB. Raveh's introduction classifies KCB's philosophy under three rubrics of decolonization (Svaraj), philosophical reflections (KCB's series of studies), and independent essays (conceptualizations). It also offers a synoptic reading of available literature on KCB, so that the reader can situate his philosophy within the multifaceted discourses that need to be recognized, reconfigured and revisited. Daya Krishna's essay is based on his two separate books so that a joint overview of KCB's notion of subject-object and the three Absolutes can be offered to the reader. The second section, "Lexicography" has three essays where the contributors [End Page 1] investigate, analyse or study a particular concept from KCB's philosophy. Elise Coquereau-Souma's essay focuses on the absence of a specific definition of "demand" in KCB's entire project. To unravel the implications of the concept of demand in KCB, she argues that it, "instigates the movement of KCB's method" (p. 49) to study, understand, and realise the domain of the experiential. Nir Feinberg's contribution underlines given-ness as felt-fact (p. 72) in KCB's contemporary commentary on Śaṅkara's theory of māyā. Feinberg argues that KCB innovatively explores the possibility of understanding the reality of the world (otherwise illusory) through the category of feeling, and that knowledge and facts have a limited application to eliminate this feeling of reality. Dor Miller's essay focuses on the concept of rasa in KCB's philosophy. Miller argues that KCB considers rasa as a "feeling par excellence" that needs to be understood, examined and studied in consonance with other human feelings. KCB thus classifies feelings into "'direct,' 'sympathetic,' and 'contemplative'" (p. 80). The aesthetic experience of reality, Miller tells us, becomes possible through the contemplative feeling whose subject is "impersonal, or universal" (p. 89). Miller claims that KCB's interpretation of rasa via the realm of contemplative feelings transcends the traditional commentarial paradigms of rasa and may offer a remedy to some contemporary anxieties of rasa theorists, especially those raised by Mukund Lath. The third section, "Philosophical Junctions," includes four contributions and starts with Stephen Kaplan's chapter on KCB's three Absolutes and four aspects of negation. Kaplan is interested in understanding whether a mapping between KCB's fourfold theory... (shrink)

Philosophers probably ask more What is questions than anyone else. From the Socratic-Platonic What is Justice, Love, Virtue, etc., through the Aristotelian quest for essences and the contemporary concern with various modes of meaning, philosophers have kept raising What is questions. Now some say that this penchant for What is represents the worst in philosophy. Such questions inevitably lead to confusing verbal or definitional matters, with substantive or factual matters. Lexicography is not an important part of either science or (...) philosophy. It is truth and not meaning that matters. If philosophers are to continue with their What is brand of questioning, they would do well to interpret What is x as a request for a true theoretical account of x. It is true theories we are after—a not very surprising conclusion. When a philosopher asks What is life? he is asking for the best theoretical account available of the phenomenon of life. Of course, we cannot always be sure that this is the question he is asking. He might be asking about the importance of life in some evaluative sense. Is life better than death? What is life, anyway? Is life worth living? And perhaps these are the truly philosophical questions about life. They are certainly elusive enough to deserve the appellation philosophical. When the scientist asks what is life, he asks for a biological theory. But when a philosopher asks this question, he is after something deeper. There are philosophers and philosophers. In what follows, philosophers are what used to be termed natural philosophers. In this usage, Newton was a great philosopher. And who would not be happy to have Newton as one of us. (shrink)

Dies ist der erste Teil einer zweibändigen Studie zur Genese unseres heutigen, vom Anspruch her den chronologischen Verlauf der gesamten Menschheitsgeschichte strukturierenden „Epochen“-Systems. Der Band skizziert zunächst die geistesgeschichtlichen Prämissen. Von der rudimentären paläolithischen Zeiteinteilung führt er über die ältesten schriftlich dokumentierten Ordnungsversuche in den sumerischen bzw. ägyptischen „Königlisten“, griechische und römische Autoren, Petrarca, Bruni und Vasari bis zu Cellarius, der am Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts die Drei-Zeitalter-Distinktion „Antike-Mittelalter-Neuzeit“ zum zentralen chronologischen Gliederungsprinzip der Weltgeschichte erhob. Anschließend stehen die drei klassischen, (...) von Pyrrhon, Polybios bzw. Ptolemaios entwickelten „Epoché“-Konzepte sowie deren Auftauchen und Rezeption im lateinischen Europa im Fokus. Sodann wird die erstaunlich spät, nämlich erst nach Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts einsetzende Transformation der „Epoché“ zur fundamentalen historiographischen Ordnungskategorie thematisiert. Schließlich verfolgen wir anhand zahlreicher Autoren sowie der kontemporären Lexikographie ihren auf Latein wie in den relevanten europäischen „Volkssprachen“ (Englisch, Französisch, Deutsch, Spanisch, Portugiesisch, Italienisch) stattfindenden Divulgationsprozeß. Dabei erweist sich der Ausgang des 17. Jahrhunderts erneut als Wasserscheide. Der erste Band endet deshalb an dieser Stelle, der zweite wird dann die weitere Entwicklung von 1700 bis zur Gegenwart analysieren. This is the first part of a two-volume study of the genesis of our modern-day system of epochs, which claims to structure the chronology of the entire history of mankind. The volume sets out by sketching the intellectual premises. It leads from the rudimentary Palaeolithic division of time via the oldest attempts at structuring to have been documented in written form, through to the Sumerian and Egyptian “King Lists”, to Greek and Roman authors, to Petrarch, Bruni, and Vasari, and finally to Cellarius, who in the late 17th century introduced the distinction between the three epochs of “Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Modern Era” as the basic chronological principle of organising the history of the world. This is followed by a closer look at the three classical concepts of “Epoché” as defined by Pyrrhon, Polybios and Ptolemaios, respectively, as well as their surfacing and reception in Latin Europe. Not until the second half of the 16th century, which is an astonishingly late point in time, can the transformation of “Epoché” into a fundamental category of historiographic structuring be detected. Finally, by studying numerous writers as well as the contemporary lexicography, we will outline the process of divulgation that took place both in Latin as well as in the relevant European “vernaculars” (English, French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian). In the process, the late 17th century again proves to be a kind of divide. As a consequence, volume one ends here; a second volume (forthc.) will analyse the further development to the present day. (shrink)

In a series of early essays, beginning with "Must We Mean What We Say?", Stanley Cavell offers a sustained response to the argument that ordinary language philosophy is nothing more than amateur linguistics, carried out from the armchair -- so that philosophers' claims about "what we say", and what we mean when we say it, are necessarily in need of proper empirical support. The present paper provides a close reading of Cavell and a defense of his argument that, since (...) a philosopher's descriptions of our use of words are supposed to be an expression of *self*-knowledge, they do not require, and indeed cannot possibly find, any empirical justification. This does not guarantee that these descriptions are immune to error, nor does it mean they describe a different range of facts from the ones that are the subject-matter of linguistics and lexicography. Nor, finally, does it follow from this argument that observation of the facts of ordinary usage, as revealed e.g. in linguistic corpora, is of no use to the philosopher of ordinary language. I close with a brief discussion of what the shared nature of linguistic communication shows about how to understand the "we" in "what we say". (shrink)

Kant's concept of sensuality, one of the revolutionary innovations of his philosophy, is anything but self-evident. It was however not recognized as a problem until it had been established how its specific aspects differ from the customary linguistic usage and the use of the term in the 18th century. The analysis of sources from the history of concepts which have hardly been considered up to now, the discussion of specific problems connected to Kant's language regulation and the examination of (...) the Latin source material show that there is a need for the revision of certain aspects. This applies not only to the history of the term sensuality but also to the lexicography which has been corrected and supplemented. In addition to the information for the history of aesthetics, this work makes an important contribution to determining the correct date of Kant's handwritten reflections. Kants Verstandnis von Sinnlichkeit, eine der umsturzenden Neuerungen seiner Philosophie, ist alles andere als selbstverstandlich. Als Problem erkennbar wird es jedoch erst dann, wenn herausgearbeitet wird, wie sich seine spezifischen Momente von dem im 18. Jahrhundert ublichen Sprach- und Begriffsgebrauch unterscheiden. Die Analyse von begriffsgeschichtlich bisher kaum berucksichtigten Quellen, die Erorterung der Sachprobleme, die mit der wohluberlegten Sprachregelung Kants verbunden sind, und die Untersuchung der lateinischen Vorlagen ergeben manchen Revisionsbedarf. Betroffen sind sowohl die Geschichte des Begriffs der 'Sinnlichkeit', als auch die Lexikographie, die korrigiert und erganzt wird. Neben Aufschlussen fur die Geschichte der deutschen Asthetik leistet die Arbeit einen wichtigen Beitrag zur richtigen Datierung von Kants handschriftlichen Reflexionen aus dem Nachlass. (shrink)

Ethics and lexicography would seem, prima facie, to have little to do with each other. Yet Aristotle testifies that Socrates pursued both:Socrates was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions. Socrates occupied himself with the excellences of character, and in connection with them became the first to raise the problem of universal definitions.

This volume presents the first unabridged translation of Ito Jinsai's (1627-1705) masterwork, the Gomo jigi (Philosophical Lexicography of the Analects and ...

From the Anglo-Saxons to the end of the Tudor era, many English glossaries and dictionaries were arranged topically rather than alphabetically and thus reflected the prevailing concerns of theology, philosophy, and natural history. These works are a fascinating part of the topical or onomasiological lexicographical tradition in England. In this book Werner Hüllen presents a learned and readable account of the topical tradition's principles and origins. He considers early glossaries, treatises for the learning of foreign languages, and didactic dialogues, (...) and provides in-depth examinations of later, more comprehensive works. He shows that the English tradition is embedded in a rich European tradition whose important representatives, such as Junius and Comenius, had a marked influence on the English methods. The book makes an important contribution to the history of the English lexicon and English semantics, and to the study of English lexicography. It also reveals a great deal about the history of English ideas over nine centuries. "This is a work of enormously broad scholarship, which brings together a range of quite diverse elements into a coherent narrative which makes for absorbing and often surprisingly entertaining reading..... This is a rich and multifaceted book, and one which will appeal to a variety of audiences." International Journal of Lexicography"Hüllen brings to life relatively dry and difficult material by applying modern techniques to remote frameworks, setting new standards for research in dictionary history." Anglistik. Mitteilungen des deutschen Anglistenverbandes. (shrink)

Ethics and lexicography would seem, prima facie, to have little to do with each other. Yet Aristotle testifies that Socrates pursued both:Socrates was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions. Socrates occupied himself with the excellences of character, and in connection with them became the first to raise the problem of universal definitions.

Situating the subject -- Hermeneutics and spech-act theory -- Hermeneutics, semantics, and conceptual grammar -- Lexicography, exegesis, and reception history -- Parables, narrative-worlds, and reader-response theories -- Philosophy, language, theology, and postermodernity -- Hermeneutics, history, and theology.

The collection of papers addresses the perennial problem of the relation between language and meaning. It proposes various theoretical approaches to the issue ranging from a synergetic theory of meaning merging the cognitive and the socio-historical perspectives, through holistic, evolutionary models and a revision of some of the assumptions of Cognitive Metaphor Theory to the discussion of the role of pragmatic competence in meaning construction. A number of papers make recourse to corpus based studies and psycholinguistic experiments. The topics of (...) specific linguistic investigations cover such diverse issues as idiom processing, emotion words in Chinese, valuation of abstract nouns, the preposition <I>at and scalar adjectives. Several papers explore the application of the reflections on the nature of meaning to lexicography and translation. One, self-reflective article investigates the consequences of the unformulated assumptions about meaning for the coherence of proposed linguistic theories. The volume firmly places the study of meaning in the centre of the linguistic research by showing its significance for linguistic theory and its applications. (shrink)

Alan R. Perreiah - Renaissance Truth and the Latin Language Turn - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.2 319-321 Ann Moss. Renaissance Truth and the Latin Language Turn. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. 306. Cloth, $74.00. Ann Moss offers an exciting and informative history of humanism from Johannes Balbus through Melanchthon, who completed the "turn" from scholastic to humanistic Latin. She marshals considerable evidence from lexicography and letters that (...) scholastics and humanists cultivated two idioms of Latin that created "two different mind-sets" , two "orders of truth-values" , and "two Latin speech communities that talked past one another" . While her main thesis that the "two linguistic universes" were "incommensurable" is questionable, it is a useful heuristic device to highlight differences between the two traditions. Moss illustrates many of her claims by controversies surrounding the legend of St. Ann, mother of Mary. Whether she is misled by the rhetoric of those heated debates on religious folklore, or whether they support her claim of "incommensurability" must be.. (shrink)

1. I have fond memories of the Linguistic Society of America meeting in New Orleans just after Christmas in 1988, the last time I was able to see all my humanist friends from graduate school who were attending the concurrent meeting of the MLA. Shortly after that, the LSA decided to forego the company of humanists and assemble by itself during the first week of January. It's hard to fault the decision. Over and above the obvious practical advantages, like not (...) having to wait in line for forty-five minutes outside popular restaurants, the groups had been growing apart intellectually for some time. Few linguists bothered to cross town for MLA sessions on topics like onomastics, English usage, and the history of lexicography. Nor for that matter were those sessions drawing many MLA attendees, either. Literary people didn't seem to be much interested in language study anymore; what filled their ballrooms now were the sessions on deconstruction and other poststructuralist enthusiasms. It was like going back for your annual drink with your high-school sweetheart and finding that you had less and less to talk about. They didn't know what subjacency was and we didn't know what alterity was, and neither seemed to care. If you were of a mind to look for milestones, you could take that as the time when linguistic semantics definitively cut itself loose from its philological roots. Like a lot of semanticists, I had mixed feelings about the break. It's undeniable that linguistic semantics couldn't have come of age as an autonomous empirical discipline if it hadn't.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:John Robert Leo CRITICISM OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN SHELLEY'S A DEFENCE OF POETRY IN his "Ode to Liberty" Shelley locates by encircling and enfolding metaphors a mythic Hellenic moment, one in which verse was yet "speechless" and philosophy still burdened with "lidless eyes." Greece— always for Shelley either the displaced Garden of prethematic unity or the mythic dream of integrated civic and aesthetic life—is about to inaugurate Athens and (...) the "wrinkled image" of historical consciousness.1 Poetry, thinking, and the tilling of an earth "to human use" are implicitly related and foreseen as destiny: from their enchanted caves Prophetic echoes flung dim melody. On the unapprehensive wild The vine, the corn, the olive mild, Grew savage yet, to human use unreconciled; And, like unfolded flowers beneath the sea, Like the man's dark thought in the infant's brain, Like aught that is which wraps what is to be, Art's deathless dreams lay veiled by many a vein Of Parian stone; and, yet a speechless child, Verse murmured, and Philosophy did strain Her lidless eyes for thee... (11. 49-60). Shelley could be describing the reading or speaking of a text, for poetic experience is an originating moment which unfolds our reflections and anticipations. Poetry elides speechlessness and the empty gaze. Its goings are all returnings, its experience is always inventive before meanings codify and resolve: "Every original language near to its source," we find in the Defence (p. 279), "is in itself the chaos of a cyclic poem; the copiousness of lexicography and the distinctions of grammar are the works of a later age and are merely the catalogue and the form of the creations of poetry." What was dark to experience is now illumined, 46 John Robert Leo47 as different regions in experience are uncovered or redistributed by language across our shifting horizons. Thus this bringing-foward-intoclarity, this moving of the previously inexpressed into articulation, is the pattern not only behind Shelley's view ofGreece producing a "sun-fire garlanded" Athens (1. 68), but also the more pervasive design describing other regarded experience. James Edie puts it this way: "We... can learn to make distinctions in our experience by attending to differences of meaning which are normally below the level of our own cultural threshold. By attending to a given region of experience, we can lower the differential thresholds already sedimented in our language almost indefinitely and make what was implicit in our experience more and more explicit."2 Edie's comments may be taken as responses to questions emerging from modernist readings of Shelley and other visionary poets—Blake, Hart Crane, or Charles Olson are instances—who sense the poetic project as a criticism of consciousness, within the lived body, as it struggles to make a world. How do language and the imagination consort in the critical regeneration of our lives? In what sorts of ways is renascence the uncovering and unfolding of an indefinite wholeness by the unlayering of fixed habits and attitudes? How does Shelley's Defence of Poetry, both a text on aesthetics and a reading of the world, suggest their alignment? What methods from critical discourse make Shelley's poetics present to our experience and thought? The adjustment of these issues is the task of the remainder of my article. First I examine Shelley's organization of consciousness into "reason" and "imagination" and trace the meanings of these functions in their immediate social context. A brief dispute with the reductive idealism of Platonic tradition allows for my third procedure, which is a phenomenological description of the imaginative field according to Husserl. Finally, I try to explicate Shelley's understanding of imaginative "decentering" within our experience. I Poetry and prose are saturated with references to phenomena. Texts refer to interior and exterior events (memory, rain), which are objects ofandfor consciousness. Shelley grasps this co-givenness of consciousness and world, their correlativity, as a condition revealed and strengthened by metaphor, which itself arrests us as "that of which we are speaking through words."3 But if it is the nature of language to be both perceptual and yet transcendental, both present and absent, it still exists as the imagination's voice in... (shrink)

Ogyû Sorai was one of the greatest philosophers of early modern Japan. This volume, a monumental work of scholarship, offers for the first time in any Western language unabridged and fully annotated translations of Sorai’s masterpieces. The Bendô and Benmei are works of political philosophy that define the theoretical foundation for a leadership exercising total power, the best remedy, in Sorai’s view, for a regime in crisis. The translations are based on the 1740 woodblock edition, the first major edition (...) of these seminal texts published during the Tokugawa period. In his commentary, John Tucker situates the Bendô and Benmei in relation to Neo-Confucianism via what is known as "philosophical lexicography." This genre, which links Sorai’s thinking with Neo-Confucianism, is traced to the early-thirteenth-century Song dynasty text the Xingli ziyi by Chen Beixi. Although Sorai was an unrelenting critic the Neo-Confucian formulations of the great Song synthesizer Zhu Xi, his thinking remained, due to its genre, methodology, and conceptual repertory, essentially a radical revision of Neo-Confucian discourse. Tucker’s introduction also examines the reception of Sorai’s two Ben during the remainder of the Tokugawa, calling attention to radical tendencies in later developments of Sorai’s thought as well as to the increasingly scathing critiques of his "Chinese" approach to philosophy, language, and politics. Finally, it traces the vicissitudes of the two Ben in modern Japanese intellectual history and their role in the formation of the ideas of Meiji intellectuals such as Nishi Amane and Kato Hiroyuki. As before, however, Sorai came under attack—this time for his supposed irreverence toward the throne, the Japanese people, and the imperial nation-state. Though an unpopular philosophy in early twentieth-century Japan, in the postwar years Sorai’s thought was interpreted as an important modernizing force. While it critiques such ideologically grounded attempts to cast Sorai’s Bendô and Benmei as theoretical contributions to political modernization, Tucker’s study nevertheless acknowledges that Sorai’s masterworks, in their concern for language analysis as the way to solve philosophical problems, share significant common ground with the analytic approach to philosophy pioneered by various twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophers. (shrink)

Ogyû Sorai was one of the greatest philosophers of early modern Japan. This volume, a monumental work of scholarship, offers for the first time in any Western language unabridged and fully annotated translations of Sorai’s masterpieces. The Bendô and Benmei are works of political philosophy that define the theoretical foundation for a leadership exercising total power, the best remedy, in Sorai’s view, for a regime in crisis. The translations are based on the 1740 woodblock edition, the first major edition (...) of these seminal texts published during the Tokugawa period. In his commentary, John Tucker situates the Bendô and Benmei in relation to Neo-Confucianism via what is known as "philosophical lexicography." This genre, which links Sorai’s thinking with Neo-Confucianism, is traced to the early-thirteenth-century Song dynasty text the Xingli ziyi by Chen Beixi. Although Sorai was an unrelenting critic the Neo-Confucian formulations of the great Song synthesizer Zhu Xi, his thinking remained, due to its genre, methodology, and conceptual repertory, essentially a radical revision of Neo-Confucian discourse. Tucker’s introduction also examines the reception of Sorai’s two Ben during the remainder of the Tokugawa, calling attention to radical tendencies in later developments of Sorai’s thought as well as to the increasingly scathing critiques of his "Chinese" approach to philosophy, language, and politics. Finally, it traces the vicissitudes of the two Ben in modern Japanese intellectual history and their role in the formation of the ideas of Meiji intellectuals such as Nishi Amane and Kato Hiroyuki. As before, however, Sorai came under attack—this time for his supposed irreverence toward the throne, the Japanese people, and the imperial nation-state. Though an unpopular philosophy in early twentieth-century Japan, in the postwar years Sorai’s thought was interpreted as an important modernizing force. While it critiques such ideologically grounded attempts to cast Sorai’s Bendô and Benmei as theoretical contributions to political modernization, Tucker’s study nevertheless acknowledges that Sorai’s masterworks, in their concern for language analysis as the way to solve philosophical problems, share significant common ground with the analytic approach to philosophy pioneered by various twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophers. (shrink)

In the Arabic eleventh century, scholars were intensely preoccupied with the way that language generated truth and beauty. Their work in poetics, logic, theology, and lexicography defined the intellectual space between God and the poets. In Language Between God and the Poets, Alexander Key argues that ar-Raghib al-Isfahani, Ibn Furak, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), and Abd al-Qahir al-Jurjani shared a conceptual vocabulary based around the words ma'na and haqiqah. They used this vocabulary to build theories of language, mind, and reality that (...) answered perennial questions: how to structure language and reference, how to describe God, how to construct logical arguments, and how to explain poetic affect."--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

In 2021, a second updated edition of Eschig’s and Pircher-Eschig’s translation of the Austrian Civil Code (ABGB) (Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch für die gesammten deutschen Erbländer der Oesterreichischen Monarchie (ABGB 1811). (as amended), 2023) was released. This edition holds particular relevance due to its potential applicability across a spectrum of players operating at the intersection of language and (civil) law, including legal professionals, the hospitality industry, and mediators. We find that this comprehensive translation may not only serve as a valuable resource (...) for (legal) practice but also holds significance for research in diverse fields, including (applied) legal linguistics, lexicography, translation studies, and comparative law. Moreover, this translation alleviates the challenges faced by practitioners inside and outside of law when dealing with legal concepts and lexis, along with their interdependencies in continental civil law discourse. We suggest that the work is particularly useful for legal departments of international companies, but also for hotel chains and/or mediation offices, seeking insights into the specifics of the Austrian legal-linguistic landscape. While computer-assisted translation and machine translation cannot be denied their utility, they should not be seen as capable of entirely replacing human expertise. Indeed, machine translations may not be able to capture the subtle multi-faceted interplay of emerging legal, linguistic, and/or cultural contexts when dealing with the legal concepts and interrelated terminology of the ABGB. In conclusion, we acknowledge the significance of high-quality legal translations, as the one under review, that have been thoroughly reviewed by human experts, thus contributing to saving time and resources. (shrink)

The present study seeks to lay out the most basic elements of the ontology of classical Aš‘arite theology. In several cases this requires a careful examination of the traditional and the formal lexicography of certain key expressions. The topics primarily treated are: how they understood “Being/ existence” and “being/existent” and essential natures; the systematic exploitation of the equivocities of certain expressions within a general context in which other than words there are no universals proves to be elegant as well as (...) insightful; the basic categories of primary entities: independant beings and nonindependant beings, created and uncreated, the equivocity of “being/existent” as predicated of contingent entities on the one hand and of God and His attributes on the other, and certain problems that arise because of the rigid application of the system's underlying analytic principles. Nous essayons ici de presenter les éléments fondamentaux de l'ontologie de l'aš‘arisme classique. Pour quelques expressions, il a fallu examiner la lexicographie et ordinaire et technique pour bien comprendre leur emploi et leur signification. Les sujets examinés sont: le sens de “Etre/existence” et de “être/existant” et le concept de réalité essentielle; l'emploi nuancé des équivocités de quelques expressions dans un contexte où les seuls universaux sont des mots, emploi qui se révèle philosophiquement élégant; les catégories fondamentales des êtres: êtres indépendants et êtres non-indépendants, soit créés soit incréés, l'équivocité de “être/existant” dit des êtres contingents d'une part, de Dieu et ses attributs d'autre part, et enfin quelques difficultiés qui résultent de l'application rigide des principes analytiques du système. (shrink)

La linguistique arabe est sans aucun doute la première science conçue et cultivée en arabe pour répondre à certains besoins scientifiques et idéologiques de la nouvelle société islamique. Les premiers travaux en ce domaine datent du VIII e siècle, et leurs auteurs, les premiers linguistes, sont précisément contemporains de l'arabisation des institutions, de l'administration, de la monnaie etc., sous le Khalife Omeyade ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Marwān. Ces premiers travaux étaient intimement liés à l'exégèse coranique, à l'orthoépie coranique, à la jurisprudence (...) islamique, c'est-à-dire aux disciplines associées à l'organisation de la nouvelle société et à sa culture. C'est à cette époque qu'Abū al-Aswad al-Duʾalī inventa des signes graphiques permettant de distinguer les différentes fonctions grammaticales des éléments linguistiques. C'est à la même époque que l'on a engagé la codification massive et systématique des données de l'arabe, comme en témoignent, à peine plus tard, les travaux d'ʿAbdallāh ibn Isḥāq , d'Abū ʿAmr ibn al-ʿAlāʾ et de bien d'autres. Ils ont également initié l'étude de la grammaire au sens large, puisque celle du système phonétique y est incluse. Tous ces travaux ont tracé la voie de plusieurs disciplines: phonologie, phonétique, métrique, lexicographie, et favorisé la naissance des grandes théories du langage. Et, de fait, au cours de la seconde moitié du VIII e siècle, al-Khalīl ibn Aḥmad a fondé plusieurs de ces disciplines. Sa connaissance des mathématiques et son recours aux procédés combinatoires l'ont aidé non seulement à inventer des disciplines telles que la métrique et la lexicographie, mais aussi à formuler les catégories grammaticales. Son élève, l'éminent linguiste Sībawayh, a ensuite codifié la plupart des analyses et des explications d'al-Khalīl, et les a enrichies en maintes occasions. Cette période héroïque de la linguistique arabe s'est prolongée grâce à de grands successeurs qui vont fonder des écoles linguistiques à Bassorah, Kufa, Bagdad, etc. D'autres écoles ont également vu le jour à Fuṣṭāṭ et ailleurs, et la recherche linguistique va ainsi se poursuivre jusqu'à la fin du XI e siècle, au moins. (shrink)

The central aim of the inquiry begun in this text is to reach a semantic characterisationof philosophical discourse, that is, to describe the »language«, or the code, ofphilosophy. This inquiry contains an examination of the views on the nature andpurpose of philosophy held by Immanuel Kant and Ludwig Wittgenstein, but manyother philosophers, semioticians, linguists and literary theorists are brought into thediscussion.In the first part of the text, the view is expressed that, with regard to the peculiarphenomena that characterize (...) class='Hi'>philosophy , a theory of philosophy itself is needed, but such that would notitself be caught in the same kind of discourse. Then some methodological restrictionsare introduced: mainly, that the »philosophy« to be dealt with is the classicalcontinental philosophy, which is percieved as a body of texts. The aim of the inquiryis then formulated as the description of the code by which these texts are organized;the method of the inquiry is specified as a deductive-hypothetical one. In the end,an outline of a semantic theory is offered, as a basis for this description.The second part of the text starts the examination of Kant’s and Wittgenstein’sphilosophical views and their views on philosophy. Kant’s theory of knowledge ispresented as one which asserts the primary role of subjective a priori forms whichshape what we know as »reality«, and is therefore opposed to Wittgenstein’s picturetheory of language, where language simply mirrors what is given. The conclusion isreached, however, that both Kant and Wittgenstein propose a parallel dichotomybetween that which can be known/said, and the thing-in-itself or the mystical, andwith regard to this they both claim that the aims of philosophy as seen traditionallymust be reconcieved to a great extent.The inquiry is continued in an another article. (shrink)

This paper develops Bernard Williams’s suggestion that for philosophy to ignore its history is for it to assume that its history is vindicatory. The paper aims to offer a fruitful line of inquiry into the question whether philosophy has a vindicatory history by providing a map of possible answers to it. It first distinguishes three types of history: the history of discovery, the history of progress, and the history of change. It then suggests that much of philosophy (...) lacks a vindicatory history, for reasons that reflect philosophy’s character as a humanistic discipline. On this basis, the paper reconstructs Williams’s conception of what it means for philosophy to engage with its own history. The paper concludes that it is a mistake to think that a vindicatory history is what we would really like to have, and that in fact, the resulting picture gives philosophy several reasons to engage with its own history. (shrink)

Reason and Value collects 15 new papers by leading contemporary philosophers on themes from the work of Joseph Raz. Raz has made major contributions in a wide range of areas, including jurisprudence, political philosophy, and the theory of practical reason; but all of his work displays a deep engagement with central themes in moral philosophy. The subtlety and power of Raz's reflections on ethical topics make his writings a fertile source for anyone working in this area. Especially significant (...) are his explorations of the connections between practical reason and the theory of value, which constitute a sustained and penetrating treatment of a set of issues at the very center of moral philosophy as it is practiced today. The contributors to the volume acknowledge the importance of Raz's contributions by engaging critically with his positions and offering independent perspectives on the topics that he has addressed. The volume aims both to honour Raz's accomplishments in the area of ethical theorizing, and to contribute to an enhanced appreciation of the significance of his work for the subject. (shrink)

Experimental philosophy uses experimental research methods from psychology and cognitive science in order to investigate both philosophical and metaphilosophical questions. It explores philosophical questions about the nature of the psychological world - the very structure or meaning of our concepts of things, and about the nature of the non-psychological world - the things themselves. It also explores metaphilosophical questions about the nature of philosophical inquiry and its proper methodology. This book provides a detailed and provocative introduction to this innovative (...) field, focusing on the relationship between experimental philosophy and the aims and methods of more traditional analytic philosophy. Special attention is paid to carefully examining experimental philosophy's quite different philosophical programs, their individual strengths and weaknesses, and the different kinds of contributions that they can make to our philosophical understanding. Clear and accessible throughout, it situates experimental philosophy within both a contemporary and historical context, explains its aims and methods, examines and critically evaluates its most significant claims and arguments, and engages with its critics. (shrink)

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THe INDUCTIVE SCIENCES. PART II. OF KNOWLEDGE. ' . VOL. II. ...

Philosophy of Experimental Biology explores some central philosophical issues concerning scientific research in experimental biology, including genetics, biochemistry, molecular biology, developmental biology, neurobiology, and microbiology. It seeks to make sense of the explanatory strategies, concepts, ways of reasoning, approaches to discovery and problem solving, tools, models and experimental systems deployed by scientific life science researchers and also integrates developments in historical scholarship, in particular the New Experimentalism. It concludes that historical explanations of scientific change that are based on local (...) laboratory practice need to be supplemented with an account of the epistemic norms and standards that are operative in science. This book should be of interest to philosophers and historians of science as well as to scientists. (shrink)

Do the new sciences of well-being provide knowledge that respects the nature of well-being? This book written from the perspective of philosophy of science articulates how this field can speak to well-being proper and can do so in a way that respects the demands of objectivity and measurement.

This paper presents a preliminary analysis of homeopathy from the perspective of the demarcation problem in the philosophy of science. In this context, Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend’s solution to the problem will be given respectively and their criteria will be applied to homeopathy, aiming to shed some light on the controversy over its scientific status. It then examines homeopathy under the lens of demarcation criteria to conclude that homeopathy is regarded as science by Feyerabend and is considered as pseudoscience (...) by Popper and Kuhn. By offering adequate tools for the analysis of the foundations, structure and implications of homeopathy, demarcation issue can help to clarify this medical controversy. The main argument of this article is that a final decision on homeopathy, whose scientific status changes depending on the criteria of the philosophers mentioned, cannot be given. (shrink)

This paper offers an explanation of how philosophy of science in the second half of the 20th century came to be so conspicuously silent on the problem of how to explain the applicability of mathematics. It examines the idea of the early logicists that the analyticity of mathematics accounts for its applicability, and how this idea was transformed during Carnap's efforts to establish a consistent and substantial philosophy of mathematics within the larger framework of Logical Empiricism. I argue (...) that at the end point of this development, philosophical discussion of the applicability problem was terminated although important aspects of the logicists' original response to the applicability problem had had to be sacrificed along the way. (shrink)