Highlighting the social tensions that confront the liberal tradition, Pierre Manent draws a portrait of what we, citizens of modern liberal democracies, have become. For Manent, a discussion of liberalism encompasses the foundations of modern society, its secularism, its individualism, and its conception of rights. The frequent incapacity of the morally neutral, democratic state to further social causes, he argues, derives from the liberal stance that political life does not serve a higher purpose. Through quick-moving, highly synthetic essays, he (...) explores the development of liberal thinking in terms of a single theme: the decline of theological politics. The author traces the liberal stance to Machiavelli, who, in seeking to divorce everyday life from the pervasive influence of the Catholic church, separated politics from all notions of a cosmological order. What followed, as Manent demonstrates in his analyses of Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, Guizot, and Constant, was the evolving concept of an individual with no goals outside the confines of the self and a state with no purpose but to prevent individuals from dominating one another. Weighing both the positive and negative effects of such a political arrangement, Manent raises important questions about the fundamental political issues of the day, among them the possibility of individual rights being reconciled with the necessary demands of political organization, and the desirability of a government system neutral about religion but not about public morals. (shrink)

Wittgensteinian readings of Being and Time, and of the source of the intelligibility of Dasein''s world, in terms of language and the average everyday public practices of das Man are partly right and partly wrong. They are right in correcting overly individualist and existentialist readings of Heidegger. But they are wrong in making Heidegger into a proponent of language or everydayness as the final word on intelligibility and the way the world is disclosed to us. The everydayness of das Man (...) and language are partial sources of intelligibility but only insofar as they are comprehended within the greater unitary structure of care and temporality. Care and temporality constitute the foundational underpinnings for disclosure and the intelligibility ofthat wherein Dasein dwells. (shrink)

Pierre Macherey est philosophe, professeur honoraire à l’université de Lille. Rattaché à l’UMR « Savoirs Textes Langage » du CNRS, il continue d’animer un blog « La philosophie au sens large » dont les travaux sont publiés sur le net ( https://philolarge.hypotheses.org/ ). Il a écrit de nombreux ouvrages, aussi bien en philosophie (sur Spinoza, Hegel, Marx, Comte, Canguilhem, Foucault) qu’en littérature et sur la manière de philosopher avec la littérature ( Philosopher avec la littérature est la reprise de (...) sa thèse soutenue en 1991 ; mais il y a aussi, par exemple : Proust. Entre littérature et philosophie ; En lisant Jules Verne ). Son dernier ouvrage s’intitule À l’essai (Paris, Kimé, 2019). Sur l’utopie, il a notamment écrit : De l’utopie! (Le Havre, De l’incidence éditeur, 2011) ainsi que « Utopie et quotidien : les deux faces d’une même réalité? », article publié dans Peggy Avez, Louis Carré et Sébastien Laoureux (dir.), Utopie et quotidien. Autour de Pierre Macherey (Bruxelles, Presses de l’Université Saint Louis, 2016). (shrink)

Pierre Maquet1,2,6, Steven Laureys1,2, Philippe Peigneux1,2,3, Sonia Fuchs1, Christophe Petiau1, Christophe Phillips1,6, Joel Aerts1, Guy Del Fiore1, Christian Degueldre1, Thierry Meulemans3, André Luxen1, Georges Franck1,2, Martial Van Der Linden3, Carlyle Smith4 and Axel Cleeremans5.

Radical views on cognition are generally defined by a cluster of features including non-representationalism and vehicle-externalism. In this paper, I concentrate on the way radical views on cognition define themselves as revolutionary theories in cognitive science. These theories often use the Kuhnian concepts of “paradigm” and “paradigm shift” for describing their ambitions and the current situation in cognitive science. I examine whether the use of Kuhn’s theory of science is appropriate here. There might be good reasons to think that cognitive (...) science is in a situation of foundational crisis, but that does not entail that the classical paradigm is currently displaced to the benefit of a new paradigm. Larry Laudan’s theory of research traditions is more enlightening than Kuhn’s theory for describing the scope and ambitions of radical views on cognition, and their relations with an anti-intellectualist tradition in philosophy. (shrink)

Criticisms and rejections of representationalism are increasingly popular in 4E cognitive science, and especially in radical enactivism. But by overfocusing our attention on the debate between radical enactivism and classical representationalism, we might miss the woods for the trees, in at least two respects: first, by neglecting the relevance of other theoretical alternatives about representationalism in cognitive science; and second by not seeing how much REC and classical representationalism are in agreement concerning basic and problematic issues dealing with mental content (...) and intentionality. In order to expand and exemplify these ideas, this paper presents two heterodox positions on intentionality and on the relations between content and representation. Special attention is paid to the way REC is rejecting these positions: I argue that this rejection reveals common assumptions with classical representationalism, but also undermines the coherence of REC’s conception of intentionality. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans la mineure « Rythmanalyses » de la revue Multitudes, n° 46, 2011. Nous remercions la revue Multitudes et Pierre Sauvanet de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Premier temps. Regardons pour commencer Young and Innocent : la dernière scène de ce film de jeunesse d'Alfred Hitchcock est un grand moment de cinéma — mais pas seulement. Comme souvent chez le réalisateur, la trame du film se noue autour de ce jeune homme, accusé (...) d'un meurtre qu'il n'a pas - Pour une éthique et une politique du rythme – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Part of the contents: 0Happiness and Theôria in Books I and X of the Nicomachean Ethics / Eudaimonia and Theôria within the 0Nicomachean Ethics / The Meaning of Bios in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics / Approximation and Acting for an 0Ultimate End / Eudaimonia, Theôria, and the Choiceworthiness of Practical Wisdom / Aristotle on the Choice of Lives: Two Concepts of Self-Sufficiency / Eudaimonia and Contemplation in Aristotle’s Ethics / Theôria and Praxis in Aristotle’s Ethics / The Private Moral Life (...) of Aristotle’s Philosopher: A Defense of a Non-Intellectualist Interpretation of Nicomachean Ethics / Theoretical Life, Practical Life, and Happiness in Aristotle / The Best Life according to Aristotle : A Reconsideration / Theos, Theôria, and Therapeia in Aristotle’s Ethical Endings / Contemplation and Service of the God: The Standard for External Goods in Eudemian Ethics / 0Aristotelian Immortality.0. (shrink)

In “The Bioethics of Environmental Injustice: Ethical, Legal, and Clinical Implications of Unhealthy Environments,” Ray and Cooper (2024) advocate for environmental law efforts, with a focus on the...

Based on an endorsement of the hypothesis of extended cognition, this paper proposes a criticism of the representationalist assumptions that still pertain to these contemporary models of cognition. I first rehearse some basic problems akin to any representationalist model of cognition, before proposing some more specific arguments directed against the necessity, the plausibility, and the coherence of the marriage between extended cognition and contemporary representationalism. Extended and distributed models of cognition have the resources to get rid of representationalism, and they (...) should better do it. Their adherence to representationalism might be an by-product of the extended character of the scientific study of cognition. (shrink)

Nul besoin de caution pour s'intéresser à l'oeuvre monumentale de Vladimir Jankélévitch qui traverse de bout en bout le XXe siècle. Philosophe, écrivain, pianiste, musicologue, résistant, témoin et victime d'une guerre qui a "coupé sa vie en deux", infatigable marcheur de la gauche, professeur en Sorbonne... C'est tout cela que fut Vladimir Jankélévitch. Les visages de l'homme sont multiples et ce Cahier, à partir de conférences et d'articles désormais introuvables (sur la musique, la religion et son judaïsme), de documents historiques (...) (un CV corrigé de la main de Jankélévitch, une attestation de Résistance), d'engagements publics (sur l'enseignement de la philosophie, sur l'Université française, sur la Shoah, sur l'Allemagne d'après-guerre), mais aussi, d'articles critiques et de témoignages de ses collègues, disciples et fidèles amis, permet d'en dessiner tous les contours. Toutes les pages de ce Cahier démontreront sans peine l'actualité d'une pensée qui lie tous les champs du savoir classique à l'exigence quasiment existentielle de la morale."--taken from publisher website. (shrink)

Editor’s Introduction The following text was prepared by Pierre Bourdieu for delivery at a conference on his work held at Duke University, April 21–23, 1995. Entitled “Pierre Bourdieu: Fieldwork in Culture,” the conference was sponsored by the Duke Graduate Program in Literature and included such well‐known literary scholars as Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Jonathan Culler, and Fredric Jameson. Bourdieu, of course, was the invited guest of honor, but was uncertain as to whether he should make the effort of attending, (...) particularly since he was recovering from a short period of poor health. As I too had been invited , Bourdieu discussed the question with me in Paris.He was rather concerned about wrongheaded, trendy applications of his theories by American literary scholars, who often misunderstand his work because they simply do not know the intellectual landscape to which it relates. Reading such conference paper titles as “Cross‐Dressing for Success: The Scramble for Symbolic Power in Tabitha Sweeney’s Female Quixotism,” Bourdieu confessed his fear of being taken as simply the French intellectual flavor of the month, one whose theory is used simply as grist for the American academy’s industrious mills of literary interpretation.He ultimately decided to send the following text to be read at the conference in his absence. It treats, with polite frankness, his worries about being misinterpreted through importation into the American theoretical field with its peculiar conception of French philosophy; Bourdieu’s paper situates these particular worries within a more general account of “allodoxic”distortions caused by the international travel of theory; but it also tries to prevent further misunderstanding by offering a brief contextualization of his theory and a brief summary of his method of analysis through fields. The translation of Bourdieu’s text was prepared by Loïc Wacquant, and is presented here with only minor adjustments. (shrink)

La fin du " monde humain "? Un panorama-discussion des tendances de la pensée actuelle (Badiou, Meillassoux, réalisme spéculatif, Latour, Stengers, Descola, Viveiros de Castro...), dans la perspective métaphysique propre à Pierre Montebello.

Abstract This paper compares Heidegger's conception of time with more prevalent physical and broadly psychological analyses of time. The ?vulgar? notion of time, as Heidegger understands it, is based on the assumption that time, regardless of whether it is identified with tense or not, is something that is essentially measurable by clocks. Heidegger maintains that the vulgar notion of time is a distortion of his own preferred conception of temporality. I show how temporality may be understood as the non?sequential tensed (...) structure underlying tensed discourse. I argue against any straightforward reduction of this tensed structure and the direction of time to physical occurrences. Nevertheless I argue that temporality can be distinguished from purely psychological analyses of temporal experience and from traditional conceptions of time as tensed experience. The selectiveness of demonstrative discourse provides the basis for Heidegger's critique and reconstruction of time understood as tensed discourse about things. Heidegger's scepticism about the interpretation of time as a sequence of nows that underlies the dominant interpretation of tense is due to his appropriation of the relativity of simultaneity from special relativity. But his interpretation of physical theory leads him to the thesis that time is pre?supposed but not completely analysed in physical theory. The meta?language of physical theory makes covert use of temporal notions, for entities can themselves only be understood in covertly temporal ways. I show how this claim may be understood and defended in the light of current physical theory. Heidegger's analysis gives us some basis for thinking that his own notion of temporality is built into an understanding of temporal experience. But I argue that Heidegger fails to make the case that physical time is ontologically dependent on human existence. (shrink)

In recent philosophy there has been increasing interest in the relation between the first and third person perspective on experience. The first person perspective has a certain epistemic priority with regard to the ascription of inner states. An agent knows his or her beliefs and desires in a way which no one else can. There is thus a presumption in favor of the agent’s self-ascriptions when it comes to the ascription of inner states. This first person authority over such inner (...) states as sensations, beliefs, and desires is an important part of what makes us think of those states as inner. We think of inner states as belonging to an individual in a way which distinguishes those states from physical states of the same individual. Inner states are constitutive of each of our own distinctive perspectives on outer states. They are the distinctive way things appear to each of us. By contrast, physical or outer states are accessible to all of us in pretty much the same way. Outer states are presented to us by way of inner states. But we think of outer states as outer precisely because we think of them as external to our own distinctive perspective. (shrink)

Kant's philosophy must be understood nonnaturalistically and anti-psychologistically. Self-consciousness must be interpreted as preceding the distinction between different persons. Kant departs from the traditional idea that I thoughts are always mediated by a certain specific I sense or conceptualization of oneself. At the same time the so-called paradoxes of self-consciousness are resolved. The possibility of a pre-personal self-consciousness is what links the way all objects are given to finite beings to the way they are conceptualized by those beings. It serves (...) as the unifying basis for intuitions and concepts. Intuitions and concepts of objects are connected by their relation to a numerically identical self. ;The subject construed impersonally provides the frame for any possible experience and is one in the same in all possible experience. As such it can never be experienced as a distinct entity. It is the condition under which it is possible to have a point of view at all. One must be in a position to become conscious of the numerical identity of this logical subject of all representation if is to be possible to communicate indeed to compare and contrast representational contents at all. ;Self-consciousness is inherently empty and yet also necessarily in relation to contents of consciousness. This means that its numerical identity can only be sustained if all potential contents of consciousness present themselves to the self in such a way that they sustain the possibility of consciousness of the self as having a discrete empirical identity. Kant's argument in the First Analogy and the Refutation of Idealism fulfills this demand for a correlate to the numerical identity of pre-personal consciousness in the data presented to self-consciousness spatio-temporally. We must view self-construction and construction of objects existing outside of us as part of a single process which presupposes an impersonal self-consciousness. (shrink)

Building on two decades of work on Hegel and continental philosophy, John McCumber offers his distinctive take on the current state of the debate about Hegel’s critique of Kant. McCumber seems to agree with a popular picture of Kant as the proponent of a “thin, universalistic, and argumentatively purified style of philosophy” and of Hegel as the original source of the “historically embedded naturalists” whose work is then taken up by feminists, gender, and race theorists. This is a plausible, if (...) ultimately less than persuasive, conception of the contrast between Kant and Hegel; I take Kant’s works to be a refutation of the kind of position that McCumber ascribes to Kant. McCumber interprets... (shrink)

Résumé Charles Wolfe vient de publier Lire le matérialisme (ENS Éditions, 2020), où il esquisse une histoire des différentes formes de matérialisme, y compris le matérialisme vitaliste et les versions du XXe et du XXIe siècle. Pierre-François Moreau, auteur de la préface de l’ouvrage, entame ici une discussion sur les problèmes et les ressources d’une telle histoire.

A truly accessible introduction to the fundamentals of classical philosophy and metaphysics. In a series of three small books, Pierre-Marie Emonet brings the riches of philosophy within reach of us all, not just those with the time and inclination to work through erudite philosophical language.

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2017 Heft: 214 Seiten: 231-248.

Que partageons nous en commun? Beaucoup de choses, à l'évidence, tant la cohabitation des hommes n'a jamais semblé aussi étroite: l'eau, l'espace, la ville, certes, mais plus profondément le désir de voir notre société s'épanouir, au bénéfice de tous, comme la promesse d'un plaisir, d'une chance... Pourtant notre idéal se révolte : dégradation des civilités, lieux publics maltraités, équilibres sociaux ou politiques saccagés... Le vivre-ensemble semble menacé par l'ignorance, la bêtise ou la cupidité; le trouble que fait naître le spectacle (...) d'une société en prise à l'injustice et au désarroi nous émeut. Le sentiment d'un monde déboussolé pose une question prégnante: que nous est-il donc arrivé? Pour tenter d'apporter des éléments de réponse, pour affronter la complexité d'un monde qui effraie et rebute, il y a peu d'outils : la philosophie en est un, qui permet de mettre en perspective les concepts épars qui tissent notre compréhension de ce vaste sujet. Dans cette perspective, Pierre-Olivier Monteil a choisi la formule de l'abécédaire, qui sous des apparences fragmentaires, relie par une discrète architecture les tenants essentiels du bien commun. À travers 42 concepts fondamentaux qui peuvent constituer les contours de cet espace informel (d'Amitié à Violence, en passant par Planète, Tolérance ou Liberté...), ce petit traité de philosophie entreprend une visite rafraîchissante des lieux-dits essentiels de notre vie partagée. (shrink)

In order to account for how organisms can apprehend the contents of the external representations they manipulate in cognizing, the endorsement of representationalism fosters a situation of what I call cognitive overdetermination. I argue that this situation is problematic for the inclusion of these external representations in cognitive processing, as the hypothesis of extended cognition would like to have it. Since that situation arises from a commitment to representationalism (even minimal), it only affects the viability of representationalist versions of extended (...) cognition. (shrink)

It is very widely accepted that the French Revolution represents a decisive moment in the history of archives, not only in France but throughout the world. The great German-born scholar Ernst Posner, writing in 1940, claimed that it "marks the beginning of a new era in archives administration."1 Posner's view has been reaffirmed many times since, in one form or another, by authors of various nationalities.In France itself this opinion is not contested. Rather than assert a claim of historical primacy, (...) however, the interest has been instead to emphasize the link between the Revolution and the present system of archival organization. A 2001 petition calling for the National Archives to be brought together under one... (shrink)

Sur fond d’une critique du libéralisme, qui rend notamment inopérante l’idée de souveraineté populaire, l’article cherche à montrer qu’une conception de la démocratie intégrant le conflit doit être élaborée à partir du cadre théorique de la gouvernementalité. Il donne en ce sens comme critère de la démocratie l’existence d’une situation de gouvernementalités multiples. Il identifie enfin, comme alternative potentielle à la gouvernementalité néolibérale, le « gouvernement du commun » dont l’existence est aujourd’hui ce qui donne sens à la démocratie.

Sur fond d’une critique du (néo)libéralisme, qui rend notamment inopérante l’idée de souveraineté populaire, l’article cherche à montrer qu’une conception de la démocratie intégrant le conflit doit être élaborée à partir du cadre théorique de la gouvernementalité. Il donne en ce sens comme critère de la démocratie l’existence d’une situation de gouvernementalités multiples. Il identifie enfin, comme alternative potentielle à la gouvernementalité néolibérale, le « gouvernement du commun » dont l’existence est aujourd’hui ce qui donne sens à la démocratie.

Hantés par la fameuse phrase de Levinas, selon laquelle«s’interroger sur l’identité juive, c’est déjà l’avoir perdue», certains penseurs de la fin du XXe siècle et du début du suivant évoquent un temps béni où nul ne se demandait qui était juif et qui ne l’était pas, si on l’était vraiment, ce que c’était donc que de l’être ; un âge d’or perdu – comme tout âge d’or – où les Juifs ne bénéficiaient certes pas des mêmes droits que les autres (...) habitants du pays, et étaient contraints de vivre da... (shrink)

La quatrième des Considérations inactuelles de Friedrich Nietzsche est emblématique en ce qu'elle présente la notion d'événement de façon dialectique. Participant au premier festival de Bayreuth durant l'été 1876, c'est à la fois en tant que spectateur, historien et philosophe, que Friedrich Nietzsche interprète l'événement comme un « cas » ou un symptôme, et saisit la volonté de Richard Wagner dans sa « chute », où le spectacle et la décadence sont les valeurs de la culture européenne et de l'Allemagne (...) moderne. De plus, d’une volonté analogue, et d’abord impressionné par la hauteur du compositeur et la puissance de son œuvre totale, c’est à partir d’un « pathos de la distance » que le philosophe va « transvaluer » le cas Wagner après Bayreuth et le faire advenir comme le nouvel événement d’une histoire critique dans laquelle il se comprend lui-même. Alors, c’est comme un « grand » événement que nous interprétons Friedrich Nietzsche à Bayreuth décrit comme la synthèse d’un processus à la fois civilisationnel et culturel. (shrink)

La quatrième des Considérations inactuelles de Friedrich Nietzsche est emblématique en ce qu'elle présente la notion d'événement de façon dialectique. Participant au premier festival de Bayreuth durant l'été 1876, c'est à la fois en tant que spectateur, historien et philosophe, que Friedrich Nietzsche interprète l'événement comme un « cas » ou un symptôme, et saisit la volonté de Richard Wagner dans sa « chute », où le spectacle et la décadence sont les valeurs de la culture européenne et de l'Allemagne (...) moderne. De plus, d’une volonté analogue, et d’abord impressionné par la hauteur du compositeur et la puissance de son œuvre totale, c’est à partir d’un « pathos de la distance » que le philosophe va « transvaluer » le cas Wagner après Bayreuth et le faire advenir comme le nouvel événement d’une histoire critique dans laquelle il se comprend lui-même. Alors, c’est comme un « grand » événement que nous interprétons Friedrich Nietzsche à Bayreuth décrit comme la synthèse d’un processus à la fois civilisationnel et culturel. (shrink)

La quatrième des Considérations inactuelles de Friedrich Nietzsche (Richard Wagner à Bayreuth) est emblématique en ce qu'elle présente la notion d'événement de façon dialectique. Participant au premier festival de Bayreuth durant l'été 1876, c'est à la fois en tant que spectateur, historien et philosophe, que Friedrich Nietzsche interprète l'événement comme un « cas » (« Der Fall ») ou un symptôme (« Das Symptom »), et saisit la volonté de Richard Wagner dans sa « chute » (« Der Vorfall »), (...) où le spectacle et la décadence sont les valeurs de la culture européenne et de l'Allemagne moderne. De plus, d’une volonté analogue, et d’abord impressionné par la hauteur du compositeur et la puissance de son œuvre totale (Gesamtkunstwerk), c’est à partir d’un « pathos de la distance » que le philosophe va « transvaluer » le cas Wagner après Bayreuth et le faire advenir comme le nouvel événement d’une histoire critique dans laquelle il se comprend lui-même. Alors, c’est comme un « grand » événement que nous interprétons Friedrich Nietzsche à Bayreuth décrit comme la synthèse d’un processus à la fois civilisationnel et culturel. (shrink)