So far, most of the philosophical literature on occupations has tried to assess the legitimacy of military rule in the aftermath of armed conflicts by exclusively employing the theoretical resources of just war theory. In this paper, I argue that this approach is mistaken. Occupations occur during or in the aftermath of wars but they are fundamentally a specific type of rule over persons. Thus, theories of political legitimacy should be at least as relevant as just war theory (...) for the moral evaluation of occupations. This paper, therefore, draws on both traditions and argues that just war theory plays a limited role in identifying the purposes and appropriate agents of occupation authority, but that theories of legitimacy are necessary for explaining why and under which conditions foreign actors have the right to rule in the aftermath of armed conflicts. (shrink)

The legitimacy of the military is frequently overlooked in standard accounts of jus ad bellum. Accordingly, this paper considers how the military should be organized. It proposes a normative conception of legitimacy – the ‘Moderate Instrumentalist Approach’ – that outlines the qualities that a military should possess. It then assesses the three leading ways of organizing the military according to this approach: the use of private military and security companies (PMSCs), a conscripted force and the all-volunteer force (AVF). (...) The paper argues that the AVF, despite some notable problems, is the most legitimate way of organizing the military. (shrink)

Attempts to simplify ethics in war by claiming exclusive legitimate authority for the law of armed conflict underestimate the moral complexities facing soldiers. Soldiers risk wrongdoing if they refuse moral guidance that can independently evaluate their legal permissions. State soldiers need to know when to object to a legal duty to fight; nonstate fighters need to know when to disregard legal prohibitions against fighting. And both might sometimes best discharge their moral duties by following a bespoke rule departing from noncombatant (...) immunity in a principled way that has been designed for a particular conflict by an authoritative leadership. (shrink)

Equality before the law is one of the fundamental guarantees citizens expect in a just and fair society. We argue that recent trend toward mass incarceration, which has had vastly disproportionate impact on African Americans, is undermining this claim to fairness and raises a serious legitimacy problem for the legal system as a whole. Using original data from the Race, Crime and Public Opinion study we show that African Americans view the 'War on Drugs" as racially biased in its (...) implementation. This perception of bias consequentially undermines legal system legitimacy by lowering blacks' expectations for police performance in their communities and encouraging receptivity to appeals for jury nullification based on race. (shrink)

During the 1990s, international society increasingly recognised that states who abuse their citizens in the most egregious ways ought to lose their sovereign inviolability and be subject to humanitarian intervention. The emergence of this norm has given renewed significance to the debate concerning what it is about humanitarian intervention that makes it legitimate. The most popular view is that it is humanitarian motivations that legitimise intervention. Others insist that humanitarian outcomes are more important that an actor's motivations, pointing for instance (...) to the ousting of the Khmer Rouge by Vietnam. Given the centrality of this debate, this article reinvestigates the ?motives versus outcomes? debate and suggests an alternative reading based on the classic Just War tradition. It argues that an actor's intentions are vital to assessing the legitimacy of an intervention. (shrink)

The question of humanitarian action appeared in France in the public arena at the beginning of the 1990s, almost twenty years after the creation of `Médecins sans frontières' by Bernard Kouchner and Xavier Emmanuelli. The humanitarian debate in France developed in a political context marked by two essential features: on the one hand, the bureaucratization of humanitarian actions with its own secretary of state, an office occupied by Bernard Kouchner between 1988 and 1993 and, on the other hand, the war (...) in ex-Yugoslavia, first in Croatia, then in Bosnia.One can distinguish two partly overlapping phases in the course of the previous ten years: initially there was a phase of media enthusiasm for humanitarian actions, and particularly for the figure of Bernard Kouchner, but this gradually gave way to a wave of intense criticism in the major Paris newspapers and journals such as Le Monde, Libération, and the journals Le débat and Esprit.We should note that this criticism is formulated primarily by intellectuals, most of whom tend more towards left-wing views. But it is also voiced, in a somewhat paradoxical fashion, by certain major figures in the field of humanitarian action, such as Rony Brauman, former chairman of `Médecins sans frontières' . Many of these internal critics continue pursuing their activities within humanitarian organizations while at the same time questioning the forms or results of humanitarian action. In the many texts he published at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, Bernard Kouchner himself, while defending humanitarian action, took these criticisms into account and recognized their validity by incorporating them into his discourse of justification.These criticisms appear to reach a culmination in 1993-94, after which the debate started to wind down and was replaced by others, particularly the social question. One could argue, however, that criticism won out over praise, at least in intellectual circles: from 1995 until today, humanitarian action is invoked mainly in order to criticize it. (shrink)

The question of humanitarian action appeared in France in the public arena at the beginning of the 1990s, almost twenty years after the creation of `Médecins sans frontières' by Bernard Kouchner and Xavier Emmanuelli. The humanitarian debate in France developed in a political context marked by two essential features: on the one hand, the bureaucratization of humanitarian actions with its own secretary of state, an office occupied by Bernard Kouchner between 1988 and 1993 and, on the other hand, the war (...) in ex-Yugoslavia, first in Croatia, then in Bosnia.One can distinguish two partly overlapping phases in the course of the previous ten years: initially there was a phase of media enthusiasm for humanitarian actions, and particularly for the figure of Bernard Kouchner, but this gradually gave way to a wave of intense criticism in the major Paris newspapers and journals such as Le Monde, Libération, and the journals Le débat and Esprit.We should note that this criticism is formulated primarily by intellectuals, most of whom tend more towards left-wing views. But it is also voiced, in a somewhat paradoxical fashion, by certain major figures in the field of humanitarian action, such as Rony Brauman, former chairman of `Médecins sans frontières' . Many of these internal critics continue pursuing their activities within humanitarian organizations while at the same time questioning the forms or results of humanitarian action. In the many texts he published at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, Bernard Kouchner himself, while defending humanitarian action, took these criticisms into account and recognized their validity by incorporating them into his discourse of justification.These criticisms appear to reach a culmination in 1993-94, after which the debate started to wind down and was replaced by others, particularly the social question. One could argue, however, that criticism won out over praise, at least in intellectual circles: from 1995 until today, humanitarian action is invoked mainly in order to criticize it. (shrink)

_A few public actions prepared the way for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the purpose of which was to define a special military operation as forced, necessary and inevitable. The use of armed force against Ukraine was discussed during those public events. The Russian authorities applied many arguments, and a great deal of attention was paid to the moral justification of war. In this article, I consistently analyze three problems: why did Russian officials use moral language to justify the war, (...) what arguments did they use, and would these arguments retain their effect in the long term. I will examine several addresses made by the President of Russia and the Russian Federation Security Council meeting materials to address these questions. I conclude that Putin's lack of legitimacy forced him to justify the war in moral terms, and the peculiarities of Russian moral discourse allowed him to do that. However, even if this strategy was effective to a certain extent at the beginning of the war, it can hardly be stable and sustainable._ _Keywords_: invasion of Ukraine, Russia, Ukraine, just war, morality. (shrink)

This photo-essay highlights the ways in which medicine features in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) and uses it to reflect on the nature of ethical obligation set out by Judith Butler in her work on state-achieved precarity. Although medical infrastructure of even the most basic type is tragically lacking and in some areas shockingly absent in the OPT, it is the particular way in which medicine comes to be needed that we focus on. Leaving aside the rhetoric that has claimed (...) authority over what can or cannot be said of the Occupation, we focus on its geo-technological arrangements. By placing photos and case studies of medical obstruction within an analysis of the Occupation, we forge an encounter between reader and the Occupation to raise questions about the use of medicine in this context and the manner in which conventional ethics can give legitimacy to this use. On the basis of what we show through visual and textual documentary material, we propose ethics be understood as inherent to the geo-technological arrangements that make life possible or, as in this case, undermine, obstruct or deliberately take life. Hence the ethical obligation that Butler calls upon is reiterated in ways that encompass the everyday features of occupation including those active in the emergence of medicine as a tactic of war. (shrink)

The event that King Kuai of Yan demised the crown to his premier Zizhi, is a tentative way of political power transmission happened in the social transforming Warring States Period, which was influenced by the popular theory of Yao and Shun’s demise of that time. However, this tentative was obviously a failure, coming under attacks from all Confucian, Taoist and Legalist scholars. We may understand the development of the thinking concerning the issue of political legitimacy during the Warring States (...) Period by analyzing the different commentaries by different schools on this unusual event, and get some beneficial inspirations. (shrink)

Peace plays a central role in the ethics of war and peace, but this proves to be an enormous challenge. In a recent article, Elisabeth Forster and Isaac Taylor grapple with this important topic. They argue that certain concepts in just war theory—aggression, legitimacy, and peace—are essentially contested and susceptible to manipulation. Because the rules are interpreted and applied by the very states that wage war, it is as if the fox is asked to guard the chicken coop—a recipe (...) for disaster. To avoid manipulation of the theory and make the goal of peace attainable, they defend “minimalism” in the ethics of war and peace. This paper responds to and builds on their article. After nuancing the analysis, I will argue that their minimalism does not solve the problem since the proposed alternative concept is equally prone to misuse, and that their minimalism is mistargeted. What I propose is to specify and ground the rules of war without raising the standard too high, to disentangle jus ad bellum and jus post bellum and see peace as guiding principle for jus post bellum, and to interpret that in a minimalist way. (shrink)

At the start of Early Modernity, the notion of raison d’état (reason of state) became a central issue in European politics. By means of that notion politicians and intellectuals reflected upon the legitimacy of violent and unethical means in the service of higher ends. Due, among others, to the nature of modern warfare, the role of the state acquired new significance in human affairs. Therefore, many philosophers and politicians argued that politics might be fundamentally different from other human activities (...) and might require a special rationality and morality. Also, thus my hypothesis, the discourse and history of the raison d’état is throughout history characterized by some recurring themes, such as the consolidation of governmental power. In this study, I want to explore how the raison d’état, in various strengths, has been instrumentalised in the political doctrine of Richelieu and Louis XIII as well in the political ideas of Putin and his ideological right-hand Dugin. It will be discussed how in both political systems; sovereignty is considered to be an undifferentiated body of legitimate power with a firm basis in Christian-Stoic natural law. The stoic ideal of indifference (apatheia) is an important reference in the reason of state rhetoric since the individual is supposed to be prepared to sacrifice his life for the preservation of the State. The common good should be the objective of each person in the society. I will analyse to what extent Putin and Dugin, in defending their war politics, use similar arguments as cardinal Richelieu. By reflecting on the intellectual discourse about the nature and purposes of the State itself, and the element of justice and higher values in the public discourse, it can be analysed how the raison d’état operates in a political doctrine. (shrink)

This book brings together scholarship on three different forms of state violence, examining each for what it can tell us about the conditions under which states use violence and the significance of violence to our understanding of states. This book calls into question the legitimacy of state uses of violence and mounts a sustained effort at interpretation, sense making, and critique. It suggests that condemning the state's decisions to use lethal force is not a simple matter of abolishing the (...) death penalty or – to take another exemplary example of the killing state – demanding that the state engage only in just wars, pointing out that even such overt instances of lethal force are more elusive as targets of critique than one might think. Indeed, altering such decisions may do little to change the essential relationship of the state to violence. (shrink)

This essay offers a critical evaluation of competing interpretations of the early Confucian thinkers Xunzi and Mencius regarding their view of the legitimacy of war. First, I briefly describe and critique Daniel Bell’s “just war” interpretation of Mencius, which is relatively permissive regarding the legitimation of war. I then consider and critique the position of Sumner Twiss and Jonathan Chan regarding Mencius’ and Xunzi’s ostensible support for what we call “humanitarian intervention,” which is also made from a just war (...) perspective. Next, I describe Xinzhong Yao’s pacifistic interpretation, offering a slightly qualified defense of it. I then consider reframing this view as “just war pacifism,” defending a phrase used in the Confucian context by Julia Ching. Finally, I address the question of whether the pacifistic account is too naïve to attribute to these great Confucian thinkers. I maintain that, on the contrary, it is not naïve. Indeed, it is a position we would do well to give due consideration. (shrink)

The Other's War is an intervention into a set of contemporary moral, political and legal debates over the legitimacy of war and terrorism within the context of the so-called global War on Terror. Tarik Kochi considers how, despite the variety of its approaches âe" just war theory, classical realist, post-Kantian, poststructuralist âe" contemporary ethical, political and legal philosophy still struggles to produce a convincing account of war. Focusing on the philosophical problem of the rightness of war, The Other's War (...) responds to this lack. Through a discussion of a number of key Western intellectual traditions, Kochi demonstrates how often conflicting and contradictory conceptions of warâe(tm)s rightness have developed in modernity. He shows how a process of ordering violence around different notions of right has constantly redrawn the boundaries of what constitutes âe~legitimateâe(tm) violence. Such a process has consequences for anyone who claims to be fighting a âe~just warâe(tm). Building upon this account and drawing upon the philosophical heritage of G.W.F. Hegel and Ernst Bloch, The Otherâe(tm)s War proposes a new understanding of war, not just as a social condition characterised by violent conflict and struggles for power, but as the attempt of individuals and groups to realise their normative claims through violence. Kochi argues that both of these aspects of war are an expression of the metaphysics of human subjectivity. War begins with, and is the radical exaggeration of, a fundamental activity of human subjectivity, in which the subject constitutes its normative and material identity; realising and positing itself through acts that involve negation and violence. By drawing consideration of the problem of war back to the level of a philosophical examination of the metaphysics of human subjectivity, The Other's War develops a novel theory of war that helps us to better understand the nature of contemporary conflict as a process of recognition. From this perspective, judgment, it is concluded, needs to be constantly guided by the effort to recognise the ethics of the other's war. (shrink)

In the early 1990s, the Commonwealth reformed its political structure to allow interference in domestic affairs of member states. This article examines whether such an institutional transformation has helped the organization to fulfil its purpose to work in the common interests of member countries and of their people. The article demonstrates that, while, as a consequence of post-Cold War globalization, concerns about the Commonwealth's political credibility and public perception have relaxed Commonwealth leaders' reluctance to accept legally binding norms of the (...) organization, strong resistance to Commonwealth interference in internal affairs exists among developing member states. It is argued that, because the new Commonwealth political structure lacks legitimacy and is contrary to the real interests of the majority of members, institutionalizing the Commonwealth has not contributed to the formation of a collective identity among Commonwealth members and to the resolution of the problem of inequality within and without the organization. (shrink)

In my paper, I develop a phenomenological and pragmatist reflection on the fragility of liberal democracy’s moral foundations in times of war. Following Judith Shklar’s conception of the “liberalism of fear”, the legitimacy of the liberal-democratic order is seen as grounded in experiences of suffering caused by political violence. It is also assumed that the liberalism of fear delivers an adequate conception of the normative foundations of the European project. With the help of phenomenologists such as Edmund Husserl, Maurice (...) Merleau-Ponty and Michel Henry, the paper ants to philosophically deepen the liberalism of fear by outlining a theory of “pathic evidence” as a normative foundation and the concept of a common “flesh of the political” as a shared moral sensitivity that sets boundaries to political conflict as well as the political imaginary, excluding what I call the production of “monumental meaning”. It then examines the question which political conditions are needed for this evidence to become a shared, communal criteria of ethical thought, and considers inner and outer challenges to the transmission and reproduction of this evidence in time, drawing especially on John Dewey’s ideas of democratic communication and social intelligence. In the current war, the following problem appears as crucial for the “soul” of European democracies which are confronted with the need to respond to Russia’s attack: How can a political morality grounded in pathic evidence be sustained, once it is challenged by an aggressor who, out of cultural and political reasons, shows a higher level of toleration towards violence? Besides aggression from an external foe, there are also temporal dynamics that further the loss of the inhibiting force of pathic evidence from the inside. As it shall be argued, boredom can be such a factor. The paper concludes by drawing conclusions for the current war in Ukraine. (shrink)

This essay offers a critical evaluation of competing interpretations of the early Confucian thinkers Xunzi and Mencius regarding their view of the legitimacy of war. First, I briefly describe and critique Daniel Bell's “just war” interpretation of Mencius, which is relatively permissive regarding the legitimation of war. I then consider and critique the position of Sumner Twiss and Jonathan Chan regarding Mencius' and Xunzi's ostensible support for what we call “humanitarian intervention,” which is also made from a just war (...) perspective. Next, I describe Xinzhong Yao's pacifistic interpretation, offering a slightly qualified defense of it. I then consider reframing this view as “just war pacifism,” defending a phrase used in the Confucian context by Julia Ching. Finally, I address the question of whether the pacifistic account is too naïve to attribute to these great Confucian thinkers. I maintain that, on the contrary, it is not naïve. Indeed, it is a position we would do well to give due consideration. (shrink)

Gentili’s conceptualization of war as a conflict between states attempted to limit the legitimacy of war to external wars only, thus precluding the legitimacy of civil wars. It reflected both the emergence of sovereign states and the vision of international law as a law among polities rather than individuals. The conceptualization of war as a dispute settlement mechanism among polities rather than a punishment for breach of the law of nations and the idea of the bilateral justice of (...) war humanized the conduct of warfare and the content of peace treaties. The idea of perfect war excluded brigandage, piracy, and civil wars from its purview. Some scholars have suggested that perfect war had a dark side, legitimizing imperial expansion. Others have cautioned that Gentili explicitly opposed imperial expansion rather adopting anti-imperialist stances. This article suggests that these ambivalent readings of the Gentilian oeuvre reflect the ambivalence of the early modern law of nations. Under the early modern law of nations, aggression for the sake of empire was clearly unjust; nonetheless, imperial expansion took place. Whereas ‘a law which many transgress[ed] [wa]s nonetheless a law’, there was a wide divide between theory and practice.1. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to reconstruct the theoretical background and practical meaning of the so called war writings which emerged within the phenomenological movement during the First World War. The author exemplifies it by researching the works of two German representatives of this movement, Max Scheler and Kurt Stavenhagen. He focuses on their application of the phenomenological method to the analysis of Russian national identity, and historical as well as cultural foundations of Russian state. The paper’s main thesis (...) is that the politicization and militarization of phenomenology consisted in both “personalization” and “sociologization” of the phenomenological approach to the problem of the state. While interpreting Scheler’s personalism as an exemplification of the approach to the state as a problem of social ontology, the author reconstructs the theoretical conditions of analyzing the Russian imperial state in terms of the “world.” The focus of the paper is particularly on the phenomenology of, as Scheler put it, Russian collective personality and Russian national consciousness or “soul” as well as on the question of legitimacy of Ukrainian resistance against Russian imperialism. (shrink)

Jihad, with its many terrifying associations, is a term widely used today, though its meaning is poorly grasped. Few people understand the circumstances requiring a jihad, or "holy" war, or how Islamic militants justify their violent actions within the framework of the religious tradition of Islam. How Islam, with more than one billion followers, interprets jihad and establishes its precepts has become a critical issue for both the Muslim and the non-Muslim world. John Kelsay's timely and important work focuses on (...) jihad of the sword in Islamic thought, history, and culture. Making use of original sources, Kelsay delves into the tradition of shari'a--Islamic jurisprudence and reasoning--and shows how it defines jihad as the Islamic analogue of the Western "just" war. He traces the arguments of thinkers over the centuries who have debated the legitimacy of war through appeals to shari'a reasoning. He brings us up to the present and demonstrates how contemporary Muslims across the political spectrum continue this quest for a realistic ethics of war within the Islamic tradition. Arguing the Just War in Islam provides a systematic account of how Islam's central texts interpret jihad, guiding us through the historical precedents and Qur'anic sources upon which today's claims to doctrinal truth and legitimate authority are made. In illuminating the broad spectrum of Islam's moral considerations of the just war, Kelsay helps Muslims and non-Muslims alike make sense of the possibilities for future war and peace. (shrink)

In this essay, Denike assesses the appropriation of international human rights by humanitarian law and policy of "security states." She maps representations of the perpetrators and victims of "tyranny" and "terror, " and their role in providing a "just cause" for the U.S.–led "war on terror. " By examining narratives of progress and human rights heroism Denike shows how human rights discourses, when used together with the pretense of self-defense and preemptive war, do the opposite of what they claim—entrenching the (...) sovereignty of Western imperialist states while eroding the conditions necessary for the recognition of the human rights of others. (shrink)

In this essay, Denike assesses the appropriation of international human rights by humanitarian law and policy of “security states.” She maps representations of the perpetrators and victims of “tyranny” and “terror,” and their role in providing a “just cause” for the U.S.-led “war on terror.” By examining narratives of progress and human rights heroism Denike shows how human rights discourses, when used together with the pretense of self-defense and preemptive war, do the opposite of what they claim—entrenching the sovereignty of (...) Western imperialist states while eroding the conditions necessary for the recognition of the human rights of others. (shrink)

In 2002 a significant number of American theologians declared that the ‘war on terror’ was a just war. But the indiscriminate strategies and munitions technologies deployed in the invasion and occupation of Iraq fall short of the just war principles of non-combatant immunity, and proportionate response. The just war tradition is one of Christendom's most enduring legacies to the law of nations. Its practice implies a standard of virtue in war that is undermined by the indiscriminate effects of many modern (...) weapons and by the deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure. The violent power represented by the technology of what the Vatican calls ‘total war’has occasioned a significant shift in Catholic social teaching on just war since the Second World War. Total war generates an asymmetry of weakness in those subjected to these techniques of terror, and this has only strengthened the violence of the Islamist struggle against the West. But those who draw inspiration and legitimacy from this weakness in their struggle with the West also reject virtue in war. In a time of terror the theological vocation is to speak peace and to recall the terms in which the peace of God was achieved by way of the cross. (shrink)

For decades the papal tradition has renounced the term ‘war’ as something around which to build an ethical approach. One can sympathize with this: resort to war seems the consequence of ethical failure and brings in its train a host of brutalities including rape, torture, and murder that harm both victims and perpetrators. But that view of ‘war’ is an incomplete representation of the possibilities of the uses of force to secure legitimate political goods. Thus the popes have struggled to (...) maintain a clear voice in the face of abject tragedies like the Russian invasion of Ukraine: on the one hand, Pope Francis condemns war in an almost absolute manner; on the other, he recognizes the legitimacy of Ukrainian defensive uses of force. In so doing, of course, he merely abides the so-called ‘just war theory’ he seems to have discarded. My contribution will focus on the current state of the just war in Catholic teaching. I will maintain the state remains where it has been since at least the middle of the twentieth century: skeptical about the capacity of states to judge in terms of international law, but cognizant of their right to defend themselves against ongoing aggression. (shrink)

This paper examines whether patriotism and other forms of group partiality can be justified and what are the moral limits on actions performed to benefit countries and other groups. In particular, I ask whether partiality toward one’s country can justify attacking enemy civilians to achieve victory or other political goals. Using a rule utilitarian approach, I then defend the legitimacy of “moderate” patriotic partiality but argue that noncombatant immunity imposes an absolute constraint on what may be done to promote (...) the interests of a country or other group involved in warfare or other forms of violent conflict. (shrink)

This work presents two theoretical challenges to Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT). The first argument shows CMT’s foundational _Conceptual Claim—_that abstract concepts are necessarily structured by concrete concepts—entails the blurring of the literal–figurative distinction, which calls into question the legitimacy of standard methods of metaphor identification used in CMT. The second argument aims at the _Linguistic Claim—_that conceptual metaphors are necessary for metaphorical language—by showing that conceptual metaphors are neither necessary nor sufficient for linguistic metaphors and that, therefore, the existence (...) of conceptual metaphors cannot be validly inferred from the presence of their linguistic counterparts. In light of the arguments put forward, the CMT theorist is forced to accept one of four options: (A) hold on to both the Conceptual Claim and Linguistic Claim, by adequately addressing problems presented here, (B) discard the Conceptual Claim and give up the theory, (C) discard both claims and give up the theory, or (D) accept the Conceptual Claim but reject the Linguistic Claim and abandon the methods of discovering conceptual metaphors through analysis of figurative language. I argue that the only tenable option is D. (shrink)

The end of the Second World War produced a shift in the Soviet mode of legitimation; the original values of Marxism-Leninism were combined with those of patriotic nationalism in a new form of ideology in which the idea of The Great Patriotic War became one of the founding myths. Especially after Stalin’s death in 1953 and the beginning of the process of de-Stalinization, the Soviet political elites made an attempt to change their strategy by reducing reliance on coercion and strengthening (...) political legitimacy in order to gain compliance from the ruled population. The system of socialist ritual became one of the most important legitimation procedures. The political elites came to regard the system of ritual as an important factor in maintaining and strengthening the legitimacy of the regime and their own position in the power structure. (shrink)

The recent Science Wars have brought into sharp focus, in a public forum, contentious questions about the authority of science and what counts as properly scientific practice that have long structured archaeological debate. As in the larger debate, localized disputes in archaeology often presuppose a conception of science as a unified enterprise defined by common goals, standards, and research programs; specific forms of inquiry are advocated (or condemned) by claiming afiliation with sciences so conceived. This pattern of argument obscures much (...) that is most creative in archaeological practice. Archaeologists routinely exploit both integrating and fragmenting relations among the sciences, especially in establishing evidential claim. I will argue that the credibility of these claims is a function, not of scientific status acquired by corporate affiliation, but of the substantive trade in tools and techniques, empirical insights, models, and theories that is made possible by local interactions between archaeology and a wide range of other disciplines. There is much more to be gained by developing a rich critical understanding of the interfield relations that make this trade possible than by appealing to generic ideals of science. (shrink)

During the resistance war against Japan in China, the national administrative authority penetrated the rural society in Enshi city in Hubei province. For one thing, the village officials as the national administrative power strengthened their functions controlling the rural area; for another, the clan organizations in the rural area in Enshi combated the control. The result of confrontation between the two forces was to further strengthen the legitimacy of the system, extend the national executive power down to the grassroots (...) level, instead of the legitimacy of cultural traditions, and control the rural communities in the Enshi area. This control shows that a modern local administrative system has been established in the Enshi area, and to a certain extent, it reflects that the national government was trying to combine the national strong power with the democratic system to explore patterns of modern political initiatives. The result was that this powerful control in this particular setting of the war again Japan set an unprecedented performance. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive moral theory of privatization in war. It examines the kind of wars that private actors might wage separate from the state and the kind of wars that private actors might wage as functionaries of the state. The first type of war serves to probe the _ad bellum_ question of whether private actors can justifiably authorize war, while the second type of war serves to probe the _in bello_ question of whether private actors can justifiably participate (...) in war. The cases that drive the analysis are drawn from the rich and complicated history of private military action, stretching back centuries to the Italian city-states whose mercenaries were reviled by Machiavelli. The book also takes up the hypothetical examples conjured by philosophers—the private protective agencies of Robert Nozick’s _Anarchy, State, and Utopia_, for example, and the private armies of Thomas More’s _Utopia_. The aim of this book is to propose a theory of privatization that retains currency not only in assessing current military engagements, but past and future ones as well. In doing so, it also raises a set of important questions about the very enterprise of war. This book will be of much interest to students of ethics, political philosophy, military studies, international relations, war and conflict studies, and security studies. (shrink)

The experiences of multinational engagements in Kosovo in the late 1990s, and then more recently Afghanistan from 2001 and Iraq from 2003, have led to a political debate about the linkage between legality and legitimacy. At the heart of contemporary political and academic discourses about war are questions about the scope and content of the law of armed conflict. Considerably less attention has been given to another mode of regulating warfare, namely Rules of Engagement (ROE), despite their operational significance. (...) This article seeks to begin to bridge this knowledge gap by examining ROE as a means to achieving greater legal accountability for the use of force against civilians. To that end, the article aims to do two things: first, to use examples from the US and the multinational context to develop a typology of the various issues that might affect ROE adversely in a legal accountability perspective, either as a background context or through the deployment and use of ROE itself; and second, to look at ways of rearticulating ROE, setting them on a path toward a more standardized and judicialized form of accountability. (shrink)

The Just War principle of jus ad bellum explicitly requires a reasonable prospect of success; the prevailing view about personal self-defence is that it can be justified even if the prospect of success is low. This chapter defends the existence of this distinction and goes on to explore the normative basis of this difference between defensive war and self-defence and its implications. In particular, the chapter highlights the rationale of the ‘success condition’ within Just War thinking and argues that this (...) condition is grounded in assumptions about the nature of political authority and responsibility that do not apply to personal self-defence. This important difference is commonly ignored or side-lined by contemporary theorists who regard the principles of these two types of conflict as very closely aligned and the moral differences between them as matters of degree only. (shrink)

The question of the legitimacy of preventive war has been at the center of the debate about the proper response to terrorism and the legitimacy of the Iraq War.

States that the war on terror cannot be truly understood without investigating the legitimacy of modernity, the challenge that religion presents to modernization, and the post-colonial predicament from which Islamist reaction arises. This book illuminates the war on terror in light of these issues.

According to the traditional textbook account, the coming into existence of States is a fact, depending on the realization of effective government over territory and people. Against this background, the present contribution argues that while the formation of States is a predominately fact-based phenomenon, it is not limited to a mere test of effectiveness. The formation of States has always incorporated elements of legitimacy and even more so by virtue of the development of international law in the wake of (...) World War II. Issues of legitimacy become relevant in particular in extreme situations, i.e. in the event that the foundational principles of the contemporary international legal order as manifested in the concept of peremptory norms of general international law are at stake. (shrink)

The logic of Leviathan is formally made to derive commonwealth and the rights of sovereignty (the obligations of subjects, read the other way around) from an elaborate process beginning in the physiology of human perception and passions, through language and reason, into the state of nature (the war of all against all) and, finally, under the direction of the laws of nature, to a collective and formal resignation of all their natural rights to create an absolute sovereign. This process of (...) ‘instituting’ the sovereignty stamps the resulting sovereign with legitimacy. Early in the Second Part of Leviathan, however, Hobbes moves to attach all the rights and legitimacy of that instituted sovereignty onto what he calls ‘Despotical Dominion’, the power created when a conqueror exacts a promise from the conquered on pain of immediate death. The result is to translate all that Hobbes has said about sovereignty in general into a defence of the legitimacy of this crude force and violence. The whole of Leviathan's political argument is coloured, then, by this strategy and the best reading of it turns out to be the oldest one—that it is a defence of tyrannical power. (shrink)

The Freud Wars offers a comprehensive introduction to the crucial question of the justification of psychoanalysis. Part I examines three powerful critiques of psychoanalysis in the context of a recent controversy about its nature and legitimacy: is it a bankrupt science, an innovative science, or not a science at all but a system of interpretation? The discussion makes sense of the entrenched disagreement about the validity of psychoanalysis, and demonstrates how the disagreement is rooted in the theoretical ambiguity of (...) the central concept of psychoanalysis, the unconscious. This ambiguity is then presented as the pathway to a new way of understanding psychoanalysis, based on a mode of thinking that precedes division into mental and physical. The reader is drawn into a lively and thought-provoking analysis of the central issues: · What would it mean for psychoanalysis to count as a science? · Is psychoanalysis a form of hermeneutics? · How can mental and physical explanations coincide? Part II contains the source material for Part I: the influential critiques of psychoanalysis by Adolf Grünbaum, Thomas Nagel and Jürgen Habermas. No specialised knowledge is assumed, and the book is clear and accessible while still conveying the complexity and richness of the subject. It provides a fascinating introduction to philosophical thinking on psychoanalysis for students and practitioners of psychoanalysis, psychotherapy and philosophy. (shrink)

Dr. Myers challenges the legitimacy of the traditional concept of the "just war," revived during the Vietnam War and with the publication of Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars in 1977.

In this paper a standard that can enable us to judge the alleged legitimacy of an interventional war is proposed. The paper consists of three parts. In the first part, it is shown that the opinion that waging a war is illegitimate in every case cannot be reconciled with the legitimacy of individual and collective self-defence, which is widely accepted in all civilizations. For this reason the second part specifies, in accordance with traditional just-war theory, six conditions of (...) a justified war and substantiates the view that assistance in an emergency is the only reason that can, under certain circumstances, morally justify a war of aggression. In the third part the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ is defined by stating special legitimacy conditions that must be satisfied to make a war of aggression a humanitarian intervention and by rejecting an influential objection against the legitimacy of such an interventional war. (shrink)

In this article, an important set of general themes will be examined in relation to the ongoing problematization of the legitimacy of modern constitutionalism within a body of work that largely draws on Carl Schmitt’s political theology. In particular, however, the themes discussed in this article will focus on the later, post-war stages of his work contained in the brief, but dense volume entitled, Political Theology II. This work involves a sustained confrontation with the theologian Erik Peterson and the (...) historian of ideas Hans Blumenberg, a confrontation which helps to shed light on the broader significance of Schmitt’s work. (shrink)

War is invariably accompanied by debate, if not controversy, over the legitimacy of using force. Alongside the longstanding state practice of justifying use of force is the increasing codification of legal rules on the use of force. In this volume a leading group of international authorities consider the issues surrounding the legitimation of force from several distinct disciplinary perspectives, including political science, law, history and philosophy. In particular, they examine the underlying question of whether and how international society's traditional (...) norms of sovereignty and non-intervention can coexist both with the new norm of humanitarian intervention and with an increasingly hegemonial role played by the United States. What is the difference between 'legality' and 'legitimacy'? Is the latter a truly universal concept or mainly a Western one? Are earlier ideas about 'just war' still relevant? (shrink)

My starting point is the first major American military action in World War II in Europe, “Operation Torch.” The action was controversial because the American military regarded it as militarily useless, if not counterproductive. But the military was overruled by President Roosevelt on the grounds that, while it was not militarily necessary, it was politically justified. This indifference to military necessity seems to violate standard rules about the legitimacy of military force. The larger question it raises is the relation (...) between military concerns and political ones in warfare. Much of this essay explores the relation between these two dimensions in war: the military dimension and the political dimension. I argue that the second dimension is the most important one, as well as the most problematic one for the legitimacy of war. Yet it is ignored by standard just war theories. I then return at the end to consider again the problems raised by “Operation Torch,” and especially the question of the harms inflicted on a country’s own soldiers – in the name of killing and dying for public relations. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs the deficiencies of formal democracies to explain the internal injustices of the modern state, the self‐righteous swaggering foreign policy of Western powers, and the dangerously over‐simplified, polar logic characterizing the war rhetoric of the modern era. In a brief tour through the non‐liberal tradition of democratic thought, drawing connections between the tragic mythological origins of Western understandings of self and world, the paper attempts to demonstrate that a failure to find alternate, healthier means of value‐creation has caused (...) Westerners, in their constructive identity work, to adhere themselves to their systems with a ritualized, ‘religious’ fervour. Legitimacy in the world becomes, in the final analysis, a simple matter of might. The possession of firearms and bread render self‐sanctifying myths legitimating aggressions on the argument of ‘good’ powers fighting the battle against ‘evil’ contaminants. (shrink)

This essay argues that contemporary warfare seems to be religious but is in fact secular in nature and as such calls forth religious alternatives. The violence unleashed by Islamic terrorism and the ‘global war on terror’ is secular in this sense that it is unmediated and removes any universal ethical limits from conflicts: unrestrained violence is either a divine injunction which is blindly and fideistically believed; or it is waged in the name of the supremely sovereign state which deploys war (...) to uphold the constitutional order guaranteeing an exclusive state monopoly on the use of arbitrary physical force. The first part compares and contrasts two false universalisms; that of global market democracy and a revivified pan-Islamic Ummah. The second part explores the classical and modern origins of Islamic terrorism. The third part examines the perverted theology at the heart of the neo-conservative ‘global war on terror’. The fourth part analyses the permanent ‘state of exception’ which underpins the modern state and licenses unrestricted violence by the sovereign who stands outside and above the constitutional order of legality and legitimacy. The fifth and final part outlines religious alternatives to secular warfare; with specific reference to Islam and Christianity. (shrink)