Vitalism was long viewed as the most grotesque view in biological theory: appeals to a mysterious life-force, Romantic insistence on the autonomy of life, or worse, a metaphysics of an entirely living universe. In the early twentieth century, attempts were made to present a revised, lighter version that was not weighted down by revisionary metaphysics: “organicism”. And mainstream philosophers of science criticized Driesch and Bergson’s “neovitalism” as a too-strong ontological commitment to the existence of certain entities or “forces”, (...) over and above the system of causal relations studied by mechanistic science, rejecting the weaker form, organicism, as well. But there has been some significant scholarly “push-back” against this orthodox attitude, notably pointing to the 18th-century Montpellier vitalists to show that there are different historical forms of vitalism, including how they relate to mainstream scientific practice. Additionally, some trends in recent biology that run counter to genetic reductionism and the informational model of the gene present themselves as organicist. Here, we examine some cases of vitalism in the twentieth century and today, not just as a historical form but as a significant metaphysical and scientific model. We argue for vitalism’s conceptual originality without either reducing it to mainstream models of science or presenting it as an alternate model of science, by focusing on historical forms of vitalism, logical empiricist critiques thereof and the impact of synthetic biology on current theorizing of vitalism. (shrink)

Crossing the boundaries - between nature and artifact and between inanimate and living matter - is a major feature of the convergence between nanotechnology and biotechnology. This paper points to two symmetric ways of crossing the boundaries: chemists mimicking nature's structures and processes, and synthetic biologists mimicking synthetic chemists with biological materials. However to what extent are they symmetrical and do they converge toward a common view of life and machines? The question is addressed in a historical (...) perspective. Both biomimetic chemistry and synthetic biology can be described as descendants of an ambitious program developed by Stéphane Leduc who coined the phrase 'synthetic biology' in the early twentieth century. The main intention of this genealogy is to emphasize that although making life in a test tube is a recurrent project there are subtle nuances in the underlying metaphysical assumptions. This comparison is meant to contribute to a better understanding of the cultural issues at stake in the convergence between nano and biotechnologies. It suggests that the demarcation line between life and inanimate matter remains a hot issue, and that all traffics across the borders do not proceed from the same metaphysical assumptions. (shrink)

The emergent new science of synthetic biology is challenging entrenched distinctions between, amongst others, life and non-life, the natural and the artificial, the evolved and the designed, and even the material and the informational. Whenever such culturally sanctioned boundaries are breached, researchers are inevitably accused of playing God or treading in Frankenstein’s footsteps. Bioethicists, theologians and editors of scientific journals feel obliged to provide an authoritative answer to the ambiguous question of the ‘meaning’ of life, both (...) as a scientific definition and as an explication with wider existential connotations. This article analyses the arguments mooted in the emerging societal debates on synthetic biology and the way its practitioners respond to criticism, mostly by assuming a defiant posture or professing humility. It explores the relationship between the ‘playing God’ theme and the Frankenstein motif and examines the doctrinal status of the ‘playing God’ argument. One particularly interesting finding is that liberal theologians generally deny the religious character of the ‘playing God’ argument—a response which fits in with the curious fact that this argument is used mainly by secular organizations. Synthetic biology, it is therefore maintained, does not offend so much the God of the Bible as a deified Nature. While syntheses of artificial life forms cause some vague uneasiness that life may lose its special meaning, most concerns turn out to be narrowly anthropocentric. As long as synthetic biology creates only new microbial life and does not directly affect human life, it will in all likelihood be considered acceptable. (shrink)

It is a most commonly accepted hypothesis that life originated from inanimate matter, somehow being a synthetic product of organic aggregates, and as such, a result of some sort of prebiotic synthetic biology. In the past decades, the newly formed scientific discipline of synthetic biology has set ambitious goals by pursuing the complete design and production of genetic circuits, entire genomes or even whole organisms. In this paper, I argue that synthetic biology might also shed (...) some novel and interesting perspectives on the question of the origin of life, and that, in addition, it might challenge our most commonly accepted definitions of life, thereby changing the ways we might think about life and its origin. (shrink)

I discuss the moral significance of artificial life within synthetic biology via a discussion of Douglas, Powell and Savulescu's paper 'Is the creation of artificial life morally significant’. I argue that the definitions of 'artificial life’ and of 'moral significance’ are too narrow. Douglas, Powell and Savulescu's definition of artificial life does not capture all core projects of synthetic biology or the ethical concerns that have been voiced, and their definition of moral (...) significance fails to take into account the possibility that creating artificial life is conditionally acceptable. Finally, I show how several important objections to synthetic biology are plausibly understood as arguing that creating artificial life in a wide sense is only conditionally acceptable. (shrink)

The attempt to define life has gained new momentum in the wake of novel fields such as synthetic biology, astrobiology, and artificial life. In a series of articles, Cleland, Chyba, and Machery claim that definitions of life seek to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the concept of life—something that such definitions cannot, and should not do. We argue that this criticism is largely unwarranted. Cleland, Chyba, and Machery approach definitions of life as (...) classifying devices, thereby neglecting their other epistemic roles. We identify within the discussions of the nature and origin of life three other types of definitions: theoretical, transdisciplinary, and diagnostic definitions. The primary aim of these definitions is not to distinguish life from nonlife, although they can also be used for classificatory purposes. We focus on the definitions of life within the budding field of astrobiology, paying particular attention to transdisciplinary definitions, and diagnostic definitions in the search for biosignatures from other planets. (shrink)

Despite numerous and increasing attempts to define what life is, there is no consensus on necessary and sufficient conditions for life. Accordingly, some scholars have questioned the value of definitions of life and encouraged scientists and philosophers alike to discard the project. As an alternative to this pessimistic conclusion, we argue that critically rethinking the nature and uses of definitions can provide new insights into the epistemic roles of definitions of life for different research practices. This (...) paper examines the possible contributions of definitions of life in scientific domains where such definitions are used most (e.g., Synthetic Biology, Origins of Life, Alife, and Astrobiology). Rather than as classificatory tools for demarcation of natural kinds, we highlight the pragmatic utility of what we call operational definitions that serve as theoretical and epistemic tools in scientific practice. In particular, we examine contexts where definitions integrate criteria for life into theoretical models that involve or enable observable operations. We show how these definitions of life play important roles in influencing research agendas and evaluating results, and we argue that to discard the project of defining life is neither sufficiently motivated, nor possible without dismissing important theoretical and practical research. (shrink)

In several disciplines within science—evolutionary biology, molecular biology, astrobiology, synthetic biology, artificial life—and outside science—primarily ethics—efforts to define life have recently multiplied. However, no consensus has emerged. In this article, I argue that this is no accident. I propose a dilemma showing that the project of defining life is either impossible or pointless. The notion of life at stake in this project is either the folk concept of life or a scientific concept. In the (...) former case, empirical evidence shows that life cannot be defined. In the latter case, I argue that, although defining life may be possible, it is pointless. I conclude that scientists, philosophers, and ethicists should discard the project of defining life. (shrink)

Discussions on the status of definitions of life have long been dominated by a position known as definitional pessimism. Per the definitional pessimist, there is no point in trying to define life. This claim is defended in different ways, but one of the shared assumptions of all definitional pessimists is that our attempts to define life are attempts to provide a list of all necessary and sufficient conditions for something to count as alive. In other words, a (...) definition of life is a strict, descriptive definition. Against this, several pragmatic alternatives have been put forward. On these pragmatic accounts, definitions of life are not strictly, but rather loosely descriptive. Their purpose is not to be true, but to be useful to scientists by guiding scientific practice. More recently, this position has come under attack for not being able to explain how our attempts to define life are connected to scientific progress within the biological sciences. Here, I argue to the contrary by showing how pragmatic definitions of life can be, and in fact are, conducive to scientific progress. Additionally, I show how the pragmatic account of definitions of life can be brought to bear upon our normative discussions involving definitions of life. (shrink)

Top-down synthetic biology makes partly synthetic cells by redesigning simple natural forms of life, and bottom-up synthetic biology aims to make fully synthetic cells using only entirely nonliving components. Within synthetic biology the notions of complexity and emergence are quite controversial, but the imprecision of key notions makes the discussion inconclusive. I employ a precise notion of weak emergent property, which is a robust characteristic of the behavior of complex bottom-up causal webs, where a (...) complex causal web is one that is incompressible and its behavior cannot be derived except by crawling through all of the gory details of the interactions in the web. The central thesis of this article is that synthetic biology centrally is the activity of engineering the desired weak emergent properties of synthetic cells. Synthetic biology has many different ways to engineer desired weak emergent properties of synthetic cells, including Edisonian trial and error, standardized parts, refactoring, and reprogramming synthetic genomes. The article ends by noting two philosophical consequences of engineering weak emergence. One is epistemological: synthesis is crucial for discovering weak emergent properties. The other is metaphysical: simple life forms are nothing but complex chemical mechanisms. (shrink)

In biology the term “vitalism” is usually associated with Hans Driesch’s doctrine of the entelechy: entelechies were nonmaterial, bio-specific agents responsible for governing a few peculiar biological phenomena. Since vitalism defined as such violates metaphysical materialism, the received view refutes the doctrine of the entelechy as a metaphysical heresy. But in the early twentieth century, a different, non-metaphysical evaluation of vitalism was endorsed by some biologists and philosophers, which finally led to a logical refutation of the doctrine of the entelechy. (...) In this non-metaphysical evaluation, first, vitalism was not treated as a metaphysical heresy but a legitimate response to the inadequacy of mechanistic explanations in biology. Second, the refutation of vitalism was logically rather than metaphysically supported by contemporary biological knowledge. The entelechy was not a valid concept, because vitalists could neither formulate vital laws, nor offer convincing examples of experimental indeterminism. (shrink)

Despite numerous and increasing attempts to define what life is, there is no consensus on necessary and sufficient conditions for life. Accordingly, some scholars have questioned the value of definitions of life and encouraged scientists and philosophers alike to discard the project. As an alternative to this pessimistic conclusion, we argue that critically rethinking the nature and uses of definitions can provide new insights into the epistemic roles of definitions of life for different research practices. This (...) paper examines the possible contributions of definitions of life in scientific domains where such definitions are used most. Rather than as classificatory tools for demarcation of natural kinds, we highlight the pragmatic utility of what we call operational definitions that serve as theoretical and epistemic tools in scientific practice. In particular, we examine contexts where definitions integrate criteria for life into theoretical models that involve or enable observable operations. We show how these definitions of life play important roles in influencing research agendas and evaluating results, and we argue that to discard the project of defining life is neither sufficiently motivated, nor possible without dismissing important theoretical and practical research. (shrink)

Bringing together the latest scientific advances and some of the most enduring subtle philosophical puzzles and problems, this book collects original historical and contemporary sources to explore the wide range of issues surrounding the nature of life. Selections ranging from Aristotle and Descartes to Sagan and Dawkins are organised around four broad themes covering classical discussions of life, the origins and extent of natural life, contemporary artificial life creations and the definition and meaning of ' (...) class='Hi'>life' in its most general form. Each section is preceded by an extensive introduction connecting the various ideas discussed in individual chapters and providing helpful background material for understanding them. With its interdisciplinary perspective, this fascinating collection is essential reading for scientists and philosophers interested in astrobiology, synthetic biology and the philosophy of life. (shrink)

First, I offer a short overview on the classical occidental philosophy as propounded by the ancient Greeks and the natural philosophies of the last 2000 years until the dawn of the empiricist logic of science in the twentieth century, which wanted to delimitate classical metaphysics from empirical sciences. In contrast to metaphysical concepts which didn’t reflect on the language with which they tried to explain the whole realm of entities empiricist logic of science initiated the end of metaphysical theories by (...) reflecting on the preconditions for foundation and justification of sentences about objects of investigation, i.e. a coherent definition of language in general, which was not the aim of classical metaphysics. Unexpectedly empiricist logic of science in the linguistic turn failed in the physical and mathematical reductionism of language and its use in communication, as will be discussed below in further detail. Nevertheless, such reflection on language and communication also introduced this vocabulary into biology. Manfred Eigen and bioinformatics, later on biolinguistics, used ‘language’ applied linguistic turn thinking to biology coherent to the logic of science and its formalisable aims. This changed significantly with the birth of biosemiotics and biohermeneutics. At the end of this introduction it will be outlined why and how all these approaches reproduced the deficiencies of the logic of science and why the biocommunicative approach avoids their abstractive fallacies. (shrink)

Research groups around the world are currently busy trying to invent new life in the laboratory, looking for extraterrestrial life, or making machines increasingly more life-like. In the case of astrobiology, any newly discovered life would likely be very old, but when discovered it would be new to us. In the case of synthetic organic life or life-like machines, humans will have invented life that did not exist before. Together, these endeavors amount (...) to what we call the emerging plurality of lives because we see a future where we are surrounded by, and interact with, life of many different origins, as well as entities that we have not traditionally seen as being alive. In the future these entities will likely possess properties that we so far have only associated with living beings, thereby transcending and perhaps blurring the borders between life and non-life. (shrink)

Synthetic biology aims to synthesize novel biological systems or redesign existing ones. The field has raised numerous philosophical questions, but most especially what is novel to this field. In this article I argue for a novel take, since the dominant ways to understand synthetic biology’s specificity each face problems. Inspired by the examination of the work of a number of chemists, I argue that synthetic biology differentiates itself by a new regime of articulation, i.e. a new way (...) of articulating the questions and phenomena it wants to address. Instead of describing actual existing biological systems, the field aims to describe biological possibilities. In the second part I corroborate this hypothesis through a comparison between early research in the field of the origins of life and contemporary synthetic biologists, who are not so much interested in the historical origin of life on Earth, but rather in a universal biology of the possible origins of any life whatsoever. (shrink)

A distinction must be made between various levels of thought. For a definition of life the formulation on the level of natural sciences,i.e. the biological definition, will not be the same as the philosophical expression. The biological definition is based on thephenomenon of life, the appearance, and considers the molecular structure and functions of a cell. The philosophical definition regards thebeing and it is proposed to consider life as transcendental. It is argued that (...) there is no opposition between these definitions, but that together they can deepen our insight into the problems of matter and life. (shrink)

During the last decades the question of defining life has gained increased interest but, at the same time, the difficulty in reaching consensus on a possible answer has led many to skeptical positions. This, in turn, has raised a wider debate about why defining life is so hard and controversial. Such a debate introduces additional aspects to be considered, like the role and nature of a definition of life itself. In this paper, we will focus on (...) those aspects, arguing that progress can be made if we conceive definitions of life as open heuristic tools that contribute to develop specific research strategies in the biological sciences and, more generally, to increase our understanding of life’s complexity. In contrast with pragmatic or operationalist approaches, we will defend that definitions of life comprise a set of ontological assumptions, together with an inherent unifying vocation, so they should be subject to comparison and critical assessment, closely related to the success or failure of the corresponding research programs, but also to the success or failure in establishing well-grounded interconnections among the latter. We consider that the search for a more coherent, integrated and generalized theory of biology cannot be pursued without keeping an empirical standpoint, and the exercise of defining life should not be taken as an obstacle but as a valuable instrument to achieve that goal. (shrink)

Van den Belt recently examined the notion that synthetic biology and the creation of ‘artificial’ organisms are examples of scientists ‘playing God’. Here I respond to some of the issues he raises, including some of his comments on my previous discussions of the value of the term ‘life’ as a scientific concept.

[ENGLISH] This article discusses the potential of synthetic biology to address fundamental questions in the philosophy of biology regarding the nature of life and biological functions. Synthetic biology aims to reduce living organisms to their simplest forms by identifying the minimal components of a cell and also to create novel life forms through genetic reprogramming, biobrick assembly, or novel proteins. However, the technical success of these endeavors does not guarantee their conceptual success in defining life. (...) There is a lack of consensus among researchers on how to define and classify the entities produced in the lab, whether they should be considered living or categorized differently. The criteria for minimal cells and minimal life are subject to arbitrary choices and varying interpretations. The concept of function, crucial to synthetic biology, is also difficult to define. The article highlights the need to consider the minimal set of functions that characterize life before determining the smallest genomes that code for those functions. The arbitrary nature of defining both life and function complicates the understanding and classification of these entities. The article suggests that the traditional dichotomy between the living and the non-living may no longer be valid and that the concept of life itself may not require precise scientific definition. As synthetic biology advances, the article emphasizes the importance of redefining or constructing new categories to encompass the expanding possibilities and creations in the field. The ability to create new life forms raises questions about recognition, identification, and ethical implications, requiring a conceptual and philosophical engagement beyond the technical achievements of synthetic biology. -/- [FRENCH] L'article aborde le potentiel de la biologie synthétique pour répondre à des questions fondamentales de la philosophie de la biologie concernant la nature de la vie et des fonctions biologiques. La biologie synthétique vise à réduire les organismes vivants à leurs formes les plus simples en identifiant les composants minimaux d'une cellule et à créer de nouvelles formes de vie grâce à la reprogrammation génétique, à l'assemblage de biobriques ou à des protéines nouvelles. Cependant, le succès technique de ces approches ne garantit pas leur réussite conceptuelle dans la définition de la vie. Il n'y a pas de consensus parmi les chercheurs sur la façon de définir et de classer les entités produites en laboratoire, qu'elles doivent être considérées comme vivantes ou catégorisées différemment. Les critères des cellules minimales et de la vie minimale sont soumis à des choix arbitraires et à des interprétations variables. La notion de fonction, essentielle en biologie synthétique, est également difficile à définir. L'article met en évidence la nécessité de prendre en compte l'ensemble minimal de fonctions qui caractérisent la vie avant de déterminer les plus petits génomes qui codent ces fonctions. La nature arbitraire de la définition de la vie et de la fonction complique la compréhension et la classification de ces entités. L'article suggère que la dichotomie traditionnelle entre le vivant et le non-vivant pourrait ne plus être valable et que le concept même de vie ne nécessite pas une définition scientifique précise. À mesure que la biologie synthétique progresse, l'article souligne l'importance de redéfinir ou de construire de nouvelles catégories pour englober les possibilités et créations croissantes dans le domaine. La capacité à créer de nouvelles formes de vie soulève des questions de reconnaissance, d'identification et d'implications éthiques, nécessitant une réflexion conceptuelle et philosophique au-delà des avancées techniques de la biologie synthétique. (shrink)

The concept of life plays a crucial role in the debate on synthetic biology. The first part of this chapter outlines the controversial debate on the status of the concept of life in current science and philosophy. Against this background, synthetic biology and the discourse on its scientific and societal consequences is revealed as an exception. Here, the concept of life is not only used as buzzword but also discussed theoretically and links the ethical aspects (...) with the epistemological prerequisites and the ontological consequences of synthetic biology. The second part examines this point of intersection and analyses some of the issues which are discussed in terms of the concept of life. The third part turns to the history of the concept of life. It offers an examination of scientific and philosophical discourses on life at the turn of the 20th century and suggests a surprising result: In the light of this history, synthetic biology leads to well-known debates, arguments, notions and questions. But it is concluded that the concept of life is too ambiguous and controversial to be useful for capturing the actual practice of synthetic biology. In the fourth part I argue that with regard to the ethical evaluation of synthetic biology, the ambiguity of the concept of life is not as problematic as sometimes held because other challenges are more important. The question whether the activity of synthetic biological systems should be conceived as life or not is primarily theoretical. (shrink)

What is theHistorical epistemologyhistorical epistemologyGayon, JeanOn historical epistemology of the life sciences? In what way does it differ from historico-philosophical reflection on “foundational” or “conceptual” issues in the sciences tout court? This is a question to which Jean Gayon and his mentor Georges CanguilhemCanguilhem, Georges devoted a considerable amount of effort, yielding somewhat different answers, as I will try to show. One obvious difference, as P.-O. MéthotMéthot, Pierre-Olivier has shown, is Gayon’s appropriation of anglophone philosophy of biology; another is (...) Canguilhem'sCanguilhem, Georges way of presenting his work as restricted to contextualized, historicist claims while in fact it is shot through with strong normative (and at times metaphysical) claims on Life, normativity, and value. In this essay I reflect on how to conduct historical epistemologiesHistorical epistemology of the life sciences, focusing on two interrelated cases I have worked on in the past: vitalismVitalism (history of) and the constitution of biology. (shrink)

Vitalism has been given different definitions and diverse figures have been labelled as vitalists throughout the history of ideas. Concentrating on the seventeenth century, we find that scholars identify as vitalists authors who endorse notions that are in diametrical opposition with each other. I briefly present the ideas of dualist vitalists and monist vitalists and the philosophical and theological considerations informing their thought. In all these varied forms of vitalism the identifiable common motives are the essential irreducibility of life (...) and the universality of life. (shrink)

Newton’s impact on Enlightenment natural philosophy has been studied at great length, in its experimental, methodological and ideological ramifications. One aspect that has received fairly little attention is the role Newtonian “analogies” played in the formulation of new conceptual schemes in physiology, medicine, and life science as a whole. So-called ‘medical Newtonians’ like Pitcairne and Keill have been studied; but they were engaged in a more literal project of directly transposing, or seeking to transpose, Newtonian laws into quantitative models (...) of the body. I am interested here in something different: neither the metaphysical reading of Newton, nor direct empirical transpositions, but rather, a more heuristic, empiricist construction of Newtonian analogies. Figures such as Haller, Barthez, and Blumenbach constructed analogies between the method of celestial mechanics and the method of physiology. In celestial mechanics, they held, an unknown entity such as gravity is posited and used to mathematically link sets of determinate physical phenomena (e.g., the phases of the moon and tides). This process allows one to remain agnostic about the ontological status of the unknown entity, as long as the two linked sets of phenomena are represented adequately. Haller et. al. held that the Newtonian physician and physiologist can similarly posit an unknown called ‘life’ and use it to link various other phenomena, from digestion to sensation and the functioning of the glands. These phenomena consequently appear as interconnected, goal-oriented processes which do not exist either in an inanimate mechanism or in a corpse. In keeping with the empiricist roots of the analogy, however, no ontological claims are made about the nature of this vital principle, and no attempts are made to directly causally connect such a principle and observable phenomena. The role of the “Newtonian analogy” thus brings together diverse schools of thought, and cuts across a surprising variety of programs, models and practices in natural philosophy. (shrink)

A range of views on the morality of synthetic biology and its place in public policy and political discourse.

To construct a synthetic cell we need to understand the rules that permit life. A central idea in modern biology is that in addition to the four entities making reality, matter, energy, space and time, a fifth one, information, plays a central role. As a consequence of this central importance of the management of information, the bacterial cell is organised as a Turing machine, where the machine, with its compartments defining an inside and an outside and its metabolism, (...) reads and expresses the genetic program carried by the genome. This highly abstract organisation is implemented using concrete objects and dynamics, and this is at the cost of repeated incompatibilities (frustration), which need to be sorted out by appropriate «patches». After describing the organisation of the genome into the paleome (sustaining and propagating life) and the cenome (permitting life in context), we describe some chemical hurdles that the cell as to cope with, ending with the specific case of the methionine salvage pathway. (shrink)

There is a familiar opposition between a ‘Scientific Revolution’ ethos and practice of experimentation, including experimentation on life, and a ‘vitalist’ reaction to this outlook. The former is often allied with different forms of mechanism – if all of Nature obeys mechanical laws, including living bodies, ‘iatromechanism’ should encounter no obstructions in investigating the particularities of animal-machines – or with more chimiatric theories of life and matter, as in the ‘Oxford Physiologists’. The latter reaction also comes in different, (...) perhaps irreducibly heterogeneous forms, ranging from metaphysical and ethical objections to the destruction of life, as in Margaret Cavendish, to more epistemological objections against the usage of instruments, the ‘anatomical’ outlook and experimentation, e.g. in Locke and Sydenham. But I will mainly focus on a third anti-interventionist argument, which I call ‘vitalist’ since it is often articulated in the writings of the so-called Montpellier Vitalists, including their medical articles for the Encyclopédie. The vitalist argument against experimentation on life is subtly different from the metaphysical, ethical and epistemological arguments, although at times it may borrow from any of them. It expresses a Hippocratic sensibility – understood as an artifact of early modernity, not as some atemporal trait of medical thought – in which Life resists the experimenter, or conversely, for the experimenter to grasp something about Life, it will have to be without torturing or radically intervening in it. I suggest that this view does not have to imply that Nature is something mysterious or sacred; nor does the vitalist have to attack experimentation on life in the name of some ‘vital force’ – which makes it less surprising to find a vivisectionist like Claude Bernard sounding so close to the vitalists. (shrink)

The definition of life is a very important issue in the philosophy of biology, but this issue has unfortunately been neglected by the mainstream philosopher of biology for many years. In this paper, the difficulties with and the reasons for defining life are illustrated, the characteristics of life on Earth are explored, ways of defining life are examined, the main definitions of life are explained and evaluated, and finally, a new information definition of (...) life is proposed. (shrink)

According to the current scientific paradigm, what we call ‘life’, ‘mind’, and ‘consciousness’ are considered epiphenomenal occurrences, or emergent properties or functions of matter and energy. Science does not associate these with an inherent and distinct existence beyond a materialistic/energetic conception. ‘Life’ is a word pointing at cellular and multicellular processes forming organisms capable of specific functions and skills. ‘Mind’ is a cognitive ability emerging from a matrix of complex interactions of neuronal processes, while ‘consciousness’ is an even (...) more elusive concept, deemed a subjective epiphenomenon of brain activity. Historically, however, this has not always been the case, even in the scientific and academic context. Several prominent figures took vitalism seriously, while some schools of Western philosophical idealism and Eastern traditions promoted conceptions in which reality is reducible to mind or consciousness rather than matter. We will argue that current biological sciences did not falsify these alternative paradigms and that some forms of vitalism could be linked to some forms of idealism if we posit life and cognition as two distinct aspects of consciousness preeminent over matter. However, we will not argue in favor of vitalistic and idealistic conceptions. Rather, contrary to a physicalist doctrine, these were and remain coherent worldviews and cannot be ruled out by modern science. (shrink)

Vivant jusqu’à la mortCompte-rendu de A. Cavazzini, A. Gualandi (édité par), Logiche del vivente.Evoluzione, sviluppo, cognizione nell’epistemologia francese contemporanea,“Discipline filosofiche” XIX, I, Quodlibet, Macerata 2009Le nouveau recueil d’essais consacrés à une épistémologie pour la discipline philosophique, sous la direction de A. Cavazzini et A. Gualandi, se structure autourd’une idée forte de Bergson, celle d’ « attention à la vie ». Cette idée est utilisée comme instrument herméneutique pour désigner un aspect de la culture philosophique française du XIXè siècle et de (...) l’époque contemporaine en particulier, qui voit dans l’épistémologie de la biologie un lieu de rencontre entre des perspectives hétérogènes, ainsi qu’un moyen de vérifier l’état actuel des sciences de la vie et d’étudier la possibilité d’une philosophie de la biologie prenant en compte et mettant profit les impulsions des avancées scientifiques. Le recueil cherche à rendre compte de la nouveauté du paradigme biologique contemporain, qui vise un degré extrême de synthèse entre les savoirs et les disciplines liées au « champ biologique ». Logiche del vivente parvient donc à rendre compte de la nouvelle approche synthétique du biologique, ouvrant à ce syncrétisme de positions qui contribue à sa définition contemporaine : évolution, développement et cognition, réunis dans une même perspective, sont les instruments d’une réécriture du vocabulaire et des catégories de la réflexion biologique, indépendamment de l’alternative paralysante entre le « mauvais » vitalisme et le mécanisme.Vivant jusqu’à la mortReview of A. Cavazzini, A. Gualandi (edited by), Logiche del vivente.Evoluzione, sviluppo, cognizione nell’epistemologia francese contemporanea,“Discipline filosofiche” XIX, I, Quodlibet, Macerata 2009Edited by A. Cavazzini and A. Gualandi, this new collection of essays devoted to an epistemology for the philosophical discipline is structured around one of Bergson’s powerful ideas, that of “attention to life.” This idea is used as a hermeneutic structure in order to outline an aspect of the French philosophical culture of the 19th century and of the contemporary epoch in particular. What one sees is that the epistemology of biology is a place of encounter between heterogeneous perspective. As well, it is a means to verify the current state of the life sciences and to study the possibility of a philosophy of biology which would take account of the novelty of the contemporary biological paradigm, a paradigm that aims at an extreme degree of synthesis between the sciences and the disciplines connected to the “biological field.” Logiche del vivente therefore manages to take account of the new synthetic approach of biology, opening itself up to a syncretism of positions which contributes to its contemporary definition: evolution, development and cognition, united in one perspective, are instruments of are-writing of the vocabulary and the categories of biological reflection, independently of the paralyzing alternative be “bad” vitalism and mechanism. (shrink)

Vivant jusqu’à la mortCompte-rendu de A. Cavazzini, A. Gualandi (édité par), Logiche del vivente.Evoluzione, sviluppo, cognizione nell’epistemologia francese contemporanea,“Discipline filosofiche” XIX, I, Quodlibet, Macerata 2009Le nouveau recueil d’essais consacrés à une épistémologie pour la discipline philosophique, sous la direction de A. Cavazzini et A. Gualandi, se structure autourd’une idée forte de Bergson, celle d’ « attention à la vie ». Cette idée est utilisée comme instrument herméneutique pour désigner un aspect de la culture philosophique française du XIXè siècle et de (...) l’époque contemporaine en particulier, qui voit dans l’épistémologie de la biologie un lieu de rencontre entre des perspectives hétérogènes, ainsi qu’un moyen de vérifier l’état actuel des sciences de la vie et d’étudier la possibilité d’une philosophie de la biologie prenant en compte et mettant profit les impulsions des avancées scientifiques. Le recueil cherche à rendre compte de la nouveauté du paradigme biologique contemporain, qui vise un degré extrême de synthèse entre les savoirs et les disciplines liées au « champ biologique ». Logiche del vivente parvient donc à rendre compte de la nouvelle approche synthétique du biologique, ouvrant à ce syncrétisme de positions qui contribue à sa définition contemporaine : évolution, développement et cognition, réunis dans une même perspective, sont les instruments d’une réécriture du vocabulaire et des catégories de la réflexion biologique, indépendamment de l’alternative paralysante entre le « mauvais » vitalisme et le mécanisme.Vivant jusqu’à la mortReview of A. Cavazzini, A. Gualandi (edited by), Logiche del vivente.Evoluzione, sviluppo, cognizione nell’epistemologia francese contemporanea,“Discipline filosofiche” XIX, I, Quodlibet, Macerata 2009Edited by A. Cavazzini and A. Gualandi, this new collection of essays devoted to an epistemology for the philosophical discipline is structured around one of Bergson’s powerful ideas, that of “attention to life.” This idea is used as a hermeneutic structure in order to outline an aspect of the French philosophical culture of the 19th century and of the contemporary epoch in particular. What one sees is that the epistemology of biology is a place of encounter between heterogeneous perspective. As well, it is a means to verify the current state of the life sciences and to study the possibility of a philosophy of biology which would take account of the novelty of the contemporary biological paradigm, a paradigm that aims at an extreme degree of synthesis between the sciences and the disciplines connected to the “biological field.” Logiche del vivente therefore manages to take account of the new synthetic approach of biology, opening itself up to a syncretism of positions which contributes to its contemporary definition: evolution, development and cognition, united in one perspective, are instruments of are-writing of the vocabulary and the categories of biological reflection, independently of the paralyzing alternative be “bad” vitalism and mechanism. (shrink)

Currently, under the law of intellectual property, IP owners may exclude from use or production substances and processes that we would ordinarily consider to be products of nature. This has helped companies monopolize disease genes, and thus diagnostic testing for those diseases, and “biosimilar” products, pharmaceutical materials that mimic biological materials. Extending the current paradigm to the world of synthetic biology and nanotechnology will create further injustices in the delivery of health care to billions of people around the world. (...) As such, I advocate heading this trend off at the pass. Scientists ought to conduct basic research into the building blocks of biology and matter in the open, publishing their results, releasing knowledge into the public domain upstream so that beneficial innovation can be produced without fear of downstream litigation, and so that what ought to remain in the public domain as a matter of right (products of nature) does not become unjustly monopolized. (shrink)

Ever since Aristotle, ontology has been assumed to have a single meaning. Classic ontology branched into three directions established by Kant--the three chief manifestations of reality: cosmology, psychology, and theology--and in its quality of pure ontology became the study exclusively of being. On the other hand, the three dialectical branches have been losing their validity and are being replaced by regional ontologies which take explicit account of their several objects. Four territories today present themselves for intensive speculative cultivation; quantity, matter, (...) life, and spirit. Theology has returned to its classic position at the side of pure ontology. The ideas of object and of concept are radically opposite, but nevertheless are closely related in the context of knowledge; an object is the source of a concept. A concept is formed by one or several objective instances, but does not include all of them; there are more or less determinate objects, some of which have undergone conceptual modification while others remain quite obscure, all of which indicates that the world of reality is not so evident or firm as it appears to common sense. The ideas of being and of objects bring us again to the consideration of the metaphysical theme of the individual. Neither being nor object is the concrete individual; the problem of the individual remains involved in the whole problem of substance as it was discussed in classic metaphysics, because it was completely grounded in this metaphysics and is best discussed and appreciated as the problem of the incommunicable and subsistent. Regional ontology, in fixing its attention entirely on the object, thereby limits itself and makes clear its methodological orientation. Regional ontology by no means is to be considered as a theory of science; any theory, concrete or general is subject to a synthetic process in which facts and proofs immediately given incorporate the theory into the patrimony and positive achievements of intelligence. A theory is a scientific synthesis, and although its fundamental role is logical, its origin implies experimental functions. Regional ontology can be considered as a theory of objects, but its validation does not come from science itself; rather, it is the validation of scientific facts. Ontology might be called a theory a priori, but in that case the terms "theory" and "a priori" would be contradictory since the former requires experience and the latter renounces all experimental data. Ontology operates by means of general essences which objects of the same denomination have in common; thus we speak of the realm of quantity, the realm of matter, the realm of life, and the realm of spirit. The mathematical as well as the natural, biological, and spiritual sciences clearly have different objective planes which correspond to different ontological categories, which are foreign to the experiencing subject because it knows them only concretely as phenomena. The metaphysical basis of mathematics is quantity, a real accident of matter. Quantity examined according to the ontology of mathematics arises from matter, finding its origin in matter as the quality related to form. The ontology of the physicochemical sciences is concerned with the contents of quantity, with the internal object by which quantity is numbered and given its nature. Matter presents a problem to philosophy no less important than the problem it presents to the sciences whose data are mere approximations to matter. Natural sciences which seem very intelligible resolve themselves into a morass of questions when one tries to reduce them to science strictly so-called. In present-day philosophy we say that the nature and structure of objects and beings, both inorganic and organic, are in practice external to human action, taking "human" in the sense of spiritual being. The instability of living being, in contrast to the internal equilibrium of inanimate being, makes it appear less intelligible. On the plane of ontology of life, man is the central problem, even though he is one of the most definite and individualized of beings. Man's life culminates in freedom, which makes man a responsible being, in this respect resembling God. Though less unknown than mathematical, material, and biological objects, mental objects are more difficult and involve subtle and risky problems. The first great phenomenon offered to the philosophy which penetrates the field of the ontology of the social sciences is the identity between the object and the subject, since the subject, who as far as possible refers systematically to the pure object, continually treads the boundary of reality and arrives at himself; that is, the inquiring subject becomes simultaneously the object investigated--a kind of cognitive identity possible in reflection. The second problem of this field of philosophy is the consideration of "I" as absolutely empty of objectivity. For contemporary philosophy, spirit is the world of values, and it is not so important to determine the pure reality of spirit as to understand its life, its activity, and its specific manifestation which is the world of culture. The social sciences deal with man as a spiritual being, and with the facts of culture. The values produced by culture constitute a hierarchy which goes from the most humble to the most elevated, from plain economic interest to an intense desire for God. Culture is produced by the objectification of values; spirit becomes fixed in certain entities which are cultural objects: a theory, a machine, a concert. Man acts as the creator of a culture, but the culture in turn spiritually actuates and nourishes him. The sciences of spirit go from signs to their meaning, from the expression to the living. The point of departure in historical knowledge is our own vital experience, the very life which flows within us. Only life understands life. Here we find the reason why culture indicates the maximum expression of life; in culture, man contemplates himself, and in himself he contemplates all the beings of creation. (shrink)

Modern philosophical biology has been dominated by the idea of mechanism. Even the attempts to escape from mechanism, such as the theories of vitalism and holism, covertly assume the mechanistic hypothesis while surrounding it with an aura of mysticism. The mechanistic approach is the result of applying the methods of physics to the realm of biology. The immense prestige of physics has tended to disguise the fact that biology is a science in its own right, with autonomous principles. The purpose (...) of the article is to develop the philosophy of organism, first systematically elaborated by Whitehead, and to seek to demonstrate that organic being is unintelligible without the concept of purposiveness and hence of value. This necessarily leads to the return of metaphysics in the form of metabiology.RésuméLa biologie philosophique moderne est dominée par l'idée de mécanisme. Il n'est pas jusqu'aux tentatives d'échapper au mécanisme, telle par exemple la théorie du vitalisme et celle du holisme, qui n'assument implicitement l'hypothése mécaniste tout en l'entourant d'une aura de mysticisme. La conception mécaniste résulte de l'applicatio n des méthodes de la physique au domaine de la biologie. L'immense prestige de la physique a tendu à déguiser le fait pourtant reel que la biologie est une science qui jouit de sa propre souveraineté et de principes autonomes. Le but de cet article est d'exposer une philosophie de l'organisme élaborée systématiquement par Whitehead pour la premiére fois et de chercher ensuite à démontrer que tout être organique est inintelligible en dehors du concept de finalité et, par conséquent, de valeur. Ceci conduit nécessairement à un renouveau de la métaphysique sous forme de métabiologie. (shrink)

The phrase ‘synthetic biology’ is used to describe a set of different scientific and technological disciplines, which share the objective to design and produce new life forms. This essay addresses the following questions: What conception of life stands behind this ambitious objective? In what relation does this conception of life stand to that of traditional biology and biotechnology? And, could such a conception of life raise ethical concerns? Three different observations that provide useful indications for (...) the conception of life in synthetic biology will be discussed in detail: 1. Synthetic biologists focus on different features of living organisms in order to design new life forms, 2. Synthetic biologists want to contribute to the understanding of life, and 3. Synthetic biologists want to modify life through a rational design, which implies the notions of utilising, minimising/optimising, varying and overcoming life. These observations indicate a tight connection between science and technology, a focus on selected aspects of life, a production-oriented approach to life, and a design-oriented understanding of life. It will be argued that through this conception of life synthetic biologists present life in a different light. This conception of life will be illustrated by the metaphor of a toolbox. According to the notion of life as a toolbox, the different features of living organisms are perceived as various rationally designed instruments that can be used for the production of the living organism itself or secondary products made by the organism. According to certain ethical positions this conception of life might raise ethical concerns related to the status of the organism, the motives of the scientists and the role of technology in our society. (shrink)

The present volume contains Part Four, "The Great Shift," of Susanne Langer’s projected six-part magnum opus entitled, Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling. The first volume dealt with three parts: "Problems and Principles," "The Import of Art," and "Natura Naturans;" Volume II rests squarely on these three foundational parts. The balance of the work will be concerned with "The Moral Structure," and with "Knowledge and Truth." In this reviewer’s opinion, Professor Langer’s essay is easily the most significant theory of mind (...) yet developed in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. The central task of her essay is to establish the total qualitative difference that divides human from animal mentality by showing that the nature and origin of that difference is explicable in terms of a continuous course of biological development. "The great shift" to human being as a mode of life typified by all that we understand as culture is accomplished, according to the conceptual framework extended throughout Volume II of the work, without recourse to metaphysical assumptions of nonzoological factors. By carefully locating a vast amount of exact psychobiological information in a conceptual structure that extends scientific definitions by modification, she makes the biological concept of human mentality adequate to the extraordinary reality it is intended to make comprehensible. Through the incorporation of highly sophisticated detail, she investigates repertoire and instinct; animal acts and ambients; animal values; interpretation of animal acts; the specialization of man; symbols and the evaluation of mind; and, finally, symbols and the human world. It is difficult to imagine that a reader could find fault with Susanne Langer’s method, because she never expands her conceptual structure by metaphorical extension, but only by modifying definitions in scientific terms so as to comprehend domains wider than those conventionally assigned to the sciences themselves. Her study, however, is not only eminently adequate methodologically, it is immensely satisfying in helping us understand that the uniqueness of human being can be fully articulated and intellectually sustained without resorting to a vitalistic discontinuity of any order. If, as Susanne Langer herself contends, the value of a philosophical outlook rests ultimately on its "serviceability," then this masterwork will serve all manner of investigators for a long time to come.—C.F.B. (shrink)

Comments and reports on synthetic biology often focus on the idea that this field may lead to synthetic life or life forms. Such claims attract general attention because “life” is a basic concept that is understood, interpreted and explained in multiple ways. While these different understandings of life may influence the ethical assessment of synthetic biology by experts and the public, this field might, in turn, influence how academics or the public view (...) class='Hi'>life. We suggest in this paper that synthetic biology provides an opportunity to discuss and compare different views and explanations of the world, starting from the concept of life. We argue that a narrow focus on just one interpretation of this concept may be harmful and that people will benefit from being aware of a diversity of understandings of life because they provide answers to different questions. Moreover, the confrontation among views is important for the development of reasoning abilities, and a nuanced view on our world will be useful for integrating scientific findings and their implications into a wider context. At the same time, we should not only consider other understandings of life for our own benefit but also because a moral attitude of respect for and toleration toward others implies permission to express and maintain their views. For these reasons, we suggest that a diversity of views on life should be included in public education and in public engagement events on synthetic biology. Moreover, they should be on the research agenda of technology assessment studies within the ELSA or RRI frameworks. (shrink)

There are about 100 different contradictory definitions of life. The definition of life based on symbiosis that is presented here differs fundamentally from them; it gives life a value. So this definition offers a basis for ethical and legal action e.g. in organ transplants. It is based on principles and is not an ad hoc model: Significant processes for life are basis for a theoretical concept. Quality criteria for definitions are employed to control the (...) concept. There is a graduation, not a clear division, between inanimate and animate. The graduation is based on the amount of symbiosis to be found. Life is based on symbiosis. The ideas of “ethics” and “reality” are considered in the context of this definition. (shrink)

Synthetic biology" is the label of a new technoscientific field with many different facets and agendas. One common aim is to "create life", primarily by using engineering principles to design and modify biological systems for human use. In a wider context, the topic has become one of the big cases in the legitimization processes associated with the political agenda to solve global problems with the aid of (bio-)technological innovation. Conceptual-level and meta-level analyses are needed: we should sort out (...) conceptual ambiguities to agree on what we talk about, and we need to spell out agendas to see the disagreements clearly. The book is based on the interdisciplinary summer school "Analyzing the societal dimensions of synthetic biology", which took place in Berlin in September 2014. The contributions address controversial discussions around the philosophical examination, public perception, moral evaluation and governance of synthetic biology. (shrink)

What is the definition of life? Artificial life environments provide an interesting test case for this classical question. Understanding what such systems can tell us about biological life requires negotiating the tricky conceptual boundary between virtual and real life forms. Drawing from Wittgenstein’s analysis of the concept of a game and a Darwinian insight about classification, I argue that classifying life involves both causal and pragmatic elements. Rather than searching for a single, sharp (...) class='Hi'>definition, these considerations suggest that life is a cluster concept with fuzzy boundaries and that there are multiple legitimate ways to make the notion precise for different scientific purposes. This pluralist, realist account avoids unnecessary border disputes by emphasizing how science negotiates such questions in relation to theory and evidence. I also discuss several objections to this approach, including a “moral hesitation” some have to allowing broader application of the concept of life to include artificial life. (shrink)

Despite hundreds of definitions, no consensus exists on a definition of life or on the closely related and problematic definitions of the organism and death. These problems retard practical and theoretical development in, for example, exobiology, artificial life, biology and evolution. This paper suggests improving this situation by basing definitions on a theory of a generalized particle hierarchy. This theory uses the common denominator of the “operator” for a unified ranking of both particles and organisms, from elementary (...) particles to animals with brains. Accordingly, this ranking is called “the operator hierarchy”. This hierarchy allows life to be defined as: matter with the configuration of an operator, and that possesses a complexity equal to, or even higher than the cellular operator. Living is then synonymous with the dynamics of such operators and the word organism refers to a select group of operators that fit the definition of life. The minimum condition defining an organism is its existence as an operator, construction thus being more essential than metabolism, growth or reproduction. In the operator hierarchy, every organism is associated with a specific closure, for example, the nucleus in eukaryotes. This allows death to be defined as: the state in which an organism has lost its closure following irreversible deterioration of its organization. The generality of the operator hierarchy also offers a context to discuss “life as we do not know it”. The paper ends with testing the definition’s practical value with a range of examples. (shrink)

Synthetic biology is a new biotechnology that is developing at an impressive pace and attracting a considerable amount of attention from outside the scientific community as well. In this article, two main philosophically and ethically relevant characteristics of this field of research will be laid bare, namely its reliance on mechanistic metaphors to denominate simple forms of life and its appeal to the semantic field of creativity. It is argued that given these characteristics synthetic biology can be (...) understood as a prime example of a kind of human interference with reality that German philosopher Hannah Arendt called “fabrication.” This kind of self-world-relation contrasts to “action,” a relation that introduces, among other things, the idea of an inherent value of the object acted upon. Taking up this latter perspective, one scientific and two ethical challenges to synthetic biology’s take on the realm of life are identified. (shrink)

Most of the reports on synthetic biology include not only familiar topics like biosafety and biosecurity but also a chapter on ‘ethical concerns’; a variety of diffuse topics that are interrelated in some way or another. This article deals with these ‘ethical concerns’. In particular it addresses issues such as the intrinsic value of life and how to deal with ‘artificial life’, and the fear that synthetic biologists are tampering with nature or playing God. Its aim (...) is to analyse what exactly is the nature of the concerns and what rationale may lie behind them. The analysis concludes that the above-mentioned worries do not give genuine cause for serious concern. In the best possible way they are interpreted as slippery slope arguments, yet arguments of this type need to be handled with care. It is argued that although we are urged to be especially vigilant we do not have sufficiently cogent reasons to assume that synthetic biology will cause such fundamental hazards as to warrant restricting or refraining from research in this field. (shrink)

Biotechnologies – synthetic biology in particular – are sometimes blamed for playing God or manifesting hubris, that is, for evincing the vicious attitude of transcending the limits of human agency. In trying to create living organisms, we would adopt an attitude that is immoral for human beings. In this article, I want to show that this blame is unwarranted. I distinguish two aspects of the argument, which claims that it is impossible for human beings to create life and (...) immoral to attempt it. I argue that if we adopt a conception of what life consists of in agreement with the scientific world view, there is no place for hubris. Finally, I maintain that even if we accept a non-scientific conception of life (a vitalist or a supernatural one), we are not in a position to formulate the blame against synthetic biologists because what they do cannot contravene this vitalist or supernaturalist view. (shrink)

In debates about criteria for human death, several camps have emerged, the main two focusing on either loss of the "organism as a whole" (the mainstream view) or loss of consciousness or "personhood." Controversies also rage over the proper definition of "irreversible" in criteria for death. The situation is reminiscent of the proverbial blind men palpating an elephant; each describes the creature according to the part he can touch. Similarly, each camp grasps some aspect of the complex reality of (...) death. The personhood camp, in contrast to the mainstream "organism" camp, recognizes that a human organism can still be a biological living whole even without brain function. The mainstream camp, in contrast to the personhood camp, recognizes that a person can be permanently, even irreversibly unconscious, and still be a living person so long as his/her body is alive. The author proposes that hylomorphic dualism incorporates both these key insights. But to complete the picture of the entire "death elephant," a fundamental paradigm shift is needed to make sense of other seemingly conflicting insights. The author proposes a "semantic bisection" of the concept of death, analogous to the traditional distinction at the beginning of life between "conception" and "birth." To avoid the semantic baggage associated with the term "death," the two new death-related concepts are referred to as "passing away" (or "deceased") and "deanimation," corresponding, respectively, to sociolegal ceasing-to-be (mirror image of birth) and ontological/theological ceasing-to-be of the bodily organism (mirror image of conception). Regarding criteria, the distinguishing feature is whether the cessation of function is permanent (passing away) or irreversible (deanimation). If the "dead donor rule" were renamed the "deceased donor rule" (both acronyms felicitously being "DDR"), the ethics of organ transplantation from non–heart-beating donors could, in principle, be validly governed by the DDR, even though the donors are not yet ontologically "deanimated." Thus, the paradigm shift satisfies both those who insist on maintaining the DDR and those who claim that it has all along been receiving only lip service and should be explicitly loosened to include those who are "as good as dead." Even so, a number of practical caveats remain to be worked out for non–heart-beating protocols. (shrink)

In this short contribution we explore the historical roots of recent synthetic approaches in biology and try to assess their real potential, as well as identify future hurdles or the reasons behind some of the main difficulties they currently face. We suggest that part of these difficulties might not be just the result of our present lack of adequate technical skills or understanding, but could spring directly from the nature of the biological phenomenon itself. In particular, if life (...) is conceived as autonomy in open-ended evolution, which would help to explain the highly complex and dynamic organization of the simplest known organisms (i.e., genetically-instructed cellular metabolisms), external synthetic implementations of such systems, or interventions on them, are bound to interfere with some of their characteristic transformation processes, both at the ontogenetic and phylogenetic scales. In any case, this will prove very revealing and productive, technologically and scientifically speaking, since the knowledge gathered from those implementations/interventions will be extremely valuable in establishing our capacities and limitations to fully comprehend, utilize, and expand the living domain as we know it today. (shrink)