This paper examines the possibility of finding evidence that phenomenal consciousness is independent of access. The suggestion reviewed is that we should look for isomorphisms between phenomenal and neural activation spaces. It is argued that the fact that phenomenal spaces are mapped via verbal report is no problem for this methodology. The fact that activation and phenomenal space are mapped via different means does not mean that they cannot be identified. The paper finishes by examining how data addressing this theoretical (...) question could be obtained. (shrink)

Recently a number of authors have responded to the knowl-edge argument by suggesting that Mary could learn about new physi-cal facts upon release (Flanagan, 1992; Mandik, 2001; Stoljar, 2001; Van Gulick, 1985). A key step in achieving this is a demonstration that there are facts that can be known via colour experience that cannot be learnt scientifically. In this paper I develop an account of scientific and visual knowledge on which there is a difference between the knowledge provided by science (...) and that provided by vision. (shrink)

In this paper we try to diagnose one reason why the debate regarding the Hard Problem of consciousness inevitably leads to a stalemate: namely that the characterisation of consciousness assumed by the Hard Problem is unjustified and probably unjustifiable. Following Dennett : 4–6, 1996, Cognition 79:221–237, 2001, J Conscious Stud 19:86, 2012) and Churchland :402–408, 1996, Brainwise: studies in neurophilosophy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002), we argue that there is in fact no non-question begging argument for the claim that consciousness (...) is a uniquely Hard Phenomenon. That is; there is no non-question begging argument for the claim that consciousness is necessarily in explicable in terms of the structure and function of mental states. Unfortunately the debate has not moved on because the majority of materialists feel the pull of the at least one of, what we call, the ‘key’ intuitions that supposedly support dualism and the existence of a Hard Phenomenon and so try to accommodate them rather than denying them. Although this a possible response to the intuitions it tends to mask the fact that there is in fact no argument for the existence of a Hard Phenomenon. So we end up participating in our own hornswoggling :402–408, 1996) and chasing our tails trying to answer a question we should in fact ignore. We have no reason to think there is a Hard Problem of consciousness because we have no reason to think the Hard Phenomenon exists. (shrink)

Despite a wealth of data we still have no clear idea what color experiences represent. In fact, color experiences vary with so many factors that it has been claimed that they do not represent anything at all. The primary challenge for any representational account of color experience is to accommodate the various psychophysical results that demonstrate that color appearance depends not only on the spectral nature of the target but also on the spectral, spatial and figural nature of the surround. (...) A number of theorists have proposed that this dependence is an aspect of the visual system's constancy mechanism. However this does not in and of itself tell us what, if anything, is represented in color experience. Ultimately the answer to this question will be informed by one's theory of representational content. I will argue that adopting a molecular scheme of representation enables the development of an account of the represented object of color experience that can do justice to the psychophysical data. (shrink)

If Australasian philosophers constitute the kind of group to which a collective identity or broadly shared self-image can plausibly be ascribed, the celebrated history of Australian materialism rightly lies close to its heart. Jack Smart’s chapter in this volume, along with an outstanding series of briefer essays in A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (Forrest 2010; Gold 2010; Koksvik 2010; Lycan 2010; Matthews 2010; Nagasawa 2010; Opie 2010; Stoljar 2010a), effectively describe the naturalistic realism of Australian philosophy (...) of mind. In occasional semi-serious psychogeographic speculation, this long-standing and strongly-felt intellectual attitude has been traced back to the influences of our light, land, or lifestyle (Devitt 1996, x; compare comments by Chalmers and O’Brien in Mitchell, 2006). Australasian work in philosophy of mind and cognition has become more diverse in the last 40 years, but is almost all still marked, in one way or another, by the history of these debates on materialism. (shrink)

Recently a number of authors have responded to the knowledge argument by suggesting that Mary could learn about new physical facts upon release (Flanagan 1992; Mandik 2001; Stoljar 2001; Van Gulick 1985). A key step in achieving this is a demonstration that there are facts that can be known via color experience that cannot..

Kim (1998) has argued that a genuine robust physicalism does not leave any room for real, causally efficacious mental properties. Despite all of his concerns about the reality and causal efficacy of mental phenomena Kim does not eliminate all higher-level macro causation. Kim’s problem with the mental is that most current cognitive theories imply that the mind is not higher-level but higher-order. In this paper I argue that connectionism makes meaning higher-level and therefore by Kim’s own standards puts meaning on (...) the same footing as other real causally efficacious higher-level properties. The upshot is that we can side-step the current debate about mental causation by moving the mind to the shared uncontroversially real and physical common-ground. (shrink)

 Introduce the intuitions  Accepting that there is no appearance/reality distinction for consciousness means we must deny that consciousness does causal work..

Proponents of the hard problem of consciousness argue that the zombie and inverted spectrum thought experiments demonstrate that consciousness cannot be physical. They present scenarios designed to demonstrate that it is conceivable that a physical replica of someone can have radically different or no conscious experiences, that such an experience-less replica is possible and therefore that materialism is false. I will argue that once one understands the limitations that the physics of this world puts on cognitive systems, zombies and the (...) inverted spectrum are not conceivable. (shrink)

Proponents of the hard problem of consciousness argue that the zombie and inverted spectrum thought experiments demonstrate that consciousness cannot be physical. They present scenarios designed to demonstrate that it is conceivable that a physical replica of someone can have radically different or no conscious experiences, that such an experience-less replica is possible and therefore that materialism is false. I will argue that once one understands the limitations that the physics of this world puts on cognitive systems, zombies and the (...) inverted spectrum are not conceivable. (shrink)

The goal of the symposium 'Integrating Perspectives on the Relation between Mind and Brain' was to get people with different views and from different disciplines to open up a dialogue by focusing on answering a set of questions. In this paper I present a view of the relation between the mind and the brain that is informed by recent work in the philosophy of science. The basic idea is that the mind is more than the brain because mental states are (...) identical to the activity of groups of organized neurons. Unlike the standard non-reductive materialism irreducibility is not seen as related to multiple realisability. The upshot is that we can bring the relation between the mind and the brain in line with other clear cases of ontological emergence, we can see how psychology can be an independent science, and yet how important explanatory connections can be made between psychology and neuroscience. (shrink)

Objective To review the way consciousness is operationalised in contemporary research, discuss strengths and weaknesses of current approaches and propose new measures. Method We first reviewed the literature pertaining to the phenomenal character of visual and self-consciousness as well as awareness of visual stimuli. We also reviewed more problematic cases of dreams and animal consciousness, specifically that of octopuses. Results Despite controversies, work in visual and self consciousness is highly developed and there are notable successes. Cases where experiences are not (...) induced, such as dreams, and where no verbal report is possible, such as when we study purported experiences of octopuses, are more challenging. It is difficult to be confident about the reliability and validity of operationalisations of dreams. Although this is a general concern about the measuring consciousness, it is not a sufficiently severe concern to completely undermine the work reviewed on vision and self-consciousness. It is more difficult to see how the good work on human psychology can be applied to non-human animals, especially those with radically different nervous systems, such as octopuses. Given the limitations of report-based operationalisations of consciousness, it is desirable to develop non-report-based measures, particularly for phenomenal qualities. We examine a number of possibilities and offer two possible approaches of varying degrees of practicality, the first based on combining quality space descriptions of phenomenal qualities and the notion of a “neural activation space” inherited from connectionist A.I., the second being a novel match to target approach Conclusion Consciousness is a multifacted phenomenon and requires a variety of operationalisations to be studied. (shrink)

I much appreciated Elizabeth Schier's paper on Frank Jackson's knowledge argument, published in the January 2008 issue of Journal of Consciousness Studies (Schier, 2008) -- in part, I confess, because of resonances with my gestalt argument for free will (Hodgson, 2001; 2002; 2005; 2007a,b). I would like to offer two comments on this paper.

This book presents an original theory of the nature of pictorial representation. The most influential recent theory of depiction, put forward by Nelson Goodman, holds that the relation between depictions and what they represent is entirely conventional. Flint Schier argues to the contrary that depiction involves resemblance to the things depicted, providing a sophisticated defence of our basic intuitions on the subject. Canvassing an attractive theory of 'generativity' rather than resemblance, Dr Schier provides a detailed account of depiction, (...) showing how it illuminates and resolves many of the enigmas of pictorial representation while remaining true to our basic intuitions on the subject. (shrink)

This paper defends the avowal view of self-deception, according to which the self-deceived agent has been led by the evidence to believe that ¬p and yet is sincere in asserting that p. I argue that the agent qualifies as sincere in asserting the contrary of what they in the most basic sense believe in virtue of asserting what they are committed to believing. It is only by recognizing such commitments and distinguishing them from the more basic beliefs whose rational regulation (...) is automatic that the tension between the self-deceived agent’s actions and assertions can be explained in a core subset of cases of self-deception. (shrink)

(1989). THE CLAIMS OF TRAGEDY: AN ESSAY IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND AESTHETIC THEORY. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 7-26. doi: 10.1080/05568648909506308.

The polarisation of the embryonic anteroposterior (AP) axis requires the establishment of positional cues with spatial information, and often involves complex intercellular communications, cell adhesion and cell movement. Recent work on several fronts has begun to shed light on how the initial asymmetries are established and maintained. In this review, I discuss the polarisation of the AP axis during Drosophila oogenesis, focusing on the function of the Notch signalling pathway and its relationship to the activation of the epidermal growth factor (...) receptor. I make special reference to some aspects of Notch activity regulation during oogenesis that appear to depart from the canonical pathway. Finally, I hypothesise on possible similarities between these activities of Notch signalling during Drosophila oogenesis and vertebrate somitogenesis. BioEssays 25:781–791, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Editors’ IntroductionElizabeth S. Radcliffe and Mark G. SpencerThis issue opens with the winning essay in the Third Annual Hume Studies Essay Prize competition: “Hume beyond Theism and Atheism” by Dr. Ariel Peckel. Dr. Peckel’s essay was chosen as the winner from among papers submitted by emerging scholars from August 2022 through July 2023. Please see the full prize announcement with information about this talented Hume scholar elsewhere in this (...) issue. Our Call for Papers for the Fourth Essay Prize competition is printed in the back of this issue and on-line at the Hume Studies website. The contest is open to authors ten or fewer years from the Ph.D. and closes on August 1, 2024. If you are eligible, please consult our “Call” for further details!In other Hume Studies news, we have once again acquired a new printer. Christensen Printing (Lincoln, Nebraska), whose work for us was excellent, suddenly closed its business when its owner retired this past year and had no one to succeed him. We received the news just when our November issue was ready to go to press. With the assistance of our friends at the Philosophy Documentation Center, we obtained estimates from three printers and have now engaged Bailey Printing in Charlottesville, Virginia. Our November issue was published on-line by November 1 (at the Philosophy Documentation Center website, the Project Muse website, and the Hume Society website), but the print issue took longer to get to subscribers.For a second time, we want to bring to the attention of our readers that Hume Studies will be marking its 50th year of publication in 2025. As we have previously noted, we are planning an anniversary issue for 50:1 (April 2025). We hope to include among the special features of that issue paragraphs or statements from our readers in answer to this query: “Of all of the articles that have been published in [End Page 7] Hume Studies over the past 50 years, which one is most noteworthy to you? Why so?” Please see the “Call for Entries” in the back of this issue or on the Hume Studies website (https://www.humesociety.org/ojs/index.php/hs), which includes details on where to send your response. The due date is October 15, 2024, but we encourage you to send your entries as soon as possible! [End Page 8]Copyright © 2024 Hume Studies... (shrink)

This concept book introduces young children to the role of nothingness and negative space in their world.

Attempts to unify Marxist and feminist social critique have been vexed by the fact that ‘patriarchy’ predates the advent of capitalism (its transhistorical status). Feminists within the Marxist, socialist, and materialist traditions have responded to this point by either granting patriarchy a certain autonomy relative to capitalism (the ‘dual/triple systems’ approach), or by suggesting that patriarchal relations have a foundational and necessary status in the history of capitalist development (which we term the ‘origins-subsistence’ approach). This paper offers an alternative account (...) of the relationship between capitalism and the transhistorical status of ‘patriarchy’. In aid of a ‘unitary theory’ of Marxist Feminism, we argue that the transhistorical status of patriarchy is better understood through an application of Marx’s concepts of formal and real subsumption. A modified version of these concepts can illuminate not only capitalist appropriation of antecedent social and economic forms, but also its capacity to produce new forms of gendered exploitation and oppression. (shrink)

Despite a growing literature on identity theory in the last two decades, much of its current use in archaeology is still driven toward locating and dating static categories such as 'Phoenician,' 'Christian' or 'native.' Previous studies have highlighted the various problems and challenges presented by identity, with the overall effect of deconstructing it to insignificance. As the humanities and social sciences turn to material culture, archaeology provides a unique perspective on the interaction between people and things over the long term. (...) This volume argues that identity is worth studying not despite its slippery nature, but because of it. Identity can be seen as an emergent property of living in a material world, an ongoing process of becoming which archaeologists are particularly well suited to study. The geographic and temporal scale of the papers included is purposefully broad to demonstrate the variety of ways in which archaeology is redefining identity. Research areas span from the Great Lakes to the Mediterranean, with case studies from the Mesolithic to the contemporary world by emerging voices in the field. The volume contains a critical review of theories of identity by the editors, as well as a response and afterword by A. Bernard Knapp"--From publisher's website. (shrink)

Chapter 12 is available Open Access under CC-BY-NC-ND licence. Conversations around diversity, equity, and inclusion in science communication are in danger of generating much concern without effecting change and systematic transformations. This radical volume addresses these circular discourses and reveals the gaps in the field. Putting the spotlight on the marginalised voices of so-called 'racialised minorities', and those from Global South regions, it interrogates the global footprint of the science communication enterprise. Moving beyond tokenistic and extractive approaches, this book creates (...) a space for academics and practitioners to challenge issues around race and sociocultural inclusion, providing mutual learning, paradigm-shifting perspectives, and innovative ways forward for the science communication advancement agenda. (shrink)

Ruins are evocative structures, and we value them in different ways for the various things they mean to us. Ruins can be aesthetically appreciated, but they are also valued for their historical importance, what they symbolize to different cultures and communities, and as lucrative objects, i.e., for tourism. However, today an increasing number of ancient ruins have been damaged or completely destroyed by acts of war. In 2001 the Taliban struck a major blow to cultural heritage by blasting the Bamiyan (...) Buddhas out of existence. They were not easy to destroy. This direct targeting of cultural property might change our attitudes toward conservation practices. Francesco Bandarin, the UNESCO assistant director-general for culture, states, “Deliberate destruction has created a new context. At the time, Bamiyan was an exceptional case.” Bandarin’s comments notwithstanding, the destruction of cultural property in times of war is not new. Not only is there relatively settled international law prohibiting the looting of cultural property during times of war, we can find examples of intentional destruction of cultural property from thousands of years ago. In this paper I would like to focus on one particular case, that of the Mỹ Sơn Archaeological Sanctuary, in the Socialist Republic of Việt Nam. Mỹ Sơn is the foremost Champa archaeological site and the largest archaeological site in Việt Nam. The largest temple (kalan) at Mỹ Sơn, A1, was destroyed in a US bombing raid in 1969. In this paper I highlight different approaches to architectural cultural heritage preservation in terms of reconstruction, restoration, and ruination -- with an eye to applying these approaches to the remains of the A1 temple in Mỹ Sơn. I briefly discuss the history of Mỹ Sơn before providing some reasons to believe that we should allow A1 to ruinate. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Allotment Associations The Allotment Site New Relationships: Councillors and Gardeners Conclusions Notes.

Why is it that the study of Ethics is so unpopular? It is because there are so many systems of Ethics, and they are all in such hopeless contradiction. Why are there so many systems? Because each writer starts with his theory and then attempts to get the facts to agree with it. What is the remedy? The remedy, says Professor Levy-Bruhl, is to start with the practice. And what then? Then, he says, you find that the practice is everything, (...) that you need no theory, and that every ethical writer is in harmony with every other. 'Every ethical doctrine,' says Professor Levy-Bruhl, 'jealously defends the originality of its ethical principle against the objections of others, but it formulates the guiding rules of conduct, the concrete precepts of justice and charity, in the same terms as its rivals, whether its adherent is a disciple of Kant, a critical philosopher, a pessimist, a positivist, an evolutionist, a spiritualist, or a theologian.' The way out of the chaos of theoretical Ethics, then, is to deny its existence. There is no such science. The only science of Ethics is the practical. Its object of study is the conscience of man. Its rules and obligations are what the conscience reveals to experience. It takes Professor Levy-Bruhl half his book to get rid of theoretical ethics. Then, however, he is free, and he moves more rapidly in the discussion of Natural Ethics and Ethical Feeling. He ends with a chapter of Practical Results. -The Expository Times, Vol. 17. (shrink)

Feminism is all about demanding equality and learning to love yourself. But not too much - men hate that! From the writers of Reductress, the subversive, satirical women's magazine read by over 2.5 million visitors a month, comes HOW TO WIN AT FEMINISM: The Definitive Guide to Having It All--And Then Some! This ultimate guide to winning feminism--filled with four-color illustrations, bold graphics, and hilarious photos--teaches readers how to battle the patriarchy better than everybody else. From the herstory of feminism (...) to how to apologize for having it all, readers will learn how to be a feminist at work and at home with tips that include: How to Do More with 33 Cents Less How to Be Sex-Positive Even When You're Bloated How to Love Your Body Even Though Hers Is Better The 9 Circles of Hell for Women Who Don't Help Other Women Designer Handbags to Hold All Your Feminism How to Get Catcalled For Your Personality HOW TO WIN AT FEMINISM is a fresh take on women's rights through the lens of the funniest women in comedy today. With this book as your wo-manual, you'll shatter that glass ceiling once and for all (but you'll still need to clean up the mess). (shrink)

This paper argues that an agent’s moral obligations are necessarily connected to her desires. In doing so I will demonstrate that such a view is less revisionary—and more in line with our common-sense views on morality—than philosophers have previously taken it to be. You can hold a desire-based view of moral normativity, I argue, without being (e.g.) a moral relativist or error theorist about morality. I’ll make this argument by showing how two important features of an objective morality are compatible (...) with such a desire-based account: 1) morality’s authoritative nature, 2) our ability to condemn immoral agents. (shrink)

The importance of ethical listening -- The power of difference and values that unite -- Take off your armor and bring down the walls: adopting a listening posture -- Dolls and cages: listening as investment and care -- Deep listening: remembering and responding with intentional focus -- Hyenas and chickens: listening as invitation -- Hope for sustainable hospitality -- References -- About the author.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:How Narrative Counts in Phenomenological Models of SchizophreniaThe author reports no conflicts of interest.Rosanna Wannberg (2024) offers an intriguing and novel critique of the predominant phenomenological model of schizophrenia, the ipseity disturbance hypothesis. According to this model, which was initially proposed by Sass and Parnas (2003), schizophrenia is best understood as arising from a disturbance or instability of minimal or basic self-hood, the sense of being present to oneself (...) and one's experiences (Henriksen, 2022). This disturbance appears as various experiential anomalies, sometimes termed "anomalous self (or world) experiences" or "self disorders," which include such phenomena as alienation from subjective processes, doubt in the existence of the world or one's own existence, fluidity of boundaries between self and others or self and world, and many other phenomena. Many of these have been captured in the Examination of Anomalous Self Experience (Parnas et al., 2005) and the Examination of Anomalous World Experience (Sass et al., 2017).At the same time, some research reveals the presence of self disorders in nonpsychotic conditions like panic disorder (Madeira et al., 2017) and depersonalization/derealization disorder (Sass et al., 2013). There are also competing phenomenological models that posit schizophrenia instead as a disturbance of dialogical self (Lysaker & Lysaker, 2002) or as a disruption of automatic perceptual processing (Uhlhaas & Mishara, 2007). Such works contain implicit critiques of the ipseity disturbance hypothesis that focus on the specificity of self disorders, or else on the specific nature of the underlying disturbance in schizophrenia.Wannberg's critique is distinct from these others: by considering the validity and function of recovery narratives, she raises crucial epistemological and ethical questions about the phenomenological approach to psychopathology, asking not only whose narrative counts, but how narrative counts. In particular, Wannberg questions a phenomenology that, she suggests, might find any ongoing symptoms as evidence of continued alterations of subjectivity, and that would then be dismissive of recovery narratives—a phenomenology that would prioritize the authority [End Page 71] of consciousness, as Wannberg puts it, over the authority of the person.It is worth stating here that the standard phenomenological response would not be to distrust or dismiss accounts of recovery. Ideally, phenomenological models, along with their ongoing theoretical developments and empirical work, are based on a deep respect for patients' experience and self-descriptions, striving to attend to experiences as they are lived without imposing pre-defined constructs that would limit or alter the experiences in a fundamental way (Nordgaard et al., 2013).Questions about the nature of recovery might be addressed within phenomenology by considering the difference between minimal (or basic) self and narrative (or extended) self, a more complex self-understanding or self-interpretation that is founded on the more basic, pre-reflective sense of being alive in the world (Gallagher, 2000; Parnas, 2007). According to proponents of the ipseity disturbance hypothesis, disturbances of basic self-hood can contribute to disturbances of narrative self, such as confusion about one's future goals or difficulties making sense of one's life history, though it is unlikely for disruptions that originate in the narrative self to trickle down to the minimal self (Henriksen, 2022). Such a view might similarly suggest that it would be unlikely for work on the level of the narrative self to lead to improvements in minimal self. Recovery, according to this approach, might best be viewed as an understanding of and compensation for alterations in basic self-hood, such that a person can develop a relatively solid narrative self that accounts for and manages disturbances of minimal self—while the minimal self may also grow more solid through various therapeutic interventions (Skodlar & Henriksen, 2019).Wannberg finds a more transformative possibility in Wittgenstein's grammatical approach, which is concerned with the function and rules of discourse. According to her grammar of recovery, recovery narratives are not only the product of a process of meaning-making and self-understanding, but they can create meaning and new realities. Furthermore, this process, according to Wannberg, has an inherently social and normative quality to it: the self-work that occurs in recovery and the recovery narrative involves the development of agency, autonomy, and responsibility in a social world... (shrink)

Identifying wordlike units in language is typically done by applying a battery of criteria, though how to weight these criteria with respect to one another is currently unknown. We address this question by investigating whether certain criteria are also used as cues for learning an artificial language—if they are, then perhaps they can be relied on more as trustworthy top‐down diagnostics. The two criteria for grammatical wordhood that we consider are a unit's free mobility and its internal immutability. These criteria (...) also map to two cognitive mechanisms that could underlie successful statistical learning: learners might orient themselves around the low transitional probabilities at unit boundaries, or they might seek chunks with high internal transitional probabilities. We find that each criterion has its own facilitatory effect, and learning is best where they both align. This supports the battery‐of‐criteria approach to diagnosing wordhood, and also suggests that the mechanism behind statistical learning may not be a question of either/or; perhaps the two mechanisms do not compete, but mutually reinforce one another. (shrink)

Attributions of moral knowledge are common in everyday life. We say that we know that some actions are morally right or wrong, permitted or required. Yet, how do we know such moral claims? Moral intuitionism is a family of theories in moral epistemology that tries to answer this question. Intuitionists are not skeptics about moral knowledge. They think that there are moral truths for us to know, and further, that knowledge of these truths is possible. What distinguishes intuitionism from other (...) anti-skeptical moral epistemologies is the idea that we can know some moral truths directly, without inferring them from premises. According to many intuitionists, it is possible for us to know that keeping promises is morally right even if we do not hold this belief on the basis of further evidence or proof. While intuitionism was popular in the early twentieth century, it was since dismissed as implausible. Recently, there has been renewed interest in intuitionism. Philosophers have defended updated versions of the theory and argue that the view has been misunderstood. This chapter considers the merits of intuitionism in moral epistemology. In what follows, I examine different ways of being an intuitionist and indicate the relative strengths and weaknesses of various approaches within intuitionism. (shrink)

In the World Library of Psychologists series, international experts themselves present career-long collections of what they judge to be their finest pieces – extracts from books, key articles, salient research findings, and their major practical theoretical contributions. Elizabeth Valentine has an international reputation as an eminent scholar and pioneer in the field of philosophy and history of psychology. This selection brings together some of her best work over the last thirty years. A specially written introduction gives an overview of (...) her career and contextualises the selection in relation to changes in the field during this time. The first section on 'Philosophy' covers work on different theoretical approaches to psychology, introspection and the study of consciousness, the mind-body problem, and different types of explanation in psychology including reductionism. The second section, 'From Philosophy to History', includes work on the philosophical psychologists G. F. Stout and James Sully, among others. The third section on 'History' covers Valentine's more recent historical work on the development of psychology in London – both institutional and biographical – and includes accounts of both Bedford College and University College, and the role of pioneer women psychologists. The book enables the reader to trace developments in the philosophy and history of psychology over the last thirty years. It will appeal to anyone with interests in these areas as well as being an invaluable resource for graduate and advanced undergraduate courses in conceptual and historical issues. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the role of propaganda use in cyberterrorism. The main premise is that cyberterrorists display various semiotic gestures (e.g., the use of images and Internet videos) to communicate their intents to the public at large. In doing so, they communicate themes—these themes range from hate to anger. Cyberterrorism, then, is a form of theater or spectacle in which terrorists exploit cyberspace to trigger feelings of panic and overreaction in the target population. In many cases, this form of propaganda (...) is the primary means of communication for various cyberterrorist groups to convey their intents. Internet sites also produce numerous opportunities for in-group communication and publicity. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Nature, Nurture, and the Female Serial Killer Introduction Female Nurture and Human Nature: Some Philosophical Background Female Serial Killers: A Typology Of Poets and Monsters: Our Common Nature.

Shifts in funding and a worldwide trend towards marketising higher education have led to a new emphasis on the quality of the student experience. In the UK this trend finds its strongest expression in recent policy proposals to simultaneously increase student fees and student choice so that students themselves become the drivers of higher education. We trace the policy developments of this shift over recent years and rehearse some of the criticisms against it. Accepting that there is good reason to (...) support improving the student experience, we then consider ways in which this might be achieved that foreground the relation of university teachers with their subject matter and students' engagement in this. A higher education, we argue, should expose its students to disciplines whose standards are rightly contested and to a form of learning that intensifies or unsettles desires rather than simply aspiring to satisfy them. (shrink)

This book presents an original theory of the nature of pictorial representation. The most influential recent theory of depiction, put forward by Nelson Goodman, holds that the relation between depictions and what they represent is entirely conventional. Flint Schier argues to the contrary that depiction involves resemblance to the things depicted, providing a sophisticated defence of our basic intuitions on the subject. Canvassing an attractive theory of 'generativity' rather than resemblance, Dr Schier provides a detailed account of depiction, (...) showing how it illuminates and resolves many of the enigmas of pictorial representation while remaining true to our basic intuitions on the subject. Philosophers, psychologists and art theorists will find this a sophisticated and stimulating treatment of one of the central topics in aesthetics. (shrink)

This study examines to what extent different types of CEOs in family firms influence external and internal stakeholder-related CSP as compared to CEOs in nonfamily firms. Linking family CEO and nonfamily CEO with CSR outcomes, we provide evidence that family CEOs are positively associated with both external and internal CSR, whereas nonfamily CEOs within family firms tend to be negatively associated with both external and internal CSR. We show that the incumbent CEO’s age moderates the above relationships, indicating the existence (...) of shifting family priorities and suggesting a tendency toward CSR conformity as the salience of succession concerns increases. (shrink)