In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 38.2 (2000) 221-238 [Access article in PDF] Hume's Iterative Probability Argument: A Pernicious Reductio Kevin Meeker University of South Alabama In this essay I want to look afresh at David Hume's iterative probability argument, found in the section entitled "Of Scepticism with regard to Reason" in his A Treatise of Human Nature.1 Interestingly enough, after years of comparative neglect,2 this argument (...) has been basking in the glow of scholarly sunshine lately.3 But to what can we attribute its extended hiatus? The convergence of three major factors seems responsible. First, philosophers have oftentimes flung this argument into the ocean of obscurity because of its perceived inadequacies.4 Second, and on a related note, many assume that Hume himself permitted this argument to drown because it never resurfaces again in his writings. Most suspiciously, Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, which is his popular (and preferred) presentation of the epistemological sections [End Page 221] of the Treatise, does not contain this argument.5 Last, but certainly not least, for a long time this argument sat uncomfortably with the naturalist interpretation of Hume6 that has gained ascendancy in the twentieth century. For prior to this century, Hume was almost unanimously regarded as a sceptic. Despite a few waves from those who interpreted Hume as a logical positivist earlier in this century, Norman Kemp Smith charted a new course for Humean interpretations with his emphasis on Hume's naturalism.7 And this is the current according to which most Hume interpreters set their sails today.Because the naturalist reading of Hume relies so heavily on the system he attempts to set forth in the Treatise, though, naturalists have come to see the importance of reading this argument in a naturalistically acceptable way. William E. Morris best expresses the significance of this argument from a naturalistic perspective in the following manner: If we ever are to understand Hume's view of the role of reason, it stands to reason that we should first figure out how to integrate "Of scepticism with regard to reason" into the picture. Only then will we be ready to move to a consideration of Hume's positive views about reason. These views are the least understood of any of Hume's doctrines. Gaining an adequate understanding of them is both the most pressing and the most difficult problem facing Hume studies today.8While I agree with Morris about the importance of getting a clear understanding of the reasoning of I, iv, 1, I will argue that a correct reading of this section reveals the implausibility of major naturalistic interpretations of Hume.This paper has four major sections. In the first important section, I will highlight the crucial aspects of the iterative argument that will be the focus of this paper and deal with a preliminary but important interpretive issue. In the second section, I will briefly look at Annette Baier's naturalistic reading of Hume's philosophy to show how this particular passage bears on broader [End Page 222] interpretive issues. The third main section will focus on explicating Morris' similar but more detailed interpretation. Finally in the last part I will show that while it is legitimate to characterize the argument here as a reductio (as Baier and Morris both do), the argument still yields, contrary to what naturalists have recently suggested, a very sceptical conclusion. 1. The Arguments of Section I, IV, 1 of the TreatiseHume's "Of Scepticism with regard to Reason" contains at least two important arguments. While Hume agrees that knowledge involves certainty (whereas beliefs based on probability are by their very nature uncertain9 ), the conclusion of his first argument is that "all knowledge resolves itself into probability" (Treatise, 181). His point here is simply that all of our beliefs are fallible. That is, nothing is absolutely certain; thus none of our beliefs attain the exalted status of certain knowledge. But once this consequence of our fallibility is recognized, he then argues roughly that the probability that any particular belief... (shrink)

This unique volume collects some of the best recent work on the philosophical challenge that religious diversity poses for religious belief. Featuring contributors from philosophy, religious studies, and theology, it is unified by the way in which many of the authors engage in sustained critical examination of one another's positions. John Hick's pluralism provides one focal point of the collection. Hick argues that all the major religious traditions make contact with the same ultimate reality, each encountering it through a variety (...) of culturally shaped forms of thought and experience but all offering equally effective paths to salvation or liberation. Another central position is William P. Alston's defense of the Christian practice of forming beliefs about manifestations of God in response to experiences of divine presence or activity. Articles by Hick and Alston develop their arguments and other selections respond, criticizing or defending various aspects of one or both positions. Religious skepticism, religious exclusivism, religious inclusivism, and other perspectives are also represented. In the introduction, the editors suggest connections among the articles and report on additional exchanges between the contributors. The only anthology that provides comprehensive coverage of the current philosophical debate about religious diversity, The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity is ideal for courses and seminars on the philosophy of religion, philosophical theology, and world religions. (shrink)

In this paper I shall closely examine some of Gilbert Harman's cases that purport to show that one can have a justified true belief that does not constitute knowledge because of the social environment. I shall provide an account of these cases that helps us not only understand why the people in these situations lack knowledge, but also why philosophers have a difficult time evaluating these cases. More specifically, I shall argue that in these cases we should conclude that the (...) cognizers lack justification. I shall also show how this account sheds some light on certain aspects of the internalism/externalism debate. (shrink)

Do we have a strong reason to offset even if offsetting is morally inefficient? Some philosophers – such as John Broome – argue that justice-based climate duties require us to contribute money to o...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 38.2 (2000) 221-238 [Access article in PDF] Hume's Iterative Probability Argument: A Pernicious Reductio Kevin Meeker University of South Alabama In this essay I want to look afresh at David Hume's iterative probability argument, found in the section entitled "Of Scepticism with regard to Reason" in his A Treatise of Human Nature.1 Interestingly enough, after years of comparative neglect,2 this argument (...) has been basking in the glow of scholarly sunshine lately.3 But to what can we attribute its extended hiatus? The convergence of three major factors seems responsible. First, philosophers have oftentimes flung this argument into the ocean of obscurity because of its perceived inadequacies.4 Second, and on a related note, many assume that Hume himself permitted this argument to drown because it never resurfaces again in his writings. Most suspiciously, Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, which is his popular (and preferred) presentation of the epistemological sections [End Page 221] of the Treatise, does not contain this argument.5 Last, but certainly not least, for a long time this argument sat uncomfortably with the naturalist interpretation of Hume6 that has gained ascendancy in the twentieth century. For prior to this century, Hume was almost unanimously regarded as a sceptic. Despite a few waves from those who interpreted Hume as a logical positivist earlier in this century, Norman Kemp Smith charted a new course for Humean interpretations with his emphasis on Hume's naturalism.7 And this is the current according to which most Hume interpreters set their sails today.Because the naturalist reading of Hume relies so heavily on the system he attempts to set forth in the Treatise, though, naturalists have come to see the importance of reading this argument in a naturalistically acceptable way. William E. Morris best expresses the significance of this argument from a naturalistic perspective in the following manner: If we ever are to understand Hume's view of the role of reason, it stands to reason that we should first figure out how to integrate "Of scepticism with regard to reason" into the picture. Only then will we be ready to move to a consideration of Hume's positive views about reason. These views are the least understood of any of Hume's doctrines. Gaining an adequate understanding of them is both the most pressing and the most difficult problem facing Hume studies today.8While I agree with Morris about the importance of getting a clear understanding of the reasoning of I, iv, 1, I will argue that a correct reading of this section reveals the implausibility of major naturalistic interpretations of Hume.This paper has four major sections. In the first important section, I will highlight the crucial aspects of the iterative argument that will be the focus of this paper and deal with a preliminary but important interpretive issue. In the second section, I will briefly look at Annette Baier's naturalistic reading of Hume's philosophy to show how this particular passage bears on broader [End Page 222] interpretive issues. The third main section will focus on explicating Morris' similar but more detailed interpretation. Finally in the last part I will show that while it is legitimate to characterize the argument here as a reductio (as Baier and Morris both do), the argument still yields, contrary to what naturalists have recently suggested, a very sceptical conclusion. 1. The Arguments of Section I, IV, 1 of the TreatiseHume's "Of Scepticism with regard to Reason" contains at least two important arguments. While Hume agrees that knowledge involves certainty (whereas beliefs based on probability are by their very nature uncertain9 ), the conclusion of his first argument is that "all knowledge resolves itself into probability" (Treatise, 181). His point here is simply that all of our beliefs are fallible. That is, nothing is absolutely certain; thus none of our beliefs attain the exalted status of certain knowledge. But once this consequence of our fallibility is recognized, he then argues roughly that the probability that any particular belief... (shrink)

This paper contends that the first argument of Hume's "Of scepticism with regard to reason" entails that humans have no knowledge as Hume understands knowledge. In defending this claim, we also see how Hume's argument anticipates an important aspect of an extremely influential 20th century development: the collapse of the analytic/synthetic distinction.

W. V. O. Quine’s assault on the analytic/synthetic distinction is one of the most celebrated events in the history of twentieth century philosophy. This paper shines a light on Quine’s own understanding of the history of this distinction. More specifically, this paper argues, contrary to what seems to be the received view, that Quine explicitly recognized a kindred subversive spirit in David Hume.

Timothy Williamson’s anti luminosity argument has received considerable attention. Escaping unnoticed, though, is a strikingly similar argument from David Hume. This paper highlights some of the arresting parallels between Williamson’s reasoning and Hume’s that will allow us to appreciate more deeply the plausibility of Williamson’s reasoning and to understand how, following Hume, we can extend this reasoning to undermine the “luminosity” of simple necessary truths. More broadly the parallels help us to identify a common skeptical predicament underlying both arguments, which (...) we shall call “the quarantine problem”. The quarantine problem expresses a deep skepticism about achieving any exalted epistemic state. Further, the perspective gained by the quarantine problem allows us to easily categorize existing responses to Williamson’s anti luminosity argument and to observe the deficiencies of those responses. In sum, the quarantine problem reveals the deeply fallibilistic nature of whatever knowledge we may possess. (shrink)

Was David Hume radically sceptical about our attempts to understand the world or was he merely approaching philosophical problems from a scientific perspective? Most philosophers today believe that Hume's outlook was more scientific than radically sceptical and that his scepticism was more limited than previously supposed. If these philosophers are correct, then Hume's approach to philosophy mirrors the approach of many contemporary philosophers. This similarity between Hume and many aspects of contemporary philosophy suggests that we should try to understand Hume (...) not as an historical relic but as a partner in a continuing philosophical dialogue. When we look closely at Hume's thoughts about human understanding, we find that Hume's scepticism emerges very insistently in the context of Hume's scientific approach. This book tries to come to terms with Hume's scepticism in a way that sheds light on contemporary philosophy and its relationship to science. (shrink)

Stephen Gardiner and Augustin Fragnière offer a thorough critique of the Oxford Principles meant to govern geoenegineering in their paper ‘The tollgate principles for the governance...

Nicholas Wolterstorff has claimed that David Hume hinted at a proper functionalist account that anticipates the epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. In this paper, I shall argue that we should refrain from attributing a proper functionalist epistemology to Hume. I shall first raise doubts as to how one could fit a notion of proper functioning into Hume's descriptive project. Next, I shall argue that adopting a proper functionalist epistemology would undermine some of Hume's most famous claims about causal inferences.

Nicholas Wolterstorff has claimed that David Hume hinted at a proper functionalist account that anticipates the epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. In this paper, I shall argue that we should refrain from attributing a proper functionalist epistemology to Hume. I shall first raise doubts as to how one could fit a notion of proper functioning into Hume's descriptive project. Next, I shall argue that adopting a proper functionalist epistemology would undermine some of Hume's most famous claims about causal inferences.

John Turri has recently called for a major shift in how the vast majority of philosophers think of knowledge. Instead of maintaining that knowledge must proceed from reliable processes, he urges epistemologists to move toward an “abilist” view that allows knowledge to proceed from abilities that are not truth-conducive. More strongly, he claims to have provided conclusive reasons for abandoning the idea that knowledge requires reliability. In this paper I explain why Turri has failed to make the case for preferring (...) abilism. (shrink)

After Certainty: A History of Our Epistemic Ideals and Illusions, by PasnauRobert. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 384.

This essay addresses the relationship between Hume’s moral theory and his epistemological project. More specifically, it focuses on one particular aspect of the relationship between Hume’s moral theory and his general scepticism with regard to reason. Several philosophers, such as David Owen and Annette Baier, have suggested that Hume’s moral theory provides significant support for his appeal to reason/reasoning. To uncover some of the main obstacles that any future attempts to rest Humean reason on ethics will probably face, this essay (...) critically examines a few of the most prominent examples of such accounts, particularly Michael Ridge’s “Epistemology Moralized: David Hume’s Practical Epistemology,” the most developed account of the possible moral support of reason in Hume‘s philosophy. (shrink)

In this essay, I call into question Yasha Rohwer and Emma Marris’s attack on what they see as a dominant view in conservation biology: namely, that there is a prima facie moral duty to preserve gen...

Although David Hume is no match for Immanuel Kant in terms of opaque writing, his overall philosophy is not without interpretive difficulties. Earlier this century, many philosophers read Hume as the precursor to logical positivism. Of course, the concluding words of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding added fuel to these flames; but with the downfall of positivism, this reading of Hume has virtually disappeared. Today, interpretations of Hume fall into two main camps: the naturalistic camp and the sceptical camp. Roughly (...) speaking, naturalistic interpreters of Hume see him as attempting to employ the methods of the natural sciences in studying human subjects while sceptical interpreters read Hume as denying that we have any knowledge. In this article I want to shed some light on this controversy in an indirect way: namely, by trying to classify Hume’s epistemology as internalist or externalist. Although this internalism/externalism debate has erupted only recently in epistemology, it should be constructive in carving up the logical space of certain epistemological positions. With this background in place, we can not only see how to categorize Hume, but also discern some of the ramifications for Hume’s epistemology when he affirms theses that place him in these categories. To anticipate a bit, I will argue that the internalist aspects of Hume’s epistemology lend great credence to the sceptical interpretation. (shrink)

This paper argues that John Hick's commitment to the moral principle of altruism undermines his pluralistic claim that all of the major world religions are equally efficacious from a soteriological perspective. This argument is placed in a context of a discussion evaluating the theoretical virtues of various hypotheses about religious diversity. (Published Online April 7 2006).

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reflection and the Stability of Belief: Essays on Descartes, Hume, and Reid by Louis E. LoebKevin MeekerLouis E. Loeb. Reflection and the Stability of Belief: Essays on Descartes, Hume, and Reid. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. xvii + 369. ISBN: 978-0-19-536876-5, Cloth, $99.00. ISBN 978-0-19-536875-8, Paper, $45.00.This book is (almost entirely) a collection of previously published essays by Louis Loeb. The first three essays focus primarily (...) on advancing the general interpretive claim that Descartes’s main epistemological goal is achieving unshakable beliefs. While essays 5–10 address many topics in Humean interpretation, they all contribute in various ways to supporting Loeb’s claim that Hume’s primary epistemological goal is achieving stable beliefs. Essay 12 compares the naturalisms of Hume and Reid. All of the collected essays are excellent.Such excellence is not surprising, for Loeb is an influential interpreter of early modern philosophy, justly renowned for the ingenuity of his readings. Spanning the last three decades, these essays display many fine qualities that have helped make Loeb such a prominent historian. Here I will briefly mention three of these qualities. First, Loeb has remarkable command of the primary historical texts and the secondary literature. This mastery is perhaps best seen in his “What is Worth Preserving in the Kemp Smith Interpretation of Hume?” (essay 9). In addition to providing a detailed exposition of a wide range of texts from Hume and Norman Kemp Smith, Loeb also makes adroit comments about the literature discussing the secondary literature when he addresses the “Canonical Understanding” of Kemp Smith (246–47). Second, Loeb effortlessly integrates historical and contemporary concerns. His “Hume’s Agent-Centered Sentimentalism” (essay 8), for instance, has [End Page 257] an interesting discussion of how Hume’s moral theory might aid contemporary utilitarians (238–44). Moreover, essays 5 (“Integrating Hume’s Accounts of Belief and Justification”) and 10 (“Psychology, Epistemology, and Skepticism in Hume’s Argument about Induction”) fruitfully discuss Hume’s epistemology in light of issues important to the contemporary distinction between internalism and externalism. Third, Loeb’s intuitive knack for isolating important connections amongst various texts and figures allows him to tell a concise story about the evolution of certain philosophical ideas that panoramically covers large portions of the history of philosophy. His “Locke and British Empiricism” (essay 11), which connects epistemological themes in Locke with Descartes, Hume, Berkeley, Malebranche, and Reid, among others, is one example. (Because this essay is, as of this writing, still forthcoming, it is the only essay that is not previously published.) Finally, all three of these qualities are prominently on display in “Sextus, Descartes, Hume, and Peirce” (essay 4), which interestingly uses contemporary views about belief (especially as developed by David Velleman) to understand Descartes and Hume “against the backdrop of Sextus and Peirce” (107). To my mind this essay is the best in the book.There are at least two main advantages of collecting these excellent essays into a book. First, the collection allows Loeb to systematically emphasize the similarities between different early modern thinkers in a way that typically strengthens the cumulative case he makes for his readings of these philosophers. Second, the volume permits us to catch a rare glimpse of how an interpreter’s views can change over time. Considering the cumulative effect of the arguments as well as the changes in Loeb’s views also provides us with a great opportunity to reflect critically on many important issues in a fruitful way. The rest of this review will focus on such critical reflections.Let us start with Descartes, as Loeb does. In his introduction to the essays, Loeb helpfully contextualizes his discussions of Descartes. He points out that his paper “Was Descartes Sincere in His Appeal to the Light of Nature?” (not included here) maintains that the arguments Descartes presents are so poor that they “suggest” that “Descartes was insincere in offering his proofs of the existence of God and in appealing to Divine veracity to validate clear and distinct perception” (9; cf. 35). Of course others have likewise contended that Descartes was a dissimulator. But in the first four chapters... (shrink)

The Preface's first sentence sketches an ambitious agenda: "The purpose of this book is to present and assess David Hume's most influential contributions to epistemology and metaphysics in a manner that does not presuppose familiarity with Hume on the reader's part and yet is sufficiently deep and rigorous to interest more advanced students". Although it is difficult to achieve such lofty aims, Dicker accomplishes the task he sets for himself in this exceptional book. In what follows, I will first selectively (...) summarize the book before evaluating its appropriateness for beginners and advanced students, its interpretation of Hume, and its assessments of Hume's claims. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reflection and the Stability of Belief: Essays on Descartes, Hume, and Reid by Louis E. LoebKevin MeekerLouis E. Loeb. Reflection and the Stability of Belief: Essays on Descartes, Hume, and Reid. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. xvii + 369. ISBN: 978-0-19-536876-5, Cloth, $99.00. ISBN 978-0-19-536875-8, Paper, $45.00.This book is (almost entirely) a collection of previously published essays by Louis Loeb. The first three essays focus primarily (...) on advancing the general interpretive claim that Descartes’s main epistemological goal is achieving unshakable beliefs. While essays 5–10 address many topics in Humean interpretation, they all contribute in various ways to supporting Loeb’s claim that Hume’s primary epistemological goal is achieving stable beliefs. Essay 12 compares the naturalisms of Hume and Reid. All of the collected essays are excellent.Such excellence is not surprising, for Loeb is an influential interpreter of early modern philosophy, justly renowned for the ingenuity of his readings. Spanning the last three decades, these essays display many fine qualities that have helped make Loeb such a prominent historian. Here I will briefly mention three of these qualities. First, Loeb has remarkable command of the primary historical texts and the secondary literature. This mastery is perhaps best seen in his “What is Worth Preserving in the Kemp Smith Interpretation of Hume?” (essay 9). In addition to providing a detailed exposition of a wide range of texts from Hume and Norman Kemp Smith, Loeb also makes adroit comments about the literature discussing the secondary literature when he addresses the “Canonical Understanding” of Kemp Smith (246–47). Second, Loeb effortlessly integrates historical and contemporary concerns. His “Hume’s Agent-Centered Sentimentalism” (essay 8), for instance, has [End Page 257] an interesting discussion of how Hume’s moral theory might aid contemporary utilitarians (238–44). Moreover, essays 5 (“Integrating Hume’s Accounts of Belief and Justification”) and 10 (“Psychology, Epistemology, and Skepticism in Hume’s Argument about Induction”) fruitfully discuss Hume’s epistemology in light of issues important to the contemporary distinction between internalism and externalism. Third, Loeb’s intuitive knack for isolating important connections amongst various texts and figures allows him to tell a concise story about the evolution of certain philosophical ideas that panoramically covers large portions of the history of philosophy. His “Locke and British Empiricism” (essay 11), which connects epistemological themes in Locke with Descartes, Hume, Berkeley, Malebranche, and Reid, among others, is one example. (Because this essay is, as of this writing, still forthcoming, it is the only essay that is not previously published.) Finally, all three of these qualities are prominently on display in “Sextus, Descartes, Hume, and Peirce” (essay 4), which interestingly uses contemporary views about belief (especially as developed by David Velleman) to understand Descartes and Hume “against the backdrop of Sextus and Peirce” (107). To my mind this essay is the best in the book.There are at least two main advantages of collecting these excellent essays into a book. First, the collection allows Loeb to systematically emphasize the similarities between different early modern thinkers in a way that typically strengthens the cumulative case he makes for his readings of these philosophers. Second, the volume permits us to catch a rare glimpse of how an interpreter’s views can change over time. Considering the cumulative effect of the arguments as well as the changes in Loeb’s views also provides us with a great opportunity to reflect critically on many important issues in a fruitful way. The rest of this review will focus on such critical reflections.Let us start with Descartes, as Loeb does. In his introduction to the essays, Loeb helpfully contextualizes his discussions of Descartes. He points out that his paper “Was Descartes Sincere in His Appeal to the Light of Nature?” (not included here) maintains that the arguments Descartes presents are so poor that they “suggest” that “Descartes was insincere in offering his proofs of the existence of God and in appealing to Divine veracity to validate clear and distinct perception” (9; cf. 35). Of course others have likewise contended that Descartes was a dissimulator. But in the first four chapters... (shrink)

There may be general agreement that David Hume is some sort of sceptic, but the nature and extent of his scepticism remains a topic of considerable debate amongst scholars. Some scholars claim his scepticism undermines the pursuit of a more positive naturalistic program of a science of human nature, while others maintain that his scepticism is reconcilable with his naturalism. In his book, Kevin Meeker maintains that Hume is a "radical sceptic" of the sort who maintains that all (...) human beliefs are "equal, epistemically speaking" in that none of them have any "positive epistemic status" (17, 26). His interpretation is set against those scholars who emphasize his naturalism. If the main arguments in the book succeeds, then Meeker hopes to "shift the burden of proof" to those who prefer the naturalist reading (7). (shrink)

Predictable polarization is everywhere: we can often predict how people’s opinions, including our own, will shift over time. Extant theories either neglect the fact that we can predict our own polarization, or explain it through irrational mechanisms. They needn’t. Empirical studies suggest that polarization is predictable when evidence is ambiguous, that is, when the rational response is not obvious. I show how Bayesians should model such ambiguity and then prove that—assuming rational updates are those which obey the value of evidence—ambiguity (...) is necessary and sufficient for the rationality of predictable polarization. The main theoretical result is that there can be a series of such updates, each of which is individually expected to make you more accurate, but which together will predictably polarize you. Polarization results from asymmetric increases in accuracy. This mechanism is not only theoretically possible, but empirically plausible. I argue that cognitive search—searching a cognitively accessible space for a particular item—often yields asymmetrically ambiguous evidence, I present an experiment supporting its polarizing effects, and I use simulations to show how it can explain two of the core causes of polarization: confirmation bias and the group polarization effect. (shrink)

A definition of emotion common to the affective sciences is an urgent desideratum. Lack of such a definition is a constant source of numerous misunderstandings and a series of mostly fruitless debates. There is little hope that there ever will be agreement on a common definition of emotion, given the sacred traditions of the disciplines involved and the egos of the scholars working in these disciplines. Our aim here is more modest. We propose a list of elements for a working (...) definition of emotion and discuss the justification for the inclusion of elements from our respective perspectives (philosophy and psychology). This working partial definition may at least serve as a litmus test to examine theories of emotion, old and new, across disciplinary boundaries. (shrink)

We argue that explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), specifically reason-giving XAI, often constitutes the most suitable way of ensuring that someone can properly be held responsible for decisions that are based on the outputs of artificial intelligent (AI) systems. We first show that, to close moral responsibility gaps (Matthias 2004), often a human in the loop is needed who is directly responsible for particular AI-supported decisions. Second, we appeal to the epistemic condition on moral responsibility to argue that, in order to (...) be responsible for her decision, the human in the loop has to have an explanation available of the system’s recommendation. Reason explanations are especially well-suited to this end and we examine whether – and how – it might be possible to make such explanations fit with AI systems. We support our claims by focusing on a case of disagreement between human in the loop and AI system. (shrink)

Husserl seems to have devoted roughly equal amounts of energy and pages to the description of perception, judgement, and imagination. By “description,” he meant the analysis of the traits and components of mental states or acts and their objects. As his views changed over the years about the nature of intentionality and philosophy, the descriptive psychology of the Logical Investigations (1900/01) gave way to descriptive programmes in which the objects of perception and of judgement were conceived of in terms of (...) a new, analytic framework; in particular Husserl lost interest in describing the things and processes in the real world that are the objects of perception and judgement and so too in describing their relations to these acts. His new analytic framework, particularly as it applies to perception, has been thoroughly expounded and discussed in the literature. My aim here is to expound Husserl's first descriptions of perception within the framework of the Investigations and to incorporate as far as possible his later descriptive results to the extent that these are separable from his later turn to idealism. (shrink)

There are many things—call them ‘experts’—that you should defer to in forming your opinions. The trouble is, many experts are modest: they’re less than certain that they are worthy of deference. When this happens, the standard theories of deference break down: the most popular (“Reflection”-style) principles collapse to inconsistency, while their most popular (“New-Reflection”-style) variants allow you to defer to someone while regarding them as an anti-expert. We propose a middle way: deferring to someone involves preferring to make any decision (...) using their opinions instead of your own. In a slogan, deferring opinions is deferring decisions. Generalizing the proposal of Dorst (2020a), we first formulate a new principle that shows exactly how your opinions must relate to an expert’s for this to be so. We then build off the results of Levinstein (2019) and Campbell-Moore (2020) to show that this principle is also equivalent to the constraint that you must always expect the expert’s estimates to be more accurate than your own. Finally, we characterize the conditions an expert’s opinions must meet to be worthy of deference in this sense, showing how they sit naturally between the too-strong constraints of Reflection and the too-weak constraints of New Reflection. (shrink)

An important and engaging book on a key argument in contemporary debates about free will and moral responsibility.

Phenomenal Conservatism (the view that an appearance that p gives one prima facie justification for believing that p) is a promising, and popular, internalist theory of epistemic justification. Despite its popularity, it faces numerous objections and challenges. For instance, epistemologists have argued that Phenomenal Conservatism is incompatible with Bayesianism, is afflicted by bootstrapping and cognitive penetration problems, does not guarantee that epistemic justification is a stable property, does not provide an account of defeat, and is not a complete theory of (...) epistemic justification. This book shows that Phenomenal Conservatism is actually immune to some of these problems, though not all of them. Accordingly, it explores the prospects of integrating Phenomenal Conservatism with Explanationism (the view that epistemic justification is a matter of explanatory relations between one’s evidence and propositions supported by that evidence). The resulting theory, Phenomenal Explanationism, has advantages over Phenomenal Conservatism and Explanationism taken on their own. Phenomenal Explanationism is a highly unified, comprehensive internalist theory of epistemic justification that delivers on the promises of Phenomenal Conservatism while avoiding its pitfalls. (shrink)

Introduction -- Organization, society and politics -- An Aristotelian perspective -- The politics -- The public good -- The rhetoric -- Talk and texts -- The Nichomachean ethics -- Decision making and ethics -- The Poetics -- Bolshevism to ballet in three steps -- What is "public interest"?: a case study -- Where do we go from here?

This paper presents the results of two corpus studies investigating the discourse surrounding conspiracy theories and genuine theories. The results of these studies show that conspiracy theories lack the epistemic and scientific standing characteristic of theories more generally. Instead, our findings indicate that conspiracy theories are spread in a manner that resembles the dissemination of rumors and falsehoods. Based on these empirical results, we argue that it is time for both re-engineering conspiracy theory and for relabeling "conspiracy theory". We propose (...) relabelling conspiracy theories as either "conspiracy stories" or "conspiracy narratives" to more accurately convey their true nature. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAndrew Bacon, Matti Eklund, and Patrick Greenough have individually proposed objections to the project in my book, Replacing Truth. Briefly, the book outlines a conceptual engineering project – our defective concept of truth is replaced for certain purposes with a team of concepts that can do some of the jobs we thought truth could do. Here, I respond to their objections and develop the views expressed in Replacing Truth in various ways.

The standard interpretation of quantum mechanics and a standard interpretation of the awareness of pain have a common feature: Both postulate the existence of an irresolvable duality. Whereas many physicists claim that all particles exhibit particle and wave properties, many philosophers working on pain argue that our awareness of pain is paradoxical, exhibiting both perceptual and introspective characteristics. In this chapter, we offer a pessimistic take on the putative paradox of pain. Specifically, we attempt to resolve the supposed paradox by (...) undermining the reasons offered for accepting the introspective side of the dualism. (shrink)