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  1. Avram Hiller (2013). Knowledge Essentially Based Upon False Belief. Logos and Episteme 4 (1):7-19.
    Richard Feldman and William Lycan have defended a view according to which a necessary condition for a doxastic agent to have knowledge is that the agent’s belief is not essentially based on any false assumptions. I call this the no-essential-false-assumption account, or NEFA. Peter Klein considers examples of what he calls “useful false beliefs” and alters his own account of knowledge in a way which can be seen as a refinement of NEFA. This paper shows that NEFA, even given Klein’s (...)
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  2. Peter Klein (1986). Immune Belief Systems. Philosophical Topics 14 (1):259-280.
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  3. Peter D. Klein (2008). Useful False Beliefs. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. 25--63.
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  4. Peter D. Klein (1983). Real Knowledge. Synthese 55 (2):143 - 164.
    Philosophers have sought to characterize a type of knowledge — what I call real knowledge — which is significantly different from the ordinary concept of knowledge. The concept of knowledge as true, justified belief — what I call knowledge simpliciter — failed to depict the sought after real knowledge because the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of knowledge simpliciter can be felicitously but accidentally fulfilled. Real knowledge is knowledge simpliciter plus a set of requirements which guarantee that the truth, belief (...)
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  5. Peter D. Klein (1981). Certainty, a Refutation of Scepticism. University of Minnesota Press.
    Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.
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  6. Peter D. Klein (1980). Misleading Evidence and the Restoration of Justification. Philosophical Studies 37 (1):81 - 89.
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  7. Peter D. Klein (1979). Misleading "Misleading Defeaters&Quot;. Journal of Philosophy 76 (7):382-386.
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  8. Peter D. Klein (1976). Knowledge, Causality, and Defeasibility. Journal of Philosophy 73 (20):792-812.
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  9. Peter D. Klein (1971). A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 68 (16):471-482.
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  10. Steven R. Levy (1978). Misleading Defeaters. Journal of Philosophy 75 (12):739-742.
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  11. Gregory Wheeler (2014). Defeat Reconsidered and Repaired. The Reasoner 8 (2):15-15.