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  1. Max Baker-Hytch & Matthew A. Benton (2015). Defeatism Defeated. Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):40-66.
    Many epistemologists are enamored with a defeat condition on knowledge. In this paper we present some implementation problems for defeatism, understood along either internalist or externalist lines. We then propose that one who accepts a knowledge norm of belief, according to which one ought to believe only what one knows, can explain away much of the motivation for defeatism. This is an important result, because on the one hand it respects the plausibility of the intuitions about defeat shared by many (...)
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  2. Claudia Blöser, Mikael Janvid, Hannes Ole Matthiessen & Marcus Willaschek (eds.) (2013). Defeasibility in Philosophy: Knowledge, Agency, Responsibility, and the Law. Editions Rodopi.
    Defeasibility, most generally speaking, means that given some set of conditions A, something else B will hold, unless or until defeating conditions C apply. While the term was introduced into philosophy by legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart in 1949, today, the concept of defeasibility is employed in many different areas of philosophy. This volume for the first time brings together contributions on defeasibility from epistemology , legal philosophy and ethics and the philosophy of action . The volume ends with an extensive (...)
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  3. Claudia Blöser, Mikael Janvid, Hannes Ole Matthiessen & Marcus Willaschek (2013). Introduction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 87:1-8.
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  4. William Cornwell (2004). Is Perception Inferential? In Johan Christian Marek & Maria Elisabeth Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium: August 8-14, 2004, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Vol. XII. Niederosterreichkultur 80-82.
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  5. David Godden & Douglas Walton (2007). A Theory of Presumption for Everyday Argumentation. Pragmatics and Cognition 15 (2):313-346.
    The paper considers contemporary models of presumption in terms of their ability to contribute to a working theory of presumption for argumentation. Beginning with the Whatelian model, we consider its contemporary developments and alternatives, as proposed by Sidgwick, Kauffeld, Cronkhite, Rescher, Walton, Freeman, Ullmann-Margalit, and Hansen. Based on these accounts, we present a picture of presumptions characterized by their nature, function, foundation and force. On our account, presumption is a modal status that is attached to a claim and has the (...)
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  6. W. Haas (1957). Defeasibility. Mind 66 (264):543.
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  7. Avram Hiller (2013). Knowledge Essentially Based Upon False Belief. Logos and Episteme 4 (1):7-19.
    Richard Feldman and William Lycan have defended a view according to which a necessary condition for a doxastic agent to have knowledge is that the agent’s belief is not essentially based on any false assumptions. I call this the no-essential-false-assumption account, or NEFA. Peter Klein considers examples of what he calls “useful false beliefs” and alters his own account of knowledge in a way which can be seen as a refinement of NEFA. This paper shows that NEFA, even given Klein’s (...)
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  8. Peter Klein (1986). Immune Belief Systems. Philosophical Topics 14 (1):259-280.
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  9. Peter D. Klein (2008). Useful False Beliefs. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press 25--63.
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  10. Peter D. Klein (1983). Real Knowledge. Synthese 55 (2):143 - 164.
    Philosophers have sought to characterize a type of knowledge — what I call real knowledge — which is significantly different from the ordinary concept of knowledge. The concept of knowledge as true, justified belief — what I call knowledge simpliciter — failed to depict the sought after real knowledge because the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of knowledge simpliciter can be felicitously but accidentally fulfilled. Real knowledge is knowledge simpliciter plus a set of requirements which guarantee that the truth, belief (...)
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  11. Peter D. Klein (1981). Certainty, a Refutation of Scepticism. University of Minnesota Press.
    Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.
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  12. Peter D. Klein (1980). Misleading Evidence and the Restoration of Justification. Philosophical Studies 37 (1):81 - 89.
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  13. Peter D. Klein (1979). Misleading "Misleading Defeaters". Journal of Philosophy 76 (7):382-386.
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  14. Peter D. Klein (1976). Knowledge, Causality, and Defeasibility. Journal of Philosophy 73 (20):792-812.
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  15. Peter D. Klein (1971). A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 68 (16):471-482.
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  16. Keith Lehrer & Thomas Paxson Jr (1969). Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief. Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):225-237.
    The recently offered, Purported counter-Examples to justified, True belief analyses of knowledge are looked at with some care and all found to be either incoherent or inconclusive. It is argued that justified, True belief analyses are based on sound insight into the concept of knowledge. The distinction between having been justified in claiming to know something and actually having known it is used in an effort to get the discussion of knowledge back on the right track.
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  17. Steven R. Levy (1978). Misleading Defeaters. Journal of Philosophy 75 (12):739-742.
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  18. Steven R. Levy (1977). Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):115 - 123.
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  19. Hannes Ole Matthiessen (2014). Epistemic Entitlement. The Right to Believe. Palgrave MacMillan.
    In Epistemic Entitlement. The Right to Believe Hannes Ole Matthiessen develops a social externalist account of epistemic entitlement and perceptual knowledge. The basic idea is that positive epistemic status should be understood as a specific kind of epistemic right, that is a right to believe. Since rights have consequences for how others are required to treat the bearer of the right, they have to be publicly accessible. The author therefore suggests that epistemic entitlement can plausibly be conceptualized as a status (...)
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  20. Hans Rott (2004). Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief Into Knowledge. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):469-493.
    In this paper I discuss the relation between various properties that have been regarded as important for determining whether or not a belief constitutes a piece of knowledge: its stability, strength and sensitivity to truth, as well as the strength of the epistemic position in which the subject is with respect to this belief. Attempts to explicate the relevant concepts more formally with the help of systems of spheres of possible worlds (à la Lewis and Grove) must take care to (...)
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  21. Gregory Wheeler (2014). Defeat Reconsidered and Repaired. The Reasoner 8 (2):15-15.
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