This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
13 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Max Baker-Hytch & Matthew A. Benton (forthcoming). Defeatism Defeated. Philosophical Perspectives.
    Many epistemologists are enamored with a defeat condition on knowledge. In this paper we present some implementation problems for defeatism, understood along either internalist or externalist lines. We then propose that one who accepts a knowledge norm of belief, according to which one ought to believe only what one knows, can explain away much of the motivation for defeatism. This is an important result, because on the one hand it respects the plausibility of the intuitions about defeat shared by many (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. David Godden & Douglas Walton (2007). A Theory of Presumption for Everyday Argumentation. Pragmatics and Cognition 15 (2):313-346.
    The paper considers contemporary models of presumption in terms of their ability to contribute to a working theory of presumption for argumentation. Beginning with the Whatelian model, we consider its contemporary developments and alternatives, as proposed by Sidgwick, Kauffeld, Cronkhite, Rescher, Walton, Freeman, Ullmann-Margalit, and Hansen. Based on these accounts, we present a picture of presumptions characterized by their nature, function, foundation and force. On our account, presumption is a modal status that is attached to a claim and has the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Avram Hiller (2013). Knowledge Essentially Based Upon False Belief. Logos and Episteme 4 (1):7-19.
    Richard Feldman and William Lycan have defended a view according to which a necessary condition for a doxastic agent to have knowledge is that the agent’s belief is not essentially based on any false assumptions. I call this the no-essential-false-assumption account, or NEFA. Peter Klein considers examples of what he calls “useful false beliefs” and alters his own account of knowledge in a way which can be seen as a refinement of NEFA. This paper shows that NEFA, even given Klein’s (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Peter Klein (1986). Immune Belief Systems. Philosophical Topics 14 (1):259-280.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Peter D. Klein (2008). Useful False Beliefs. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press 25--63.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Peter D. Klein (1983). Real Knowledge. Synthese 55 (2):143 - 164.
    Philosophers have sought to characterize a type of knowledge — what I call real knowledge — which is significantly different from the ordinary concept of knowledge. The concept of knowledge as true, justified belief — what I call knowledge simpliciter — failed to depict the sought after real knowledge because the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of knowledge simpliciter can be felicitously but accidentally fulfilled. Real knowledge is knowledge simpliciter plus a set of requirements which guarantee that the truth, belief (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Peter D. Klein (1981). Certainty, a Refutation of Scepticism. University of Minnesota Press.
    Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Peter D. Klein (1980). Misleading Evidence and the Restoration of Justification. Philosophical Studies 37 (1):81 - 89.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Peter D. Klein (1979). Misleading "Misleading Defeaters". Journal of Philosophy 76 (7):382-386.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Peter D. Klein (1976). Knowledge, Causality, and Defeasibility. Journal of Philosophy 73 (20):792-812.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Peter D. Klein (1971). A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 68 (16):471-482.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Steven R. Levy (1978). Misleading Defeaters. Journal of Philosophy 75 (12):739-742.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Gregory Wheeler (2014). Defeat Reconsidered and Repaired. The Reasoner 8 (2):15-15.