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  1. Diana Ackerman (1979). Proper Names, Propositional Attitudes and Non-Descriptive Connotations. Philosophical Studies 35 (1):55 - 69.
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  2. Jacob Beck (forthcoming). Sense, Mentalese, and Ontology. Protosociology, 30 (Special Issue: Concepts.
    Modes of presentation are often posited to accommodate Frege’s puzzle. Philosophers differ, however, in whether they follow Frege in identifying modes of presentation with Fregean senses, or instead take them to be formally individuated symbols of “Mentalese”. Building on Fodor, Margolis and Laurence defend the latter view by arguing that the mind-independence of Fregean senses renders them ontologically suspect in a way that Mentalese symbols are not. This paper shows how Fregeans can withstand this objection. Along the way, a clearer (...)
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  3. Rod Bertolet (2006). Modes of Presentation and Modes of Determination in Frege. Journal of Philosophical Research 31:233-238.
    Michael Beaney has argued that Frege’s characterization of the senses of names as modes of presentation early in “On Sense and Reference” is problematic, but the problem disappears if we use the notion of modes of determination as that was deployed in the Begriffsschrift to characterize senses. It is argued that there is no philosophically interesting difference between the two notions, and no problem posed by modes of presentation that would be resolved by appeal to modes of determination.
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  4. Rod Bertolet (1994). Conventions and Coreferentiality. Journal of Philosophical Research 19:257-262.
    In Frege’s Puzzle, Nathan Salmon takes it to be obvious that the fact that names such as ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are coreferential is purely a matter of arbitrary linguistic convention, while the fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus is by no means a conventional matter. Salmon also takes these points to be ones to which Frege appeals in the opening paragraph of “On Sense and Reference,” and hence finds it ironic that these points undercut the theory of sense that Frege develops (...)
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  5. J. I. Biro & Petr Kot̓átko (eds.) (1995). Frege, Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    This volume bears witness to the continuing importance and influence of that agenda.
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  6. Robert Briscoe (2006). Individualism, Externalism and Idiolectical Meaning. Synthese 152 (1):95-128.
    Semantic externalism in contemporary philosophy of language typically – and often tacitly – combines two supervenience claims about idiolectical meaning (i.e., meaning in the language system of an individual speaker). The first claim is that the meaning of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her intrinsic, physical properties. The second is that the meaning of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her understanding of its use. I here show (...)
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  7. Tyler Burge (2005). Truth, Thought, Reason: Essays on Frege. Oxford University Press.
    Tyler Burge presents a collection of his seminal essays on Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), who has a strong claim to be seen as the founder of modern analytic philosophy, and whose work remains at the centre of philosophical debate today. Truth, Thought, Reason gathers some of Burge's most influential work from the last twenty-five years, and also features important new material, including a substantial introduction and postscripts to four of the ten papers. It will be an essential resource for any historian (...)
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  8. Tyler Burge (1979). Sinning Against Frege. Philosophical Review 88 (3):398-432.
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  9. H. G. Callaway (2008). Sense and Mode of Presentation. In , Meaning without Analyticity.
    Theories of linguistic meaning have been a major influence in twentieth century philosophy. This is due, in part, to the assumption that meaning is the crucial and interesting thing about language. To know the meaning of an expression is to understand it, and since understanding is central to philosophy in many different ways, it should be no surprise that the notion of meaning has often taken center stage. The aim of this paper is to briefly explore some influential views concerning (...)
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  10. H. G. Callaway (1993). Context for Meaning and Analysis, A Critical Study in the Philosophy of Language. Rodopi.
    This book provides a concise overview, with excellent historical and systematic coverage, of the problems of the philosophy of language in the analytic tradition. Howard Callaway explains and explores the relation of language to the philosophy of mind and culture, to the theory of knowledge, and to ontology. He places the question of linguistic meaning at the center of his investigations. The teachings of authors who have become classics in the field, including Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, and Putnam are (...)
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  11. Manuel Campos (2003). Communication Without Sense. Teorema 22 (1-2):5-21.
    Different authors of Fregean inspiration have argued recently for the need of resorting to senses in order to explain successful communication. Such arguments have led some philosophers to develop theories of sense which include some of the externalist insights brought up by neo-Russellians. In this paper, we argue that these theories of sense don't work. We also present a broadly neo-Russellian account that explains away Fregean puzzles on communication without resource to entities like senses.
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  12. Wolfgang Carl (1994). Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Its Origins and Scope. Cambridge University Press.
    Gottlob Frege has exerted an enormous influence on the evolution of twentieth-century philosophy, yet the real significance of that influence is still very much a matter of debate. This book provides a completely new and systematic account of Frege's philosophy by focusing on its cornerstone: the theory of sense and reference. Two features distinguish this study from other books on Frege. First, sense and reference are placed absolutely at the core of Frege's work; the author shows that no adequate account (...)
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  13. David Chalmers (forthcoming). Frontloading and Fregean Sense: Reply to Neta, Schroeter, and Stanley. Analysis.
    A reply to Ram Neta, Laura Schroeter, and Jason Stanley, for a symposium in Analysis on Constructing the World.
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  14. David J. Chalmers (2002). On Sense and Intension. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):135-82.
    What is involved in the meaning of our expressions? Frege suggested that there is an aspect of an expression.
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  15. Oswaldo Chateaubriand (2007). The Truth of Thoughts: Variations on Fregean Themes. Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):199-215.
    In this paper I present an abstract theory of senses, thoughts, and truth, inspired by ideas of Frege. "Inspired" because for the most part I shall not pretend to interpret Frege in a literal sense, but, rather, develop some of his ideas in ways that seem to me to preserve important aspects of them. Senses are characterized as identifying properties; i.e., roughly, as properties that apply, in virtue of their logical structure, to exactly one thing, if they apply to anything (...)
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  16. Alonzo Church (1993). A Revised Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation. Alternative (1). Noûs 27 (2):141-157.
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  17. Alonzo Church (1974). Outline of a Revised Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation (Part II). Noûs 8 (2):135-156.
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  18. Alonzo Church (1973). Outline of a Revised Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation (Part I). Noûs 7 (1):24-33.
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  19. David Coder (1974). The Opening Passage of Frege's 'Über Sinn Und Bedeutung'. Philosophia 4 (2-3):339-343.
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  20. Jonathan Cohen (2000). Analyticity and Katz's New Intensionalism: Or, If You Sever Sense From Reference, Analyticity is Cheap but Useless. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):115-135.
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  21. Michael E. Cuffaro (2012). Kant and Frege on Existence and the Ontological Argument. History of Philosophy Quarterly 29 (4):337-354.
    I argue that Kant's and Frege's refutations of the ontological argument are more similar than has generally been acknowledged. As I clarify, for both Kant and Frege, to say that something exists is to assert of a concept that it is instantiated. With such an assertion one expresses that there is a particular relation between the instantiating object and a rational subject - a particular mode of presentation for the object in question. By its very nature such a relation cannot (...)
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  22. Jan Dejnožka (2010). Dummett's Forward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism. Diametros 25:118-131.
    This paper continues Michael Dummett's and my discussion of Frege in The Philosophy of Michael Dummett [2007]. Most of it is about Dummett’s change in view on Frege’s senses and objects. The issues include: the cognitive order versus the ontological order for the forward road; the nature and identity of senses and the different senses of "intension;" the nature of saturation; whether special quantifiers are now needed for senses; and Frege’s earlier and later permutation arguments. I discuss the implications of (...)
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  23. Imogen Dickie (2008). Informative Identities in the Begriffsschrift and 'on Sense and Reference'. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):pp. 269-288.
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  24. Imogen Dickie & Gurpreet Rattan (2010). Sense, Communication, and Rational Engagement. Dialectica 64 (2):131-151.
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  25. Michael Dummett (1973). Frege: Philosophy of Language. Duckworth.
    This highly acclaimed book is a major contribution to the philosophy of language as well as a systematic interpretation of Frege, indisputably the father of ...
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  26. Michael A. E. Dummett (1981). The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
  27. Edward Elliott, Kelvin McQueen & Clas Weber (2013). Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism and Arguments From Epistemic Misclassification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):375-389.
    According to Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics (E2D), expressions have a counterfactual intension and an epistemic intension. Epistemic intensions reflect cognitive significance such that sentences with necessary epistemic intensions are a priori. We defend E2D against an influential line of criticism: arguments from epistemic misclassification. We focus in particular on the arguments of Speaks [2010] and Schroeter [2005]. Such arguments conclude that E2D is mistaken from (i) the claim that E2D is committed to classifying certain sentences as a priori, and (ii) the (...)
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  28. Maite Ezcurdia (1995). Modos de presentación y modos de determinación. Crítica 27 (80):57 - 96.
    In this paper I argue that, in order to make (T1) and (T2) compatible within a Fregean approach, we must reject the view that all modes of presentation are senses. (T1) There is a diversity of ways in which Venus may be presented to each subject, and which are associated with the name ‘Venus’. (T2) There is only one Fregean thought expressed by the sentence ‘Venus is a planet’. Modes of presentation are essentially psychological and have causal powers on minds. (...)
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  29. Bryan Frances (2000). Disquotation and Substitutivity. Mind 109 (435):519-25.
    Millianism is reasonable; that is, it is reasonable to think that all there is to the semantic value of a proper name is its referent. But Millianism appears to be undermined by the falsehood of Substitutivity, the principle that interchanging coreferential proper names in an intentional context cannot change the truth value of the resulting belief report. Mary might be perfectly rational in assenting to ‘Twain was a great writer’ as well as ‘Clemens was not a great writer’. Her confusion (...)
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  30. G. Frege, On Sinn and Bedeutung.
  31. Gottlob Frege (2010). On Sense and Reference. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge. 36--56.
    Equality1 gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects? In my Begriffsschrift I assumed the latter. The reasons which seem to favour this are the following: a = a and a = b are obviously statements of differing cognitive value; a = a holds a priori and, according to Kant, is to be labeled analytic, while statements of the form a = (...)
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  32. Gottlob Frege (1956). The Thought: A Logical Inquiry. Mind 65 (259):289-311.
  33. Gottlob Frege (1948). Sense and Reference. Philosophical Review 57 (3):209-230.
    This book is an analysis of Frege's views on language metaphysics raised in On Sense Reference, arguably one of the most important philosophical essays of the past hundred years. It provides a thorough introduction to the function/argument analysis and applies Frege's technique to the central notions of predication, identity, existence and truth. Of particular interest is the analysis of the Paradox of Identity and a discussion of three solutions: the little-known Begriffsschrift solution, the sense/reference solution, and Russell's 'On Denoting' solution. (...)
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  34. Gottlob Frege (1892/1960). Über Sinn und Bedeutung. Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1):25--50.
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  35. Andre T. Fuhrmann (1987). Fregean Sense Overlap. Philosophical Quarterly 37 (149):412-420.
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  36. Richard Gaskin (1997). Fregean Sense and Russellian Propositions. Philosophical Studies 86 (2):131-154.
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  37. Irwin Goldstein (1994). Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.
    Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
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  38. Karen Green (2001). Dummett: Philosophy of Language. Polity Press.
    Dummett's output has been prolific and highly influential, but not always as accessible as it deserves to be. This book sets out to rectify this situation.
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  39. Mitchell S. Green (2002). The Inferential Significance of Frege's Assertion Sign. Facta Philosophica 4 (2).
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  40. Harry Halpin (2011). Sense and Reference on the Web. Minds and Machines 21 (2):153-178.
    We examine a crucial question for the World Wide Web: What does a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) mean? Crucial for the next-generation Semantic Web, can it refer to things outside web-pages? The Web is a universal information space for naming and accessing information via URIs. However, the classical philosophical problems of meaning and reference that have been the source of debate within the philosophy of language return when the Web is given as the foundation for a knowledge representation with the (...)
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  41. Edward Harcourt (2000). The First Person: Problems of Sense and Reference. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 46:25-.
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  42. Robert M. Harnish (1994). What is the Sense of Phos and Hes? Grazer Philosophische Studien 47:185-196.
    Frege's puzzle for demonstratives is accounting for the cognitive significance of identity statements containing demonstratives, such as "That [demonstration-1] is identical to that [demonstration-2]". Since the demonstrative 'that' makes the same semantic contribution (has the same 'character') on both occurrences, the difference must be due to the cognitive significance or 'senses' of the associated demonstrations. But what is the sense of a demonstration? Kaplan's suggested solutions in terms of gestures and appearances are not compatible with his general theory, and do (...)
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  43. HaroldHodes (2004). On the Sense and Reference of a Logical Constant. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):134–165.
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  44. Richard Heck (2002). Do Demonstratives Have Senses? Philosophers' Imprint 2 (2):1-33.
    Frege held that referring expressions in general, and demonstratives and indexicals in particular, contribute more than just their reference to what is expressed by utterances of sentences containing them. Heck first attempts to get clear about what the essence of the Fregean view is, arguing that it rests upon a certain conception of linguistic communication that is ultimately indefensible. On the other hand, however, he argues that understanding a demonstrative (or indexical) utterance requires one to think of the object denoted (...)
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  45. Richard Heck (1996). Communication and Knowledge: Rejoinder to Byrne and Thau. Mind 105 (417):151 - 156.
    A reply to Byrne and Thau's criticisms of "The Sense of Communiction".
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  46. Richard Heck (1995). The Sense of Communication. Mind 104 (413):79 - 106.
    Many philosophers nowadays believe Frege was right about belief, but wrong about language: The contents of beliefs need to be individuated more finely than in terms of Russellian propositions, but the contents of utterances do not. I argue that this 'hybrid view' cannot offer no reasonable account of how communication transfers knowledge from one speaker to another and that, to do so, we must insist that understanding depends upon more than just getting the references of terms right.
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  47. Richard Heck & Robert May (2011). The Composition of Thoughts. Noûs 45 (1):126-166.
    Are Fregean thoughts compositionally complex and composed of senses? We argue that, in Begriffsschrift, Frege took 'conceptual contents' to be unstructured, but that he quickly moved away from this position, holding just two years later that conceptual contents divide of themselves into 'function' and 'argument'. This second position is shown to be unstable, however, by Frege's famous substitution puzzle. For Frege, the crucial question the puzzle raises is why "The Morning Star is a planet" and "The Evening Star is a (...)
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  48. Richard Heck & Robert May (2006). Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.
    An investigation of Frege's various contributions to the study of language, focusing on three of his most famous doctrines: that concepts are unsaturated, that sentences refer to truth-values, and that sense must be distinguished from reference.
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  49. Harold T. Hodes (2004). On The Sense and Reference of A Logical Constant. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):134-165.
    Logicism is, roughly speaking, the doctrine that mathematics is fancy logic. So getting clear about the nature of logic is a necessary step in an assessment of logicism. Logic is the study of logical concepts, how they are expressed in languages, their semantic values, and the relationships between these things and the rest of our concepts, linguistic expressions, and their semantic values. A logical concept is what can be expressed by a logical constant in a language. So the question “What (...)
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  50. Melinda Hogan (2003). Brute Error Without Sinn: Identity Claims in the Phaedo and in Frege. In Naomi Reshotko (ed.), Desire, Identity, and Existence: Essays in Honor of T.M. Penner.
    There is a parallel between Plato's argument for the forms at 74b7-c5 in the Phaedo and Frege's argument for the claim that proper names express senses. There is also, I claim, an important asymmetry. The asymmetry explains why it is consistent to accept the conclusion of the Phaedo argument without accepting the conclusion of Frege's argument. The Phaedo argument turns on the possibility of a specific kind of mistaken judgement that may be termed "brute error". Frege's argument does not so (...)
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