In the article I discuss functionalist interpretations of Husserlian phenomenology. The first one was coined in the discussion between Hubert Dreyfus and Ronald McIntyre. They argue that Husserl’s phenomenology shares similarities with computational functionalism, and the key similarity is between the concept of noema and the concept of mental representation. I show the weaknesses of that reading and argue that there is another available functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology. I propose to shift perspective and approach the relation between phenomenology and (...) functionalism from a methodological perspective, specifically taking into account the functionalist explanatory strategy called functional analysis. I discuss the notion of function in Husserl’s works and Husserl’s idea of functional phenomenology. The key argument I develop is that in functional phenomenology we can find an explanatory strategy which is analogous to the strategy of functional decomposition used in functional analysis. I conclude that the proposed functionalist reading of phenomenology opens a new approach to the integration of phenomenology with cognitive sciences. (shrink)

The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first (...) aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism. (shrink)

It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe for practical reasons because we can often cause our beliefs for practical reasons. This paper reveals the limits of this recently popular strategy for defending pragmatism, and thereby reshapes the dialectical options for pragmatism. I argue that the strategy presupposes that reasons for being in non-intentional states are not reducible (...) to reasons to act. Pragmatists who want to preserve a motivational constraint on reasons therefore have exactly two options: either arguing that there are irreducible reasons for being in non-intentional states ; or arguing that we can believe directly for practical reasons. I argue that the prospects for the former option are dim because irreducible reasons to be in states are hard to square with the motivational constraint on reasons. Returning to the more traditional route of arguing for pragmatism by defending a version of doxastic voluntarism therefore seems to be the more promising way for pragmatists to go. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to introduce the work of Leopold Blaustein — philosopher and psychologist, who studied under Kazimierz Twardowski in Lvov and under Husserl in Freiburg im Breisgau. In his short academic career Blaustein developed an original philosophy that drew upon both phenomenology and Twardowski’s analytical approach. One of his main publications concerns Husserl’s early theory of intentional act and object, introduced in Logische Untersuchungen. In the first part of the article I briefly present Blaustein’s biography and (...) some general features of his philosophy. The second part provides an overview of Blaustein’s dissertation concerning Husserl’s early phenomenology. In the third and final part I summarize Blaustein’s research, including the critical remarks of Roman Ingarden. (shrink)

Das Buch beschreibt die Transformation des Diskurses der Kulturwissenschaft, der seit seinem Entstehen um die Jahrhundertwende auch die deutsch-jüdische Interkulturalität retten sollte, in einem Diskurs der politischen Theologie (Carl Schmitt und Gerschom Scholem), über den sich der katastrophale Trennungsprozess beider Kulturen vollstreckt.

Clinical Ethics Consultations are an important tool for physicians in solving difficult cases. They are extremely common in North America and to a lesser extent also present in Europe. However, there is little data on this practice in Poland. We present results of a survey of 521 physicians practising in Poland concerning their opinion on CECs and related practices. We analysed the data looking at such issues as CECs’ perceived availability, use of CECs, and perceived usefulness of such support. Physicians (...) in our study generally encounter hard ethics cases, even—surprisingly—those who do not work in hospitals. Most physicians have no CEC access, and those that do still do not employ CECs. However, physicians perceive this form of support as useful—even more so among actual users of CECs. We compared these findings with similar studies from other European countries and the North America. We point out peculiarities of our results as compared to those in other countries, with some possible explanations. We hope the results may encourage regulatory debate on the need to formally introduce CECs into the Polish healthcare system. (shrink)

Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal to reasons-responsiveness, can (...) make sense of blameworthiness for non-culpable attitudes. In response, voluntarists could propose a revision of our actual practices. This would lead us into a quite different debate. (shrink)

Artykuł podejmuje polemikę z obiegowym rozumieniem tolerancji. Autor podkreśla znaczenie podziału na tolerancję jako postawę i na dyskursy o tolerancji. Następnie, w nawiązaniu i częściowo w dyskusji z koncepcją tolerancji zaproponowaną przez Iję Lazari Pawłowską, przedstawione jest rozróżnienie trzech odmian tolerancji, a także rozróżnienie odpowiednich trzech odmian nietolerancji. Rozważane są również niektóre paradoksy związane z tolerancją oraz ze zwalczaniem nietolerancji.

The paper is a contribution to the debate on the epistemological status of thought experiments. I deal with the epistemological uniqueness of experiments in the sense of their irreducibility to other sources of justification. In particular, I criticize an influential argument for the irreducibility of thought experiments to general arguments. First, I introduce the radical empiricist theory of eliminativism, which considers thought experiments to be rhetorically modified arguments, uninteresting from the epistemological point of view. Second, I present objections to the (...) theory, focusing on the critique of eliminativism by Tamar Szabó Gendler based on the reconstruction of famous Galileo's Pisa experiment. I show that her reconstruction is simplistic and that more elaborate reconstruction is needed for an appropriate assessment of the epistemic power of general argument. I propose such a reconstruction and demonstrate that general version of Pisa experiment is epistemically equal to the particular one. Thus, from an epistemological perspective, Galileo's thought experiment is reducible to a straightforward argument without particular premises. (shrink)

Introduction: A Theory of Democracy and Justice.

The Law of Peoples and Global Justice: Beyond the Liberal Nationalism of John Rawls The paper deals with the relation of a theory of international justice, specifically John Rawls's philosophy of the law of peoples, and a theory of global justice. In the first part, the paper outlines Rawls's main theses on the international conception of the law of peoples. The second part concerns a problem found in segments of Rawls's theory, specifically his concept of a social contract—contractualism. This problem (...) inadequately approaches the relationship between the individual and the community. The third part deals with the inconsistent points in Rawls's theory contained in part two, i.e. his principles of justice selected with the aid of social contract. In the fourth part, the paper concentrates on the consequences of these limitations for a socially distributive dimension of justice or as an approach for dealing with disproportionate global inequalities. The last part formulates the causes of the limitations of Rawls's theory of international justice and points out the need for a global justice which is socially and inter-culturally considerate. (shrink)

Descriptions of bodies within the literature of the enactive approach to cognitive science exhibit an interesting dialectical tension. On the one hand, a body is considered to be a unity which instantiates an identity, forming an intrinsic basis for value. On the other, a living body is in a reciprocally defining relationship with the environment, and is therefore immersed and entangled with, rather than distinct from, its environment. In this paper I examine this tension, and its implications for the enactive (...) approach, particularly the enactive conceptions of life and bodies. Following the lead of others, I argue that enactive cognitive science can benefit from a deeper reading and integration with extant work on the complexity and multiplicity of the living body within feminist philosophy and feminist science studies. (shrink)

The fact of religious diversity is vital for the philosopher of religion but also, to some extent, for the believer of a given faith. It takes place in such a dimension in which the views of a given believer or the meaning of the practice of a given religion presupposes the truthfulness of specific claims concerning a given religion or the beliefs included in it. If now on the part of the philosopher of religion or the followers of another religion, (...) there is a direct or indirect challenge to such a key proposition, religious disagreement with epistemic dimension is involved. At the same time, it is not the case that any religious diversity is a case of epistemically significant religious dissent. The paper, by distinguishing different aspects of religions and functions performed by religion, tries to show in which situations religious diversification leads to religious disagreement. Both the follower of religion and the philosopher of religion can and should seek the truth in matters of crucial importance to religion. The difference is that the follower of a given religion is more interested in the salvific and practical functions of religion, along with the associated sense of value and meaningfulness of life and, to a lesser degree, the theoretical certainty that her religion is correct at crucial points. On the other hand, the achievement of ‘the soteriological’ purpose of religion based on false belief is impossible, just as the meaningfulness of life 'based on the sand and not on the rock’. It is because the false foundation is devoid of higher value. That is why there is a community of a philosopher of religion and a follower of a given religion to search for the truth of it. (shrink)

Local hidden-variable model of singlet-state correlations discussed in Czachor is shown to be a particular case of an infinite hierarchy of local hidden-variable models based on an infinite hierarchy of calculi. Violation of Bell-type inequalities can be interpreted as a ‘confusion of languages’ problem, a result of mixing different but neighboring levels of the hierarchy. Mixing of non-neighboring levels results in violations beyond the Tsirelson bounds.

The paper links higher education reforms and welfare states reforms in postcommunist Central European countries. It links current higher education debates (and reform pressures) and public sector debates (and reform pressures), stressing the importance of communist-era legacies in both areas. It refers to existing typologies of both higher education governance and welfare state regimes and concludes that the lack of the inclusion of Central Europe in any of them is a serious theoretical drawback in comparative social research. The region should (...) still, after more than two decades of transition and heavy international policy advising, be viewed as a “laboratory of social experimentation”. It is still too risky to suggest generalizations about how Central European higher education and welfare systems fit existing typologies. Consequently, the “transition” period is by no means over: it is over in terms of politics and economics but not in terms of social arrangements. Both higher education and welfare states should be viewed as “work in progress”: permanently under reform pressures, and with unclear future. (shrink)

Bell’s theorem cannot be proved if complementary measurements have to be represented by random variables which cannot be added or multiplied. One such case occurs if their domains are not identical. The case more directly related to the Einstein–Rosen–Podolsky argument occurs if there exists an ‘element of reality’ but nevertheless addition of complementary results is impossible because they are represented by elements from different arithmetics. A naive mixing of arithmetics leads to contradictions at a much more elementary level than the (...) Clauser–Horne–Shimony–Holt inequality. (shrink)

Newtonian physics is based on Newtonian calculus applied to Newtonian dynamics. New paradigms such as ‘modified Newtonian dynamics’ change the dynamics, but do not alter the calculus. However, calculus is dependent on arithmetic, that is the ways we add and multiply numbers. For example, in special relativity we add and subtract velocities by means of addition β1⊕β2=tanh+tanh-1)\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\beta _1\oplus \beta _2=\tanh \big +\tanh ^{-1}\big )$$\end{document}, although multiplication β1⊙β2=tanh·tanh-1)\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} (...) \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\beta _1\odot \beta _2=\tanh \big \cdot \tanh ^{-1}\big )$$\end{document}, and division β1⊘β2=tanh/tanh-1)\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\beta _1\oslash \beta _2=\tanh \big /\tanh ^{-1}\big )$$\end{document} do not seem to appear in the literature. The map fX=tanh-1\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$f_{\mathbb{X}}=\tanh ^{-1}$$\end{document} defines an isomorphism of the arithmetic in X=\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbb{X}}=$$\end{document} with the standard one in R\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbb{R}}$$\end{document}. The new arithmetic is projective and non-Diophantine in the sense of Burgin, 1977), while ultrarelativistic velocities are super-large in the sense of Kolmogorov, 1961). Velocity of light plays a role of non-Diophantine infinity. The new arithmetic allows us to define the corresponding derivative and integral, and thus a new calculus which is non-Newtonian in the sense of Grossman and Katz. Treating the above example as a paradigm, we ask what can be said about the set X\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbb{X}}$$\end{document} of ‘real numbers’, and the isomorphism fX:X→R\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$f_{{\mathbb{X}}}:{\mathbb{X}}\rightarrow {\mathbb{R}}$$\end{document}, if we assume the standard form of Newtonian mechanics and general relativity but demand agreement with astrophysical observations. It turns out that the observable accelerated expansion of the Universe can be reconstructed with zero cosmological constant if fX≈0.8sinh/\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$f_{\mathbb{X}}\approx 0.8\sinh /$$\end{document}. The resulting non-Newtonian model is exactly equivalent to the standard Newtonian one with ΩΛ=0.7\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\Omega _\Lambda =0.7$$\end{document}, ΩM=0.3\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\Omega _M=0.3$$\end{document}. Asymptotically flat rotation curves are obtained if ‘zero’, the neutral element 0X\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$0_{{\mathbb{X}}}$$\end{document} of addition, is nonzero from the point of view of the standard arithmetic of R\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbb{R}}$$\end{document}. This implies fX-1=0X>0\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$f^{-1}_{{\mathbb{X}}}=0_{{\mathbb{X}}}>0$$\end{document}. The opposition Diophantine versus non-Diophantine, or Newtonian versus non-Newtonian, is an arithmetic analogue of Euclidean versus non-Euclidean in geometry. We do not yet know if the proposed generalization ultimately removes any need of dark matter, but it will certainly change estimates of its parameters. Physics of the dark universe seems to be both geometry and arithmetic. (shrink)

The Polish equivalents of Research Ethics Committees are Bioethics Committees (BCs). A questionnaire study has been undertaken to determine their situation. The BC is usually comprised of 13 members. Nine of these are doctors and four are non-doctors. In 2006 BCs assessed an average of 27.3 ± 31.7 (range: 0–131) projects of clinical trials and 71.1 ± 139.8 (range: 0–638) projects of other types of medical research. During one BC meeting an average of 10.3 ± 14.7 (range: 0–71) projects of (...) medical research were assessed (2006). The amendment of Polish laws according with Directive 2001/20/EC caused a percentage increase in BCs which assessed less than 20 projects per year (16% vs. 33% or 42% in 2003 vs. 2005 or 2006 respectively, p < 0,05). The results confirm the usefulness of the current practice of creating BCs by medical universities, medical institutes and regional chambers of physicians and dentists but rationalization of the workload for individual BCs is necessary. (shrink)

According to UNESCO guidelines, one of the four forms of bioethics committees in medicine are the Hospital Ethics Committees. The purpose of this study was to evaluate how the above guidelines are implemented in real practice. There were 111 hospitals selected out of 176 Polish clinical hospitals and hospitals accredited by Center of Monitoring Quality in Health System. The study was conducted by the survey method. There were 56 hospitals that responded to the survey. The number of HECs members fluctuated (...) between 3 and 16 members, where usually 5 members were part of the board committee. The composition of the HECs for professions other than physicians was diverse and non-standardized. Only 55 % of HECs had a professional set of standards. 98 % of HECs had specific tasks. 62 % of HECs were asked for their expertise, and 55 % prepared <6.88 % of the opinions were related to interpersonal relations between hospital personnel, patients and their families with emphasis on the interactions between superiors and their inferiors or hospital staff and patients and their families. Only 12 % of the opinions were reported by the respondents as related to ethical dilemmas. In conclusion, few Polish hospitals have HECs, and the structure, services and workload are not always adequate. To ensure a reliable operation of HECs requires the development of relevant legislation, standard operating procedures and well trained members. (shrink)

We generalize the notion of analytic/Borel equivalence relations, orbit equivalence relations, and Borel reductions between them to their continuous and quantitative counterparts: analytic/Borel pseudometrics, orbit pseudometrics, and Borel reductions between them. We motivate these concepts on examples and we set some basic general theory. We illustrate the new notion of reduction by showing that the Gromov–Hausdorff distance maintains the same complexity if it is defined on the class of all Polish metric spaces, spaces bounded from below, from above, and from (...) both below and above. Then we show that [Formula: see text] is not reducible to equivalences induced by orbit pseudometrics, generalizing the seminal result of Kechris and Louveau. We answer in negative a question of Ben Yaacov, Doucha, Nies, and Tsankov on whether balls in the Gromov–Hausdorff and Kadets distances are Borel. In appendix, we provide new methods using games showing that the distance-zero classes in certain pseudometrics are Borel, extending the results of Ben Yaacov, Doucha, Nies, and Tsankov. There is a complementary paper of the authors where reductions between the most common pseudometrics from functional analysis and metric geometry are provided. (shrink)

Referring to basic Weberian notions of rationalization and secularization, I try to find a more accurate sense of the term “secularization”, intending to describe adequately the position of religion in modernity. The result of this query is—or at least should be—a new, original conceptualization of religion as one of finite provinces of meaning within one paramount reality of the life-world, as defined by Alfred Schutz. I proceed by exposing a well known, major oversimplification of the Weberian concept of secularization, very (...) well outlined in Peter Berger’s The sacred canopy, in order to point to the genuine, much more differentiated position of Max Weber in this matter (especially from the period of Foundations of social economic and Economy and society), and, consequently, to return to the roots of Berger’s thought: phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schutz, an attempt to assure the philosophical foundations of Weber’s sociological theory. At a closer glimpse, transformation of religion in the modern process of rationalization does not consist—according to Weber—in eliminating religion and thus depriving society of the religious source of meaning, but in parallel emancipation of many different domains of rationality, including religion itself. Using Schutz’s analysis of the social world as a complex structure of many different final provinces of meaning, I describe religion as such a province and show what does the process of rationalization of this province consist and what it should consist in: a complex, ongoing exchange of cognitive relevances and contents, combined with growing autonomy of many different sub-worlds. Schutz’s theory of symbol, rooted in Edmund Husserl’s description of constitution of complex objects in mono- and polythetic acts of consciousness, moves the analysis to the epistemological level, pointing to a chance of intensifying our cognitive relation to reality through increasing interpenetration of various sub-universes of meaning. (shrink)

Kuala Lumpur is a diverse city representing many different religions and nationalities. Recent government policy has actively promoted unity and cohesion throughout the city; and the country of Malaysia, with the implementation of a programme called 1Malaysia. In this book, the authors investigate the aims of this programme – predominantly to unify the Malaysian society – and how these objectives resonate in the daily spatial practices of the city’s residents. -/- This book argues that elements of urban infrastructure could work (...) as an essential mediator ‘beyond community’, allowing inclusive social structures to be built, despite cultural and religious tensions existing within the city. It builds on the premise of an empirical study which explores the ways in which different communities use the same spaces, supported through the implementation of a theoretical framework which looks at both Western and Islamic conceptualisations of the notion of community. Through the analysis of Kuala Lumpur, this book contributes towards the creation of more inclusive places in multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious communities across the world. (shrink)

Can we see the expressiveness of other people's gestures, hear the intentions in their voice, see the emotions in their posture? Traditional theories of social cognition still say we cannot because intentions and emotions for them are hidden away inside and we do not have direct access to them. Enactive theories still have no idea because they have so far mainly focused on perception of our physical world. We surmise, however, that the latter hold promise since, in trying to understand (...) cognition, enactive theory focuses on the embodied engagements of a cognizer with his world. In this paper, we attempt an answer for the question What is social perception in an enactive account? In enaction, perception is conceived as a skill, crucially involving action, an ability to work successfully within the set of regularities, or contingencies that characterize a given domain. If this is the case, then social perception should be a social skill. Having thus transformed the question of what social perception is into that of what social skill is, we examine the concept of social contingencies and the manner in which social skills structure—both constrain and empower— social interaction. Some of the implications of our account for how social and physical perception differ, the role of embodiment in social interaction and the distinction between our approach and other social contingency theories are also addressed. (shrink)

The book discusses trust in gods and how people have sought to reinvest this trust as religious faith has diminished; the effect of low social trust on economic ...

Prezentowana tu książka jest poświęcona relacjom między filozofią a polityką, politycznemu zaangażowaniu filozofii bądź jej ucieczce przed owym zaangażowaniem. W moim ujęciu pytania o autowizerunek filozofa w XX wieku są pytaniami o jego uwikłania, i uwikłania jego filozofii, w politykę. Nigdy wcześniej filozofowie nie żywili takich nadziei na przemodelowanie społeczeństwa z pomocą polityki (i tym się różnili od licznych wcześniejszych utopistów) zgodnie ze swoją filozoficzną wizją jak właśnie w XX wieku. Jest to zarazem książka o tradycyjnych antynomiach i opozycjach filozoficznych: (...) bios teoretikos i bios praktikos, teoria i praktyka, myśl i działanie, interpretowanie świata i jego zmienianie, człowiek kontemplacji i człowiek czynu, wieża z kości słoniowej i zaangażowanie etc. etc. I dlatego, pisząc tu o autowizerunku filozofa, mam na myśli jego autowizerunek ujmowany z punktu widzenia polityki. Interesują mnie tu odpowiedzi na pytanie o stosunek między filozofią a polityką, bowiem to pytanie uważam dzisiaj z racji historycznych za fundamentalne. Dlaczego pytam tu o autowizerunek filozofa? Uważam, że w filozofii (pytającej o swoje uwikłania w politykę) sposób ujmowania siebie determinuje sposób ujmowania świata. Im bardziej filozofia zostaje odniesiona do „teraz”, tym wymaga większej precyzji, dokładniejszego usytuowania siebie w ramach dostępnych bądź wyobrażonych w kulturze możliwości. Autowizerunek to platforma, z której korzysta filozof, to pewien horyzont konstytuujący jego tożsamość, podający zakres możliwych do przyjęcia ról w kulturze. Zupełnie inny jest autowizerunek filozofa w filozofii odniesionej do „teraz”, a zupełnie inny w filozofii nastawionej na uniwersalność, wieczne i niezmienne prawa, na spoglądanie na świat sub specie aeternitatis. Kluczowe słowa w takiej perspektywie to choćby rewolucja intelektualna, przemoc, nowy świat, nowy człowiek, nowa era, zmiana, postęp, konstruktywny wkład, przyłączenie się i zaangażowanie czy wymogi chwili. Pytam tutaj o chęć wywoływania zmian politycznych mocą filozofii i poprzez filozofię jako narzędzie, pytam o filozofa jako politycznego „zbawcę” (Habermas o Martinie Heideggerze), o filozofa jako egzekutora wyroków historii dysponującego pełną świadomością doniosłości chwili, która nikomu poza filozofami nie może się w pełni odsłonić i ujawnić. Dlaczego jednak filozofia potrzebuje siły? Skąd bierze się jej odwieczne marzenie o wykroczeniu poza uniwersum teorii, myśli, kontemplacji - ku realnemu światu, w którym filozof działa? Książka ta w pewnej mierze stanowi analizę marzeń o filozofii działającej, o filozofii czynu - o filozofie przekonanym o swoim posłannictwie jako posłannictwie człowieka działania. Filozof działający to człowiek oddany wspólnocie - przekonany o politycznie sprawczej roli wypowiadanego, filozoficznego słowa; zwierciadlanym odbiciem tego ideału jest filozof oddany tekstowi, czyli (bezpośrednio) lekceważący społeczne powinności i zobowiązania — przekonany o politycznej i społecznej bezsilności tegoż słowa, skoncentrowany na dostarczaniu interpretacji kolejnych interpretacji tekstów filozoficznych. Jednak oprócz nich w perspektywie autowizerunku politycznego pojawiają się i inni: tekstualiści marzący o drobnych, choć społecznie wpływowych wspólnotach czytelników; wspólnotowcy pragnący działać poprzez filozoficzne słowo, a jednak zarazem pozbawieni złudzeń co do swojej historycznej skuteczności, poniekąd z góry świadomi, że tą drogą świata (przynajmniej w przewidywalnym horyzoncie czasowym) zmienić się nie da; miłośnicy tekstu budujący programy społecznej naprawy świata, a poszukujący wśród tekstualistów (na przykład genealogicznej czy dekonstrukcjonistycznej) „metody”, którą można by wprost zastosować w praktyce, na sposób działających w historii wspólnotowców. Tekst, wspólnota - to jedynie ogólne hasła wywoławcze mające ewokować pewne marzenia o miejscu filozofii i filozofa w kulturze. Z jednej strony stoi autowizerunek, w ramach którego naczelnym hasłem jest „robienie historii” (Emil Cioran) czy „robienie rewolucji”, z drugiej autowizerunek z naczelnym hasłem „robienia tekstów”, czyli bycia uważnym czytelnikiem tekstów filozoficznych i uważnym ich autorem. A oprócz tego, pomiędzy nimi, jest miejsce na autowizerunki pośrednie, mieszane i mniej czy bardziej skłaniające się ku któremuś ze skrajnych wyborów oraz na autowizerunki, których powyższe przeciwstawienie nie uchwytuje. Oba motywy mają do pewnego stopnia organizować prezentowaną książkę, ale nie mają stać się jakimś nowym kluczem pozwalającym na zupełnie nową odsłonę filozoficznego pejzażu. Stoi przecież za nimi długa, filozoficzna tradycja, korzystająca na przestrzeni dziejów z określeń pochodzących z różnych słowników. Kto powiedział, że filozofia ma „robić rewolucję”, tzn. gruntować ją i przygotowywać, promować i usprawiedliwiać, znajdować dla niej wielki intelektualny kontekst, stanowić jej awangardę i magazyn niezbędnych pojęć, legitymizować jej przemoc i uzasadniać jej terror, dawać jej broń w walce i podtrzymywać marzenia o jej nieuchronności, wyjątkowości, celowości i wartości? Kojeve, Heidegger, de Man, Sartre, Bataille (w analizowanych tu przeze mnie tekstach i w ściśle określonych okresach) - byli o tym przekonani. Dlaczego odpowiadał im właśnie taki autowizerunek? Co więcej - albo co innego - daje filozofowi „filozofia wspólnoty” niż „filozofia tekstu”, by sięgnąć do dwóch skrajności w ramach długiego continuum? Czym jest owa nadwyżka? Uczuciem spełnienia, świadomością realizacji marzeń, wcielenia w życie filozoficznych ideałów? Przejściem do świata rzeczywistego - a może wreszcie „pracą”, w mocnym sensie tego terminu? Jednak im filozofia była bliżej świata, tym większe rodziła napięcia. Tym większe miała wyrzuty sumienia. Kluczowy problem analizowanych tu propozycji filozoficznych można by podsumować tak: czy szukać przejść — a jeśli tak, to jakie powinny one przyjmować formy - między uniwersum. zagadnień filozoficznych a światem rzeczywistym? Jaka relacja wiąże filozofa ze światem realnym: z historią, postępem, zmianą? Kim jest filozof zanurzony w historii, kim jest filozof „robiący historię”? W jakiej mierze filozofia jest niezbędnym fundamentem społecznych transformacji i społecznych rewolucji? Jak związać filozofię z czynem i z działaniem? Jak związać spekulację i kontemplację z aktywizmem? Jaki stosunek wobec gwałtownych i radykalnych zmian w świecie społecznym ma zajmować filozof - i w jakim charakterze? Filozofa? Obywatela? Obywatela-filozofa? Czy umieszczać filozofię w głównym nurcie zmian społecznych - w ramach toczących się rewolucji — czy przyjmować w niej postawę wyczekującą, obserwującą, niezaangażowaną, która pozwala spoglądać na akcydentalne zawirowania świata rzeczywistego z perspektywy jego istoty? Czy filozofia ma brać na siebie odpowiedzialność za zmienianie świata? Czy ma się do niego dostosowywać, czy może wręcz je ugruntowywać, znajdując dla niego szeroki, metafizyczny kontekst? Spis treści Wprowadzenie. „TYRANIA HEGLA” I MYŚLENIE PONOWOCZESNE W KONTEKŚCIE PYTAŃ 0 AUTO WIZERUNEK FILOZOFA (9) „Uwolnić się od Hegla”? (10) Panorama (15) „Przyszłość świata” a „interpretacja pism Hegla” (24) Podsumowanie: filozof czynu, filozofia działania (27) Rozdział 1. Przykład wspólnotowy: Alexandre’a KOJEVE’A filozof zmieniający świat (FRANCUSKI HEGEL) (37) Antropologia, panowanie, niewola (41) Kojeve-Strauss: debata stulecia? (44) Filozof wedle Straussa (47) Filozof wedle Kojeve’a (50) Historia, filozofia, przemoc. „Humanizm” i „terror” (57) Rządzenie: zdolności i powinności (61) Kres historii (63) Podsumowanie (68) Rozdział 2. PRZYKŁAD TEKSTUALNY: DELEUZE’A 1 KLOSSOWSKIEGO FILOZOF TWORZĄCY TEKST (francuski Nietzsche) (70) „Jakiegoż to adwersarza, jakiegoś wroga należy pokonać?” (73) „Między Heglem a Nietzschem nie może być kompromisu” 77 Nietzsche, Freud, Marks 90 Historia i genealogia 96 Kwestia stylu 99 Rozdział 3. PRZYPADEK GEORGESA BATAILLE’A: MIĘDZY HEGLEM A NlETZSCHEM? 106 „Człowiek integralny” a działanie 110 Rewolucja, ekstaza, krew 115 W towarzystwie Nietzschego 124 Ekonomia nadmiaru 128 Rozdział 4. WOKÓŁ ZAANGAŻOWANIA. OD WSPÓLNOTY DO TEKSTU I DALEJ: SARTRE, BARTHES, BLANCHOT, FOUCAULT 133 „Umiłowanie mądrości” a polityka 133 Filozofia, polityka - tekst, wspólnota 136 Pisarze i piszący 138 „Co to znaczy pisać?”142 Pisanie - czysta bierność na marginesie historii? 151 Poza opozycję esteta/pisarz zaangażowany 157 Intelektualiści - władza 161 Książki-doświadczenia i książki-prawdy 166 „Tyrania prawdy”168 Rozdział 5. FILOZOF A CZASY PRZEŁOMU. FRANCUSKIE BURZE WOKÓŁ MARTINA HEIDEGGERA W PERSPEKTYWIE SPORU O MIEJSCE FILOZOFII W SFERZE OBYWATELSKOŚCI. 172 Początki 172 Heidegger - francuski „mistrz myślenia”180 „Czy można jeszcze wierzyć filozofom?” 184 Heideggera sen o przywództwie 188 Dyskusje, dyskusje 205 Specyficzna aura filozofa? 210 „Przyjdźcie do nas, a będziecie mogli przekuć waszą myśl w czyn” 230 Rozdział 6. WOKÓŁ PAULA DE MANA - EUROPEJSKIE PYTANIA O SŁOWA JAKO CZYNY 233 Kontekst europejski - rewolucja intelektualna 238 Nowy porządek, nowy początek 248 „Konstruktywne” podejście do rewolucji a „humanizm” 255 Europejski cień człowieka czynu 257 Ideologia estetyczna 262 Rozdział 7. W STRONĘ ESTETYKI EGZYSTENCJI: MICHEL FOUCAULT 266 „Dać żyjącym exempla...” 271 Kanta i Nietzschego „troska o siebie” 272 Etyka jako estetyka 283 Foucault, Kant i „ontologia teraźniejszości” 291 „Troska o siebie” jako praktyka wolności 302 Myślenie - niebezpiecznym aktem? 310 Bibliografia 313 SUMMARY 331 CONTENTS. (shrink)

The author of the article deals with the causes of anti-naturalism in culture today from the point view of both a philosophical conception of evolutionary ontology, and the psychology of environmental problems. He highlights the real potential for a biophilic transformation of culture in the context of current knowledge on cognitive psychology, where emphasis is placed on the limits to the phenomena of cognitive dissonance. The author of the article seeks certain options to repress these limits in Gestalt theory, which (...) on some aspects corresponds substantially to the insights and goals of evolutionary psychology. (shrink)