In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant declares that “Only an end that is also a duty can be called a duty of virtue”. In the same text Kant refers to the duty of respect for others as a duty of virtue. It follows that the duty of respect must correspond to some end that is also a duty. What is this end? This paper endeavors to answer this question. Though Kant explicitly identifies two obligatory ends—one’s own perfection (...) and the happiness of others —neither is a good candidate for the end which corresponds to the duty of respect. This paper examines two plausible candidates—others’ humanity and others’ self-esteem—arguing that the latter is preferable insofar as it accords better with what Kant says about the vice of defamation, respecting others in the logical use of their reason, and respectful beneficence. (shrink)

In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant declares that “Only an end that is also a duty can be called a duty of virtue”. In the same text Kant refers to the duty of respect for others as a duty of virtue. It follows that the duty of respect must correspond to some end that is also a duty. What is this end? This paper endeavors to answer this question. Though Kant explicitly identifies two obligatory ends—one’s own perfection (...) and the happiness of others —neither is a good candidate for the end which corresponds to the duty of respect. This paper examines two plausible candidates—others’ humanity and others’ self-esteem—arguing that the latter is preferable insofar as it accords better with what Kant says about the vice of defamation, respecting others in the logical use of their reason, and respectful beneficence. (shrink)

A defence of the idea that there are sui generis duties of love: duties, that is, that we owe to people in virtue of standing in loving relationships with them. I contrast this non-reductionist position with the widespread reductionist view that our duties to those we love all derive from more generic moral principles. The paper mounts a cumulative argument in favour of the non-reductionist position, adducing a variety of considerations that together speak strongly in favour (...) of adopting it. The concluding section connects this debate with larger issues in moral theory concerning the general idea of obligation. (shrink)

Is human goodness a matter of fulfilling one’s obligations and obeying rules, or one of developing habits of virtue? This article contrasts Peter French’s and Alasdair MacIntyre’s Aristotelian approach to ethics as a matter of virtue with William Frankena’s and Iris Murdoch’s Kantian view of ethics as a matter of duty. If ethicists seek to establish an acceptable, distinguishing moral characteristic as the standard of goodness, such a task may only be accomplished at a metaethical level of investigation. (...) Approaching ethics as an either/or proposition of virtue vs. duty is wrongheaded; instead, we should approach ethics as a both/and proposition, consisting of both duty AND virtue. (shrink)

칸트의 덕론에서 도덕적 완전성은 덕의 심정을 계발하여 도덕적 목적들을 완전하게 달성하는 것이며 도덕적 완전성의 의무를 따르는 사람은 유덕한 사람이다. 본 논문에서는 도덕적 완전성의 의무에 대한 칸트의 설명들을 검토하면서 칸트의 덕개념이 가진 성격과 이러한 성격이 덕윤리적 논의에서 갖는 의의를 고찰한다. 먼저 도덕적 완전성은 덕에 대한 의무지움에 이르고 이에 따라 덕의무들을 완전하게 준수하는 것이라는 점과 이 의무가 완전하지만 불완전한 의무와 자기개선의 의무라는 두 성격을 가진다는 점을 살펴본다. 그러고 나서 도덕적 완전성의 의무가 완전하지만 불완전한 의무로서 갖는 성격을 통해 하나뿐이지만 다수가 존재한다는 칸트의 덕개념의 (...) 의미를 파악한다. 또한 이러한 덕개념이 덕의 고귀한 가치와 현실적합성을 모두 확보하고자 한다는 점에서 덕들의 통일성 논쟁에서 의의를 갖지만 형식적 덕이 어떤 덕인지 그 실체를 명확하게 파악하기 어렵다는 문제를 안고 있음을 밝힌다. 다음으로 자기개선의 의무로서 도덕적 완전성의 의무는 칸트의 덕개념이 이상적 덕개념에 속함을 뜻하지만 하나의 완전함에서 다른 완전함으로의 지속적인 전진이라는 자기개선의 과정은 칸트의 덕개념이 도달 불가능한 이상과 도달 가능한 것으로서의 성격을 이중적으로 담고 있음을 보여준다고 주장한다. 그리고 이러한 칸트의 덕개념이 전형적인 이상적 덕개념의 난점을 해결할 수 있는 반면 도달 불가능한 이상으로서의 도덕적 완전성에서 완전성이 어떤 성격의 것인지 불분명하다는 점에서 이러한 완전성에 대응하는, 객관적으로 고려된 덕이 무엇인지 명확하게 파악하기 어렵다는 문제에 직면함을 살펴본다. (shrink)

Duty and virtue are no longer the common coin of daily conversation. Both terms strike many of us as old-fashioned and heavy handed. Yet we incessantly talk about what ought and ought not to be done, and about the sorts of persons we admire or despise. As soon as we talk in these ways we discuss topics traditionally dealt with under the headings of duty and of virtue. If we no longer use these terms, it may be because (...) we associate them with heavily moralistic approaches to life, with obsolete codes and ideals, with ‘Victorian’ values and attitudes, rather than because the concerns our predecessors discussed in these terms have vanished from our lives. (shrink)

The author contends that the debate between the theological ethicists who champion an ethics of virtue and moral philosophers who support an ethics of duty is much more than a disagreement about normative ethics. He attempts to clarify the nature of this debate and to turn it in a more useful direction by constructing comprehensive outline of Frankena's view of the conditions of moral reasoning and indicating where the points in dispute most naturally arise.

The paper examines the ethical conception of the most well-known and much discussed Hindu text, the "Bhagavad Gītā", in the context of the Western distinction between duty ethics and virtue ethics. Most of the materials published on the "Gītā" make much of its conception of duty; however, there is no systematic investigation of the notion of virtue in the "Gītā". The paper begins with a discussion of the fundamental characteristics of virtue ethics, before undertaking a discussion of (...) the conceptions of duty and virtue in the "Gītā". The paper clearly demonstrates that (1) both duty and virtue coexist in the "Gītā", and (2) the "Gītā" accords virtue an important place. (shrink)

This chapter introduces some central issues in Epistemology, and, like others in the open textbook series Introduction to Philosophy, is set up for rewarding college classroom use, with discussion/reflection questions matched to clearly-stated learning objectives,, a brief glossary of the introduced/bolded terms/concepts, links to further open source readings as a next step, and a readily-accessible outline of the classic between William Clifford and William James over the "ethics of belief." The chapter introduces questions of epistemic value through Plato's famous example (...) of the 'road to Larissa,' and goes on to explain work on doxastic responsibility, on intellectual “virtue”/“vice,” and on epistemic value monism vs. pluralism. Section 1; Epistemic Value and the Value Problem; Section 2: The Ethics of Belief; Section 3: Virtue & Vice Epistemologies; Section 4: Epistemic Paternalism. (shrink)

This paper deals primarily with theDoctrine of Method(DM) of Kant’sDoctrine of Virtue. First, I present an overview of theDM(1.1) and an explanation of how it is possible to teach virtue (1.2). Second, I address the following issues: Why is aDMnecessary at all (2.1)? How does theDMrelate to what Kant calls casuistry (2.2)? I will argue that wide duties have two essential characteristics: They command the right kind of moral motivation in terms of a moral maxim, and they (...) allow for latitude. The fact that wide duties command the right kind of motivation leads to theDM; the latitude of wide duties, however, leads to casuistry. To unfold this interpretation, it must also be shown that both imperfect and perfect duties are wide duties. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The paper examines the ethical conception of the most well‐known and much discussed Hindu text, the Bhagavad Gītā, in the context of the Western distinction between duty ethics and virtue ethics. Most of the materials published on the Gītā make much of its conception of duty; however, there is no systematic investigation of the notion of virtue in the Gītā. The paper begins with a discussion of the fundamental characteristics of virtue ethics, before undertaking a discussion (...) of the conceptions of duty and virtue in the Gītā. The paper clearly demonstrates that (1) both duty and virtue coexist in the Gītā, and (2) the Gītā accords virtue an important place. (shrink)

A defence of the idea that there are sui generis duties of love: duties, that is, that we owe to people in virtue of standing in loving relationships with them. I contrast this non‐reductionist position with the widespread reductionist view that our duties to those we love all derive from more generic moral principles. The paper mounts a cumulative argument in favour of the non‐reductionist position, adducing a variety of considerations that together speak strongly in favour (...) of adopting it. The concluding section connects this debate with larger issues in moral theory concerning the general idea of obligation. (shrink)

This paper presents an account of the virtuous person, which I take to be the same as the good person. I argue that goodness in a person is based on her desires. Contra Aristotelians, I argue that one does not need practical wisdom to be good. There can be a perfectly good person with mental retardation or autism, for example, whether or not such conditions are compatible with the Aristotelian kind of wisdom. Contra Kantians, I argue that the sense of (...) duty - which does exist! - is compatible with a desire-based moral psychology. (shrink)

I argue that agents can have duties to cooperate with one another if this increases their combined efficiency and/or efficacy in addressing ongoing collective moral problems. I call these duties cooperative duties of efficiency and efficacy. I focus particularly on collective agents and how agents ought to reason and act in the face of global moral problems. After setting out my account, I argue that a subset of cooperative duties of efficiency and efficacy of collective agents (...) are duties of justice in virtue of the roles these agents have taken up. (shrink)

In latter-day discussions on corporate morality, duties of commission are fiercely debated. Moral institutionalists argue that duties of commission—such as a duty of assistance—overstep the boundaries of moral duty owed by economic agents. " Moral institutionalism" is a newly coined term for a familiar position on market morality. It maintains that market morality ought to be restricted, excluding all duties of commission. Neo-Classical thinkers such as Baumol and Homann defend it most eloquently. They underpin their position with (...) concerns that go to the core of liberalism—the dominant western political theory that sustains the ideals of both the free market and the free, rational person. Those authors claim that liberalism calls for a fully differentiated market because it resents the politicization of the market. Fully differentiated markets exclude duties of commission. They also claim that full differentiation of the market closes the troublesome gap between moral motivation and moral virtue. Full differentiation redeems the promise of "easy virtue". In this paper moral institutionalism will be rejected from a Kantian point of view, mostly inspired by Herman's thesis on the invisibility of morality. Liberalism may perhaps ban the politicization of the market; it does not forbid its moralization. The idea of a fully differentiated market must also be rejected because it is either morally over-demanding (to the morally autonomous person) or morally hazardous (to the person with failing moral motivation). Contrary to what the moral institutionalists claim, right action, morally, is actually quite difficult in fully differentiated markets. (shrink)

In this book, Professor Jeanine Grenberg defends the idea that Kant's virtue theory is best understood as a system of eudaemonism, indeed, as a distinctive form of eudaemonism that makes it preferable to other forms of it: a system of what she calls Deontological Eudaemonism. In Deontological Eudaemonism, one achieves happiness both rationally conceived and empirically conceived only via authentic commitment to and fulfilment of what is demanded of all rational beings: making persons as such one's end in all (...) things. To tell this story of Deontological Eudaemonism, Grenberg first defends the notion that Kant's deontological approach to ethics is simultaneously teleological. She then shows that the realization of an aptitude for the virtuous fulfilment of one's obligatory ends provides the solid basis for simultaneous realization of happiness, both rationally and empirically conceived. Along the way, she argues both that Kant's notion of happiness rationally conceived is essentially identical to Aristotle's conception of happiness as unimpeded activity, and that his notion of happiness empirically conceived is best realized via an unwavering commitment to the fulfilment of one's obligatory ends. (shrink)

In this paper, I explicate Kant’s theory of virtue and situate it within the context of theories of virtue before Kant (such as Aristotle, Hobbes, and Hume) and after Kant (such as Schiller and Schopenhauer). I explore Kant’s notions of virtue as a disposition to do one’s duty out of respect for the moral law, as moral strength in non-holy wills, as the moral disposition in conflict, and as moral self-constraint based on inner freedom. I distinguish between (...) Kant’s notions of virtue and of the good will. I discuss Kant’s duties of virtue (and so particular virtues and vices), the relationships between virtue and happiness and virtue and the emotions, and Kant’s criticisms of his predecessors’ views of virtue. I close with a discussion of Kant and contemporary virtue ethics. Although the paper reflects my own interpretation of Kant, it strives less to argue for a particular thesis about Kant on virtue than to illuminate important aspects of Kant’s theory of virtue. (shrink)

Civic virtue is a bulwark against authoritarianism, but also against the worst excesses of democracy. It has been appropriated by the proponents of republicanism and communitarianism, focusing upon duties rather than rights, and the collective rather than the individual. This paper demonstrates, however, that republicanism and community values are not mutually exclusive with the concept of universal individual human rights. It considers traditional interpretations of civic virtue from both West and East, then introduces a conceptualization of the (...) relationship between rights and responsibilities which alienates neither the liberal concept of individuals as universal human rights bearers, nor the communitarian perspectives. (shrink)

Through a critical analysis of the work of Henry Davis, S.J. and Francis, C.SS.R., this study examines the Catholic tradition in respect to the moral responsibilities of physicians. It first reviews the historical formation of the manuals of moral theology in order to historically situate Davis and Connell in the twentieth century. The study then examines the work of Davis and Connell in light of David Kelly's The Emergence of Roman Catholic Medical Ethics in North America, wherein he posits a (...) shift in moral methodology in 1940 from physicalism to ecclesiastical positivism. Contrary to Kelly's thesis, this study finds essentially no methodological difference between Davis' commandment-centered methodology and Connell's virtue-centered method. In actuality, both theologians throughout their careers focused upon the physical nature of the action and employed the traditional principles of double effect and cooperation when determining the morality of an intrinsically evil act. ;Through a comparison of the work of Davis and Connell, the study concludes with a description of the moral responsibilities of physicians for a contemporary practice of medicine. These duties include basic responsibilities, social responsibilities and the responsibilities to the dying patient. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:In The Trusted Doctor: Medical Ethics and Professionalism (2020), Rosamond Rhodes presents a new theory of medical ethics based on 16 duties she considers central to medical ethics and professionalism. She asserts that her theory is "bioethical heresy," as it contradicts established "principlism" and "common morality" approaches to ethics in medicine. Rhodes advocates the development of parallelism between clinical and ethical decision-making and a systematic approach that emphasizes duties over principles and rules to facilitate the development of a (...) "doctorly character" among medical decision-makers. Rhodes further asserts that her theory and approach necessitate the cultivation of virtues contained in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. But Rhodes's insistence that "medical professionals," not just doctors, are covered by her theory is open to critique, as is her conflation of ethic and morals, especially around the question of the "doctorly character" upon which her duty-based theory hinges. This assessment argues that applicants to medical schools and allied health training programs be screened for specific virtues—honesty, diligence, curiosity, and compassion—to facilitate reinforcement of these pre-professionalized inclinations throughout the habituation processes of medical training. This would increase the probability of turning fear and hope to cure and care via reasoning and affective models performed within an ethical medical framework—even while what this ethical framework should reference remains under debate. (shrink)

In the Stoics we find a combination of two perspectives which are commonly thought to conflict: the embedded perspective from within one's social context, and the universal perspective of the member of the moral community of rational beings. I argue that the Stoics do have a unified theory, one which avoids problems that trouble some modern theories which try to unite these perspectives.

One of the principal aims of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, especially of the Doctrine of Virtue, is to present a taxonomy of our duties as human beings. The basic division of duties is between juridical duties and ethical duties, which determines the division of the Metaphysics of Morals into the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue. Juridical duties are duties that may be coercively enforced from outside the agent, as by (...) the civil or criminal laws, or other social pressures. Ethical duties must not be externally enforced (to do so violates the right of the person coerced). Instead, the subject herself, through her own reason and the feelings and motives arising a priori from her rational capacities -- the feelings of respect, conscience, moral feeling and love of other human beings, must constrain herself to follow them (MS 6:399-404).1 Among ethical duties, the fundamental division is between duties to oneself and duties to others. Within each of these two main divisions of ethical duty, there is a further division between duties that are strictly owed, requiring specific actions or omissions, and whose violation incurs moral blame, and duties that are wide or meritorious, the specific actions not strictly owed, but deserving of moral credit or merit. Kant treats these latter as ‘duties’ (eschewing any category such as ‘supererogation’) because the actions in question are conceived as fit objects of self-constraint – things we can make ourselves do through the exercise of reason and the moral feelings arising from the application of practical reason to our faculty of desire. Regarding duties to oneself, this division is between ‘perfect’ and ‘imperfect’ duty; regarding duties to others, the strict or narrow... (shrink)

It is uncontroversial that our engagement with artworks is constrained by obligations; most commonly, these consist in obligations to other persons, such as artists, audiences, and owners of artworks. A more controversial claim is that we have genuine obligations to artworks themselves. I defend a qualified version of this claim. However, I argue that such obligations do not derive from the supposed moral rights of artworks – for no such rights exist. Rather, I argue that these obligations are instances of (...) duties of love: obligations that one incurs in virtue of loving some object, be it a person or, in this case, an artwork. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Obligatory Ends Anti‐paternalism and the Duty of Beneficence Beneficence: The Finer Points The Question of Latitude Latitude and (Im)partiality Gratitude Sympathy Conclusion Bibliography.

Are positive duties to help others in need mere informal duties of virtue or can they also be enforceable duties of justice? In this paper I defend the claim that some positive duties (which I call basic positive duties) can be duties of justice against one of the most important prin- cipled objections to it. This is the libertarian challenge, according to which only negative duties to avoid harming others can be (...) class='Hi'>duties of justice, whereas positive duties (basic or nonbasic) must be seen, at best, as informal moral requirements or recommendations. I focus on the contractarian version of the libertarian challenge as recently presented by Jan Narveson. I claim that Narveson’s contractarian construal of libertarianism is not only intuitively weak, but is also subject to decisive internal problems. I argue, in particular, that it does not pro- vide a clear rationale for distinguishing between informal duties of virtue and enforceable duties of justice, that it can neither successfully justify libertarianism’s protection of negative rights nor its denial of positive ones, and that it fails to undermine the claim that basic positive duties are duties of global justice. -/- . (shrink)

In this article I argue that understanding the role that the virtues of love play in Kant’s ethical theory requires understanding not only the nature of the virtues themselves, but also the unique nature of wide Kantian duties. I begin by making the case that while the Doctrine of Virtue supports attributing an affective component to the virtues of love, we are right to resist attributing anaffective success conditionto these virtues. I then distinguish wide duties from negative (...) and narrow (positive) duties in order to make the case that prudential considerations often unavoidably and unproblematically play a role in deliberation about how we fulfil our wide duties. In the final section I combine these findings, arguing that the virtues of love play an important moral role by shaping these prudential considerations. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence-driven technology increasingly shapes work practices and, accordingly, employees’ opportunities for meaningful work (MW). In our paper, we identify five dimensions of MW: pursuing a purpose, social relationships, exercising skills and self-development, autonomy, self-esteem and recognition. Because MW is an important good, lacking opportunities for MW is a serious disadvantage. Therefore, we need to know to what extent employers have a duty to provide this good to their employees. We hold that employers have a duty of beneficence to design (...) for opportunities for MW when implementing AI-technology in the workplace. We argue that this duty of beneficence is supported by the three major ethical theories, namely, Kantian ethics, consequentialism, and virtue ethics. We defend this duty against two objections, including the view that it is incompatible with the shareholder theory of the firm. We then employ the five dimensions of MW as our analytical lens to investigate how AI-based technological innovation in logistic warehouses has an impact, both positively and negatively, on MW, and illustrate that design for MW is feasible. We further support this practical feasibility with the help of insights from organizational psychology. We end by discussing how AI-based technology has an impact both on meaningful work (often seen as an aspirational goal) and decent work (generally seen as a matter of justice). Accordingly, ethical reflection on meaningful and decent work should become more integrated to do justice to how AI-technology inevitably shapes both simultaneously. (shrink)

This paper is a response to a recent article by Christopher Wellman in which Wellman argues that gratitude is better understood as a virtue rather than a source of moral obligations. First, I offer several examples intended to dispute his claim that gratitude does not impose duties. Second, I provide my own reasons for thinking that deontic notions alone cannot capture the moral significance of gratitude. Wellman’s mistake is attributable to an overly narrow conception of duty that his (...) argument presupposes. Finally, I consider the implications of my analysis for fiduciary ethics generally given the indeterminacy of the principle of gratitude. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that Yulgok's sincere intention〔誠意〕 implies the characteristics of virtue ethics. This paper aims to establish the meaningful discussion that Yulgok's sincere intention goes beyond the limits of normative ethics, duty ethics, or the constraints of knowledge, and is significant in pursuing the goal of individual's daily moral practice and well-being. Virtue ethics place emphasis on the will for the prosperity of the community, well-being, the virtues, character, and the cultivation of (...) the agent. The moral agent can intentionally and repeatedly engage in virtuous actions through habituation thereby transforming their character. Yulgok's sincere intention aims to derive natural moral conduct through everyday will for practice, with the goal of cultivating virtuous dispositions. In other words, humans possess intellectual abilities and the virtues of renyilizhi〔仁義禮智〕. By cultivating these virtues, they attain an ideal state of character where virtuous actions can naturally manifest regardless of time and place. When aspiring to virtuous actions, the moral agent must be capable of comparing and analyzing various cases to derive rational judgments and conducts. This can be confirmed through Yulgok's interpretation of yi〔意〕 separated by nianlusi〔念慮思〕. Furthermore, Yulgok emphasized the importance of sincere mind〔實心〕. This is a driving force for appropriate judgment and moral choices making the virtue of renyilizhi〔仁義禮智〕 and impartiality. Therefore Yulgok's sincere intention provides a meaningful discussion explaining the interdependence between intellectual virtues and moral virtues required in the process of habituation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.2 (2004) 221-223 [Access article in PDF] John J. Conley. The Suspicion of Virtue: Women Philosophers in Neoclassical France. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002. Pp. xi + 222. Cloth, $39.95. The rediscovery of forgotten women philosophers began in the 1970s and has yielded important results by broadening substantially the intellectual history of early modern Europe. In The Suspicion of Virtue: (...) Women Philosophers in Neoclassical France, John J. Conley expands even more the corpus of philosophical texts written by women to include five authors whose work has never been considered in this context. Five salonnières, traditionally considered the authors of light literature, are the subject of Conley's book. By expanding the "map of philosophy sites and genres" (159), Conley has looked beyond the university setting and beyond the female philosophers associated with the major male figures of [End Page 221] the period. He argues that the salon produced important female philosophers whose intellectual power was especially revealed in their highly original consideration and discussion of virtue and whose work provides an alternative to the philosophy produced by the canonical male authors of the seventeenth century.As he explores the moral philosophies of Sablé, Deshoulières, Sablière, Vallière, and Maintenon, Conley shows us how the salon promoted experimentation with alternative methods of philosophical analysis. Specifically, the salon produced philosophical arguments that were "characterized more by debate and by epigrammatic commentary than by the lecture and the treatise" (158). It promoted new methods of argument and focused thematically on moral issues.The works of the Jansenist Madame de Sablé rely on the maxime, the literary genre associated most closely with salon culture. In her Maximes, Sablé engages in moral psychology to offer a critique of aristocratic society. She writes about the pride and self-interest that defines this milieu, and she draws a clear distinction between a physical aristocracy (based on blood and rank) and a spiritual aristocracy of the virtuous. For this author, the essential trait of the individual is moral identity, not family or heritage.The poetry and philosophy of Madame Deshoulières is rooted in naturalism and inspired by the works of Lucretius and Gassendi. For her, virtue involves "an ecological reverence for the material world" (49). She addressed the vice and confusion that come from human misconceptions about nature. In particular, the human refusal to accept mortality reflects a broader refusal to accept the materialist nature of human beings. The belief in human superiority and immortality constitutes an attack on nature and explains human efforts to dominate nature. The belief in human immortality in turn raises issues of morality because it produces in humans hubris and the consequent mistreatment of the animal world and material environment. For Deshoulières virtue involves reverence for the material world.With Sablière the ethical person is the "redeemed saint, the sinner freed to a life of charity by the sovereign action of God and summoned to a particular set of moral duties in the midst of austere prayer" (94-95). Her maxims refer ultimately to spiritual abandonment to the will of God, and Sablière combines a deeply mystical piety, shaped by contact with Quietism, and the idea of the sovereignty of God, derived from Augustinian theology. The individual is dependent upon God's grace, and to live a moral life requires serious contemplation and communication with God and pyschological detachment from self, a relationship that springs from God's initiative.La Vallière also interprets virtue in an Augustinian vein, but her approach to virtue does not insist on abandonment of the world. She writes about knowing God through the experiences of repentance and conversion. Her Reflections on the Mercy of God is a dialogue with God on the part of repentent female voice. Her voice is definitely gendered, and she witnesses to God's mercy.Finally, Conley shows us in turn that the salonnières brought to their discussion of virtue an interest in etiquette and manners that derived from the distinctive experiences of women. Here the... (shrink)

Do adult children have a particular duty, or set of duties, to their aging parents? What might the normative source and content of filial obligation be? This chapter examines Kant’s duty of beneficence in The Doctrine of Virtue and the Groundwork, suggesting that at its core, performance of filial duty occurs in response to the needs of aging parents. The duty of beneficence accounts for inevitable vulnerabilities that befall human rational beings and reveals moral agents as situated in (...) communities of dependence and mutual aid. Other accounts of filial obligation, such as those based on a notion of gratitude, virtue, or friendship, generate various difficulties and fail to adequately address and emphasize four morally significant features of the adult child/ aging parent relationship. First, the relationship between adult children and their aging parents is one of dependency created by the increasing frailty and need of those parents. Second, the obligations that adult children have to aging parents take place in the context of a relationship not voluntarily assumed, but not coerced. Third, given a cultural tendency toward paternalistic care of elderly individuals, the content of filial obligation should safeguard against such treatment. Fourth, because dependency relations between adult children and aging parents can involve an immense degree of sacrifice on the part of the caretaker, an acknowledgment of duties should be accompanied by a concurrent acknowledgment of the necessary limitation of duties. Addressing these four issues is essential in offering a coherent account of the normative source, content, nature, and scope of adult children’s duty to care for their aging parents. This essay demonstrates that the Kantian duty of beneficence, when functioning as the philosophical foundation of filial obligation, allows for ample light to be shed upon and for proper analysis to take place of these four issues. (shrink)

The emergence several years ago of SARS, with its high rate of infection and death among healthcare workers, resurrected a recurring ethical question: do health professionals have a duty to provide care to patients with deadly infectious diseases, even at some substantial risk to themselves and their families? The conventional answer, repeated on the heels of the SARS epidemic, is that they do. In this paper, I argue that the arguments in support of such a duty are wanting in significant (...) respects, and that the language of duty is simply not adequate to an understanding of all the moral dimensions of professional responses to the care of risky patients. Instead, we should speak the language of virtues and ideals if we want to do justice to the complexity of such harrowing circumstances. (shrink)

Focusing on the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, historical and contemporary critics of Kant's rationalist ethical theory accuse him of holding an impoverished moral psychology and an inadequate account of character and virtue. Kant's sharp contrast between duty and inclination and his claim that only action from duty possesses moral worth appear to imply that pro-moral inclination is unnecessary for, if perhaps compatible with, a good will. On traditional accounts of virtue, however, having a good will (...) and possessing virtue require pro-moral emotions and inclinations. Thus, Kant's moral psychology seems at odds with the common view that emotions and appetites are constituent elements within virtue. Kant's defenders have argued that an adequate assessment of these charges must address his theory of virtue, as it is set out in The Doctrine of Virtue, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, and the Lectures on Ethics. Yet the prospect for reconstructing a plausible Kantian account of virtue from these tests may appear bleak when we see that Kant conceives of virtue as moral strength of will over recalcitrant inclinations, and characterizes virtue in terms of the autocracy of pure practical reason. For autocracy may seem to require the extirpation or suppression of feelings and inclinations. Indeed, it might seem difficult to distinguish the autocratic agent from the agent who, in Aristotle's terms, is merely continent, or who, in Schiller's terms, possesses dignity, but not grace. But these objections misunderstand autocracy. In the thesis, I argue that the self-mastery constitutive of Kantian virtue involves the cultivation of sensibility according to reason and that emotions and appetites modified and regulated by a proper conception of the moral law play a constructive role within Kantian virtue. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:An Introduction to Christian Ethics: Goals, Duties, and Virtues by Robin W. Lovin, and: The Moral Disciple: An Introduction to Christian Ethics by Kent A. Van TilPaul J. WadellAn Introduction to Christian Ethics: Goals, Duties, and Virtues ROBIN W. LOVIN Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2011. 288 pp. $29.00The Moral Disciple: An Introduction to Christian Ethics KENT A. VAN TIL Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012. 160 pp. $18.00Over (...) the last several years a number of introductory texts in Christian ethics have been published. Robin Lovin’s An Introduction to Christian Ethics and Kent Van Til’s The Moral Disciple are impressive and worthy additions to that growing collection. Both are intended for undergraduate students—an audience, these authors realize, whose upbringing, history, and experiences are very different from their own. How can professors guide students through the thicket of choices and decisions that confront them every day, especially when they are bombarded with seemingly endlessly diverse answers about what is true, good, worthwhile, or fulfilling? When so much is constantly changing, how can professors help students understand what it means to live wisely, responsibly, and with integrity? How can they use the manifold traditions and resources of Christian ethics to help students discern the contours of a life that is truly worth living as well as the attitudes, dispositions, and choices that will enable them to achieve that? And, perhaps most challengingly, how can they do this when their students come to the study of ethics, as Lovin observes, with little more than “mere fragments of a moral vocabulary that has lost its meaning”? (238) With these questions in mind, Lovin and Van Til, wise and compassionate guides, lead the reader through the history of Christian ethics to illustrate how those who have gone before us, in all the different ways they understood the moral life, can assist us on our journey today.Both texts are structured around the customary focal points of goals and consequences (teleology), laws and norms (deontology), and character and virtue (areteology). In investigating each of these models for understanding ethics, [End Page 213] Van Til and Lovin give special attention to the influence of Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and Kant. And both offer an insightful, balanced overview of the natural law, the moral and theological virtues, and the abiding but sometimes overlooked influence of utilitarianism on our moral reasoning. Moreover, both texts offer ample examples or case studies along with clear, succinct definitions that help students connect the material to their lives and appreciate important differences among varied accounts of the moral life.But there are also interesting differences between these two books. Because Van Til is primarily concerned with what ethics means in a life of faithful discipleship, he places how one’s relationship with Christ shapes her identity, understanding of the world, and sense of moral agency more at the forefront of his analysis than does Lovin in his Introduction to Christian Ethics. This is not a shortcoming of Lovin’s text, but it indicates an important difference in their methodologies. For example, because Van Til emphasizes that the lives of Christians are primarily guided by the biblical narrative, he moves from asking in the opening chapter “What is ethics?” to considering in chapter 2 the role of the scriptures for illuminating how Christians understand God, themselves, and their place in the world. “Christians believe that the Bible is God’s true and complete revelation,” Van Til writes, “and we also trust that the moral guidance we receive from Scripture is the truest and most complete moral guidance available to us” (18). Nonetheless, Van Til rightly cautions that because the Bible is “not an ethics textbook … problems may arise if we try to make the Bible guide our morality in ways that the Bible itself does not intend” (18). Thus, determining how biblical teaching should inform moral decisions demands ongoing personal and communal discernment.By contrast, after an expansive and very helpful overview of the origin of ethics in his opening chapter, Lovin adopts Charles Curran’s well-known fivefold “Christian stance” to provide the overarching framework for understanding the distinctiveness of Christian ethics. He then probes four... (shrink)

In this article, I use the expanded hohfeldian model presented by Wenar to argue that, according to Aristotle's theory of friendship, every bond of friendship that is based on utility or virtue creates duties and hohfeldian incidents between those who are friends. In section 1, I provide a quick presentation of Hohfeld's work and of Wenar's hohfeldian model. In section 2, I present my thesis about the creation of certain hohfeldian incidents and certain duties in virtue (...) and utility friendships as conceived by Aristotle. In section 3, I give a broad characterization of Aristotle's theory of friendship and of the three great kinds of friendship that he recognizes. In section 4, I defend the thesis that it is only in virtue and utility friendships that duties are created. In section 5, I specify what are the hohfeldian incidents created by these two kinds of friendship. In section 6, I specify the two ways in which, according to Aristotle, these incidents and duties might be created. In section 7, I conclude with a brief recapitulation of the argument. En este artículo utilizo el modelo hohfeldiano extendido, presentado por Wenar, para argumentar que, según la teoría de la amistad de Aristóteles, todo lazo de amistad basado en la utilidad o la virtud crea deberes e incidentes hohfeldianos entre aquellos que son amigos. En la sección 1 proporciono una presentación rápida de la obra de Hohfeld y del modelo hohfeldiano de Wenar. En la sección 2 presento mi tesis sobre la creación de ciertos incidentes hohfeldianos y ciertos deberes en las amistades basadas en la virtud y la utilidad tal como fueron concebidos por Aristóteles. En la sección 3 ofrezco una caracterización general de la teoría de la amistad de Aristóteles y de los tres grandes tipos de amistad que reconoce. En la sección 4 defiendo la tesis de que los deberes se crean solamente en las amistades basadas en la virtud y la utilidad. En la sección 5 especifico cuáles son los incidentes hohfeldianos creados por estos dos tipos de amistad. En la sección 6 especifico las dos maneras en que, según Aristóteles, podrían crearse estos incidentes y deberes. En la sección 7 concluyo con una breve recapitulación de la argumentación. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant's final publication in ethics was The Doctrine of Virtue, Part II of the 1797 The Metaphysics of Morals. This text presents Kant's normative ethical theory. This guide is meant to be read alongside Kant's text, combining accessible explanations and novel interpretations of this difficult text. It is the first book in English devoted to The Doctrine of Virtue, one of Kant's most significant works. -/- Timmons divides the guide into five parts. Part I reviews Kant's life, (...) the history and significance of The Doctrine of Virtue, and situates Kant's ethics within his general metaphysical and epistemological views. Part II is devoted to the General Introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals, which is essential for understanding Kant's ethics. Part III and Part IV turn to The Doctrine of Virtue itself, exploring Kant's defense of a system of duties and corresponding virtues. Part V examines Kant's conception of moral education, the practice of virtue, and the conclusion to the book where Kant explains why the discipline of ethics does not include religion as a doctrine of duties to God. Timmons concludes the book highlighting key aspects of The Doctrine of Virtue, situating Kant's ethical theory in relation to other normative ethical theories. This guide is a vital resource for both students and scholars interested in ethics and the history of philosophy. (shrink)

The main purpose of this article is to discuss the place of the ethics of virtues and char acter in nursing and health care in general, and in psychiatric nursing in particular. To attain this goal, the relationship between the ethics of duty (i.e. rule based ethics) and the ethics of virtue and character will be clarified in order to defend our main hypothe sis that these two types of ethics should complement each other, since both are necessary but (...) neither by itself is sufficient for nursing. This means that any applied ethics, as in nursing, should consider the importance of the agent's moral character. To support our arguments, we shall use cases from the empirical reality of psychiatric and mental health care. (shrink)

In this paper I tee off from a footnote in prichard's article, "is moral philosophy based on a mistake?" in it he contrasts living under the aegis of moral obligation and moral goodness with living under the aegis of virtue. Using prichard's terms I try to say what an ethics of virtue as versus one of duty and moral goodness would be like. Then I try to see what prichard's case against the former and for the latter would (...) be like, And to indicate my own sympathies in the matter. (shrink)

Le Grand's introduction to philosophy, written for use in Cambridge, was the first to be written along Cartesian lines. A section on moral philosophy, first included in the second edition 1672, drew on the common Aristotelian-style way of dealing with the subject-matter, but with modifications inspired by Descartes. In the third edition 1675 this section was almost doubled in size. The additional chapters are an unacknowledged paraphrase of the bulk of Pufendorf's De officio hominis et civis 1673. Le Grand's revision (...) can be taken as a point of transition from an older moral philosophy to modern moral philosophy. It is argued that the contrast between them is not one of virtues vs rules. Rather, the important difference is that the older is essentially eudaimonistic, both in its Aristotelian and Cartesian varieties, but the modern one is not. It relegates the quest for happiness to other disciplines such as psychology, and imports concepts which had belonged to moral theology, such as conscience, imputation, obligation, etc. into moral philosophy. Le Grands für den Gebrauch in Cambridge geschriebene "Einführung in die Philosophie" ist die erste, die nach kartesianischen Richtlinien verfaßt wird. Der Abschnitt über Moralphilosophie, der in die zweite Auflage von 1672 eingefügt wird, ist zwar immer noch in dem gebräuchlichen aristotelischen Stil geschrieben, enthält aber Modifikationen, die von Descartes inspiriert sind. In der dritten Auflage von 1675 wird der Umfang dieses Abschnitts nahezu verdoppelt. Die neu hinzugekommenen Kapitel sind eine Wiedergabe des Hauptteils von Pufendorfs "De officio hominis et civis" von 1673, die als Wiedergabe jedoch nicht kenntlich gemacht wird. Man kann Le Grands Bearbeitung als einen Schritt auf dem Weg von der alten zur modernen Moralphilosophie ansehen. Der Unterschied zwischen beiden ist nicht der Unterschied zwischen der Lehre von den moralischen Tugenden und der von den moralischen Gesetzen. Der entscheidende Unterschied ist vielmehr, daß die ältere Moralphilosophie, sowohl in ihrer aristotelischen, als auch in ihrer kartesianischen Variante, im wesentlichen eudämonistisch ist, während das auf die moderne Moralphilosophie gerade nicht zutrifft. Dadurch wird die Suche nach dem Glück an andere Disziplinen, beispielsweise die Psychologie, verwiesen, während die Moralphilosophie Konzepte wie "Gewissen", "Zurechnung", "Verbindlichkeit" übernimmt, die von der Moraltheologie entwickelt worden waren. (shrink)

Structural injustice is injustice produced by largescale social structures and processes that create systemic disadvantages for large groups of people. Individuals have duties to counteract structural injustice. These duties are more demanding for people privileged by unjust social structures than for non-privileged individuals, even when the latter have equal ability to contribute. What explains this? I review and reject two common explanations, i.e., the Reparation Account and the Restitution Account. I offer a third view, the Domination Account; it (...) holds that the privileged have more demanding duties because they pose a constant threat of domination to non-privileged individuals by virtue of their structural positions. (shrink)

An apathetic life is not the sort of life that most of us would want for ourselves or believe that we have a duty to strive for. And yet Kant argues that we have a duty of apathy, a duty to strive to be without affects (Affecten) and passions (Leidenschaften). But is Kant’s claim that there is a duty of apathy really as problematic as it sounds? In arguing that it is not, this paper investigates in detail in Kant’s accounts (...) of affects and passions and defends Kant’s argument that we have a duty of apathy. This investigation reveals Kant’s nuanced view on the role that sensible motivating states play in moral agency and the development of a virtuous character. (shrink)