For the past half-century, critical pedagogy has represented perhaps the most influential response to traditional ‘banking’ models of education and the political obedience and social conformity they are purported to engender. Precisely because of its lasting impact, however, it has tended to overshadow other possible visions of the critical political potential of education. In this article, I trace the origins and development of a distinctive yet under-discussed concept in Michel Foucault’s late ethical work – psychagogy – to pursue an alternative (...) depiction of education as a critical political practice. Attending to the origins and meaning of psychagogy in Foucault’s work is valuable, I argue, for two reasons. On the one hand, the concept offers a vision of political education that avoids reproducing problematic juridical binaries – truth and ideology, rationality and irrationality, absolved and condemned – that Foucault believed inhered in Enlightenment-era conceptions of emancipation. On the other hand, it demonstrates how political problems of our present might be rendered workable not only through recourse to the authoritative discourses of experts or collective demands of revolutionaries, but also through exercises in subjectivity formation that are rather more quotidian, experiential, and conditional in nature. (shrink)

Historically, American political science has rarely engaged popular culture as a central topic of study, despite the domain’s outsized influence in American community life. This article argues that this marginalization is, in part, the by-product of long-standing disciplinary debates over the inadequate political development of the American public. To develop this argument, the article first surveys the work of early political scientists, such as John Burgess and Woodrow Wilson, to show that their reformist ambitions largely precluded discussion of mundane activities (...) of social life such as popular culture. It then turns to Harold Lasswell, who produced some of the first investigations of popular culture in American political science. Ironically, however, his work – and the work of those who adapted similar ways of speaking about popular culture after him – only reinforced skepticisms concerning the American public. It has thus helped keep the topic on the margins of disciplinary discourse. (shrink)

Positions on the ethics of human enhancement technologies can be (crudely) characterized as ranging from transhumanism to bioconservatism. Transhumanists believe that human enhancement technologies should be made widely available, that individuals should have broad discretion over which of these technologies to apply to themselves, and that parents should normally have the right to choose enhancements for their children-to-be. Bioconservatives (whose ranks include such diverse writers as Leon Kass, Francis Fukuyama, George Annas, Wesley Smith, Jeremy Rifkin, and Bill McKibben) are generally (...) opposed to the use of technology to modify human nature. A central idea in bioconservativism is that human enhancement technologies will undermine our human dignity. To forestall a slide down the slippery slope towards an ultimately debased ‘posthuman’ state, bioconservatives often argue for broad bans on otherwise promising human enhancements. This paper distinguishes two common fears about the posthuman and argues for the importance of a concept of dignity that is inclusive enough to also apply to many possible posthuman beings. Recognizing the possibility of posthuman dignity undercuts an important objection against human enhancement and removes a distortive double standard from our field of moral vision. (shrink)

Suppose that we develop a medically safe and affordable means of enhancing human intelligence. For concreteness, we shall assume that the technology is genetic engineering (either somatic or germ line), although the argument we will present does not depend on the technological implementation. For simplicity, we shall speak of enhancing “intelligence” or “cognitive capacity,” but we do not presuppose that intelligence is best conceived of as a unitary attribute. Our considerations could be applied to specific cognitive abilities such as verbal (...) fluency, memory, abstract reasoning, social intelligence, spatial cognition, numerical ability, or musical talent. It will emerge that the form of argument that we use can be applied much more generally to help assess other kinds of enhancement technologies as well as other kinds of reform. However, to give a detailed illustration of how the argument form works, we will focus on the prospect of cognitive enhancement. (shrink)

Transhumanism is a loosely defined movement that has developed gradually over the past two decades. [1] It promotes an interdisciplinary approach to understanding and evaluating the opportunities for enhancing the human condition and the human organism opened up by the advancement of technology. Attention is given to both present technologies, like genetic engineering and information technology, and anticipated future ones, such as molecular nanotechnology and artificial intelligence.

Transhumanism is a loosely defined movement that has developed gradually over the past two decades. It promotes an interdisciplinary approach to understanding and evaluating the opportunities for enhancing the human condition and the human organism opened up by the advancement of technology. Attention is given to both present technologies, like genetic engineering and information technology, and anticipated future ones, such as molecular nanotechnology and artificial intelligence.

The ethical issues related to the possible future creation of machines with general intellectual capabilities far outstripping those of humans are quite distinct from any ethical problems arising in current automation and information systems. Such superintelligence would not be just another technological development; it would be the most important invention ever made, and would lead to explosive progress in all scientific and technological fields, as the superintelligence would conduct research with superhuman efficiency. To the extent that ethics is a cognitive (...) pursuit, a superintelligence could also easily surpass humans in the quality of its moral thinking. However, it would be up to the designers of the superintelligence to specify its original motivations. Since the superintelligence may become unstoppably powerful because of its intellectual superiority and the technologies it could develop, it is crucial that it be provided with human-friendly motivations. This paper surveys some of the unique ethical issues in creating superintelligence, and discusses what motivations we ought to give a superintelligence, and introduces some cost-benefit considerations relating to whether the development of superintelligent machines ought to be accelerated or retarded. (shrink)

Cognitive enhancement may be defined as the amplification or extension of core capacities of the mind through improvement or augmentation of internal or external information processing systems. Cognition refers to the processes an organism uses to organize information. These include acquiring information (perception), selecting (attention), representing (understanding) and retaining (memory) information, and using it to guide behavior (reasoning and coordination of motor outputs). Interventions to improve cognitive function may be directed at any of these core faculties.

Abstract: This article addresses a number of difficulties and complications in the standard formulations of motivational internalism, and considers what besires might be in the light of those difficulties and complications. Two notions of besire are then distinguished, before considering how different kinds of motivational internalism and different conceptions of besire fare against the significant argument that we may be indifferent to the demands of morality without irrationality.

This paper considers the implications for the relational-substantival debate of observations of parity nonconservation in weak interactions, a much neglected topic. It is argued that 'geometric proofs' of absolute space, first proposed by Kant (1768), fail, but that parity violating laws allow 'mechanical proofs', like Newton's laws. Parity violating laws are explained and arguments analogous to those of Newton's Scholium are constructed to show that they require absolute spacetime structure--namely, an orientation--as Newtonian mechanics requires affine structure. Finally, it is considered (...) how standard relationist responses to Newton's argument might respond to the new challenge of parity nonconservation. (shrink)

In this paper we critically review the various attempts that have been made to understand quantum field theory. We focus on Teller's (1990) harmonic oscillator interpretation, and Bohm et al.'s (1987) causal interpretation. The former unabashedly aims to be a purely heuristic account, but we show that it is only interestingly applicable to the free bosonic field. Along the way we suggest alternative models. Bohm's interpretation provides an ontology for the theory--a classical field, with a quantum equation of motion. This (...) too has problems; it is not Lorentz invariant. (shrink)

This paper attempts to provide, through a reading of Derrida's Rogues, an account of the political phenomenon where regimes of sovereignty are resisted in the name of the very values — freedom, democracy and human rights, for example — they purport to stand for. To Derrida, sovereignty must simultaneously conform to a logic of both self-identity and of unconditionality. However, the unconditionality that makes sovereignty possible will always threaten and exceed it, something that other accounts like Agamben's try implicitly to (...) deny. In the end, for Derrida, our present political challenge is to recognize, and even affirm, the way the unconditionality of sovereignty is turned against itself. Sovereignty, then, is most effectively dealt with not by imagining a world in which it will no longer occur, nor by simple opposition, but by committing to the very logic of sovereignty itself. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence is a possibility that should not be ignored in any serious thinking about the future, and it raises many profound issues for ethics and public policy that philosophers ought to start thinking about. This article outlines the case for thinking that human-level machine intelligence might well appear within the next half century. It then explains four immediate consequences of such a development, and argues that machine intelligence would have a revolutionary impact on a wide range of the social, (...) political, economic, commercial, technological, scientific and environmental issues that humanity will face over the coming decades. (shrink)

No topic has caused more discussion in recent philosophy and political theory than sovereignty. From late Foucault to Agamben, and from Guantanamo Bay to the 'war on terror,' the issue of the extent and the nature of the sovereign has given theoretical debates their currency and urgency. New thinking on sovereignty has always imagined the styles of human selfhood that each regime involves. Each denomination of sovereignty requires a specific mode of subjectivity to explain its meaning and facilitate its operation. (...) The aim of this book is to help outline Jacques Derrida's thinking on sovereignty - a theme which increasingly attracted Derrida towards the end of his career - in its relationship to subjectivity. It investigates the late work Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, as not only Derrida's fullest statement of his thinking on sovereignty, but also as the destination of his career-long interest in questions of politics and self-identity. The book argues that in Derrida's thinking of the relationship between sovereignty and subjectivity - and the related themes of unconditionality and ipseity - we can detect the outline of Bataille's adaptation of Freud. Freud completed his 'metapsychology,' by defining the 'economic' nature of subjectivity. In Bataille's hands, this economic theory became a key to the nature of inter-relationship in general, specifically the complex and shifting relationship between subjectivity and power. In playing with Bataille's legacy, Derrida connects not only with the irrepressibly outrageous thinking of philosophy's most self-consciously transgressive thinker, but with the early twentieth century scientific revolution through which 'energy' became ontology. As with so many of the forebears who influenced him, Derrida echoes and adapts Bataille's thinking while radically de-literalising it. The results are crucial for understanding Derrida's views on power, subjectivity and representation, as well as all of the other key themes in late Derrida: hospitality, justice, otherness and the gift. (shrink)

(2009). “Twenty Paragraphs of Written Instructions”. Angelaki: Vol. 14, shadows of cruelty sadism, masochism and the philosophical muse – part one, pp. 59-68.

We show that every proper normal extension of the bi-modal system S5 2 has the poly-size model property. In fact, to every proper normal extension L of S5 2 corresponds a natural number b(L) - the bound of L. For every L, there exists a polynomial P(·) of degree b(L) + 1 such that every L-consistent formula is satisfiable on an L-frame whose universe is bounded by P(||), where || denotes the number of subformulas of . It is shown that (...) this bound is optimal. (shrink)

Over the past few years, a new paradigm for thinking about humankind's future has begun to take shape among some leading computer scientists, neuroscientists, nanotechnologists and researchers at the forefront of technological development. The new paradigm rejects a crucial assumption that is implicit in both traditional futurology and practically all of today's political thinking. This is the assumption that the "human condition" is at root a constant. Present-day processes can be fine-tuned; wealth can be increased and redistributed; tools can be (...) developed and refined; culture can change, sometimes drastically; but human nature itself is not up for grabs. (shrink)

Future of Humanity Institute, James Martin 21st Century School, University of Oxford, Littlegate House, 16/17 St Ebbe's Street, Oxford OX1 1PT, UK; www.nickbostrom.com..

When water was discovered on Mars, people got very excited. Where there is water, there may be life. Scientists are planning new missions to study the planet up close. NASA’s next Mars rover is scheduled to arrive in 2010. In the decade following, a Mars Sample Return mission might be launched, which would use robotic systems to collect samples of Martian rocks, soils, and atmosphere, and return them to Earth. We could then analyze the sample to see if it contains (...) any traces of life, whether extinct or still active. Such a discovery would be of tremendous scientific significance. What could be more fascinating than discovering life that had evolved entirely independently of life here on Earth? Many people would also find it heartening to learn that we are not entirely alone in this vast cold cosmos. (shrink)

As it is traditionally conceived, Just War Theory is not well suited for dealing with nation vs non-nation wars. It thus makes sense to create a second Just War Theory to deal with these wars. This article explores the differences and similarities between the two theories.

Marx's call for a materialism capable of engaging reality as ‘sensuous human activity’ opens a question about the role of representation in relation to data. Images have increasingly been seen as significant forms of data in the history of education. Derrida's theory of the spectre—a variation on the positions established in his earlier works on the trace, the supplement and differance—offers a way of rethinking visual images, their relations with existing discourses of knowledge and with positioned subjects who makes sense. (...) Two early twentieth-century photographs are explored here in relation to ideas derived from Derrida as an exercise in the philosophy of representation. (shrink)

Since the collapse of the 'received view' consensus in the late 1960s, the question of scientific realism has been a major preoccupation of philosophers of science. This paper sketches the history of this debate, which grew from developments in the philosophy of language, but eventually took on an autonomous existence. More recently, the debate has tended towards more 'local' considerations of particular scientific episodes as a way of getting purchase on the issues. The paper reviews two such approaches, Fine's and (...) Hacking's, describing their positions, their prospects, and how they are related. Finally, the paper suggests that local philosophies of science offer a way for our discipline to engage more fruitfully with the public and the scientific community. (shrink)

This article seeks to identify, theoretically,some broad ethical issues about the type ofspace which the Internet is becoming, issueswhich are closely linked to developing newagendas for empirical research into Internetuse. It seeks to move away from the concept of''digital divide'' which has dominated debate inthis area while presuming a rather staticnotion of the space which the Internet is, orcould become. Instead, it draws on deliberativedemocracy theory in general and John Dryzek''sconcept of ''discursive design'' in particular toformulate six types of issue (...) (Convergence, WhoConverges?, Deliberation, Public Action,Relations to the State, and Long-term Patternsof Practice) around which both empiricalresearch and ethical debate can focus, andwhich taken together will help answer whetherthe Internet is, or can be, in part a''discursive design'' which contributes to theconditions of democratic public life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rhetorical Agency as a Property of QuestioningNick TurnbullAttention to agency has increased with the ongoing crisis of thought arising from the critique of metaphysics. With the absence of a foundation for reason comes an increased scope for choice in the interpretation of the world and the necessity to persuade others where demonstrative reason is lacking. Hence the "rhetorical turn" accompanies the problematization of knowledge. Even identity itself has been (...) "rhetoricized" with the death of the subject, and attention turns to how discourse constructs knowledge of the world and of ourselves. The rhetorical turn supports an increased capacity of agency in the use of language to construct identity and to relate to others. Agency is a fundamental property of rhetoric: we can debate the discourse of an interlocutor through resort to argumentation even if, as Gerard Hauser notes in the call for papers, that interlocutor is a monster. Philosophy itself has been rhetoricized in that the many philosophical systems of history have been revealed to be unsupportable now that there is no firm foundation upon which to ground inference in general. In a discourse without foundations we are free to choose between different philosophies, so much so that some have rejected philosophy itself in favor of general arbitrariness. This is apparent in deconstruction in philosophy and the rehabilitation of sophism within rhetoric.Where there is choice there is agency, of the rhetor and the audience. But the agency that is so positive for rhetoric is also that for which rhetoric has been condemned. Rhetoric has long been associated with sophistic, in which discourse can be used to deceive others or to simply demonstrate the status of the rhetor regardless of the truth of the conclusions reached. Rhetorical agency permits deception and stands in contrast with logical demonstration, in which necessity and self-evidence are the hallmarks of ideal reason. We have no choice but to accept necessary conclusions. Hence the apparent weakness of rhetoric in relation to logic and the questionable status [End Page 207] of the ethical properties of agency. And if agency is condemned as relativist, is not humanity condemned along with it? The rise of rhetoric also encompasses the "rhetoric of inquiry," which shows that even science employs rhetorical devices to construct the world and to persuade its audience. Science is especially rhetorical in the process of discovery, which is nonscientific. Nonetheless, the status of rhetoric is still problematic because of the freedom it permits. It is viewed by many as a weakness to be eliminated rather than a positive quality to be embraced. The contrast between rhetorical agency and logical necessity lies at the heart of contemporary debates about knowledge, identity, and postmodernity.In this paper I address the nature of rhetorical agency. This requires an examination of the foundations of knowledge and the division between logic and rhetoric. Although this division has been addressed many times in this journal, I believe it is still useful to revisit the debate. We must try to move beyond the postmodern impasse if knowledge is to progress and if rhetoric is to overcome its residual status. I draw on the philosophy of Michel Meyer, who offers a unique perspective on the status of rhetoric and the nature of philosophy. First, I outline the rhetorical turn as part of an increasing problematization of thought. I suggest that the rhetorical turn is incomplete because although problematicity is present in postmodern times, it remains unthematized on its own terms. The division between logic and rhetoric arises from an underlying conflict between freedom and necessity that suggests we inquire into the nature of the problematic itself. Next, I propose that Michel Meyer offers a solution to the problem by effecting a synthesis of freedom and necessity in his consideration of questioning as the foundation of reason and the consideration of the historical crisis faced by philosophy at the end of the twentieth century. Finally, I suggest that agency can be understood as a fundamental property of questioning that arises from the necessity of questioning as the foundation of reason. Rhetorical agency is thus a defining characteristic of humanity.1.The Aristotelian division of logic and rhetoric separated the necessary from the contingent... (shrink)

Because of accelerating technological progress, humankind may be rapidly approaching a critical phase in its career. In addition to well-known threats such as nuclear holocaust, the prospects of radically transforming technologies like nanotech systems and machine intelligence present us with unprecedented opportunities and risks. Our future, and whether we will have a future at all, may well be determined by how we deal with these challenges. In the case of radically transforming technologies, a better understanding of the transition dynamics from (...) a human to a “posthuman” society is needed. Of particular importance is to know where the pitfalls are: the ways in which things could go terminally wrong. While we have had long exposure to various personal, local, and endurable global hazards, this paper analyzes a recently emerging category: that of existential risks. These are threats that could cause our extinction or destroy the potential of Earth-originating intelligent life. Some of these threats are relatively well known while others, including some of the gravest, have gone almost unrecognized. Existential risks have a cluster of features that make ordinary risk management ineffective. A final section of this paper discusses several ethical and policy implications. A clearer understanding of the threat picture will enable us to formulate better strategies. (shrink)

More precisely, transhumanists advocate increased funding for research to radically extend healthy lifespan and favor the development of medical and technological means to improve memory, concentration, and other human capacities. Transhumanists propose that everybody should have the option to use such means to enhance various dimensions of their cognitive, emotional, and physical well-being. Not only is this a natural extension of the traditional aims of medicine and technology, but it is also a great humanitarian opportunity to genuinely improve the human (...) condition. (shrink)

Averill (1990) argues that not every property is a disposition. I claim here that his reasoning is faulty, suffering at one point from a logical error and at other points from an inadequate account of counterfactuals.

I had my accident on the rugby field on July 29, 2000 about 2.00 p.m. during a simple line - out, even before the ball was thrown in. I t just felt like another simple case of concussion , I staggered to the sideline, the coach asked me “what ’s wrong”? He said I told him I just felt sick and to put me back on the field in 10 minutes. Then I collapsed, eventually blacked out and then was rushed (...) to hospital unconscious in an ambulance with them struggling drastically to keep me alive. Af ter three days of being in there, they thought I was alright and were going to send me home. Then it star ted happening. First I nearly collapsed again tak ing a shower . For days the spe - cialists didn’t k now what was wrong with me. M y girlfriend at the time, who had rushed down from Wanak a when she had heard it had happened went mad at the specialists to do something. Af ter six days of going in and out of seizures, finally af ter what seemed like all the tests k nown to man, they said I had suffered several brain stem strokes then one massive major one, which altogether had lef t me diagnosed with the ex tremely rare and unk nown condition only k nown to a few as “ locked in syndrome”. (shrink)

Когда-то Земля находилась под тиранией гигантского драконa. Ростом дракон был выше самого высокого собора, и весь был покрыт черной чешуей. Его красные глаза пылали ненавистью, и изо рта тёк непрерывный поток зловонной желтовато- зеленой слизи. Дракон требовал от человечества чудовищную дань: для удовлетворения его непомерного аппетита, десять тысяч мужчин и женщин должны были быть доставлены на исходе каждого дня к подножью горы у которой жил дракон-тиран. Некоторых дракон пожирал сразу, других держал в течение многих месяцев или даже лет перед тем (...) как они были съедены. (shrink)

Blackballing the reaper is an old ambition, and considerable progress has been made. For the past 150 years, best-performance life-expectancy (i.e. life-expectancy in the country where it is highest) has increased at a very steady rate of 3 months per year.1 Lifeexpectancy for the ancient Romans was circa 23 years; today the average life-expectancy in the world is 64 years.2 Will this trend continue? What are the consequences if it does? And what ethical and political challenges does the prospect of (...) life-extension create for us today? This article comments on some views on the ethics, science, and politics of lifeextension from a recent edited volume, The Fountain of Youth. (shrink)

An existential risk is defined as one that threatens to annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically to curtail its potential. Since we are still here, we know that no existential disaster has ever occurred. But lacking experience with such disasters, it is also likely that we have not have evolved mechanisms, biologically or culturally, for managing existential risks.

Lang, lang geleden werd de planeet getiranniseerd door een gigantische draak. De draak was groter dan de grootste kerk en was bedekt met dikke, zwarte schubben. Zijn rode ogen gloeiden van haat en uit zijn verschrikkelijke bek stroomde onophoudelijk stinkend, geelgroen slijm. Hij eiste van de mens een ijzingwekkend eerbetoon: om zijn enorme honger te stillen, moesten er iedere avond bij het vallen van het duister tienduizend mannen en vrouwen aan de voet van de berg, waar de draak-tiran woonde, afgeleverd (...) worden. Soms slokte de draak deze arme zielen gelijk op; soms sloot hij ze echter op in de berg waar zij maanden of jaren wegkwijnden totdat zij uiteindelijk opgegeten werden. (shrink)

We differentiate morally between actual and potential beings: the latter do not exist now and will never exist unless we bring them into existence. The interests of existing persons should guide the creation of new beings. We ought not to create new beings that are expected to harm the interests of existing persons. If a potential being becomes actual, it becomes a member of the moral community and its interests should be taken into account. A being can be actual even (...) if it does not currently exist: there is a moral reason not to set up a mechanism today that will harm a being that comes into existence tomorrow. (shrink)

Larry King: With me tonight is a very special guest. One year ago, Albert was a golden retriever dog much like any other. Then he was uploaded to a computer, and now he has been given a set of remarkable cognitive enhancements that enable him to reason and speak. Thanks for joining us, Albert.

The idea of life on Mars has been with us for nearly 300 years, ever since early astronomers saw what they believed to be polar ice caps through their primitive telescopes. Since then, space probes have indeed confirmed that the red planet has water and future missions might tell us if Mars contains any traces of life, whether extinct or still active. Such a discovery would be of tremendous scientific significance: the first time that any signs of extraterrestrial life have (...) ever been detected. Many people would also find it heartening to learn that we’re not entirely alone in this vast cold cosmos. (shrink)

More and more researchers now agree that radical human life extension is only a matter of time. Aging is a biochemical process and humans will learn how to intervene in it and slow it down. Abolishing aging is theoretically possible. It is a goal that is not quite within reach yet, but it will be one day.

It is, of course, widely appreciated that certain academic contributions lay the theoretical or empirical foundations for further work. One reason why a great scientist such as Einstein is celebrated is that his discoveries have enabled thousands of other scientists to tackle problems that they could not have solved without relativity theory.

The state of the art as regards the thesis of indeterminacy of translation is as follows. Very much has been said about it, most of which is based on misunderstandings. No satisfactory formulation of the thesis has been presented. No good argument has been given in favour of the thesis. No good argument has been advanced against it.

Since it is conceivable that the sun won't rise tomorrow although it has always done so in the past, we cannot hope for justification for the belief that it is strictly speaking absolutely certain that the sun will rise tomorrow. What we are looking for is an explanation of why it is reasonable even to believe with a high degree of confidence that the sun will rise.

We explicate recent results that shed light on the obscure and troubling problem of renormalization in Quantum Field Theory (QFT). We review how divergent predictions arise in perturbative QFT, and how they are renormalized into finite quantities. Commentators have worried that there is no foundation for renormalization, and hence that QFTs are not logically coherent. We dispute this by describing the physics behind liquid diffusion, in which exactly analogous divergences are found and renormalized. But now we are looking at a (...) problem that is physically and formally well-defined, proving that the problems of renormalization, by themselves, cannot refute QFT. (shrink)