Lun Xun's collected anti-Confucianist writings.

The deduction of categories in the 1781 edition of the Critique of the Pure Reason (A Deduction) has “two sides”—the “objective deduction” and the “subjective deduction”. Kant seems ambivalent about the latter deduction. I treat it as a significant episode of Kant’s thinking about categories that extended from the early 1770s to around 1790. It contains his most detailed answer to the question about the origin of categories that he formulated in the 1772 letter to Marcus Herz. The answer is (...) that categories are generated a priori through a kind of intellectual “epigenesis”. This account leaves unexplained why precisely such and such categories should be generated. While this observation caused Kant to worry about the hypothetical status of the subjective deduction in 1781, he would come to acquiesce in the recognition that the ground of the possibility of categories is itself inscrutable. I call this his “methodological skepticism”. (shrink)

Recent studies have identified practical wisdom as a critical area for exploration in the domains of management and leadership. This paper delves into the cultivation and manifestation of practical wisdom in leadership, emphasizing the potential of narratives as an efficacious tool, as corroborated by academic literature. Employing practical wisdom theory and a refined analytical model, we examine the role of narratives as a key instrument for practically wise leaders. Through the provision of theoretical underpinnings and empirical evidence, our study seeks (...) to elucidate the tripartite interconnectedness of practical wisdom, narratives, and leadership. Subsequently, a conceptual model is developed and illustrated, outlining the relationship between narratives and practical wisdom across diverse leadership contexts. This analysis positions practical wisdom as a fundamental guidance for leaders’ narrative practices. Acknowledging the paper’s conceptual focus, we discuss the practical and theoretical implications of the proposed model and advocate for empirical inquiry to further enhance understanding of narrative practices in practically wise leadership. (shrink)

As an important view in the epistemology of perception, dogmatism proposes that for any experience, if it has a distinctive kind of phenomenal character, then it thereby provides us with immediate justification for beliefs about the external world. This paper rejects dogmatism by looking into the epistemology of imagining. In particular, this paper first appeals to some empirical studies on perceptual experiences and imaginings to show that it is possible for imaginings to have the distinctive phenomenal character dogmatists have in (...) mind. Then this paper argues that some of these imaginings fail to provide us with immediate justification for beliefs about the external world at least partly due to their inappropriate etiology. Such imaginings constitute counterexamples to dogmatism. (shrink)

Ms. B. was a 70-year-old woman who presented with a chief complaint of “my belly got puffy.” She noted that her waistband got progressively tighter as her abdomen swelled up on the month prior to her admission. Although not painful, the swelling caused considerable discomfort and anorexia.Ms. B. was a 70-year-old woman who presented with a chief complaint of “my belly got puffy.” She noted that her waistband got progressively tighter as her abdomen swelled up on the month prior to (...) her admission. Although not painful, the swelling caused considerable discomfort and anorexia.Ms. B. had come to the university hospital by referral from her primary care doctor. She was my first patient on my junior clerkship in internal medicine, a specialty I was particularly interested in going into. It is a rare opportunity for a medical student to pick up a mystery case. Ms. B. had come to us without a diagnosis. (shrink)

According to phenomenal conservatism or dogmatism, perceptual experiences can give us immediate justification for beliefs about the external world in virtue of having a distinctive kind of phenomenal character—namely phenomenal force. I present three cases to show that phenomenal force is neither pervasive among nor exclusive to perceptual experiences. The plausibility of such cases calls out for explanation. I argue that contrary to a long-held assumption, phenomenal force is a separate, non-perceptual state generated by some metacognitive mechanisms that monitor one’s (...) first-order mental processes and states. This new account advances our understanding of the nature of phenomenal force. (shrink)

Despite the prevalent role of guanxi in conducting business in Chinese, it is unclear whether interpersonal guanxi fosters interfirm trust. Taking a contingency approach, this study examines how institutional (government–market relationship and Buddhism influence) and individual (relative role performance and the span of partner control) factors moderate the association between interpersonal guanxi and interfirm trust. Based on a paired survey between salespersons and sales managers and two secondary datasets, this study finds that interpersonal guanxi is positively associated with interfirm trust. (...) Moreover, this positive effect is stronger when firms operate in regions with strong government–market relationships and strong Buddhism influence. In addition, the positive relationship is weaker when guanxi resides in boundary spanners who have relatively high role performance, but becomes stronger when boundary spanners have a broad span of partner control. These findings highlight the situations in which guanxi at an interpersonal level is more or less likely to foster interfirm trust. (shrink)

Despite the prevalent role of guanxi in conducting business in Chinese, it is unclear whether interpersonal guanxi fosters interfirm trust. Taking a contingency approach, this study examines how institutional and individual factors moderate the association between interpersonal guanxi and interfirm trust. Based on a paired survey between salespersons and sales managers and two secondary datasets, this study finds that interpersonal guanxi is positively associated with interfirm trust. Moreover, this positive effect is stronger when firms operate in regions with strong government–market (...) relationships and strong Buddhism influence. In addition, the positive relationship is weaker when guanxi resides in boundary spanners who have relatively high role performance, but becomes stronger when boundary spanners have a broad span of partner control. These findings highlight the situations in which guanxi at an interpersonal level is more or less likely to foster interfirm trust. (shrink)

Does phenomenal force, the distinctive phenomenology attributed to perceptual experience, really form an integral part of the latter? If not, what implications does it have for perceptual justification? In this paper, I first argue for a metacognitive account, according to which phenomenal force constitutes a separate, metacognitive state. This account opens up a previously unexplored path for challenging phenomenal conservatism or dogmatism, which has been a prominent theory of perceptual justification over the past two decades. Moreover, I investigate several alternative (...) possibilities in which phenomenal force might still be deemed as significant, but ultimately demonstrate that its epistemic role remains marginal at best. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Cognitive penetrability refers to the possibility that perceptual experiences are influenced by our beliefs, expectations, emotions, or other personal-level mental states. In this paper, I focus on the epistemological implication of cognitive penetration, and examine how, exactly, aetiologies matter to the justificatory power of perceptual experiences. I examine a prominent theory, according to which some cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences are like conclusions of bad inferences. Whereas one version of this theory is psychologically implausible, the other version has sceptical consequences. (...) In the second half of the paper, I suggest an alternative theory, drawing on recent empirical research on imagining-perception interaction and the epistemology of imagining. (shrink)

This paper rigorously examines the primitive foundations of economic reasoning through a framework based on symbolic logic. Extending previous work, it formalizes economic conceptions (\(\mathbb{C}\)), symbols (\(s_i\)), and introduces a structured language (\(\mathcal{L_{\mathbb{C}}}\)) to define their formation and interpretation. Organized as a continuous chain of declarations and illustrations, the paper offers a concise, systematic approach to understanding the philosophy of economic reasoning through formal symbolic representations.

In the mid-T'ang movement for the reform of literary style, literary form, and literary language, Liu Tsung-yüan made brilliant contributions. His travelogues, metaphorical satires, and miscellaneous other works are a precious heritage of Chinese literature. This has long been well known, but his important place in the history of the development of Chinese materialism and atheism, on the other hand, has long since been hidden in obscurity.

The persistent challenge of formulating ontic structuralism in a rigorous manner, which prioritizes structures over the entities they contain, calls for a transformation of traditional logical frameworks. I argue that Univalent Foundations (UF), which feature the axiom that all isomorphic structures are identical, offer such a foundation and are more attractive than other proposed structuralist frameworks. Furthermore, I delve into the significance in the case of the hole argument and, very briefly, the nature of symmetries.

Previous studies have found a link between red and aggressive behavior. For example, athletes who wear red uniforms in sports are considered to have a competitive advantage. So far, most previous studies have adopted self-report methods, which have low face validity and were easily influenced by the social expectations. Therefore, the study used two implicit methods to further explore the association between red and aggressiveness. A modified Stroop task was used in Experiment 1 to probe college students’ differences between “congruent” (...) tasks and “incongruent” tasks. Result showed that participants responded more quickly to the congruent tasks than the incongruent tasks. Then, in order to adapt to the competitive context, Experiment 2 used an implicit association test with photos of athletes as the stimulus to college students and athletes to evaluate “congruent” tasks as well as “incongruent” tasks, respectively. According to the results, both college students and athletes respond faster to congruent tasks than to incongruent tasks. Besides, athletes’ reactions to the red–aggressiveness association are faster than college students, which may relate to the athletes’ professional experience. The athletes may be more aggressive and impulsive. Overall, the study has attempted to examine the association between red and aggressiveness through implicit methods, but in the future, researches are need to find a deep association from brain mechanism aspect. (shrink)

We tend to think that perceptual experiences tell us about what the external world is like without being influenced by our own mind. But recent psychological and philosophical research indicates that this might not be true. Our beliefs, expectations, knowledge, and other personal-level mental states might influence what we experience. This kind of psychological phenomena is now called “cognitive penetration.” The research of cognitive penetration not only has important consequences for psychology and the philosophy of mind, but also has interesting (...) epistemological implications. According to the Downgrade Thesis, some cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences give their subjects less justification for believing their penetrated contents than perceptual experiences that are unpenetrated to represent those contents would usually give. In this paper, I propose an innovative argument for the Downgrade Thesis. First, I develop a positive account of how some cognitive penetration works, according to which cognitive states influence perceptual experiences by triggering some imaginings. Second, I argue that imaginings do not give their subjects justification for believing their contents. I apply this epistemology of imagining to cognitive penetration, and argue that because of the role that imaginings play, some cognitively penetrated experiences also give their subjects less justification for believing their penetrated contents. (shrink)

More and more people in China are now realizing that the country has already become a globalizing economy, but some contend that China's economy is still far from being based on knowledge. However, as globalization necessarily brings with it a knowledge economy, China is of necessity involved in the new economy, and has in consequence encountered many new ethical issues. In the first part of the paper some of these issues are discussed – issues of intellectual property protection, issues related (...) to the exploitation of Chinese know‐how and knowledge products by foreign companies, and issues of cultural colonization. These issues are complicated, widespread and novel, and there is a need to develop ethical guidelines to deal with these issues. Although the perspective of the analysis is Chinese, these same problems are faced by countries the world over. (shrink)

Psychological research has discovered that episodic memories are constructive in nature. This paper examines how, despite being constructive, episodic memories can provide us with justification for beliefs about the past. In current literature, two major approaches to memorial justification are internalist foundationalism and reliabilism. I first demonstrate that an influential version of internalist foundationalism, dogmatism, encounters problems when we compare certain types of memory construction with cognitive penetration in perception. On the other hand, various versions of reliabilism all face skeptical (...) challenges. I propose an alternative, two-factor theory that recognizes an epistemic distinction typically overlooked by dogmatism and reliabilism. Although our account leaves certain aspects unspecified, it is an important step forward. (shrink)

Geographical Information Systems (GIS) – either as “standard” GIS or custom made Historical GIS (HGIS) – have become quite popular in some historical sub-disciplines, such as Economic and Social History or Historical Geography. “Mainstream” history, however, seems to be rather unaffected by this trend. More generally speaking: Why is it that computer applications in general have failed to make much headway in history departments, despite the first steps being undertaken a good forty years ago? With the “spatial turn” in full (...) swing in the humanities, and many historians dealing with spatial and geographical questions, one would think GIS would be welcomed with open arms. Yet there seems to be no general anticipation by historians of employing GIS as a research tool. As mentioned, HGIS are popular chiefly among Historical Geographers and Social and Economic Historians. The latter disciplines seem to be predestined to use such software through the widespread quantitative methodology these disciplines have employed traditionally. Other historical sub-disciplines, such as Ancient History, are also very open to this emerging technology since the scarcity of written sources in this field can be mitigated by inferences made from an HGIS that has archaeological data stored in it, for example. In most of Modern History, however, the use of GIS is rarely seen. The intellectual benefit that a GIS may bring about seems not be apparent to scholars from this sub-discipline (and others). This book wants to investigate and discuss this controversy. Why does the wider historian community not embrace GIS more readily? While one cannot deny that the methodologies linked with a GIS follow geographical paradigms rather than historical ones, the potential of GIS as a 'killer application' for digital historical scholarship should be obvious. This book brings together authors from Geography and History to discuss the value of GIS for historical research. The focus, however, will not be on the "how", but on the "why" of GIS in history. (shrink)