Trust constitutes a fundamental strategy to deal with risks and uncertainty in complex societies. In line with the vast literature stressing the importance of trust in doctor–patient relationships, trust is therefore regularly suggested as a way of dealing with the risks of medical artificial intelligence (AI). Yet, this approach has come under charge from different angles. At least two lines of thought can be distinguished: (1) that trusting AI is conceptually confused, that is, that we cannot trust AI; and (2) (...) that it is also dangerous, that is, that we should not trust AI—particularly if the stakes are as high as they routinely are in medicine. In this paper, we aim to defend a notion of trust in the context of medical AI against both charges. To do so, we highlight the technically mediated intentions manifest in AI systems, rendering trust a conceptually plausible stance for dealing with them. Based on literature from human–robot interactions, psychology and sociology, we then propose a novel model to analyse notions of trust, distinguishing between three aspects: reliability, competence, and intentions. We discuss each aspect and make suggestions regarding how medical AI may become worthy of our trust. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 2, Page 154-161, February 2022.

Machine Learning (ML) is on the rise in medicine, promising improved diagnostic, therapeutic and prognostic clinical tools. While these technological innovations are bound to transform health care, they also bring new ethical concerns to the forefront. One particularly elusive challenge regards discriminatory algorithmic judgements based on biases inherent in the training data. A common line of reasoning distinguishes between justified differential treatments that mirror true disparities between socially salient groups, and unjustified biases which do not, leading to misdiagnosis and erroneous (...) treatment. In the curation of training data this strategy runs into severe problems though, since distinguishing between the two can be next to impossible. We thus plead for a pragmatist dealing with algorithmic bias in healthcare environments. By recurring to a recent reformulation of William James’s pragmatist understanding of truth, we recommend that, instead of aiming at a supposedly objective truth, outcome-based therapeutic usefulness should serve as the guiding principle for assessing ML applications in medicine. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) plays a rapidly increasing role in clinical care. Many of these systems, for instance, deep learning-based applications using multilayered Artificial Neural Nets, exhibit epistemic opacity in the sense that they preclude comprehensive human understanding. In consequence, voices from industry, policymakers, and research have suggested trust as an attitude for engaging with clinical AI systems. Yet, in the philosophical and ethical literature on medical AI, the notion of trust remains fiercely debated. Trust skeptics hold that talking about trust (...) in nonhuman agents constitutes a category error and worry about the concept being misused for ethics washing. Proponents of trust have responded to these worries from various angles, disentangling different concepts and aspects of trust in AI, potentially organized in layers or dimensions. Given the substantial disagreements across these accounts of trust and the important worries about ethics washing, we embrace a diverging strategy here. Instead of aiming for a positive definition of the elements and nature of trust in AI, we proceed ex negativo, that is we look at cases where trust or distrust are misplaced. Comparing these instances with trust expedited in doctor–patient relationships, we systematize these instances and propose a taxonomy of both misplaced trust and distrust. By inverting the perspective and focusing on negative examples, we develop an account that provides useful ethical constraints for decisions in clinical as well as regulatory contexts and that highlights how we should not engage with medical AI. (shrink)

The aim of the study is to encourage a critical debate on the use of normality in the medical literature on DSD or intersex. For this purpose, a scoping review was conducted to identify and map the various ways in which “normal” is used in the medical literature on DSD between 2016 and 2020. We identified 75 studies, many of which were case studies highlighting rare cases of DSD, others, mainly retrospective observational studies, focused on improving diagnosis or treatment. The (...) most common use of the adjective normal was in association with phenotypic sex. Overall, appearance was the most commonly cited criteria to evaluate the normality of sex organs. More than 1/3 of the studies included also medical photographs of sex organs. This persistent use of normality in reference to phenotypic sex is worrisome given the long-term medicalization of intersex bodies in the name of a “normal” appearance or leading a “normal” life. Healthcare professionals should be more careful about the ethical implications of using photographs in publications given that many intersex persons describe their experience with medical photography as dehumanizing. (shrink)

Assistive systems based on Artificial Intelligence (AI) are bound to reshape decision-making in all areas of society. One of the most intricate challenges arising from their implementation in high-stakes environments such as medicine concerns their frequently unsatisfying levels of explainability, especially in the guise of the so-called black-box problem: highly successful models based on deep learning seem to be inherently opaque, resisting comprehensive explanations. This may explain why some scholars claim that research should focus on rendering AI systems understandable, rather (...) than explainable. Yet, there is a grave lack of agreement concerning these terms in much of the literature on AI. We argue that the seminal distinction made by the philosopher and physician Karl Jaspers between different types of explaining and understanding in psychopathology can be used to promote greater conceptual clarity in the context of Machine Learning (ML). Following Jaspers, we claim that explaining and understanding constitute multi-faceted epistemic approaches that should not be seen as mutually exclusive, but rather as complementary ones as in and of themselves they are necessarily limited. Drawing on the famous example of Watson for Oncology we highlight how Jaspers’ methodology translates to the case of medical AI. Classical considerations from the philosophy of psychiatry can therefore inform a debate at the centre of current AI ethics, which in turn may be crucial for a successful implementation of ethically and legally sound AI in medicine. (shrink)

The increasing integration of Machine Learning (ML) techniques into clinical care, driven in particular by Deep Learning (DL) using Artificial Neural Nets (ANNs), promises to reshape medical practice on various levels and across multiple medical fields. Much recent literature examines the ethical consequences of employing ML within medical and psychiatric practice but the potential impact on psychiatric diagnostic systems has so far not been well-developed. In this article, we aim to explore the challenges that arise from the recent use of (...) ANNs for the old problems of psychiatric nosology. To enable an empirically supported critical reflection on the topic, we conducted semi-structured qualitative interviews with Swiss and German experts in computational psychiatry. Here, we report our findings structured around two themes, namely (1) the possibility of using ML for defining or refining of psychiatric classification, and (2) the desirability of employing ML for psychiatric nosology. We discuss these themes by relating them to recent debates about network theory for psychiatric nosology and show why empirical research in the field should critically reflect on its contribution to psychopathology research. In sum, we argue that beyond technical, regulatory, and ethical challenges, philosophical reflection is crucial to harness the potential of ML in psychiatry. (shrink)

The convergence of human and artificial intelligence is currently receiving considerable scholarly attention. Much debate about the resulting _Hybrid Minds_ focuses on the integration of artificial intelligence into the human brain through intelligent brain-computer interfaces as they enter clinical use. In this contribution we discuss a complementary development: the integration of a functional in vitro network of human neurons into an _in silico_ computing environment. To do so, we draw on a recent experiment reporting the creation of silico-biological intelligence as (...) a case study (Kagan et al., 2022b ). In this experiment, multielectrode arrays were plated with stem cell-derived human neurons, creating a system which the authors call _DishBrain_. By embedding the system into a virtual game-world, neural clusters were able to receive electrical input signals from the game-world and to respond appropriately with output signals from pre-assigned motor regions. Using this design, the authors demonstrate how the _DishBrain_ self-organises and successfully learns to play the computer game ‘Pong’, exhibiting ‘sentient’ and intelligent behaviour in its virtual environment. The creation of such hybrid, silico-biological intelligence raises numerous ethical challenges. Following the neuroscientific framework embraced by the authors themselves, we discuss the arising ethical challenges in the context of Karl Friston’s Free Energy Principle, focusing on the risk of creating synthetic phenomenology. Following the _DishBrain’s_ creator’s neuroscientific assumptions, we highlight how DishBrain’s design may risk bringing about artificial suffering and argue for a congruently cautious approach to such synthetic biological intelligence. (shrink)

This article presents a comparative theory of subjective argument strength simple enough for application. Using the axioms and corollaries of the theory, anyone with an elementary knowledge of logic and probability theory can produce an at least minimally rational ranking of any set of arguments according to their subjective strength, provided that the arguments in question are descriptive ones in standard form. The basic idea is that the strength of argument A as seen by person x is a function of (...) three factors: x's degree of belief in the premisses of A; x's degree of belief in the conclusion of A under the assumption that all premisses of A are true; and x's belief in the conclusion of A under the assumption that not all premisses of A are true. (shrink)

This article presents a comparative theory of subjective argument strength simple enough for application. Using the axioms and corollaries of the theory, anyone with an elementary knowledge of logic and probability theory can produce an - at least minimally rational - ranking of any set of arguments according to their subjective strength, provided that the arguments in question are descriptive ones in standard form. The basic idea is that the strength of argument A as seen by person x is a (...) function of three values: x ’s degree of belief in the premisses of A; x ’s degree of belief in the conclusion of A under the assumption that all premisses of A are true; and x ’s belief in the conclusion of A under the assumption that not all premisses of A are true. (shrink)

Marcel Broodthaers’s A Film by Charles Baudelaire was produced in lieu of a research paper for a seminar on Baudelaire run by Lucien Goldmann in Brussels during the winter of 1969–70. The film and the seminar serve as points of departure for this article’s pursuit of three interrelated aims: first, to establish specific discursive coordinates for one of the most mystifying aspects of Broodthaers’s work, namely its pervasive and seemingly anachronistic references to nineteenth-century poetic modernism in general and to Baudelaire (...) in particular; second, to take on the figure of the world for Broodthaers, both in his use of the world map in the Baudelaire film and several other works to be discussed and in the question of his stance regarding the world-shaping catastrophe of colonialism; and finally, to investigate the prominence of the concept of reification in Broodthaers’s theoretical lexicon in relation to its first formulation by Georg Lukács, its revival and dissemination by Goldmann, and Aimé Césaire’s account of colonialism’s “reification of the world.”. (shrink)

Es werden vier verbreitete Verwendungsweisen des Wortes ‘Argument’ beschrieben, an Beispielen erläutert und dann schrittweise expliziert. Die wichtigsten Explikata sind: ‘eine Satzfolge x ist ein deskriptives Argument in Standardform’, ‘ein deskriptives Argument x in Standardform ist bei der subjektiven Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung p stark (bzw. schwach)’, ‘ein Aussagesatz x ist bei der subjektiven Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung p ein Argument für (bzw. gegen) einen Aussagesatz y’, ‘ein geordneter Tripel x von deskriptiven Argumenten in Standardform, von Argumentebenen und von Argumentsträngen ist eine deskriptive Argumenthierarchie in Standardform’, (...) ‘eine deskriptive Argumenthierarchie x in Standardform ist gültig (bzw. ungültig; stichhaltig; konsistent; inkonsistent; sichtlich zirkelhaft; stark (bzw. schwach) bei der subjektiven Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung p)’. (shrink)

Angesichts der Zunahme chronischer Erkrankungen erscheint es geboten, vermehrt auf Präventionsmaßnahmen zurückzugreifen, die den Einzelnen zu einer gesundheitsfördernden Lebensweise anhalten und exogene gesundheitsschädigende Einflüsse reduzieren. Dabei ergeben sich zwei ethische Problemkonstellationen: 1) Welche Einschränkungen der Entscheidungsautonomie des Einzelnen sind gerechtfertigt, um bestimmte Präventionsziele zu erreichen? 2) Welche Verantwortung kann und soll der Einzelne für seine Gesundheit tragen? Fünf ethische Anforderungen sind an jede Präventionsmaßnahme zu stellen: 1) nachgewiesene Wirksamkeit, 2) günstiges Kosten-Nutzen-Profil, 3) akzeptables Kosten-Nutzen-Verhältnis, 4) möglichst geringe Restriktivität und 5) (...) faire Entscheidungsverfahren. Je nachdem, wie weit diese Anforderungen erfüllt sind, lässt sich eine unterschiedlich starke Beeinflussung der individuellen Entscheidungsautonomie rechtfertigen. Anstatt den Einzelnen für gesundheitsschädigendes Verhalten retrospektiv zu bestrafen, sollte er – im Sinne einer Stärkung der Gesundheitsmündigkeit – prospektiv in die Lage versetzt werden, Sorge für seine eigene Gesundheit zu tragen. (shrink)

Me, You, Us addresses a range of issues in moral and political philosophy and moral psychology, but are unified by their starkly individualistic view of the moral subject. They challenge recent tendencies to conceptualize normative issues in terms of relationships, collectivities, and social meanings.

Is the Universe on our side? "My own investigations over a period of many years have given me a quiet assurance that there is a God who has given us sufficient clues in life, nature, human thought, beauty and art to satisfy the genuine inquirer that he exists, and that he has expressed himself most meaningfully in Jesus Christ. However, you may come to a different conclusion at the end of this book and that is your right as a thinking (...) responsible person. All I can do is to invite you to join me in looking at the arguments again..." Writing in a popular style but with careful reasoning, George Carey explains the traditional message of Christianity in its stark confrontation with modern unbelief and indifference. Here is a brief, aggressive, but always warm and generous appeal to faith for modern readers. (shrink)

The goal of this essay is to analyse the influence of Johann Bernhard Basedow and Rousseau on Kant’s cosmopolitanism and concept of cosmopolitan education. It argues that both Basedow and Kant defined cosmopolitan education as non-denominational moral formation or Bildung, encompassing—in different forms—a thin version of moral religion following the core tenets of Christianity. Kant’s encounter with Basedow and the Philanthropinum in Dessau helps to understand the development of Kant’s concept of cosmopolitanism and educational theory ‘in weltbürgerlicher Absicht’. Rousseau’s role (...) is more complex: he clearly influenced Kant; he is usually considered a precursor of modern nationalism and national education; and recent studies have stressed the cosmopolitan dimension of his educational programme. I claim that the dilemma of education according to Rousseau is that one has to choose between education of homme or education of citoyen, and that there is no way to avoid or go beyond this stark alternative. Kant’s reinterpretation of Rousseau is favourable and creative and has found many followers up to the present, but is misleading, as he ignores the dilemma and imposes his own conception of cosmopolitanism, of cosmopolitan education and of (possible) progress in history on Rousseau while claiming that this was actually Rousseau’s message. (shrink)

Wegen seiner Theorie des Gesellschaftsvertrags gilt Rousseau als der Begründer der Volkssouveränität. Zweifellos hat er mit seinen Ideen die Französische Revolution und die Entwicklung der Demokratien stark beeinflussen können. Das Volk übernimmt nach ihm die Herrschaft, und zwar auf Grund eines Vertrags (,,contrat“), aus dem, als zentrale Instanz der politischen Gemeinschaft, der Gemeinwille (,,volonté générale“) hervorgeht. Dieser ist der Souverän. Alle Bürger nehmen gleicherweise daran teil. Doch sind sie ihm auch unterworfen, denn er ist der Gesetzgeber, und Freiheit kann der (...) Einzelne nur besitzen, wenn er dem Gesetz gehorcht. Der Einzelne ist somit Herrschender und Untertan zugleich. Erst wenn die Gesellschaft an die Stelle des ursprünglichen Naturzustandes gelangt, wenn also der natürliche Mensch (,,homme naturel“) zum bürgerlichen Menschen (,,homme civil“) wird, kann von Sittlichkeit die Rede sein. Das Zusammenbestehen in einer und derselben Person von Freiheit und Zwang bildet ein Paradox, das zu mancherlei Widersprüchlichkeiten Anlass gibt. Das ist der Grund, weshalb auch heute noch ganz unterschiedliche politische Systeme sich auf Rousseau berufen können. Um dieses Paradox dreht sich seine politische Philosophie, die im Contrat social (1762) ihre volle Entfaltung erreicht. Unser Text ist ein Beitrag zu folgendem Doppeljubiläum: Wir gedenken der Geburt Rousseaus vor 300 Jahren, am 28. Juni 1712, sowie des Contrat social , der also vor 250 Jahren erschienen ist. (shrink)

Nietzsches Hermeneutik lässt die attische Tragödie zu einem kosmischen Geschehen werden dank der ontologischen Deutung, die sie ihr verleiht. Das tragische Schauspiel offenbart in seiner artistischen Symbolik den Grundcharakter der Welt und des Lebens, der von den ästhetischen Seinsmächten Dionysos und Apollo getragen wird, die, obgleich gegensätzlicher Natur, in ihrem Bestehen aufeinander angewiesen sind und sich gegenseitig steigern. Die durch die Schönheit trotz allen Leidens erzeugte Rechtfertigung menschlicher Existenz erreicht in der griechischen Tragödie somit ihren Höhepunkt. Sofern die Zuschauer zum (...) Miterleben stark genug sind, werden ihre Kräfte noch gemehrt. Aus alldem ergibt sich der Ausdruck einer lebensbejahenden Einstellung, die ganz das Gegenteil der Willensverneinung darstellt, zu der nach Schopenhauer die tragische Kunst überleiten soll. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.4 (2001) 589-590 [Access article in PDF] Luc Foisneau. Hobbes et la toute-puissance de Dieu. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2000. Pp. 424. Paper, FF 174. As a recent conference in London confirmed, Hobbes scholarship remains sharply divided, even precarious, with several plausible and diametrically opposed interpretations en jeu. This is especially true as to the question of Hobbes's religion in relation to (...) his political thinking. The famous "Strauss thesis" appeals to many, and, not long ago (Journal of the History of Philosophy 34, no. 2, 1996), this journal printed an exchange between Edwin Curley and A. P. Martinich that canvassed the old arguments and introduced many new ones. The issue seems to be whether Hobbes was sincere in making his theological arguments, prompting us to include them in his thought, or ironic, allowing us to pass them by.French philosopher Luc Foisneau has produced a carefully written, brilliantly crafted account of Hobbes's theory of political obligation that includes the theological elements and makes them central, but without resort to the difficult concept of authorial sincerity. Foisneau, who teaches at the Institut d'Études Politiques, Paris, finds his interpretive key in Hobbes's description of divine omnipotence. The concept, he claims, figures centrally in Hobbes's theory of knowledge. It grounds the theory of political obligation and provides a principal justification for sovereignty itself. Moreover, Foisneau draws a starkly moving picture of human mortality vis-à-vis God's "irresistible power," asserting that the secular or lay temper of modern moral and political theory stems less from a rejection of theology (certainly not in Hobbes's case) than from a sharpened awareness of human limitations. Foisneau gives an impressive and convincing answer to the abiding question: "Hobbes's theology: What does it matter?" Namely, Hobbes's theology is the core of Hobbes's politics.Before briefly considering one strand in the tissue of Foisneau's argument, let us consider two features of his work and the context of its production.The first is that the author's focus is securely on the text itself, recalling the French explication du texte tradition. According to its strictures, working in detail, the analyst of the text carefully unfolds its meaning, precisely contained in and coextensive with the text's form. Hobbes the man and his contemporaries recede as limiting cases or frames of reference, though they and the other Hobbesian texts do figure as material illustrative [End Page 589] of points made through textual interpretation. Indeed, the history of ideas serves to illuminate the text; see the potentia absoluta/ordinata distinction, below. This steady, ample focus on the text's possible coherence and the concern not to leave the four corners of the document bear comparison with the contextualism of Lucien Lefebvre and Quentin Skinner.The second feature is linked to the first, and it is Foisneau's association with the Centre Thomas Hobbes (CTH), at the Centre National des Recherches Scientifiques, Paris, headed by Prof. Yves Charles Zarka. The foremost academic institution devoted solely to the study of Thomas Hobbes, the CTH annually holds extended, international seminars, explicating two or three chapters of Leviathan. Several books and articles have appeared under CTH sponsorship, dealing with specific aspects of Hobbes's work, for example, detailed analyses of his philosophic vocabulary. The CTH's highly focused, on-going program of study gives promise that the rough places in Hobbes scholarship may one day be a bit plainer. Foisneau's book is a major contribution toward that end.Let us consider one particular, viz., Hobbes's modeling of the sovereign's power upon God's absolute power. Hobbes's long-time interlocutor, John Bramhall, is quick to detect and criticize this in De Cive, moving him to reprove both the theological and political deficiencies of Hobbes's conceptual translatio. Bramhall denies one can consider God's absolute power independently of His ordained power, expressed in the eternal laws He has ordained. Nor may one place the power of the sovereign beyond the reach of the law. Impressed... (shrink)

In The Decent Society, Avishai Margalit’s contends that a good society is a decent society, a society whose institutions do not humiliate persons. However, Margalit affirms a stark distinction between the decent society and a just society. “[T]he concept of a decent society … is not necessarily connected with the concept of rights. Even a society without a concept of rights can develop concepts of honor and humiliation appropriate for a decent society.” This paper rejects this position by showing that (...) in order for a society to be a decent society it must incorporate fundamental rights. Sections II, III, and IV examine, criticize, and reject Margalit’s arguments to the contrary, and in so doing summon arguments that demonstrate the indispensable value of fundamental rights for any society that purports to be decent. The central contention here is that only a concept of humiliation that affirms and respects fundamental rights is sufficiently robust to recognize certain violations of these rights as constituting distinctive and devastating assaults on the self-respect of specific individuals. Thus insofar as a decent society cannot countenance such assaults, a decent society must include rights. (shrink)

Dass Bildung und Religion zusammengehören, ist begründungsbedürftig geworden. Vielfach scheint Religion als ein altertümliches Relikt einer vergangenen Epoche. Aber auch die Frage nach dem, was Bildung wesentlich ausmacht, ist keineswegs geklärt, sondern wird durch die starke Fokussierung auf die Frage nach den Kompetenzen umso drängender gestellt.Georg Hardecker antwortet auf diese beiden Fragen mit der Freilegung des systematischen Profils von Schleiermachers Bildungsverständnis. Bildung ist demnach nicht auf den Erziehungsvorgang beschränkt, sondern versteht Bildung als ein fundamentales Phänomen des Sein, des (...) menschlichen Zusammenlebens und des individuellen menschlichen Werdens. Dabei wird Bildung relational beschrieben: Als Ausdifferenzierung des Bezogenseins, als Reintegration des Ausdifferenzierten in ein Ganzes und als Ausdruck von Wahrheit. (shrink)

Zu den weiterreichenden transhumanistischen Zukunftsvisionen gehört Mind-Uploading: Wir werden dank wissenschaftlicher und technologischer Fortschritte in der Lage sein, Bewusstsein auf künstliche Körper oder digitale Strukturen zu transferieren, um sehr viel länger oder gar unendlich lange leben zu können. Im Kern handelt es sich also um die Vision, durch Technik den Tod zu überwinden. In diesem Beitrag gehe ich im Wesentlichen der Frage nach, welche Theorie des Bewusstseins bzw. welches Geist-Körper-Verhältnis im Mind-Uploading vorausgesetzt werden. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass das zugrunde (...) gelegte Verständnis des menschlichen Geistes problematisch ist, weil die Rolle des Eingebettet-Seins in einen lebendigen Körper unterschätzt wird. Mind-Uploading arbeitet mit einem stark verkürzten Begriff des Geistes, der den komplexen Bezügen zu den biologischen, psychischen und sozialen Dimensionen unserer Existenz nicht gerecht wird. (shrink)

This essay on the social history of logic instruction considers the programmatic writings of Carnap/Neurath, but especially in the widely read book by Lillian Lieber, Mits, Wits and Logic, where Mits is the man in the street and Wits the woman in the street. In the ‘pre-Toulmin’ days it was seriously argued that the intense study of formal logic would create a more rational frame of mind and have many beneficial effects upon the social and political life. It arose from (...) the conviction that most metaphysical conundrums, religious and political problems and even fanaticism had their root in the irrationality of ordinary discourse, which had to be replaced by the more logical ‘ideal language’ of Principia Mathematica. The enthusiastic promotion of formal logic occurred at a time when it was widely thought that minds could be ‘made over’, ‘reprogrammed’ by proper intervention. This stands in stark contrast to the motivation for teaching informal logic and critical thinking, as it becomes apparent in a 1981 exchange between Ralph Johnson and Gerald Massey in Teaching Philosophy. Most of this essay focuses on Lillian Lieber, an earnest and enthusiastic advocate of the cause of formal logic, and on the reasons for the widespread conviction that, for the sake of peace and social harmony, formal logic should, if possible, be taught to every man, woman and child. (shrink)

In der Architekturtheorie ist häufig von der Identität von Bauwerken oder Städten die Rede. Der Ausdruck „Identität“ bezieht sich dabei auf etwas, was man „spezifischen Charakter“ nennen könnte. Wir schlagen eine symboltheoretische Explikation dieses Identitätsbegriffs vor und zeigen, in welchem Sinn ein Bauwerk verschiedene, sich verändernde oder gar konfligierende Identitäten haben kann. Identitäten von Bauwerken werden oft als mehr oder weniger klar, positiv, angemessen oder stark bewertet. Solche Attribute diskutieren wir, indem wir epistemische, materielle und strukturelle Bewertungen von Identitäten unterscheiden. (...) Abschliessend weisen wir Wechselwirkungen zwischen Identitäten von Bauwerken und Identitäten (im Sinn des Selbstverständnisses) von Personen und Gesellschaften hin. (shrink)

A decade has passed since the breaking out of the ‘Arabic Spring’ revolutionary phenomena all over the Arab World’s societies. Many challenging and radically intriguing developments and ramifications have eventuated out of that era and led the Arab World’s context into unchartered territories of existence and self-understanding. This essay pauses at one of the particular challenges that faces this Sitz im Leben, namely the question of identity-formation and self-perception processes. It argues that the Arab states do manifest in their political (...) and statehood situations a political situation of democracy that is run by ‘non-democrats’. The essay then suggests that this democracy of non-democrats is the outcome of the prevalence of an identity-formation and self-perception rationales that are rooted in crudely religious Weltanschauung that, far from maintaining distinction and particularity individually and communally, turns alterity into a self-otherizing dogma expressive of contrariety and stark divisive and discriminative relatedness to the other. The essay, finally, suggests that liberating the identity-formation process from the dogmatic attempt at turning religion into ‘identity’ per se is the first required step towards a more cross-pollinating and symbiotic relationality between the different persons and groups who live in that context. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:M. C. Henberg GEORGE ELIOT'S MORAL REALISM No moment in the history of ethics could be more propitious than the present for a comprehensive restudy of George Eliot's moral realism. Analysis of the "logic" of moral language has proved barren, prescriptivism is in full flight, and schematic divisions of moral theories into descriptive versus normative, deontological versus teleological, or substantive versus meta-ethical have promised much but delivered little. Such (...) distinctions dominate maps to the modern moral terrain, but awanderer in the land ofchoice itselfstill finds himselfwithout signposts. A particularly unhealthy bias in contemporary ethics has been the belief that moral principles ought to withstand all counterexamples, however plausible or implausible, whether concocted from a sense of men's actual capacities or from a fondness for outrageous possibilities, many of them lifted from the pages of science fiction. If moral rules do not govern in hard cases, it is thought, they do not govern at all. Few philosophers have bothered to distinguish between the hard cases common to men's actual choices and the hard cases confronted by one man in a million or by the imagined inhabitants of some future world. (Witness, for example, the present preoccupation with "lifeboat ethics" and ask yourself how many actual moral choices are so starkly dramatic.) Any logically possible circumstance is too often assumed to qualify as a fruitful area for moral investigation; and any conceivable counterexample, achieved by whatever stretch of the imagination, is assumed to be fair ammunition in the debate over principles. Closely related to this first bad tendency in modern philosophical ethics is another, equally bad. Too often the examples used are of little moral significance, obviously conceived to make a point rather than to direct attention to commonplace but nonetheless important circumstances where informed choice is essential. Philosophy journals have treated us to discussions about whether failing to wear tennis whites is or is not "rude" and about whether a first sinner's crossing of a patch of lawn does or does not have a "threshold-related effect" 20 M. C. Henberg21 which must be considered in assessing later consequences (a bare path ultimately worn in the grass). Such examples rightly earn a contemptuous snort from anyone who expects philosophy to increase our understanding in matters of serious consequence. Whatever her other accomplishments as a moralist and philosophical thinker, George Eliot never commits either of the preceding crimes. Her moral realism constitutes first and foremost an ethics aimed at the bulk of her fellow men. She yields to the theoretic impulse solely in criticizing other theories. When it comes to providing answers, she depicts fictional characters whose struggles, failings, and passions are ultimately akin to what we ourselves are likely to experience. Her ethical precepts are not aimed at proving themselves in every conceivable situation. They are instead precepts which are sometimes susceptible to ruin, just as are the changeable creatures who profess them. To know the natural boundaries of a moral rule, Eliot tells us, is as difficult and important as knowing the rule itself. Moral realism requires a combination of clear-eyed perception and imaginative sympathy—faculties ill-served by lectures on abstract principles. Eliot reminds us that our best moral judgments must be "checked and enlightened by a perpetual reference to the special circumstances that mark the individual lot" (The Mill on the Floss, Book VII, chap. 3). This emphasis in particular—found both in her early essays and early fiction—makes Eliot's moral realism a welcome anodyne to the worst tendencies of modern ethics. The discussion which follows will be confined to early works, including Scenes of Clerical Life, Adam Bede, and The Mill on the Floss. The ruminations of her authorial voice in these novels may conveniently be juxtaposed with her essays, for the works are near to one another both temporally and thematically. Later novels such as Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda—however interesting from an ethical perspective— do not lend themselves to this mode of analysis. To what extent Eliot's views are modified in these later novels constitutes a separate topic whose omission here does not reflect upon its intrinsic interest or importance. Since George Eliot offers no... (shrink)

In this chapter, the author takes up aspects of Richard Rorty's account of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel in the light of such developments. In an autobiographical essay Rorty recounted an early phase of his intellectual life in which he became disillusioned with the Platonist "quest for certainty" that he had harbored up to that time. Rorty's parallel vision of Hegel as providing a philosophical form of this redescriptive path to freedom and thereby as providing a philosophical narrative without a (...) "moral" or any "aspect of eternity" is one that, of course, stands in stark contrast to the usual picture of Hegel's philosophy. Rorty had been obviously attracted to the strongly anti‐Cartesian dimensions of Hegel's account of "Anerkennung" in which mindedness is treated not as a fixed human capacity but as having a history in virtue of being dependent on historically variable forms of social interaction. (shrink)

Hegel's phenomenological method is meant to provide a pathway for a "finite consciousness" to the objective viewpoint of philosophical "science".

This brilliant study of the stages in the mind's necessary progress from immediate sense-consciousness to the position of a scientific philosophy includes an introductory essay and a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis of the text to help the reader understand this most difficult and most influential of Hegel's works.

Siehe die stark erweiterte Neufassung dieses Beitrags: "Was ist der Mensch? Ein Streifzug durch die philosophische Anthropologie", in: Ulrich Lüke & Georg Souvignier (eds.), Der Mensch – ein Tier. Und sonst? Interdisziplinäre Annäherungen. Freiburg: Herder. pp. 19-44 (2020).

Taking Carnap’s classic exposition as a starting point, this paper develops a pragmatic account of the method of explication, defends it against a range of challenges and proposes a detailed recipe for the practice of explicating. It is then argued that confusions are involved in characterizing explications as definitions, and in advocating precising definitions as an alternative to explications. Explication is better characterized as conceptual re-engineering for theoretical purposes, in contrast to conceptual re-engineering for other purposes and improving exactness for (...) purely practical reasons. Finally, three limitations which call for further development of the method of explication are discussed. (shrink)

Germany is widely seen as a “dualized” economy driven by a powerful and stable “insider” coalition in the manufacturing sectors. In this article, that picture is challenged. An examination of the political economy of the outsider-friendly 2014 Minimum Wage Act, using public opinion data, document analysis, and qualitative interviews, shows how earlier dualizing reforms led to unintended negative feedback effects: First, public opinion reacted negatively to increasing inequality in the years preceding the introduction of the minimum wage. Second, a remarkable (...) shift is found among trade unions toward support of a minimum wage, even in manufacturing. Although the threat of low-wage competition and flexibilization did play a role, trade union solidarity was at least as important. Those endogenous dynamics came together in a self-undermining process unfolding over a relatively short period of time. Potential alternative explanations are explored, including classical partisan politics, party competition, and employer preferences. (shrink)

This volume distinguishes between two main traditions in the philosophy of science - the aristotelian, with its stress on explanation in terms of purpose and intentionality, and the galilean, which takes causal explanation as primary. It then traces the complex history of these competing traditions as they are manifested in such movements as positivism, idealism, Marxism and contemporary linguistic analysis. Hempels's theory of scientific explanation, the claims of cybernetics the rise of an analytic philosophy of action and the revival of (...) hermenuetics are all discussed. The volume also deals with causal explanation, intentionality and teleological explanation, and explanation in history and the social sciences. The author concludes that explanation of human actions cannot be reduced to simple causality, and discusses the implications of this conclusion for the disciplines of history and sociology. (shrink)

Among the most influential parts of the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) were his ethics, his theory of the state, and his philosophy of history. The Philosophy of Right (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts) (1821), the last work published in Hegel's lifetime, is a combined system of moral and political philosophy, or a sociology dominated by the idea of the state. Here Hegel repudiates his earlier assessment of the French Revolution as a "a marvelous sunrise" in the realization of liberty. (...) Rejecting the republican form of government, he espouses an idealized form of a constitutional monarchy, whose ultimate power rests with the sovereign. (shrink)

Carnap and Goodman developed methods of conceptual re-engineering known respectively as explication and reflective equilibrium. These methods aim at advancing theories by developing concepts that are simultaneously guided by pre-existing concepts and intended to replace these concepts. This paper shows that Carnap’s and Goodman’s methods are historically closely related, analyses their structural interconnections, and argues that there is great systematic potential in interpreting them as aspects of one method, which ultimately must be conceived as a component of theory development. The (...) main results are: an adequate method of conceptual re-engineering must focus not on individual concepts but on systems of concepts and theories; the linear structure of Carnapian explication must be replaced by a process of mutual adjustments as described by Goodman; Carnap’s condition of similarity can be analysed into two components, one securing a relation to the specific extensions of the pre-existing concepts, one regulating the transition to the new system of concepts; these two criteria of adequacy can be built into Goodman’s account of reflective equilibrium to ensure that the resulting concepts promote theoretical virtues while being sufficiently similar to the concepts we started out with. (shrink)