This paper examines why robots are so often presented as monstrous in the popular media, regardless of the intended applications of the robots themselves. The figure of the robot monster is examined in its historical and cultural specificity—that is, as a direct descendent of monsters that we have grown accustomed to since the nineteenth century: Frankenstein, Mr. Hyde, vampires, zombies, etc. Using the psychoanalytic notion of projection, these monsters are understood as representing human anxieties regarding the dehumanising tendencies of (...) science and reason, and regarding a perceived transformation in human nature over the last two hundred years. In analysing these anxieties, we can therefore gain insight into the fears—genuine or naïve—that the public harbours towards new advancements in technology; these insights can then inform those working with and designing living machines as to how their inventions might be received. (shrink)

Moral enhancement techniques modifying brain processes to produce improved moral conduct present us with new challenges for how we grapple with the ethical questions raised. John Shook (2012) argues that we should greet these developments with some measure of skepticism and cynicism regarding their success and desirability. This commentary considers further Shook’s scepticism. It is argued that the issue of “moral enhancement” raises questions about which view(s) may benefit and the problems this poses for societies characterized by the fact of (...) reasonable pluralism. More importantly, it is further argued that moral enhancement runs into greater difficulties where enhancement is thought to contribute to alleviating illegal behavior. This is because law and morality are related imperfectly and, therefore, improved moral sensitivity may not translate into less illegality. Thus, moral enhancement techniques may create moral Frankensteins that (a) may undermine the existence of reasonable pluralism in modern liberal societies and (b) may fail to better achieve lawful behavior. (shrink)

Traces the depiction of biological science in mass media and how it has shaped public perceptions.

To show how the case of Mary Shelley’s Victor Frankenstein brings light to the ethical and moral issues raised in Institutional Review Board protocols, we nest an imaginary IRB proposal dated August 1790 by Victor Frankenstein within a discussion of the importance and function of the IRB. Considering the world of science as would have appeared in 1790 when Victor was a student at Ingolstadt, we offer a schematic overview of a fecund moment when advances in comparative anatomy, (...) medical experimentation and theories of life involving animalcules and animal electricity sparked intensive debates about the basic principles of life and the relationship between body and soul. Constructing an IRB application based upon myriad speculations circulating up to 1790, we imagine how Victor would have drawn upon his contemporaries’ scientific work to justify the feasibility of his project, as well as how he might have outlined the ethical implications of his plan to animate life from “dead” tissues. In Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, Victor failed to consider his creature’s autonomy, vulnerability, and welfare. In this IRB proposal, we show Victor facing those issues of justice and emphasize how the novel can be an important component in courses or workshops on research ethics. Had Victor Frankenstein had to submit an IRB proposal tragedy may have been averted, for he would have been compelled to consider the consequences of his experiment and acknowledge, if not fulfill, his concomitant responsibilities to the creature that he abandoned and left to fend for itself. (shrink)

This book is a philosophically sophisticated and scientifically well-informed discussion of the moral and social issues raised by genetically engineering animals, a powerful technology which has major implications for society. Unlike other books on this emotionally charged subject, the author attempts to inform, not inflame, the reader about the real problems society must address in order to manage this technology. Bernard Rollin is both a professor of philosophy, and physiology and biophysics, and writes from a uniquely well-informed perspective on this (...) topic. The style is non-technical and anecdotal and will ensure that the book can be used on a wide range of courses on bioethics, biotechnology, veterinary medicine and public policy. The book could also appeal to a general, non-academic reader with a serious interest in genetic engineering. (shrink)

Theodore Roszak's compelling parable, The Memoirs of Elizabeth Frankenstein, provides an (eco)-feminist view of the “Night of the Living Dead Model” and suggests that only the equal union of “masculine” and “feminine” energies will help us resolve the current eco-crisis. This article further explores the consequences of the highly masculinized post-Enlightenment rationalism as demonstrated in Roszak's novel. Although this article agrees that there is a dangerous imbalance between natural/spiritual and scientific/rational viewpoints, it also stresses that the extreme genderification of (...) these energies is potentially problematic. (shrink)

As one of the best known science narratives about the consequences of creating life, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus is an enduring tale that people know and understand with an almost instinctive familiarity. It has become a myth reflecting people’s ambivalent feelings about emerging science: they are curious about science, but they are also afraid of what science can do to them. In this essay, we argue that the Frankenstein myth has evolved into a stigma attached (...) to scientists that focalizes the public’s as well as the scientific community’s negative reactions towards certain sciences and scientific practices. This stigma produces ambivalent reactions towards scientific artifacts and it leads to negative connotations because it implies that some sciences are dangerous and harmful. We argue that understanding the Frankenstein stigma can empower scientists by helping them revisit their own biases as well as responding effectively to people’s expectations for, and attitudes towards, scientists and scientific artifacts. Debunking the Frankenstein stigma could also allow scientists to reshape their professional identities so they can better show the public what ethical and moral values guide their research enterprises. (shrink)

Often called the first of its kind, Frankenstein paved the way for science fiction writing. Its depiction of a then impossible scientific feat has in our time become possible and is essentially recognizable in what we now refer to as bioengineering, biomedicine, or biotechnology. The fiction of Frankenstein has as it were given way to scientific fact. Of more importance, however, is the challenge Mary Shelley’s novel presents to the ostensibly high-minded and well-intentioned hopes and promises of the (...) scientist/technologist. Finally, the fictional character, Victor Frankenstein, has come to serve as the poster child and whipping boy for all scientific and technological irresponsibility, so much so that thanks to him we are able to free ourselves and our scientists from any real responsibility, since none of us ever would or could be as monstrous as Frankenstein. (shrink)

Origin of life models based on “energized assemblages of building blocks” are untenable in principle. This is fundamentally a consequence of the fact that any living system is in a physical state that is extremely far from equilibrium, a condition it must itself build and sustain. This in turn requires that it carries out all of its molecular transformations–obligatorily those that convert, and thereby create, disequilibria–using case‐specific mechanochemical macromolecular machines. Mass‐action solution chemistry is quite unable to do this. We argue (...) in Part 2 of this series that this inherent dependence of life on disequilibria‐converting macromolecular machines is also an obligatory requirement for life at its emergence. Therefore, life must have been launched by the operation of abiotic macromolecular machines driven by abiotic, but specifically “life‐like”, disequilibria, coopted from mineral precipitates that are chemically and physically active. Models grounded in “chemistry‐in‐a‐bag” ideas, however energized, should not be considered. (shrink)

Throughout Mary Shelley’s early life, she was exposed to numerous well-known and influential people regarding cultural, political, and socio-economic matters. As she began writing, these influences undoubtedly played a role in her narrative. Her novel, _Frankenstein_, written during the time of the first Industrial Revolution in Britain, was one such novel that exhibited her political and economic influences through science fiction. This article addresses many of those influences, including the introduction of the machine into manufacturing. It further addresses how (...) class='Hi'>Frankenstein’s Monster may have been one of the first created forms of artificial intelligence (AI). We further expound upon many economic concepts that have persisted through time and are relevant today given the faciliatory aspects, as well as the uncertainty, of AI. We relate these through the literary piece _Frankenstein_ to explore how a two-century-year-old tale provides a blueprint for understanding the conflict among humans and machines and provides a roadmap for harmonization in the past, present, and future. (shrink)

We argued in Part 1 of this series that because all living systems are extremely far‐from‐equilibrium dynamic confections of matter, they must necessarily be driven to that state by the conversion of chemically specific external disequilibria into specific internal disequilibria. Such conversions require task‐specific macromolecular engines. We here argue that the same is not only true of life at its emergence; it is the enabling cause of that emergence; although here the external driving disequilibria, and the conversion engines needed must (...) have been abiotic. We argue further that the initial step in life's emergence can only create an extremely simple non‐equilibrium “seed” from which all the complexity of life must then develop. We assert that this complexity develops incrementally and progressively, each step tested for value added “in flight.” And we make the case that only the submarine alkaline hydrothermal vent (AHV) model has the potential to satisfy these requirements. (shrink)

BackgroundAdvances in biomedicine can substantially change human life. However, progress is not always followed by ethical reflection on its consequences or scientists’ responsibility for their creations. The humanities can help health sciences students learn to critically analyse these issues; in particular, literature can aid discussions about ethical principles in biomedical research. Mary Shelley’sFrankenstein; or, the modern Prometheus(1818) is an example of a classic novel presenting complex scenarios that could be used to stimulate discussion.Main textWithin the framework of the 200th anniversary (...) of the novel, we searched PubMed to identify works that explore and discuss its value in teaching health sciences. Our search yielded 56 articles, but only two of these reported empirical findings. Our analysis of these articles identified three main approaches to usingFrankensteinin teaching health sciences: discussing the relationship between literature and science, analysing ethical issues in biomedical research, and examining the importance of empathy and compassion in healthcare and research. After a critical discussion of the articles, we propose usingFrankensteinas a teaching tool to prompt students to critically analyse ethical aspects of scientific and technological progress, the need for compassion and empathy in medical research, and scientists’ responsibility for their discoveries.ConclusionFrankensteincan help students reflect on the personal and social limits of science, the connection between curiosity and scientific progress, and scientists’ responsibilities. Its potential usefulness in teaching derives from the interconnectedness of science, ethics, and compassion.Frankensteincan be a useful tool for analysing bioethical issues related to scientific and technological advances, such as artificial intelligence, genetic engineering, and cloning. Empirical studies measuring learning outcomes are necessary to confirm the usefulness of this approach. (shrink)

As we reread Mary Shelley's Frankenstein at two hundred years, it is evident that Victor Frankenstein is both a mad scientist (fevered, obsessive) and a bad scientist (secretive, hubristic, irresponsible). He's also not a very nice person. He's a narcissist, a liar, and a bad “parent.” But he is not genuinely evil. And yet when we reimagine him as evil—as an evil scientist and as an evil person—we can learn some important lessons about science and technology, our contemporary (...) society, and ourselves. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is the article's first paragraph: Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein has remained in print ever since it was published two hundred years ago this year, and has been the basis for innumerable adaptations. While most novels from so long ago have been forgotten, Shelley’s lives on. Why has it remained so popular? Perhaps, at least in part, it’s due to the philosophical themes it addresses: tampering with nature, the dereliction of duties, and the importance of (...) taking responsibility for one’s actions. The tale of a being born without a mother, written by a young woman whose own mother died a few days after giving birth to her, it is perhaps most of all an examination of the need for love in order to survive in a harsh and unforgiving world. It is also a cautionary tale of a man who achieves what he sought to do, only to have his creation turn on him and all he loves. (shrink)

From the classic Frankenstein of 1931 to Matrix, which offers a version of the philosophical fable of the brain in a vat and on to Self/less, in which the consciousness of a dying tycoon is transferred to a younger man’s body, cinema has variously explored the relationship between personhood and the body by means of fictions concerning the brain and its contents.1 From the crude disembodied brains of 1950s B-movies to the neuroimaging visuals of 21st-century cyberpunk, these films localize (...) individuality essentially in the brain, and make personal identity transcend the body’s demise by transplanting the brain into other, typically younger or at least healthier bodies.... (shrink)

Synthetic biology has emerged as one of the newest and promising areas of bio-technology. Issues typically associated to SB, notably in the media, like the idea of artificial life creation and “real” engineering of life also appear in many popular films. Drawing upon the analysis of 48 films, the article discusses how scientists applying technologies that can be related to SB are represented in these movies. It hereby discusses that traditional clichés of scientists in general tend to be sublated by (...) new stereotypical characterizations. These reflect real trends in bio-technological research such as SB, especially the increased relationship between science and industry. Frankenstein 2.0. looks less like the old, genius yet mad scientist, and follows a more entrepreneurial than academic spirit. (shrink)

This paper aims to offer an innovative reading of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein by reflecting on the cultural horizon that influenced the composition of the novel, namely the Naturphilosophie of the Romantic period, characterized by the interpenetration of matter and spirit, visible and invisible. Its major development occurred in German aesthetics of the 18th century, where the union of sensibility and imagination was harmonically realized through a special fusion of philosophy and literature. Thanks to this encounter, philosophy regained its link (...) with the universal and literature became capable of “telling” the invisible without falling into arbitrariness. From this theoretical perspective, the monster created by Shelley is not a creative failure, but something enormous that terrifies because it transcends both our sensitive faculty and our imaginative capacity. Monster is described here as the place of interaction between visible and invisible, which only the artist – by placing himself in the middle of this relationship – is able to narrate. (shrink)

As last year's 200th anniversary celebrations of the first publication of Mary Godwin Shelley's novel Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus came to a close, it seemed there could be nothing that remained unsaid about the work and its enduring cultural influence. Academic conferences had begun two years earlier: in June 2016, the Brocher Foundation hosted one of the first international meetings to examine the importance of the novel for our time. The Brocher Foundation, situated in Hermance, Switzerland—just a few (...) miles along Lake Geneva from the Villa Diodati, the site in June 1816 of Mary Godwin's inspiration for her famous gothic tale—was the perfect place for such an event. Since... (shrink)

This study uses evidence from the press and from the parliamentary record to examine the extent to which, and the ways in which, people involved in the public debate over laboratory experiments on human embryos in Britain during the 1980s drew on images from science fiction. It is shown that negative images from science fiction were used in the debate, but that these images could be transformed into resources for defending, as well as attacking, this form of scientific endeavor. It (...) is also shown that other fictional structures were present in the debate and that both sides relied heavily on fictional components to justify their competing appraisals of embryo research. (shrink)

Since Robert Hooke published Micrographia, scientists have been expanding the boundaries of science to new scales, giving rise to questions about epistemology and ontology and challenging perceptions of objectivity, life, and artifact. Recent developments in areas such as nanotechnology and synthetic life have not only pushed these boundaries, but have called their very existence into question. In this issue, Spontaneous Generations examines science at the nanoscale from ten perspectives...

Given the recent developments in biotechnology and genetic engineering, the ability to eliminate genetic diseases from the human genome seems more and more possible each day. Being able to do so would mean a better quality of life for those who would otherwise suffer from incurable genetic diseases.However, even though the success of such a procedure would bring benefits that cannot be obtained by other means, the consequences for humans are still unknown. As such, the people involved should be held (...) responsible.The responsibility needs to be collective, not individual, because the decisions leading to the edition of a human genome and someone being born as a result of it are not made by a single individual, but several people, from the prospective parents interested in the intervention for their future child to the ones in charge of performing said intervention.The addition of the human genome can bring significant benefits, and it seems to be the only way to avoid certain genetic diseases; however, collective responsibility should be taken by those involved in the decisions that lead to a person being born with a modified genome. (shrink)

Given the recent developments in biotechnology and genetic engineering, the ability to eliminate genetic diseases from the human genome seems more and more possible each day. Being able to do so would mean a better quality of life for those who would otherwise suffer from incurable genetic diseases. However, even though the success of such a procedure would bring benefits that cannot be obtained by other means, the consequences for humans are still unknown. As such, the people involved should be (...) held responsible. The responsibility needs to be collective, not individual, because the decisions leading to the edition of a human genome and someone being born as a result of it are not made by a single individual, but several people, from the prospective parents interested in the intervention for their future child to the ones in charge of performing said intervention. The addition of the human genome can bring significant benefits, and it seems to be the only way to avoid certain genetic diseases; however, collective responsibility should be taken by those involved in the decisions that lead to a person being born with a modified genome. (shrink)

This paper draws attention to the role of representation in the depiction of scientific and technological innovation as a means of understanding the narratives that circulate concerning the shape of things to come. It considers how metaphors play an important part in the conduct of scientific explanation, and how they do more than describe the world in helping also to shape expectations, normalise particular choices, establish priorities and create needs. In surveying the range of metaphorical responses to the digital and (...) biotechnological age, we will see how technologies are regarded both as 'endangerment' and 'promise'. What we believe 'technology' is doing to 'us' reflects important implicit philosophies of technology and its relationship to human agency and political choice; yet we also need to be alert to the assumptions about 'human nature' itself which inform such reactions. The paper argues that embedded in the various representations implicit in new technologies are crucial issues of identity, community and justice: what it means to be (post)human, who is (and is not) entitled to the rewards of technological advancement, what priorities (and whose interests) will inform the shape of global humanity into the next century. (shrink)

Die literarische Figur des verrückten Wissenschaftlers ist heute vor allem über Filme bekannt. Tatsächlich hat Hollywood diese Figur, die auf Englisch mad scientist genannt wird, seit seinen Gründungstagen mit zahlreichen Filmen zu einem eigenen Genre entwickelt: Ein älterer Mann mit zerzaustem Haar, Laborkittel und Brille arbeitet besessen und einsam in seinem Labor an einer großen Erfindung, mit der er die ganze Welt verändern will. Typischerweise ist dieser Wissenschaftler entweder gutwillig und naiv, nur naiv oder skrupellos. Ist er gutwillig und naiv, (...) dann will er die Welt retten oder zum Besseren wenden; doch in seiner Besessenheit und Engstirnigkeit verkennt er die Welt und die große Erfindung entgleist ihm und wird zu einer Bedrohung der Welt, bis am Ende ein guter Held die Gefahr bannt und die Welt rettet. Falls er nur naiv ist, dann entreißt ein Böser ihm die Erfindung im entscheidenen Moment, um die Welt zu bedrohen, bis am Ende der Gute die Sache wieder ins Reine bringt. Ist er hingegen skrupelos, dann treibt ihn seine Besessenheit dazu, immer größere Opfer für sein Werk zu erbringen, nicht nur, indem er sich selber gesundheitlich und finanziell aufreibt, sondern auch, indem er die Gesundheit und das Leben von Unbeteiligten aufs Spiel setzt. Treibt er dies zu weit, ohne rechtzeitig Reue zu zeigen, dann muss er am Ende um der Gerechtigkeit willen sterben, in der Regel als Opfer seiner eigenen besessenen Forschertaten. Die Figur des verrückten Wissenschaftlers ist heute so einschlägig, dass sie das öffentliche Bild der Wissenschaft in der westlichen Welt entscheidend mitgeprägt hat. Das ärgert natürlich die Wissenschaftler, die darum heftigst auf Hollywood schimpfen. Doch Hollywood hat nur aufgegriffen, stereotypisch vereinfacht und bilderreich ausgemalt, was Schriftsteller des 19. Jahrhunderts in fast allen westlichen Ländern in Form von Romanen, Theaterstücken, Kurzgeschichten und Gedichten vorgebildet haben. Denn der verrückte Wissenschaftler ist tatsächlich eine literarische Erfindung des 19.. (shrink)

Ever since it was first unleashed in 1818 the story of Victor Frankenstein and his reanimated, stitched-together corpse has inspired intense debate. Can organic life be reanimated using electricity or genetic manipulation? If so, could Frankenstein’s monster really teach itself to read and speak as Mary Shelley imagined? Do monsters have rights, or responsibilities to those who would as soon kill them? What is it about music that so affects Frankenstein’s monster, or any of us? What does (...) Mel Brook’s Frau Blucher say to contemporary eco-feminism? Why are some Frankenstein’s flops and others historic successes? Is there a true Frankenstein? Why are children, but not adults, drawn to Shelley’s monster? And what is a “monster,” anyway? Frankenstein and Philosophy calls 25 philosophers to stitch together these and other questions as they apply to history’s greatest horror franchise. Some chapters treat the Frankenstein films, others the original novel, and yet others the many comic books, novels, and modern adaptations. Together they pay tribute to perhaps the most enduring pop culture icon and the fundamental fears, hopes, and puzzles it raises. (shrink)

Los textos publicados sobre el poshumanismo han ido creciendo en los últimos años, asimismo, la recepción del fenómeno se ha hecho cada vez más matizada y los análisis diversos. Tampoco han faltado las metáforas usadas para acercar el fenómeno, un tanto nuevo y desconocido, a otros más familiares. Entre estas metáforas, una de las primeras y, a nuestro juicio, más interesantes es la de Frankenstein. No obstante, su amplio uso, consideramos que falta un análisis más detallado de los motivos (...) antropológicos y las estrategias narrativas que encierra el uso de esta metáfora como critica al poshumanismo. El artículo busca desarrollar dicho análisis. (shrink)

This original collection investigates how Mary Shelley's 200-year-old novel is the product of creolization--the intentional conglomeration of scientific, mythological, political, and social discourses. The book traces how the story has creolized itself into life and culture as a new mythology and political statement for each generation.

This paper describes how an ethics instructor might use Mary Shelley’s “Frankenstein” to teach Kant’s duty-based ethics. For example, themes like the lack of beneficence of Victor toward his creature and Victor’s uneven development of his talents can be used to introduce students to criticisms of Kant’s view that beneficence is an imperfect (or wide) duty or that we have an imperfect duty to cultivate, not only our scientific abilities, but also non-scientific ones. In addition, “Frankenstein” can be (...) used to consider Kant’s prohibition on making false promises, physically abusing one’s body, suicide, as well as Kant’s stance on the abuse of non-rational animals. (shrink)

This paper examines Edmund Husserl's assessment of the modern sciences and articulation of "the crisis of European Man" in terms of motifs from Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, interpreted in light of issues in Africana philosophy and feminist thought.

Frankenstein é um dos personagens mais populares da ficção. Nascido no romance de Mary Shelley, ele está completando 180 anos, mas já transcendeu as fronteiras da literatura. Há 65 anos, é encontrado nas telas cinematográficas, somando 117 aparições, perdendo apenas para o Conde Drácula, com 161, no gênero de filmes de terror. Este ensaio, atravessado por suas precariedades e limitações históricas, procurará respostas sobre o mito de Frankenstein. É importante investigar as significações desta experiência de alma, que lhe (...) asseguram atualidade e permanência às vésperas do terceiro milênio. Para tanto, serão usados os pressupostos da Psicanálise, compatibilizados com os do filósofo Louis Althusser. (shrink)

Two hundred years after it was first published, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; or, the modern Prometheus remains relevant. This novel has endured because of its literary merits and because its themes lend themselves to analysis from multiple viewpoints. Scholars from many disciplines have examined this work in relation to controversial scientific research. In this paper, we review the academic literature where Frankenstein is used to discuss ethics, bioethics, science, technology and medicine. We searched the academic literature and carried out (...) a content analysis of articles discussing the novel and films derived from it, analyzing the findings qualitatively and quantitatively. We recorded the following variables: year and language of publication, whether it referred to the novel or to a film, the academic discipline in which it was published, and the topics addressed in the analysis. Our findings indicate that the scientific literature on Frankenstein focuses mainly on science and the personality of the scientist rather than on the creature the scientist created or ethical aspects of his research. The scientist’s responsibility is central to the ethical interest of Frankenstein; this issue entails both the motivation underlying the scientist’s acts and the consequences of these acts. (shrink)

In this article, I examine Slavoj Žižek’s Freudian-Hegelian interpretation of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein: or the Modern Prometheus (1818), and argue that Žižek’s critique of Shelley’s ambiguous and contradictory attitude toward the French Revolution and its regime of terror remains central to the debates about the revolutionary and Enlightenment ideals today. For Žižek, Shelley employs the family myth not only to obfuscate the social reality of the French Revolution, but also to subvert the bourgeois family from within, through its transgressive (...) sexual politics. Although Shelley manages not simply to dismantle modernity, she expresses a radical commitment to a “pure Enlightenment subjectivity”. Nonetheless, Shelley fails to articulate the speculative identity of the Enlightenment and revolutionary terror. Žižek’s analysis of Shelley’s ambiguous position on emancipatory politics has major implications for his critique of Leftist debates about Muslim refugees in Europe and transgender sexuality. It is still urgent, Žižek correctly insists, to interrogate the ways in which identity politics and the human rights regime can be readily appropriated and commodified in late capitalism. (shrink)

Hybride der Romantik: Frankenstein, Olimpia und das künstliche Leben. Dieser Beitrag untersucht Vorstellungen über die Möglichkeit der Erzeugung künstlicher Lebewesen in der Zeit der Romantik und die damit verbundenen Ängste am Beispiel zweier fiktionaler Texte: Mary Shelleys Frankenstein und Ernst Theodor Amadeus Hoffmanns Sandmann. Dr. Franksteins Monster und Dr. Spalanzanis Automat verkörpern – auf unterschiedliche Weise – die Möglichkeit einer Wendung wissenschaftlicher Produkte und insbesondere künstlicher Hybride ins Monströse. Ihre Geschichten thematisieren das Grauen, das vom drohenden Kontrollverlust ausgeht (...) und als der modernen Wissenschaft innewohnende Gefahr selbst nach der Zerstörung der monströsen Kreaturen bestehen bleibt. Der Begriff des Unheimlichen, von Ernst Jentsch und Sigmund Freud mit Bezug auf Hoffmanns Sandmann formuliert und 1970 von dem japanischen Robotiker Masahiro Mori als Phänomen „des unheimlichen Tals“ (Uncanny Valley) weiterentwickelt, erlaubt weitere Einblicke in die Frage nach künstlichen Lebewesen und ihre Interaktion mit Menschen. Summary: Hybrids of the Romantic: Frankenstein, Olimpia, and Artificial Life. This essay analyzes fantasies and fears related to the possible creation of artificial humans in two influential pieces of Romantic literature, namely E.T.A. Hoffmann's Der Sandmann and Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. Both the automaton Olimpia and Dr. Frankenstein's monster are hybrid creatures. These dystopian figures represent the Romantic fear of the loss of control over the outcome of human endeavour, they symbolize the dangers immanent in modern science and technology. As hybrids, Olimpia and Frankenstein's monster are capable of breaking apparently unpenetrable boundaries, such as those between human and non‐human, and between life and death. As such, these creatures become “unheimlich” (uncanny), a critical term developed by Ernst Jentsch and Sigmund Freud, who directly referred to Hoffmann's Sandman. The term “uncanny” was further developed by the Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori in the 1970s. Mori's investigation of human responses to androids (“Uncanny Valley”), shows the persistence of doubts and fears surrounding artificial humans far beyond the Romantic times, and opens new questions related to the issues of creation, reproduction, hybrids, hubris and gender. (shrink)

The emergent new science of synthetic biology is challenging entrenched distinctions between, amongst others, life and non-life, the natural and the artificial, the evolved and the designed, and even the material and the informational. Whenever such culturally sanctioned boundaries are breached, researchers are inevitably accused of playing God or treading in Frankenstein’s footsteps. Bioethicists, theologians and editors of scientific journals feel obliged to provide an authoritative answer to the ambiguous question of the ‘meaning’ of life, both as a scientific (...) definition and as an explication with wider existential connotations. This article analyses the arguments mooted in the emerging societal debates on synthetic biology and the way its practitioners respond to criticism, mostly by assuming a defiant posture or professing humility. It explores the relationship between the ‘playing God’ theme and the Frankenstein motif and examines the doctrinal status of the ‘playing God’ argument. One particularly interesting finding is that liberal theologians generally deny the religious character of the ‘playing God’ argument—a response which fits in with the curious fact that this argument is used mainly by secular organizations. Synthetic biology, it is therefore maintained, does not offend so much the God of the Bible as a deified Nature. While syntheses of artificial life forms cause some vague uneasiness that life may lose its special meaning, most concerns turn out to be narrowly anthropocentric. As long as synthetic biology creates only new microbial life and does not directly affect human life, it will in all likelihood be considered acceptable. (shrink)

My chief purpose in this paper is to direct attention towards a problem which has received little attention from philosophers, but which I think has a greater claim to importance than any other problem that would naturally arise from a consideration of robots and cybernetic machines: both because it seems of greater intrinsic philosophical interest, and because it represents more nearly than any other problem the kind of worry that afflicts ordinary people. This problem may be roughly formulated in the (...) question ‘What can men do that machines can't ?’. (shrink)