The two opinions concerning real essences that Locke mentions in III.iii.17 represent competing theories about the way in which naturally occurring objects are divided into species. In this paper I explain what these competing theories amount to, why he denies the theory of kinds that is embodied in the first of these opinions, and how this denial is related to his general critique of essentialism. I argue first, that we cannot meaningfully ask whether Locke accepts the existence of natural kinds, (...) per se, since he affirms the theory of kinds that is embodied in the second opinion, while he denies the theory that is embodied in the first opinion. Second, I show that his denial of this theory is not solely or even primarily directed against the scholastic/Aristotelian theory of substantial forms, since he is most interested in refuting a corpuscularian version of this theory. And third, I argue that Locke’s anti-essentialism does not follow solely from his denial of (deeply objective) natural kinds, since one could consistently make this denial and affirm the existence of de re essential properties. (shrink)

The two opinions concerning real essences that Locke mentions in III.iii.17 represent competing theories about the way in which naturally occurring objects are divided into species. In this paper I explain what these competing theories amount to, why he denies the theory of kinds that is embodied in the first of these opinions, and how this denial is related to his general critique of essentialism. I argue first, that we cannot meaningfully ask whether Locke accepts the existence of natural kinds, (...) per se, since he affirms the theory of kinds that is embodied in the second opinion, while he denies the theory that is embodied in the first opinion. Second, I show that his denial of this theory is not solely or even primarily directed against the scholastic/Aristotelian theory of substantial forms, since he is most interested in refuting a corpuscularian version of this theory. And third, I argue that Locke’s anti-essentialism does not follow solely from his denial of (deeply objective) natural kinds, since one could consistently make this denial and affirm the existence of de re essential properties. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with metaphysical issues surrounding the doctrines of transubstantiation and the real presence. In particular, I am concerned with the nature of the eucharistic change, and with the manner in which Christ is believed to be present in the Blessed Sacrament. My primary goal is to give an account of these doctrines (i) which does not involve the thesis that upon consecration one substance has become identical with another, previously existing substance, (ii) which is consistent with a (...) particulate account of matter and material substances, and (iii) which explains why Christ—in his institution of the Lord’s Supper—is not enjoining us to become cannibals. More generally, my goal is to locate the irreducibly mysterious aspects of these doctrines, and to respond to some intuitively plausible reasons for thinking them to be incoherent, metaphysically impossible, or morally repugnant. (shrink)

Aristotle's ethical theory is often seen as instructing agents in the prudent pursuit of their own well-being, and therefore labeled egoistic. Yet it is also subject to the opposing charge of failing to direct agents to their well-being, directing them instead to perfection. I am here concerned chiefly with the second criticism, and proceed as follows: I first articulate Sumner's version of the criticism, and second assess his argument for his own (subjective) account of well-being. Third, I present reasons motivating (...) a more objective account of well-being, reasons for taking another look at Aristotle. Finally, granting that Aristotle does indeed direct agents to pursue their perfection, I argue that perfection includes well-being within it. This shows how Aristotle escapes the second criticism, while at the same time pointing the way toward a defense against the first. (Published Online August 21 2006). (shrink)

Classical virtue ethics offers an attractive alternative to mainstream ethical theories because it sees the moral life as the proper pursuit of happiness. It advocates this principle of action: "My goal is to be and to act in a way that is good for me." This invites the response that it is egoistic. We see in the literature both peremptory dismissals of virtue ethics, and the complacent suggestion that virtue ethics is unobjectionable because only "formally egoistic." My thesis is that, (...) instead, classical virtue ethics is not egoistic in any sense. We should begin by noting that its principle of action can be read in two ways: My goal is to be and to act in a way that is good for me. My goal is to be and to act in a way that is good for me. ;The first two chapters make explicit the difference between these principles, only the first of which is egoistic, and distinguish several kinds of egoism. Chapters 3 through 5 comprise a historical study which makes clear two important truths. First, neither Aristotle nor his followers fit any of the egoistic profiles developed; they endorse the second reading of the principle. Second, it is the development of a dualism of ultimate principles, maturing in John Duns Scotus, that makes virtue ethics look egoistic. Scotus posits two basic affections of the will, for justice and for advantage, and holds that the first acts as a moral constraint upon the second. With the spread of Scotus's influence, which continues today, theories failing to posit some special moral principle to restrain the desire for happiness will look egoistic. ;The final two chapters survey recent virtue theories. I argue that some of them have been distorted by the influence of dualism, and that some are egoistic. I end by considering the theories of Foot and MacIntyre, and show that here we see plausible ethical theories which have escaped the influence of dualism and avoided egoism by modeling themselves on classical ethical theory. I conclude that virtue ethics is not susceptible to the egoism objection. (shrink)

For Anselm, the attribute of omnipresence is not merely concerned with where God exists, but with where and when God exists. His account of this attribute thus precipitates a discourse on the nature of space and time: how they are related to God, to one another, and to the rest of the created order. In the course of this analysis Anselm articulates a number of positions which are generally thought to be the sole possession of modernity. In Part One of (...) what follows I argue, first, that Anselm provides us with an analysis of objects which have both spatial and temporal parts, and second, that he provides us with a clear distinction between those objects which persist by enduring through time in their entirety and those which persist by being temporally extended. In Part Two I argue that Anselm's analysis of omnipresence is consciously informed by a conception of spacetime, according to which space and time form a single, four-dimensional manifold in which objects both persist and move. (shrink)

In part one of this paper I argue that there are three possible accounts of human nature: we are either (i) purely material beings, (ii) purely spiritual beings (souls), or (iii) body/soul composites. In parts two and three I assess the relative merits of these positions both from a broadly secular perspective and also from the perspective of Christian orthodoxy. While both perspectives are mostly strongly opposed to the thesis that we are souls, and while a secular perspective is likely (...) to favor some form of materialism, I argue that Christian orthodoxy commits us to compositional substance dualism, since materialism is incompatible first, with the traditional understanding of Christ’s humanity, and second, with the thesis that we shall enjoy a conscious, sentient existence during the interim period between our death and the General Resurrection. (shrink)

In this paper I contend that Locke is both a realist and a skeptic regarding the mind-independent bodies which are causally responsible for our ideas of sense. Although he frequently indicates that we have experiential knowledge of these bodies, I argue that this was not his considered position. In support of this conclusion I turn: first, to the basic contours of his accounts of knowledge and perception; second, to his argument for the existence of the material world; and third, to (...) his discussions of judgment and probability. Locke’s considered position, I contend, is that instances of veridical perception do not yield genuine instances of knowledge. Rather, these perceptual encounters give rise to empirical judgments which enjoy a high degree of probability. While this prevents them from being suitable objects of knowledge, since Locke thinks that we can be nearly certain of their truth, he contends that we should not hesitate to think, speak and act as if they were instances of knowledge. I further argue that this account provides us with a more satisfying explanation of Locke’s dismissive attitude towards the skeptical hypotheses which appear throughout the Essay. (shrink)

'Critical Management Studies', or 'CMS', describes a diverse group of work that has adopted a critical or questioning approach to the traditional concerns of Management Studies, and the growing interest in CMS has produced a vibrant and exciting body of research. Christopher Grey and Hugh Willmott, leading authorities in this area, introduce seventeen readings which reflect these developments, and show CMS' importance. As an assessment of CMS, the Reader will be of interest to academics, researchers, and students of Management (...) Studies. As an introduction to CMS, it will prove invaluable to students taking courses requiring familiarity with the CMS literature. (shrink)

Students reading Aristotle for the first time often face significant challenges. To complicate matters, if students who already have the habit of reading at a superficial level are asked to read large portions of Aristotle’s work, instructors may be reinforcing bad reading habits. This paper suggest that it is possible to insure many students learn how to read Aristotle for themselves provided students are assigned small, relatively accessible portions of text and initial discussion of these texts is geared toward empowering (...) students to make sense of Aristotle for themselves. To this end, this paper has developed an exercise using modeling clay that helps students to learn some of the main points in Book I and II of Aristotle’s “Physics.”. (shrink)

Traditional memory strategy training interventions improve older adults’ performance on tests of episodic memory, but have limited transfer to episodic memory tasks, let alone to everyday memory. We argue that an alternative approach is needed to assist older adults to compensate for age-related cognitive declines and to maintain functional capacity in their own natural ecologies. We outline a set of principles regarding how interventions can successfully train older adults to increase successful goal pursuit to reduce risks of everyday memory failures. (...) We argue that training individuals to use metacognitive self-regulatory strategies to proactively manage formulation and pursuit of daily goals can compensate for age-related cognitive changes and increase the likelihood of goal attainment. We then describe an intervention approach that instantiates these principles in a multi-modal intervention that is unique in its three-phase approach: individualized assessment of an individual’s current approaches to self-regulation; training memory strategies, self-management skills, and new habits of mind in a group training context; and a behavioral shaping period in which individuals receive coaching and feedback on their efforts to use trained procedures to improve everyday cognition. A recently completed study conducted an initial test of the intervention, with highly encouraging results. We advocate further efforts to replicate, extend, and fine-tune this type of intervention. The ultimate goal is to be able to deliver the intervention in a way that increases its potential reach, including to subpopulations of older adults at risk for everyday cognitive impairments. (shrink)

I discuss what Aquinas’ doctrine of divine simplicity is, and what he takes to be its implications. I also discuss the extent to which Aquinas succeeds in motivating and defending those implications.

Saul Kripke, in a series of classic writings of the 1960s and 1970s, changed the face of metaphysics and philosophy of language. Christopher Hughes offers a careful exposition and critical analysis of Kripke's central ideas about names, necessity, and identity. He clears up some common misunderstandings of Kripke's views on rigid designation, causality and reference, and the necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori. Through his engagement with Kripke's ideas Hughes makes a significant contribution to ongoing debates (...) on, inter alia, the semantics of natural kind terms, the nature of natural kinds, the essentiality of origin and constitution, the relative merits of 'identitarian' and counterpart-theoretic accounts of modality, and the identity or otherwise of mental types and tokens with physical types and tokens. No specialist knowledge in either the philosophy of language or metaphysics is presupposed; Hughes's book will be valuable for anyone working on the ideas which Kripke made famous in the philosophy world. (shrink)

[I] Divine Simplicity: God and His Existence Types of Divine Simplicity Of the properties ascribed to God in Aquinas' natural theology, we may call one sort ...

The European Medical Information Framework project, funded through the IMI programme, has designed and implemented a federated platform to connect health data from a variety of sources across Europe, to facilitate large scale clinical and life sciences research. It enables approved users to analyse securely multiple, diverse, data via a single portal, thereby mediating research opportunities across a large quantity of research data. EMIF developed a code of practice to ensure the privacy protection of data subjects, protect the interests of (...) data sharing parties, comply with legislation and various organisational policies on data protection, uphold best practices in the protection of personal privacy and information governance, and eventually promote these best practices more widely. EMIF convened an Ethics Advisory Board, to provide feedback on its approach, platform, and the EcoP. The most important challenges the ECoP team faced were: how to define, control and monitor the purposes for which federated health data are used; the kinds of organisation that should be permitted to conduct permitted research; and how to monitor this. This manuscript explores those issues, offering the combined insights of the EAB and EMIF core ECoP team. For some issues, a consensus on how to approach them is proposed. For other issues, a singular approach may be premature but the challenges are summarised to help the community to debate the topic further. Arguably, the issues and their analyses have application beyond EMIF, to many research infrastructures connected to health data sources. (shrink)

Locke thought that it was impossible for there to be two things of the same kind in the same place at the same time. I offer (what looks to me like) a counterexample to that principle, involving two ships in the same place at the same time. I then consider two ways of explaining away, and one way of denying, the apparent counterexample of Locke's principle, and I argue that none is successful. I conclude that, although the case under discussion (...) does not refute Locke's principle, it constitutes a serious challenge to it. (shrink)

Christopher Hughes; XII*—Is A Thing Just The Sum Of Its Parts?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 86, Issue 1, 1 June 1986, Pages 213–234, https:/.

Christopher Hughes; XII*—Is A Thing Just The Sum Of Its Parts?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 86, Issue 1, 1 June 1986, Pages 213–234, https:/.

Sider has argued that four‐dimensionalism can be given a clear and coherent formulation, and has attempted to provide one. He has also argued that three‐dimensionalism resists adequate formulation. I argue that Sider's worries about whether there is an adequate formulation of three‐dimensionalism are misplaced, and suggest a formulation of three‐dimensionalism different from the ones considered and rejected by Sider. I then give a ‘matching’ formulation of four‐dimensionalism, and argue that it captures four‐dimensionalism better than Sider's own formulation of that doctrine.

Sider has argued that four‐dimensionalism can be given a clear and coherent formulation, and has attempted to provide one. He has also argued that three‐dimensionalism resists adequate formulation. I argue that Sider's worries about whether there is an adequate formulation of three‐dimensionalism are misplaced, and suggest a formulation of three‐dimensionalism different from the ones considered and rejected by Sider. I then give a ‘matching’ formulation of four‐dimensionalism, and argue that it captures four‐dimensionalism better than Sider's own formulation of that doctrine.

According to egalitarians, there is no privileged now-possible history. Egalitarianism seems to provide an attractive way to reconcile openness and omniscience, but, I argue, it does not.

Thomas Aquinas was the most influential philosopher of the Middle Ages, and one of the most famous Christian theologians of all time. His philosophy is a powerful synthesis of Aristotle and Plato presented within a Christian framework. His "five ways" to prove the existence of God are studied by undergraduates on many theology and philosophy of religion courses. Apart from his specifically theological works, he spent much of his time writing about metaphysics, all of which was to have important ramifications (...) for epistemology, philosophy of mind and ethics. Christophe Hughes focuses mostly on the philosophical Aquinas; beginning with a chapter on his life and works he goes on to discuss Aquinas's metaphysics and his theory of human beings in general, covering his ideas about body and soul, the mind, and free will. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas is one of the most important figures in the history of philosophy and philosophical theology. Relying on a deep understanding of Aristotle, Aquinas developed a metaphysical framework that is comprehensive, detailed, and flexible. Within that framework, he formulated a range of strikingly original and carefully explicated views in areas including natural theology, philosophy of mind, philosophical psychology, and ethics. In this book_, _Christopher Hughes focuses on Aquinas’s thought from an analytic philosophical perspective. After an overview of Aquinas’s (...) life and works, Hughes discusses Aquinas’s metaphysics, including his conception of substance, matter, and form, and his account of essence and existence; and his theory of the nature of human beings, including his critique of a substance dualism that Aquinas attributes to Plato, but is usually associated with Descartes. In the final chapters, Hughes discusses Aquinas’s account of the existence and nature of God, and his treatment of the problem of evil, as well as his ideas about the relation of goodness to being, choice, and happiness. Aquinas on Being, Goodness, and God is essential reading for students and scholars of Aquinas, and anyone interested in philosophy of religion or the history of medieval philosophy. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas was the most influential philosopher of the Middle Ages, and one of the most famous Christian theologians of all time. His philosophy is a powerful synthesis of Aristotle and Plato presented within a Christian framework. His "five ways" to prove the existence of God are studied by undergraduates on many theology and philosophy of religion courses. Apart from his specifically theological works, he spent much of his time writing about metaphysics, all of which was to have important ramifications (...) for epistemology, philosophy of mind and ethics. Christophe Hughes focuses mostly on the philosophical Aquinas; beginning with a chapter on his life and works he goes on to discuss Aquinas's metaphysics and his theory of human beings in general, covering his ideas about body and soul, the mind, and free will. (shrink)

First published in 2008. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

I argue that the Proslogion 2 argument rests on Meinongian assumptions, and Meinongianism is more defensible than many metaphysicians think, but although Meinongianism can be defended from objections, the most promising strategies for doing that call into question the cogency of the Proslogion 2 argument, so that argument is less than convincing, even if Meinongianism is true.

Suppose there are possible worlds in which God exists but Anselm does not. Then (I argue) there are possible worlds in which Anselm does not exist, but God cannot even entertain the thought that he does not. In such worlds Anselm does not exist, but God does not know that. This, I argue, is incompatible with (a straightforward construal of) the doctrine of God's essential omniscience. Considerations involving negative existentials also call into question a certain picture of creation, on which (...) God chooses which particular (possible) individuals to create. They suggest that there is an element of brute contingency about which individuals exist. (shrink)