Just as the differentiation of human beings from other species has traditionally been thought to be based on some common essence or nature, so has the division of humankind into certain groups, in particular, men and women and races, been thought to be based on their distinct natures. There are many similarities between the concepts of human nature, ‘women’s nature’ and race, and how these concepts have functioned ideologically: For all three, the traditional idea was that there were fixed, (...) natural essences determining the cognitive, moral, and emotional traits and abilities of the group in question. Some, e.g., Plato, and Herrnstein in recent years, have applied the idea to different social classes as well. I will call this view essentialism, and note that it is compatible with various metaphysical analyses. One could be opposed to metaphysical essentialism, but accept essences in this sense, as, for example, Hume did. (shrink)

An essay review of Rutger Bregman's "Humankind: A Hopeful History" (2020).

The paper intends to analyze the philosophic, imaginative, and theological aspects of Islam, which give grounds to the integration, acceptance, and enhancement of the transhuman, through the analysis of core concepts such as ‘humanity’ and ‘body’ in Islamic tradition. While transhumanism is considered mainly from a lay or super-diverse perspective, Imams, fuquha, Muslim scholars and simple believers—be they in Western or non-Western contexts—are evermore challenged to question the relationship between technological innovation effecting human nature, and Islamic tradition with its specific (...) cultural framework. Considering that body-matter is what expresses the identity and the ‘anthropopoiesis’ of the Muslim believer, the intent of the paper is to investigate how—and through which spiritual meanings—can Islamic theology integrate the liminal bodies of the transhuman into the limited, defined, and purified human traditional models of Islamic belief. (shrink)

The discovery that the DNA of chimpanzees and humans is incredibly similar, sharing 98% of the same code, suggests that there is very little different--or special--about the human animal. Likewise, advances in artificial intelligence mean that humans no longer have exclusive access to reason, consciousness and imagination. Indeed, the harder we cling to the concept of humanity, the more slippery it becomes. But if it breaks down altogether, what will this mean for human values, human rights, and the defense of (...) human dignity? In a book of breathtaking range, Felipe Fernandez-Armesto takes us on an enlightening journey through the history of humankind, a narrative tour de force that challenges our most fundamental belief--that we are, and have always been, human. Humankind confronts the problem from a historical perspective, showing how our current understanding of what it means to be human has been shaken by new discoveries from science and philosophy. The author shows how our concept of humankind has changed over time, tracing its faltering expansion to its present limits and arguing that these limits are neither fixed or scientifically verifiable. Controversially, he proposes that we have further to go in developing our concept of humankind and that we need to rethink it as a matter of urgency. One of the most imaginative historians writing today, Felipe Fernandez-Armesto here combines astonishing breadth with passionate and exciting storytelling. For the intellectually curious, for those interested in history, philosophy, science and culture, and for anyone who has ever wondered about what makes us human, Humankind offers an exhilarating new perspective. (shrink)

This paper sketches the history of unethical behavior of Homo sapiens to other forms of life on planet Earth. I ask, and sketch responses to, the question: How and why is it that we, the so-called “ethical animal,” have been the worst of all animals in relation to other life-forms on our planet? In response to the answers to this question, I claim that we know, and have known for a very long time, what it means to be morally good. (...) But in light of the natural bases of our behavior, I wonder if it will ever be possible for us, as a species, to become so. (shrink)

Things in common: an introduction -- Life -- Specters -- Subscendence -- Species -- Kindness.

Fifty-eight years ago Max Scheler, one of the founders of modern philosophical anthropology, wrote: “Man is more of a problem to himself at the present time than ever before in all recorded history. ... the increasing multiplicity of the special sciences that deal with man, valuable as they are, tend to hide his nature more than they reveal it.”1 In 1944, some sixteen years later, Ernst Cassirer comments that even though “no former age was ever in such a favorable position (...) with regard to the sources of our knowledge of human nature,” we are still looking for a clue which will provide “real insight into the general character of human culture.”2 In his famous 1958 book, Irrational Man,3 William Barrett looked to existentialism to recover the whole and integral, suffering and dying human being from the abstract image of humankind as logical operators dominant in modern philosophy. However, in a new book William Barrett concludes that the concrete human self was not in fact recovered in existentialism and laments its disappearance in modern thought. He talks of the Death of the Soul.4 I would add: and Elimination of the Body. (shrink)

A new book by Timothy Morton, Humankind: Solidarity with Nonhuman People, is reviewed. Humankind: Solidarity with Nonhuman People is a project into the applied political ethics that emerge between speculative realism and Marxism. This book is intended to build on the object-oriented ontology that Morton has espoused in previous volumes, however with a greater emphasis on normative politics. The book’s core methodology is to outline the various neologisms that Morton employs and incorporate those speculative realist terms into a (...) retooling of Marxist. The book dialogue prose is a poetic tour de force that is both academically and philosophically rigorous. Morton provides a novel reworking of Marxist theory that can exist on the cutting edge of continental philosophy. -/- . (shrink)

Following in the tradition of Montaigne and Rousseau, a number of recent philosophers have argued that reflection on the relationship between humankind and certain animals yields good reasons for a misanthropic verdict on the former. One reason, of course, is the terrible treatment and exploitation of animals by human beings. Another reason—the one focused on and endorsed in this paper—is that humankind does very badly in the moral comparison with animal species that Hume thought was essential to any (...) moral verdict on our species. I argue that animals are favored by such a comparison since they are free of the vices and moral failings of human beings. To the objection that, in that case, they are also without the virtues that we have, my reply is that this objection is mistaken. (Even if it weren’t, animals would come off better than humankind, since it is morally more important to be without vices than to have virtues.) Simply put, the “innocence” of animals—perhaps like that of young children—is incompatible with being morally vicious, but it is not incompatible with manifesting and exercising certain virtues. Innocence does not exclude experiencing benign moral emotions, such as compassion. (shrink)

For Rousseau, humankind is in a perpetual state of decay—decadency from an earlier, natural, primitive, and perfect state. For Rousseau, the natural man, or man in the state of beast, was of an era where humankind was unencumbered by that which is now entirely associated with society—that is, “. . . establishment of laws and of the right of property . . . the institution of magistracy . . . and the conversion of legitimate into arbitrary power.” For (...) Kant, humankind is in its natural state. For Kant, nature brings about conditions that continually develop and refine humankind’s dispositions, purposefully setting about societies in order to facilitate a foundation within all civilized society, whereby all of humankind’s goals may be achieved. All matters have their place—placed there by nature, as though with purpose. For Kant, nature intended for humankind to employ reason, to acquiesce to coercion for social cohesion, and to strive to build a society that is ever-increasingly progressing towards perfection. Nature uses humankind’s dispositions, including ‘antagonistic’ behavior to gradually bring about a, “perfectly just civil constitution.” Humankind’s highest goal yet to be achieved is for that just civil constitution to emerge from trial and error (in the form of wars, revolutions, secessions, abdications), over time, ultimately providing for development of other dispositions within a perfect society. (shrink)

What is termed today globalisation or, in French, mondialisation, and viewed very sceptically, in many cases also sharply criticized and even rejected, has neither descended over humanity like a natural catastrophe nor is it the unintentional evil of irreproachable good intentions. It is, rather, at its core at any rate, exactly what the so-called „project of modernity“ wanted and aimed at from the very beginning, and what has been worked out, propagated and put into practice particularly in the area of (...) the European-American enlightenment, in the systems of ideas that followed and socio-cultural and political movements connected with it. And yet the intellectual and political Protagonists of the said project would be taken aback if they were to see what has become of it. After sufficient reflection and analysis, however, they would have to realize that it had to lead to this, at least by and large. In my paper I intend to show this and back it up. (shrink)

My anthropological analysis of bionics is basedon the representations of engineers concerningthe definition of humankind and its future. Thedifference between repairing and improving onhuman beings is disappearing and we strive toreach a kind of `perfection', whose criteriaare evolving with technical developments.Nowadays, in the so-called information society,information is described as the best value: aperfect human being would be a free braindirectly connected to the web, and without abody because it is considered as an impedimentto the circulation of information. But what (...) isconsidered as good today won't be good enoughtomorrow. And `improving' the human being moreand more could make it evolve into a verydifferent human being, or even into a newspecies: post-humankind. For some people, thisis not a problem, because the goal is to be`better' than we are, human or not. As for me,I think that we risk losing something veryimportant: our social ability. (shrink)

This paper was presented at the XIX World Congress of Philosophy, "Mankind at a Turning Point: Philosophical Perspectives" held in Moscow, August 22-28, 1993. The author, representing the International Association of Women Philosophers, criticizes the use of "Mankind" in the Congress title and incorporates a resolution, subsequently passed unanimously by the steering committee of the Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie, that calls for the use of non-sexist language at future World Congresses.

How does the Indian philosophical tradition view the relationship between human beings and nature? Is human existence an integral, though highly evolved, part of nature? Or is human existence radically different from natural existence? This question is fundamental and important, for its answer determines basic cultural values and life practices, including the primary aims of life (puruṣārthas) and the norms of life‐stages and social classes (varṇāśramadharma). As might be expected, tradition does not provide us with a single, univocal answer to (...) this question. Because the Indian tradition is made up of many sub‐traditions, each with its own answer, and because these traditions are continuously changing, the answer varies across time, as well as across traditions. Nonetheless, allowing for necessary qualifications, these different answers share the view that both questions are to be answered in the affirmative. That is, the tradition's shared core of understanding across sub‐traditions and time is that human existence is both an integral part of nature and that it is radically different. How is the apparent conflict between these two views resolved within the tradition? Is the attempted resolution successful? It is these two questions that form the problematic of this essay. (shrink)

Buddhism teaches that the diversity of living beings in the world is caused and upheld by intentional acts performed in this and previous lives by karmic trajectories, beings whose continuity through rebirths is not dependent on a transcendent substratum such as a self (ātman), and that the order of beings in the world exactly correlates with the consequences of acts (karrnan) operative for their present life. The central Buddhist doctrine of dependent co‐arising (pratītya‐samutpāda) shows how these karmic trajectories are sustained (...) by twelve conditions, the primary of which is ignorance. The goal of Buddhists is ultimately to transcend rebirth and attain nirvāṇa. This is possible because the world is both a rebirth realm and a realm in which awakening from ignorance can be attained. The natural world of living beings is a moral order and this moral order functions in a physical setting. The physical setting of the rebirth system is the cosmos as the abode of beings, and the beings participating in the rebirth system constitute the world of living beings. These together constitute the world of rebirth (saṃsāra). By nature in this article is understood that part of the cosmos that constitutes the physical setting of humans and the world of non‐human beings also living there – that is, animals and plants. This is, one should note, only a very small part of the Buddhist cosmos, which consists of a huge number of world systems, and which is immense in time and space and eternally manifests and dissolves. (shrink)

This paper draws a distinction between ‘right MacIntyreans’ who are relatively optimistic that MacIntyre’s vision of ethics can be realised in capitalist society, and ‘left MacIntyreans’ who are sceptical about this possibility, and aims to show that the ‘left MacIntyrean’ position is a promising perspective available to business ethicists. It does so by arguing for a distinction between ‘community-focused’ practices and ‘excellence-focused’ practices. The latter concept fulfils the promise of practices to provide us with an understanding of the best work (...) for humankind and highlights the affinities between MacIntyre’s concept of a practice and Marx’s conception of good work as free, creative activity. The paper concludes with a suggestion that we reflect on the best forms of work so that we can strive to ensure the very best activities, those most consonant with our flourishing, one day become available to all. (shrink)

In this article, I question the actuality of Freud's ideas on sexuality. First, I investigate why Freud thinks that the main psychopathological syndromes are determined by problems related to sexuality. I then show in what sense Freud's theories on sexuality make it impossible to simply think of psychoanalysis as yet another developmental psychology. Then, I turn to Fonagy's recent claim that sexual emotions cannot be mirrored and that this is the reason why sexuality can only be an imposed burden. Or, (...) rather, this impossibility explains why sexuality belongs to the borderline spectrum. Fonagy further links this idea to Laplanche's theory of a generalized seduction that it is meant to explain. I argue that it is the other way around: the theory of a generalized seduction explains the lack of mirroring in the case of sexuality. In my conclusion, I state that although the metapsychological claims of both Fonagy and Laplanche allow us to reaffirm the special place sexuality has in understanding the human being, their theories fall short when it comes to defending an exclusive primacy of sexuality. (shrink)

In The Grasshopper, Bernard Suits argues that the best life is the one whose essence is game-play. In fact, only through the concept of game-play can we understand how anything at all is worth doing. Yet this seems implausible: morality makes things worth doing independently of any game, and games are themselves subject to moral evaluation. So games must be logically posterior to morality. The current paper responds to these objections by developing the theory of Ludic Constructivism. Constructivist theories such (...) as Kant’s explain normativity in a way that is both objective and cognitivist but also mind-dependent. Roughly, constructivists ground normative structures in rational procedures. But rational agency is diverse: it is realized in different ways and to different degrees by different agents. Yet Kantian Constructivism requires a strong identity of rational procedures across rational agents. Ludic Constructivism avoids this challenge by rejecting this strong identity of agency, instead building a normative framework out of the ingredients of Suits’s definition of game-play. We want to play the best games we can. In order to do so we must play games with a certain structure: they must be nested multiplayer games in which everyone who is capable of self-originating activity is engaged as a fellow player rather than a plaything. Nested games – games that are constructed out of other games – go best when each game contributes to the value of each other game in the nest. Such game nests are “reciprocating value-maximization structures”. Our lives go best when we design, play, and revise the game of our Individual Life and we also embed that game within the highest-order nested game of Fate of Humankind. In this way, Ludic Constructivism delivers a normative system that expands Kant’s Kingdom of Ends, and a life that meets Aristotle’s conception of pleasure. (shrink)

For example, it is commonly held that the difference between human beings and nonhumans, between human social practice and the activities of animals, lies in the self-conscious agency of humankind ; that is to say, human beings act in a self-conscious and intentional way. This gives rise to the question: If labor is characteristic of humankind and begins with the making of tools, and if tool-making activity is a universal and necessary characteristic which already implies intentional, conscious, and (...) self-conscious activity, does this then mean that human consciousness is prior to human activity ? As a scientific expression of this view, some paleoanthropologists emphasize the decision-making function of the human brain [as a defining characteristic of humankind]. I disagree with this view. (shrink)

You think you're human. But what does that mean? How can humanity be defined? Felipe Fernandez-Armesto takes us on an enlightening and provocative journey through the history of humankind to reveal the challenges to our most fundamental belief - that we are, and have always been, human. Fernandez-Armesto investigates advances in artificial intelligence and genetics, and asks what these mean for the future of human values, human rights, and the defence of human dignity. The book illustrates how our concept (...) of humankind has changed over time and how our current understanding of this has been shaken by new challenges from science and philosophy. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to argue that the sharing of ‘being’ between Jesus and the Godhead, professed in creedal Christianity and based on the Nicaean creed, pertains to a ‘sameness in divine substance’. This substance refers to divine wisdom, justice and mercy. The article attempts to demonstrate that there exists a congruence between textual evidence in the New Testament and these ‘orthodox’ belief tenets, especially represented in the Athanasian creed. This is explained in terms of an analysis of (...) the origins and development of creedal formulae. This process represents a movement from a fundamental religious experience to a ‘use’ of metaphorical language, to the origins of confessional formulae that lead to the formulation of dogma. In light of the insight into the ‘building blocks’ of the formation of confessional formulae, the article concludes with a ‘deconstruction’ of the concepts ‘anathematisation’ and ‘heresy’. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

One way to think about the philosophical significance of hatred is to consider doctrines that are characterised by feelings of hatred. A good candidate is misanthropy, which is often conceived as an attitude of hatred directed at humankind at large. I start by sketching a working account of misanthropy as a critical verdict or judgment on the contemporary condition of humankind as it has become. The criticism is directed at the array of vices and failings that are ubiquitous (...) and entrenched within the wider structures of human life, rather than those of individual persons. In one of its forms, misanthropy manifests itself in feelings of hatred for those entrenched failings and the patterns of awful behaviour which they motivate and sustain - for instance, the figure that Kant called the "enemy of mankind", or the radical eco-misanthropes who populated much American radical environmentalism of the 1980s, with their calls to 'tear down' the 'whole human world'. I then argue that such hateful 'enemies of mankind' represent only one among a set of modes of misanthropy. These have more peaceable affective and practical profiles that offer us forms of misanthropy without hatred. If so, we can think philosophically about hate in relation to misanthropy and about the potential scope of hatred. Thinking about the entrenched vices and failings constitutive of our life as it has become offers a way of intelligibly hating something as large as 'humanity'. But there are other responses to those vices and failings than hatred. I end by speculating that although hateful misanthropy tends to dominate discussions of misanthropy, historically it is the least common. That, itself, might tell us something about the sustainability of hatred. (shrink)

Throughout history, people have observed aerial events that appeared extraordinary and anomalous. In earlier eras, these were often interpreted through a lens that invoked special classes of divine beings, such as angels (who, compared with gods, are regarded as more likely to interact with humans). Today, in our ostensibly secular scientific age, there is a tendency to assume such observers were mistaken, and that with the benefit of modern knowledge, these events can be “debunked” and attributed to conventional naturalistic explanations. (...) However, recent years have seen a burgeoning interest and even concern over the issue of unidentified aerial phenomena. Through the lens of our “space age,” these are sometimes interpreted using notions such as extraterrestrial agents. Ultimately though, this article suggests that both categories of explanation, from angels to aliens, may be the perennial human quest to render comprehensible, through the prism of prevailing beliefs and traditions, an ongoing encounter with celestial phenomena that remain genuinely unknown but deeply significant. (shrink)

Contemporary educational policies have recently prioritised the development of generic, core, and transferable skills. This essay reflects on this tendency in the context of the ‘algorithmic condition’ and those discourses that tend toward an image of education that privileges dematerialised skills, practices, and knowledge. It argues that this turn towards dematerialisation is resonant with shifts in a number of diff erent domains, including work, and explores some of the implications of this shift. Instead I suggest an approach to education that (...) understands it as turning towards the world, loving the world, and creating a common world. In order to understanding thinking and knowing as material practices, the concept of ‘material thinking’ is developed that refuses binaries of theory and practice, but that instead understands thinking, particularly in educational contexts, as material and a practice of thinking with something, and a turning towards the world. I draw upon the work of Susan Oyama, Elizabeth Grosz, Tim Ingold and Isabelle Stengers, and explore the example of Barbara McClintock’s research as a cytogeneticist researching maize. Here I am particularly interested in the importance of deep engagement with a subject matter in terms of developing the skilfulness that is associated with what I am calling ‘material thinking’. This allows us to think about education in a way that pays attention to the plurality of practices of material thinking that engage with the natural history of humankind, and the story of the world. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question regarding the relation between capitalism and nature, on the one hand, and that of the continued existence of life, including humankind, on earth in light of the disturbing evidence that has emerged since the early 1970s, concerning massive environmental degradation, on the other. It is argued that the evidence of such destruction is there for every one to see; what is less obvious – in fact, mostly ignored or denied – is the connection between (...) capital as a process which either grows, or dies, and the devastating effect of such uncontrollable growth on geo-ecology (where a distinction is made between ecology and environment in terms of the relations of interdependence by which the former is characterised). Ironically, as far back as 1972 the ‘Club of Rome' warned against the dangers of ‘unlimited growth'. The paper draws substantially, but not exclusively, on the work of Joel Kovel, who argues in favour of what he terms eco-socialism as the best kind of alternative to capitalism. Needless to say, this entails an understanding of the latter, in an encompassing sense as a state of being, instead of in a narrow economistic sense. It also requires that one should distinguish clearly between a mechanistic conception of nature (the Cartesian) that seems to legitimize its exploitation for human use and eventual degradation, on the one hand, and another (Kantian) conception which makes room for the inscrutability of a natural purposiveness that transcends human cognition. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.24(2) 2005: 121-136. (shrink)

Tractatus Politico-Philosophicus (Political-Philosophical Treatise) aims to establish the principles of good governance and of a happy society, and to open up new directions for the future development of humankind. W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz demonstrates the necessity of, and provides a guide for, the redirection of humanity. He argues that this paradigm shift must involve changing the character of social life and politics from competitive to cooperative, encouraging moral and intellectual virtues, providing foundations for happy societies, promoting peace among countries and (...) building a strong international community. (shrink)

Prescriptive political and moral theories contain ideas about what human beings are like and about what, correspondingly, is good for them. Conceptions of human “nature” and corresponding human good enter into normative argument by way of support and justification. Of course, it is logically open for the ratiocinative traffic to run the other way. Strongly held convictions about the rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness, of certain social institutions or practices may help condition and shape one's responses to one or (...) another set of propositions about what people are like and what, in consequence, they have reason to value. (shrink)

During the century of colonial expansion by the Iberian monarchies, the presence of the Church alongside the colonizers was not just a logical continuation of the medieval idea of the good prince who was advised and accompanied by men of faith. It also underlined the political dimension of the ‘spiritual conquest’ and the equally political dimension of the cultural practices accompanying it. There are numerous works that have emphasized this with regard to the American continents in particular, where the connection (...) between the forces present, which quickly led to the destruction and subjugation of the local populations, brought about Spanish colonial domination over large swathes of the ‘West Indies’. Those scholars who have concentrated on the ‘East Indies’, and China in particular, have emphasized acculturation or accommodation, highlighting the cultural rather than the political dimension of contact. This article explores the significant asymmetries in the understanding of humankind developed by the missionaries in their analyses of the Americas and the East Indies. These asymmetries stemmed largely from their distinct roles and functions in the process of colonial or imperial contact. I argue that these asymmetries obscure our understanding of what missionaries contributed to the global circulation of knowledge of lands and peoples new to Europeans in the 16th and 17th centuries, in part by defining ‘savagery’ and locating it mostly in the ‘West Indies’. (shrink)

In this collection on the Kyoto School of Philosophy, the author offers the reader Tanabe's religious philosophy, but also, and for the first time, his ...

Intense interest has long been shown in the nature of humankind. Are we the products of genes? Are we the products of culture? Or are we something in between? The Marxist position, stressing the dominant significance of social methods for studying humans, is sketched. Then, a number of Western, biologically influenced views are discussed and criticised. Although there are important insights in the writings of the holders of these views, ultimately they produce only a semiscience.