There is no well-built theory on credit risk measurement and decision analysis for financial big data, and an effective and scientific evaluation system for them has not been formed. A review of them can contribute to grasping the abovementioned topics, understanding current issues, analyzing research problems, mastering research challenges, and predicting future research directions. Besides, this paper points out four research directions of credit risk measurement and decision analysis for financial big data. Moreover, this paper can provide some (...) guidance directions and insights for practitioners, researchers, financial institutions, and government departments who have an interest in complex decision-making in big data. (shrink)

Many studies claim to measure decision-making under risk by employing the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) scale, a self-report measure, or the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART), a behavioural task. However, these tasks do not measure decision-making under risk but decision-making under uncertainty, a related but distinct concept. The present commentary discusses both the theoretical and empirical basis of the distinction between uncertainty and risk from the viewpoint of several scientific disciplines and reports how many studies wrongfully (...) employ the DOSPERT scale and BART as risk-taking measures. Importantly, we call for proper distinguishing between (tasks measuring) decision-making under uncertainty and decision-making under risk in psychology and related fields. We believe this is vital as research has shown that people’s attitudes, behaviour, and brain activity differ between both concepts, indicating that confusing the concepts may lead researchers to erroneous conclusions. (shrink)

Decision-makers increasingly invoke equity to motivate, design, implement, and evaluate strategies for managing flood risks. But there is no objective definition of equity. This pluralistic setting calls for transparency about underlying values, but this practice is uncommon. Here, we review how equity is measured by surveying peer-reviewed publications that explicitly state an interest in equity in the context of flood-risk management. We develop a simple taxonomy for how transparent measurements can be defined. We map reviewed measurements to this taxonomy. (...) Finally, we offer guidance on how the pursuit of a clear and consistent quantitative evidence base about equity can become more widespread in flood-risk research and beyond. (shrink)

Ramsey (1926) sketches a proposal for measuring the subjective probabilities of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is an expected utility maximizer. I show how to extend the spirit of Ramsey's method to a strictly wider class of agents: risk-weighted expected utility maximizers (Buchak 2013). In particular, I show how we can measure the risk attitudes of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is a risk-weighted expected utility maximizer. Further, (...) we can leverage this method to measure the subjective probabilities of a risk-weighted expected utility maximizer. (shrink)

Quantitative health risk assessment is a procedure for estimating the likelihood that exposure to environmental contaminants will produce certain adverse health effects, most commonly cancer. One instance of its use has been a California air toxics public “right-to-know” law. This article examines the ways in which credible health risk measurements were produced and challenged during the implementation of the California public policy. Fieldwork and documentary analysis finds that stakeholders negotiated within the formal constraints of the risk assessment (...) procedures but still expressed their competing visions for the implementation of the risk communication policy. The abstract results of the method were contextualized according to different time frames and allocations of uncertainty. Furthermore, the article demonstrates that the political process privileged consistency of measurement over accuracy, revealing political negotiations at a fundamentally technical level. The struggle and variation in interpretations can be explained best by the demand to organize the program around the discordant values of democratic accountability and technical efficiency. (shrink)

The use of composite outcomes is becoming widespread in clinical trials. By combining individual outcome measures into a composite, researchers claim a composite can increase statistical precision and trial efficiency, expediting the trial by reducing sample size and cost, and consequently enabling researchers to answer questions that could not otherwise be answered. Another rationale given for using a composite is that it provides a measure of the net effect of the intervention that is more patient-relevant than any single outcome (...) measure. Critics, on the other hand, argue that the use of composites threatens the scientific objectivity of the trial by introducing new risks, and that in practice components are inconsistently defined, unreasonably combined, and inadequately reported. Philosophical scrutiny can help shed light in these disagreements and disentangle ethical and epistemological issues of composites in clinical trials. I examine common use of composites in cardiovascular trials, and show how composite results can be problematic, even misleading, if the proper range of scientific decisions and their consequences are ignored when judging the composite. Philosophies of science that are principled on normative versions of the argument from inductive risk can help explicate issues with composites. I conclude by suggesting ways of remedying composite issues in clinical trials. (shrink)

A commentary on “Were There ‘Additional Foreseeable Risks’ in the SUPPORT Study?,” by Henry J. Silverman and Didier Dreyfuss; “SUPPORT: Risks, Harms, and Equipoise,” by Robert M. Nelson; “The Controversy over SUPPORT Continues and the Hyperbole Increases,” by Alan R. Fleischman; and “SUPPORT and Comparative Effectiveness Trials: What's at Stake?,” by Lois Shepherd, all in the January‐February 2015 issue.

This paper proposes a new method of measuring excess risk of child mortality in cross-sectional surveys, which is applied to DHS I data for Burundi, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The expected child mortality experience is estimated for each mother on the basis of child's age, mother's age at child's birth and her parity, and compared with her observed experience. Mothers who exceed their expected child mortality experience and also had more than one child die are considered to have excess child (...) mortality. Zimbabwe had the greatest concentration of child deaths as measured by a simple ratio of mothers to deaths, but when observed experience was compared with expected it had less than half as many excess deaths as Uganda and Burundi. In all three countries mother's education had a strong negative association with the risk of excess child mortality, and in Zimbabwe and Burundi there were significant regional differences. (shrink)

The phenomenon of transnational families is a topical issue on the European Union's family policy agenda, especially in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals and the Europe 2020 Strategy. Romania, not only as a member state of the European Union, but also as a country directly affected by the scale of this phenomenon, must include in the public family policy the issue of transnational families and provide solutions for these families. Starting from the identification of the risk factors (...) faced by children whose parents are working abroad, the article proposes a critical analysis of existing programs and measures in national legislation aimed at preventing and combating the social exclusion of Romanian children from transnational families. The results of the SWOT analysis carried out indicate a number of shortcomings in covering the risk situations of these vulnerable children, the access to education and a good start in the life of these children being quite affected. The obtained results have implications at the level of decision-makers, helping to improve the efficiency of measures and programs for the left behind children and transnational Romanian families. (shrink)

Little is known about people’s perceived benefits and risks of sports, despite their role in shaping people’s intentions to engage in them. Here, we developed and tested a scale to measure perceived physical, emotional, cognitive, and social benefits as well as aggression-related risks of karate and football. Additionally, we compared these perceptions within and between these two sports, as well as among undergraduates with current/former participation in different types of physical activity. After a literature review, we created a 5-factor scale (...) with 20 items administered to 184 undergraduates, along with questions about physical activity participation. After removing five items, confirmatory factor analyses supported the factor structure of the scale. Factor loadings and reliability indices were acceptable, though less than desirable results were found concerning the average variance extracted of all benefits dimensions and the reliability of the social benefits dimension. Analyses of variance showed that: physical benefits were seen as the salient outcomes of karate and football, though martial artists perceived karate’s physical, emotional, and social benefits to the same extent; in comparison to football, karate was perceived to bring more emotional and cognitive benefits and to entail less aggressiveness risks; karate and football perceptions varied as a function of participant’s involvement in physical activity. This study presents a promising instrument to gather information on people’s perceptions about karate and football, which can be used to foster people’s engagement in them. (shrink)

Prevention of age-related disorders is increasingly in focus of health policies, and it is hoped that early intervention on processes of deterioration can promote healthier and longer lives. New opportunities to slow down the aging process are emerging with new fields such as personalized nutrition. Data-intensive research has the potential to improve the precision of existing risk factors, e.g., to replace coarse-grained markers such as blood cholesterol with more detailed multivariate biomarkers. In this paper, we follow an attempt to (...) develop a new aging biomarker. The vision among the project consortium, comprising both research and industrial partners, is that the new biomarker will be predictive of a range of age-related conditions, which may be preventable through personalized nutrition. We combine philosophical analysis and ethnographic fieldwork to explore the possibilities and challenges of managing aging through bodily signs that are not straightforwardly linked to symptomatic disease. We document how the improvement of measurement brings about new conceptual challenges of demarcating healthy and unhealthy states. Moreover, we highlight that the reframing of aging as risk has social and ethical implications, as it is generative of normative notions of what constitutes successful aging and good citizenship. (shrink)

Various experimental procedures aimed at measuring individual risk aversion involve a list of pairs of alternative prospects. We first study the widely used method by Holt and Laury :1644–1655, 2002), for which we find that the removal of some items from the lists yields a systematic decrease in risk aversion and scrambles the ranking of individuals by risk aversion. This bias, that we call embedding bias, is quite distinct from other confounds that have been previously observed in (...) the use of the HL method. It may be related to empirical phenomena and theoretical developments where better prospects increase risk aversion. Nevertheless, we also find that the more recent elicitation method due to Abdellaoui et al., also based on lists but using only one and the same probability in the list, does not display any statistically significant bias when the corresponding items of the list are removed. Our results suggest that methods other than the popular HL one may be preferable for the measurement of risk aversion. (shrink)

We compare two different elicitation methods for measuring risk attitudes on a sample of French farmers. We consider the lottery tasks initially proposed by Holt and Laury (Econ Rev 92:1644–1655, 2002) and by Eckel and Grossman (Evol Hum Behav 23:281–295, 2002; J Econ Behav Org 68:1–7, 2008). The main empirical result from this within-subject study is that risk preference measures are affected by the type of mechanism used. We first show that this risk preference instability can (...) be related to non-expected utility preferences of farmers. Using a risk-taking psychometric questionnaire, we then demonstrate that risk preferences of farmers are context-dependent. This may be another explanation of the observed risk preference instability. (shrink)

This article studies the stability of risk-preference during the COVID-19 pandemic. The results differ between risk-preference measurements and also men and women. We use March 13, 2020, when President Trump declared a national state of emergency as a time anchor to define the pre-pandemic and on-pandemic periods. The pre-pandemic experiment was conducted on February 21, 2020. There are three on-pandemic rounds conducted 10 days, 15 days, and 20 days after the COVID-19 emergency declaration. We include four different (...) class='Hi'>risk-preference measures. Men are more sensitive to the pandemic and become more risk-averse based on the Balloon Analogue Risk Task. Women become more risk-averse in the Social and Experience Seeking domains based on the results from the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking and Sensation Seeking Scales. Both men's and women's risk-preference are stable during COVID-19 based on a Gamble Choice task. The results match our hypotheses which are based on the discussion about whether the psychological construct of risk-preference is general or domain-specific. The differential outcomes between incentivized behavioral and self-reported propensity measures of risk-preference in our experiment show the caveats for studies using a single measure to test risk-preference changes during COVID-19. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to validate the Polish adaptation of the Treatment Self-Regulation Questionnaire, which measures the degree of self-determination in risk behaviour changes. The study comprised 219 patients, beginning to undergo treatment. The Global Motivation Scale was used to test a convergent validity. The confirmatory factor analysis did not support the theoretical four-factor model, thus an exploratory analysis was conducted to determine an optimal model across risk behaviours. The adopted two-factor model matched original TSRQ (...) subscales: autonomous motivation and external regulation. The internal consistency of factors ranging from.78 to.89. Structural equation modeling revealed the impact of global motivation on contextual motivation, limited to the equivalent type of regulation. The action aimed at supporting patient’s autonomy should consider the particular behaviour and the global motivation as a resource in disease. (shrink)

How much does rationality constrain what we should believe on the basis of our evidence? According to this book, not very much. For most people and most bodies of evidence, there is a wide range of beliefs that rationality permits them to have in response to that evidence. The argument, which takes inspiration from William James' ideas in 'The Will to Believe', proceeds from two premises. The first is a theory about the basis of epistemic rationality. It's called epistemic utility (...) theory, and it says that what it is epistemically rational for you to believe is what it would be rational for you to choose if you were given the chance to pick your beliefs and, when picking them, you were to care only about their epistemic value. So, to say which beliefs are permitted, we must say how to measure epistemic value, and which decision rule to use when picking your beliefs. The second premise is a claim about attitudes to epistemic risk, and it says that rationality permits many different such attitudes. These attitudes can show up in epistemic utility theory in two ways: in the way you measure epistemic value; and in the decision rule you use to pick beliefs. This book explores the latter. The result is permissivism about epistemic rationality: different attitudes to epistemic risk lead to different choices of prior beliefs; given most bodies of evidence, different priors lead to different posteriors; and even once we fix your attitudes to epistemic risk, if they are at all risk-inclined, there is a range of different priors and therefore different posteriors they permit. (shrink)

I argue that university supervisors should not use student evaluations of teachers (SETs) as a measure of teaching effectiveness in personnel assessments because the evidence suggests SETs likely violate several duties university supervisors have toward their instructional employees. I focus on the duty to not knowingly impose a wrongful risk of harm on nonconsenting and innocent others. Many university employers impose a wrongful risk of harm on instructors by not using relevant, merit-based performance indicators that have adequate construct (...) validity, by using uncorrected indicators that likely perpetuate discrimination, and by incentivizing instructors to do wrong. The use of SETs imposes unjust risk of harm on all instructors, but the risk is higher for women, minorities, and those in precarious, teaching-focused roles. In conclusion, I tentatively suggest some other means of evaluating student learning and assessing instructors. (shrink)

There is a strong impetus in international agricultural development to close ‘gender gaps’ in agricultural productivity. The goal of empowering women is often framed as the solution to closing these gaps, stimulating the proliferation of new indicators and instruments for the targeting, measurement, and tracking of programmatic goals in research for agricultural development. Despite these advances, current measurements and indices remain too simplified in terms of unit and scope of analysis, as well as being fundamentally flawed in how they aim (...) to capture the relevance of ‘gender’ in diverse local contexts. We propose that the impulse to apply exogenously defined and weakly validated ‘women’s empowerment’ measures to diverse local contexts risks prioritizing practical expedience over scientific accuracy and societal relevance. Furthermore, the application of such measures risks creating the impression that programmatic “gender targets” are being achieved, while simultaneously undermining substantive gender transformative goals. The authors conclude that a different methodological approach grounded in participatory and qualitative methods is needed to create more meaningful metrics for assessing progress towards women’s empowerment. (shrink)

With the ascent of modern epidemiology in the Twentieth Century came a new standard model of prediction in public health and clinical medicine. In this article, we describe the structure of the model. The standard model uses epidemiological measures-most commonly, risk measures-to predict outcomes (prognosis) and effect sizes (treatment) in a patient population that can then be transformed into probabilities for individual patients. In the first step, a risk measure in a study population is generalized or (...) extrapolated to a target population. In the second step, the risk measure is particularized or transformed to yield probabilistic information relevant to a patient from the target population. Hence, we call the approach the Risk Generalization-Particularization (Risk GP) Model. There are serious problems at both stages, especially with the extent to which the required assumptions will hold and the extent to which we have evidence for the assumptions. Given that there are other models of prediction that use different assumptions, we should not inflexibly commit ourselves to one standard model. Instead, model pluralism should be standard in medical prediction. (shrink)

Suicide is considered a global public health issue and compulsory admission is a commonly used measure to prevent suicide. However, the practice has been criticised since several studies indicate that the measure lacks empirical support and may even increase suicide risk. This paper investigates whether the practice has enough empirical support to be considered proportionate. To that end, arguments supporting compulsory admission as a suicide-preventive measure for most suicidal patients are scrutinized. The ethical point of departure is that the (...) expected benefits of compulsory admission should outweigh the potential harms of the measure to be proportionate and defensible. It is concluded that, for most suicidal patients, suicide-preventive compulsory admission cannot be presumed to be a proportionate measure. To be so, the expected medical benefits of the measure should be greater than the potential increase in suicide risk and other harms that compulsory admission could entail. Instead of using compulsory admission as a suicide-preventive measure, extra safety measures may be needed during and after compulsory admission to prevent the risk of hospitalisation-induced suicide. (shrink)

Measuring the effectiveness of medical interventions faces three epistemological challenges: the choice of good measuring instruments, the use of appropriate analytic measures, and the use of a reliable method of extrapolating measures from an experimental context to a more general context. In practice each of these challenges contributes to overestimating the effectiveness of medical interventions. These challenges suggest the need for corrective normative principles. The instruments employed in clinical research should measure patient-relevant and disease-specific parameters, and should not (...) be sensitive to parameters that are only indirectly relevant. Effectiveness always should be measured and reported in absolute terms (using measures such as 'absolute risk reduction'), and only sometimes should effectiveness also be measured and reported in relative terms (using measures such as 'relative risk reduction')-employment of relative measures promotes an informal fallacy akin to the base-rate fallacy, which can be exploited to exaggerate claims of effectiveness. Finally, extrapolating from research settings to clinical settings should more rigorously take into account possible ways in which the intervention in question can fail to be effective in a target population. (shrink)

Prospect theory emerged as one of the leading descriptive decision theories that can rationalize a large body of behavioral regularities. The methods for eliciting prospect theory parameters, such as its value function and probability weighting, are invaluable tools in decision analysis. This paper presents a new simple method for eliciting prospect theory’s value function without any auxiliary/simplifying parametric assumptions. The method is applicable both to choice under ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty) and risk (when events are characterized by objective probabilities). Our (...) new elicitation method is implemented in a simple paper-and-pencil experiment (via an iterative multiple price list format). This is one of the first experiments that elicits non-parametric prospect theory’s value function with salient rewards. The collected data generally confirm findings in the existing literature: the value function is S-shaped (concave in the gain domain and convex in the loss domain) though there is a weaker loss aversion on the aggregate level and a substantial heterogeneity in loss aversion on the individual level (41% loss averse, 6% loss neutral and 53% gain seeking). (shrink)

Aim: Streamlining consent for low-risk comparative effectiveness research (CER) could facilitate research, while safeguarding patients' rights. Materials & methods: 2618 adults were randomized to one of seven consent approaches (six streamlined and one traditional) for a hypothetical, low-risk CER study. A survey measured understanding, voluntariness, and feelings of respect. Results: Participants in all arms had a high understanding of the trial and positive attitudes toward the consent interaction. Highest satisfaction was with a streamlined approach showing a video before (...) the medical appointment. Participants in streamlined were more likely to mistakenly think a signature was required. Conclusion: Streamlined consent was no less acceptable than traditional, signed consent. Streamlined and traditional approaches achieved similar levels of understanding, voluntariness and a feeling that the doctor–patient interaction was respectful. (shrink)

It is argued that the standard way that the criminal justice debate regarding the permissible extent of wrongful convictions is cast is fundamentally flawed. In particular, it is claimed that there is an inherent danger in focussing our attention in this debate on different ways of measuring the probabilistic likelihood of wrongful conviction and then evaluating whether these probabilities are unacceptably high. This is because such probabilistic measures are clumsy ways of capturing the level of risk involved, to (...) the extent that a defendant can be subject to an unacceptably high level of legal risk in this regard even where the relevant probabilities are very low. An alternative conception of legal risk – one that is primarily cast along modal rather than probabilistic lines – is set out which offers a much better way of framing the debate regarding what would be an acceptable level of wrongful conviction. It is further argued that with this modal conception of legal risk in play we can capture an important necessary condition that should be imposed on legal evidence, one that has application beyond the context of the criminal trial. (shrink)

Parfit advertised the priority view as a new and fundamental theory in the ethics of distribution. He never discusses risk, and many writers follow suit when discussing the priority view. This article formalizes two popular arguments for a commonly accepted risk-free definition of the priority view. One is based on a direct attempt to define the priority view, the other is based on a contrast with utilitarianism and egalitarianism. But neither argument succeeds, and more generally, it is not (...) possible to make sense of the priority view in a risk-free framework. The article pays particular attention to the proper role of evaluative measurements in theorizing about the ethics of distribution. Despite appearances, approaching the priority view in terms of risk from the outset is argued to be quite natural. (shrink)

The risks of materials containing nanoscale components are in the public debate discussed as if a manufactured nanomaterial will remain invariant with time and environmental exposure, and as if we can identify its risks by the risks of its nanoscale components. Additionally, the debate on mitigation of specific nanorisks by new legislation implicitly assumes that we can have full and accurate knowledge of the distribution and composition of nanomaterials in a product or the environment. In this discussion note, I argue (...) that physical laws intrinsic to the behavior of nanoparticles both lead to limits on the risks to which we are likely exposed and on our technological ability to verify compliance with new regulations. My conclusion is that governmental actors should be careful not to overreact in their response to a technological revolution that only in few areas is likely to lead to increased public exposure, and in doing so using legal measures for which compliance cannot be monitored. (shrink)

Research highlights several risk and resilience factors at multiple ecological levels that influence individuals’ mental health and wellbeing in their everyday lives and, more specifically, in disaster or outbreak situations. However, there is limited research on the role of these factors in the early days of the COVID-19 crisis. The present study examined if and how potential risk factors and resilience factors are associated with mental health and well-being outcomes, and whether these resilience factors buffer the associations between (...) risk factors and said outcomes. One to two weeks after the government recommended preventative measures, 1,122 Canadian workers completed an online questionnaire, including multiple wellbeing outcome scales in addition to measures of potential risk and resilience factors. Structural equation models were tested, highlighting that overall, the considered risk factors were associated with poorer wellbeing outcomes, except social distancing which was associated with lower levels of stress. Each of the potential resilience factors was found to have a main effect on one or more of the wellbeing outcomes. Moderation analysis indicated that in general these resilience factors did not, however, buffer the risk factors. The findings confirm that the COVID-19 crisis encompasses several stressors related to the virus as well as to its impact on one’s social, occupational, and financial situation, which put people at risk for lower wellbeing as early as one to two weeks after the crisis began. While several resilience factors emerged as positively related to wellbeing, such factors may not be enough, or sufficiently activated at that time, to buffer the effects of the numerous life changes required by COVID-19. From an ecological perspective, while mental health professionals and public health decision-makers should offer/design services directly focused on mental health and wellbeing, it is important they go beyond celebrating individuals’ inner potential for resilience, and also support individuals in activating their environmental resources during a pandemic. (shrink)

The current study provides data about the immediate risk perceptions and psychological effects of the COVID-19 pandemic among Italian participants. A sample of 1034 volunteers answered a web-based survey which aimed to investigate the many facets of risk perceptions connected to COVID-19 (health, work, economy, social and psychological), and risk-related variables such as knowledge, news seeking, perceived control, efficacy of containment measures, and affective states. Socio-demographic characteristics were also collected. Results showed that although levels of general (...) concern are relatively high among Italians, risk perceptions are highest with regards to the economy and work, and lowest concerning health. Cognitive and affective risk-related variables affected the several risk perception domains differently. COVID-19 knowledge did not affect any risk perception while the perceived control decreased health risk likelihood. The other risk-related variables amplified risk perceptions: News seeking increased work-economy risk; efficacy of containment measures increased all perceived risks; negative affective states of fear, anger and sadness increased health and psycho-social risks; anxiety increased only health risk, and uncertainty increased work-economy and psycho-social risk perceptions. Finally, positive affective states increased health risk perception. Socio-psychological implications are discussed. (shrink)

One of the central problems concerning research with children is the delineation of appropriate levels of risk exposure. In the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, the "minimal risk" concept serves as an anchoring measure for allowable risk. While the regulations sought to promote a balance between scientific advances and the protection of children's vulnerable status, ambiguities in the language of the regulations and the regulatory definition of "minimal risk" have given rise to a great deal of (...) confusion. Research ethics boards and the medical community espouse a multitude of varying opinions regarding the interpretation and application of the federal regulations with more recent research demonstrating an apparent increase in risk without corresponding benefit in pediatric research. Informed by ethical theory, law, and science, this project analyzes the apparent increase in allowable risk, calls for a reassessment of the concept of "minimal risk," and recommends modifications to the federal regulations. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders in the context of a shareholder risk model. We first differentiate shareholders and nonshareholders with regard to the nature of their risks, their awareness of risks, their abilities to avoid risk, and their abilities to ensure compensation for risk. We then develop a model of measuring the risks facing stakeholders that addresses human risk magnitude and environmental risk magnitude. We conclude with implications for theory and (...) practice. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders in the context of a shareholder risk model. We first differentiate shareholders and nonshareholders with regard to the nature of their risks, their awareness of risks, their abilities to avoid risk, and their abilities to ensure compensation for risk. We then develop a model of measuring the risks facing stakeholders that addresses human risk magnitude and environmental risk magnitude. We conclude with implications for theory and (...) practice. (shrink)

The orthodox theory of instrumental rationality, expected utility (EU) theory, severely restricts the way in which risk-considerations can figure into a rational individual's preferences. It is argued here that this is because EU theory neglects an important component of instrumental rationality. This paper presents a more general theory of decision-making, risk-weighted expected utility (REU) theory, of which expected utility maximization is a special case. According to REU theory, the weight that each outcome gets in decision-making is not the (...) subjective probability of that outcome; rather, the weight each outcome gets depends on both its subjective probability and its position in the gamble. Furthermore, the individual's utility function, her subjective probability function, and a function that measures her attitude towards risk can be separately derived from her preferences via a Representation Theorem. This theorem illuminates the role that each of these entities plays in preferences, and shows how REU theory explicates the components of instrumental rationality. (shrink)

From what norms does the ethics of belief derive its oughts, its attributions of virtues and vices, responsibilities and irresponsibilities, its permissioning and censuring? Since my inductive risk account is inspired by pragmatism, and this method understands epistemology as the theory of inquiry, the paper will try to explain what the aims and tasks are for an ethics of belief, or project of guidance, which best fits with this understanding of epistemology. More specifically, this chapter approaches the ethics of (...) belief from a focus on responsible risk management, where doxastic responsibility is understood in terms of the degree of riskiness of agents’ doxastic strategies, a riskiness which is in turn most objectively measured through accordance or violation of inductive norms. Doxastic responsibility is attributable to agents on the basis of how epistemically risky was the process or strategy of inquiry salient in the etiology of their belief or in their maintenance of what one believes or accepts. (shrink)

We argue that, from the point of view public health ethics, vaccination is significantly analogous to seat belt use in motor vehicles and that coercive vaccination policies are ethically justified for the same reasons why coercive seat belt laws are ethically justified. We start by taking seriously the small risk of vaccines’ side effects and the fact that such risks might need to be coercively imposed on individuals. If millions of individuals are vaccinated, even a very small risk (...) of serious side effects implies that, statistically, at some point side effects will occur. Imposing such risks raises issues about individual freedom to decide what risks to take on oneself or on one’s children and about attribution of responsibility in case of adverse side effects. Seat belt requirements raise many of the same ethical issues as vaccination requirements, and seat belt laws initially encountered some opposition from the public that is very similar to some of the current opposition to vaccine mandates. The analogy suggests that the risks of vaccines do not constitute strong enough reasons against coercive vaccination policies and that the same reasons that justify compulsory seat belt use—a measure now widely accepted and endorsed—also justify coercive vaccination policies. (shrink)