In spite of these efforts in the 1920s and 1930s to initiate ongoing research on contraception, the subject of birth control remained a problem of concern primarily to the social activist rather than to the research scientist or practicing physician.80 In the 1930s, as has been shown, American scientists turned to the study of other aspects of reproductive physiology, while American physicians, anxious to eliminate the moral and medical dangers of contraception, only reluctantly accepted birth control as falling within their (...) professional domain.As a result, the problem of cheap, effective, and safe contraception was not solved by these earliest attempts. Consideration of the subject was initiated afresh by private philanthropy after World War II, sparked by a new wave of interest in population studies.81 Summarizing such efforts to support research in the reproductive sciences, a recent Ford Foundation study has noted: “To initiate and sustain serious research in the reproductive sciences has required for more than half a century concerted effort by interested individuals and private organizations, mainly from outside the mainstreams of the biomedical research community.”82The early laboratory research on chemical contraception described in this paper was but one important outcome of the concerted effort made by reformers in the 1920s to eliminate a variety of social problems thought to derive from excessive fertility. Scientific arguments and expertise were employed to advocate reform as well as to define the appropriate solution to such social problems. Scientists were recruited as advocates for the movement, but they were also employed as researchers in laboratory investigations sponsored by these same reformers.Sponsors of these early laboratory studies noted the difficulty of obtaining first-class investigators.83 The routine analyses necessary for such research, as well as the traditional scientific aversion to applied problems, provide only a partial explanation for this response. The real difficulty lay in recruiting investigators to a field that had previously been taboo. Once opened up — first as socially relevant, and finally as scientifically sound — there was much interest in this area, and the appeal to researchers of the scientific issues surrounding fertility and reproduction soon surpassed that of the reforming value of birth control.A survey of the kinds of experimental investigations sponsored by birth control advocates indicates the range of physiological problems explored by contraceptive research. The most definitive work was done on the efficacy and safety of spermicides, but the potential of other contraceptive methods was also examined. Investigators attempted to develop spermatoxins that would effectively immunize women against sperm, and they also tried to elucidate the mechanism of hormonal control of reproduction. In fact, speculations about the possible hormonal manipulation of fertility were expressed at the Seventh International Birth Control Conference held in Zurich in 1930.84In the 1920s, clinical studies were undertaken to assess the effectiveness of the various birth control methods. Laboratory investigators complemented this work by screening spermicides for safety and testing for their ability to kill sperm. There were a variety of birth control preparations on the market, but no one really knew whether these were effective or even safe.85 Although the physiology of other major organ systems was well advanced, the scientific study of reproductive physiology and contraceptive technology was clearly in its infancy in this period. Routine analyses simply could not be conducted, because the fundamental research establishing baselines had not yet been done. Scientists used this fact to redirect attention to basic research on reproduction.Laboratory research on contraception indicated important unexplored areas for physiological investigation. Social activists, who had encouraged prominent scientists to become interested in both the social value and the genetic implications of birth control, found these investigators revising the goals of their research. The biologists had formed their own network and had begun to seek out funding, reformulating the justification for sponsorship of further investigations. The eugenic motivations underlying these studies, which had initially made them theoretically attractive to biologists, were gradually eroded. Concern with “human evolution” ceded its place to interest in physiological mechanisms. Crew and others began to note that the use of biological theory to justify essentially political decisions had serious limitations. Biologists had become uncomfortable with those very arguments which had originally captured their interest. Recognition of the potential political abuse wrought by applying scientific principles to society was expressed by Crew just one year after the Zurich meeting. Referring to previous assessments of the role of sex in reproduction, he generalized: “In the past the biologist has justified feudalism, Manchester Liberalism, socialism and every other type of social organization and political programme by reference to selected biological phenomena.”86 By 1932 Crew had also begun to question the biological logic of regulated breeding, and had made it clear to his American sponsor that there was no simple correspondence between the practice of birth control and the genetic improvement of the human race.87Biologists further began to recognize, however, that although the hopeful genetic solution to human problems was probably an illusion, contraception still remained one tangible means to alleviate, human misery. Some laboratory scientists, like Crew, acknowledged the applicability of their own particular skills to this problem. For a few brief years, social needs and scientific goals were mutually supportive and closely intertwined. But as laboratory researchers gained interest in the study of reproduction and established their own priorities in this field, they temporarily withdrew from the arena of debate over birth control as an important mechanism for social reform.With the rise of Hitler, the genetic arguments for birth control rapidly lost their appeal. But by that time the scientific problem of how to achieve effective contraception had entered the professional consciousness. Both physicians and scientists began to be aware of birth control as a subject within their domain of expertise, although outside the principal focus of their research. Scientific discussion of birth control permanently altered from a question of justification to a problem of method: How could one achieve reliable and safe contraception? This had been Sanger's and Dickinson's goal from the beginning. Laboratory scientists had indeed been persuaded to undertake this work; this research had in turn affected biologists' perceptions of the whole field of reproductive physiology, encouraging further study of reproductive mechanisms. The promise of new knowledge provided for continued funding of this research, despite the caution by scientists that the social benefits would not be as immediate or as far-reaching as advocates and they themselves had first argued.The activities of birth control activists and their supporting agencies, and the financial backing of private contributors and foundations, notably the Rockefeller philanthropies, provided an important new stimulus to the development of research on the biology of reproduction in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Biologists were able to claim an enlarged realm of issues for scientific study through their activities as advocates and as investigators for the birth control movement. At the same time, they promised as-yet-undiscovered possibilities for regulating human reproduction once its physiology was understood. The knowledge and control that they promised lay in understanding the whole reproductive cycle — not merely in evaluating the toxic effects of presumptive spermicides.Chemical spermicides never summoned the interest of scientists as the contraceptive pill was to do, yet that research did reinforce the widespread perceptions of scientific research as essential to social reform. Spermicide investigations focused research efforts in reproductive biology by challenging traditional taboos, defining problems for further study, and providing laboratory investigators the opportunity to assert the social and scientific value of their own skills. Crew echoed this attitude as he observed in 1934:Man has turned from the adventurous conquest of his environment to the conquest of himself. To-day is the day of biological invention, eagerly used for the control of the undesirable and the unwanted. Sex and reproduction are no longer hedged around by myth and taboo; they are no longer accepted as mysteries that defy understanding. They are matters inviting examination and explanation; they are regarded as expressions of physico-chemical forces, the nature of which is to be displayed. It is accepted that when knowledge is sufficient, control will be absolute, and, though knowledge is not yet sufficient, readers... must be persuaded to the view that this will not always be so.88The synergism between reproductive biology and social needs has been temporary and sporadic, but recurring, since the 1920s. Scientific research programs have clearly been influenced by issues raised by public debate. Nevertheless, reproductive biologists have continued to assert their own professional goals. For the most part, they have rejected problems without inherent scientific interest and have spurned applied research except as it has had a direct bearing on current research themes. This attitude, apparent among American and British investigators in the 1930s, created the intellectual context for the invention and acceptance of the technically sophisticated oral contraceptive pill. It did not foster the production and improvement of the simple, safe, effective, and cheap vaginal contraceptive desired by early birth control advocates. (shrink)

Philosophers and historians of biology have argued that genes are conceptualized differently in different fields of biology and that these differences influence both the conduct of research and the interpretation of research by audiences outside the field in which the research was conducted. In this paper we report the results of a questionnaire study of how genes are conceptualized by biological scientists at the University of Sydney, Australia. The results provide tentative support for some hypotheses about conceptual differences between different (...) fields of biological research. (shrink)

Stereological techniques allow biologists to create quantitative, three-dimensional descriptions of biological structures from two- dimensional images of tissue viewed under the microscope. For example, they can accurately estimate the size of a particular organelle, the total length of a mass of capillaries, or the number of neurons or synapses in a particular region of the brain. This book provides a practical guide to designing and critically evaluating stereological studies of the nervous system and other tissues. It explains the basic concepts (...) behind design-based stereology and how to get started. Also included are detailed descriptions of how to prepare tissue appropriately, perform pilot studies and decide on the appropriate sampling strategy, and account for phenomena such as tissue shrinkage. Numerous examples of applications of stereological methods that are applicable to studies of the central system and a wide variety of other tissues are explained. The book is therefore essential reading for neurobiologists and cell biologists interested in generating accurate representations of cell and tissue architecture. (shrink)

Philosophers and historians of biology have argued that genes are conceptualized differently in different fields of biology and that these differences influence both the conduct of research and the interpretation of research by audiences outside the field in which the research was conducted. In this paper we report the results of a questionnaire study of how genes are conceptualized by biological scientists at the University of Sydney, Australia. The results provide tentative support for some hypotheses about conceptual differences between different (...) fields of biological research. (shrink)

In his recently published seminar Life Death (1975–76), Derrida engages in a close reading of Heidegger's refutation of the biologistic interpretation of Nietzsche. Derrida explains that, building on his interpretation of Nietzsche as the peak of metaphysics, Heidegger wishes to rescue the latter's metaphysical discourse from its biologizing character. In this article, I argue that Derrida's reading centres on the ontological regionalism undergirding Heidegger's refutation. To develop this argument, I test the following three hypotheses. First, I show that the later (...) exploration offered in Life Death draws on the schematic reading of Heidegger's question of being provided in Of Grammatology (1967). Second, I explain that, for Derrida, through his refutation of Nietzsche's supposed biologism, Heidegger reaffirms ontological regionalism in order to secure the whole interpretative system that interweaves together his reading of Nietzsche and Western metaphysics and his thinking of being. Finally, I highlight Derrida's emphasis on the relentlessness of Heidegger's denunciation of biologism. I demonstrate that, for Derrida, this can be explained as biology, which is a discourse on life and nature that since its beginnings touches on the blind point of regionalism. (shrink)

Conservation biology is a discipline with the explicit goal of protecting species from extinction. We examine how conservation biologists represent at-risk species, how they navigate values and ethical tensions in the discipline, and how they might be more effective in reaching conservation goals. While these topics are discussed in the literature, we offer a unique empirical examination of how individuals perceive and perform conservation work. We conducted 29 interviews with conservation biologists and found that most respondents viewed their work as (...) providing information but also felt that other species have intrinsic value and we should extend our ethical standards to include other species. However, many attempted to separate science from values, and some felt it was necessary to hide their values and ethical positions and avoid advocacy. While conservation biologists navigate these tensions differently, those who engage in advocacy will likely be more effective in reaching conservation goals. Current societal values and views on ethical extension, rather than a lack of science, represent the most significant impediment to addressing the extinction crisis. (shrink)

A revised and enlarged version of Biologen unter Hitler, translated by Thomas Dunlap.

An examination of the currently fashionable thesis that scientists, and especially biologists in the wake of the Darwinian Revolution, can now solve the problems that traditional philosophers have only talked about. Past philosophers, for example during the Enlightenment, have themselves made use of contemporary, scientific techniques and theories. The present claim may only be another such move, to be welcomed by philosophers who would distinguish themselves from rhetoricians. Others may prefer to stake out the merely human or subjective world as (...) their field, identifying 'truth' with 'what it's better to believe'. Both moderns and postmoderns must abandon the rational realism that actually sustained Enlightenment endeavours, and Darwinian explanation, on its own, must erode traditional ethical values and the meta-ethical assumptions that sustain them. Universal humanism is only one possible project among many - and Darwinian reasonings suggest that it is hypocritical. In this crisis there may after all be a rôle for traditional, Platonizing philosophers, believing that there is a truth, and that we can find it out. Such a theory is actually better able to explain our scientific successes, and our evolutionary past. (shrink)

Physicists, chemists and geologists in the USA and Europe propose that the search for extraterrestrial life is an important justification for the exploration of Mars. Biologists, however, much more excited by the advent of the postgenome sequencing era, in general display little enthusiasm for planetary exploration. We argue that the search for traces of life on Mars represents a major thought‐provoking challenge for the life sciences that should be taken up by the biological community. BioEssays 23:977–978, 2001. © 2001 John (...) Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

Four theoretical monographs, written by biologists in the wake of the sociobiology debate, and which treat, or purport to treat, the topic of sociocultural evolution are examined in this paper. On the biosocial spectrum they range from Trivers' pure sociobiology, to Lumsden and Wilson's sociobiology "in drag," to Boyd and Richerson's genuinely dual approach, to Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman's purely cultural transmission and evolution. The latter is likely to prove of greatest interest to social scientists and represents a major advance in (...) theorizing mathematically about social change. While the most comprehensive, Boyd and Richerson's "dual inheritance" model ultimately places more emphasis on the biological evolution of the capacity for culture than on genuine gene/culture coevolution even though it is conceivable that cultural transmission and evolution could be providing the selective force responsible for some fundamental biological phenomena such as sexual reproduction in long-lived vertebrates for example. The relationship between contemporary evolutionary and non-evolutionary theories of social change is not dealt with here but the former are very relevant to the latter because evolutionists believe they have available sophisticated solutions to problems which continue to plague other theoretical traditions. (shrink)

The article considers historical and actual aspects of social biologism. The historical aspects of biologism should help to describe the social content and quasi-scientific basis of socio-biologistic ideas in the contemporary world. The author shows the connections between many forms of socio-biologistic discourses and the structure of social relations. He proves that ideas of social biologism function as an ideological justification for different phenomena of social inequality, but at the same time they formulate a condition for its (...) material reproduction. The connection between sociobiologistic ideology and practice is shown by the examples of the main historical forms which social biologism took in the 19th century. These examples include colonial racism, class-racism, anti-Semitism, and psychiatric biologism. (shrink)

We characterize a type of functional explanation that addresses why a homologous trait originating deep in the evolutionary history of a group remains widespread and largely unchanged across the group’s lineages. We argue that biologists regularly provide this type of explanation when they attribute conserved functions to phenotypic and genetic traits. The concept of conserved function applies broadly to many biological domains, and we illustrate its importance using examples of molecular sequence alignments at the intersection of evolution and cell biology. (...) We use these examples to show how the study of conserved functions can integrate knowledge of a trait’s causal effects on fitness and its history of natural selection without invoking adaptation. We also show how conserved function provides a novel basis for addressing objections against evolutionary functions raised by Robert Cummins. (shrink)

This paper is the result of the research I undertook at Lancaster University with a Marie Curie Fellowship during the academic years 2000‐2002. The objective of this research was to study the limits and the challenges of the analogy between molecular geneticists’ work and hackers’ activities. By focusing on this analogy I aim to explore the different ethical and philosophical issues surrounding new genetics and its IPR regulations. The paper firstly will show the philosophical background lying behind the proposed analogy (...) and analyses the sense in which we can talk of geneticists as “hackers.” It will provide grounds for the analogy by exploring some of the techniques used by geneticists; in particular it will focus on the so‐called Shotgun method for genomic sequencing. After having provided reasons for the proposed analogy I will claim that the open source philosophy used in the computer field would be a good way to regulate research in the genetics and in pharmaceutical field too. The open source philosophy would provide fair distribution of research opportunities around the globe with the shift from patenting to copyright in sensitive fields such as genetics. (shrink)

Biologists rely on theories, apply models and construct explanations, but rarely reflect on their nature and structure. This book introduces key topics in philosophy of science to provide the required philosophical background for this kind of reflection, which is an important part of all aspects of research and communication in biology. It concisely and accessibly addresses fundamental questions such as: Why should biologists care about philosophy of science? How do concepts contribute to scientific advancement? What is the nature of scientific (...) controversies in the biological sciences? Chapters draw on contemporary examples and case studies from across biology, making the discussion relevant and insightful. Written for researchers and advanced undergraduate and graduate students across the life sciences, its aim is to encourage readers to become more philosophically minded and informed to enable better scientific practice. It is also an interesting and pertinent read for philosophers of science. (shrink)

Biologists and historians often present natural history and molecular biology as distinct, perhaps conflicting, fields in biological research. Such accounts, although supported by abundant evidence, overlook important areas of overlap between these areas. Focusing upon examples drawn particularly from systematics and molecular evolution, I argue that naturalists and molecular biologists often share questions, methods, and forms of explanation. Acknowledging these interdisciplinary efforts provides a more balanced account of the development of biology during the post-World War II era.

Abstract.In recent issues of Zygon, numerous reflections have been published commenting on where the field of science‐and‐religion has been, where it presently stands, and where it should move in the future. These reflections touch on the importance of the dialogue and raise questions as to what audience the dialogue addresses and whom it should address. Some scholars see the dialogue as prospering, while others point out that much work needs to be done to make the dialogue more accessible to a (...) larger audience and more successful at tackling the provocative questions before us. Other academics view the questions themselves as needing further consideration and focus before answers to them can even be explored. In this article I provide a general overview of these essays by outlining some general categories of thought that seem to emerge from the contributors. I then present some of my own opinions concerning the future of the science‐religion field and emphasize that the dialogue, in addition to its traditional roles, must further the philosophical framework that can aid humanity in resolving the most pressing global concerns of our time. (shrink)

Abstract.In recent issues of Zygon, numerous reflections have been published commenting on where the field of science‐and‐religion has been, where it presently stands, and where it should move in the future. These reflections touch on the importance of the dialogue and raise questions as to what audience the dialogue addresses and whom it should address. Some scholars see the dialogue as prospering, while others point out that much work needs to be done to make the dialogue more accessible to a (...) larger audience and more successful at tackling the provocative questions before us. Other academics view the questions themselves as needing further consideration and focus before answers to them can even be explored. In this article I provide a general overview of these essays by outlining some general categories of thought that seem to emerge from the contributors. I then present some of my own opinions concerning the future of the science‐religion field and emphasize that the dialogue, in addition to its traditional roles, must further the philosophical framework that can aid humanity in resolving the most pressing global concerns of our time. (shrink)

In a move that has puzzled commentators, Derrida's The Animal that Therefore I Am rejects claims for continuity between the human and the animal, aligning such claims with the ideology of “biologistic continuism.” This problematization of the logic of the human-animal limit holds implications for how we are to understand life in relation to auto-affection, immanence in relation to transcendence, and naturalism in relation to phenomenology. Derrida's abyssal logic parallels the “strange kinship” described by Merleau-Ponty, though only if this strangeness (...) is intensified as “hetero-affection” by incorporating death into life. Following Merleau-Ponty and Elizabeth Grosz, we locate the creative moment of this abyssal intimacy in the transformative productions of sexual difference. This positive account of the excess of hetero-affection reconciles phenomenology with evolution and offers a figure for thinking the thickening and multiplying of the differences between human and non-human, living and nonliving, corporeal and cosmic. (shrink)

Throughout, this book questions our accepted definitions and biases, showing the self-reflective nature of scientific activity within society.

This note discusses the importance of Natural History (biology) in the development of Aristotle philosophy and scientific outlook, and so the importance of considering Aristotle's philosophy as a necessary and useful background for contemporary biology.

This paper investigated the part played by collaborative practices in chaneling the work of prominent biochemists into the development of molecular biology. The RNA collaborative network that emerged in the 1960s in France encompassed a continuum of activities that linked laboratories to policy-making centers. New institutional frameworks such as the DGRST committees were instrumental in establishing new patterns of funding, and in offering arenas for multidisciplinary debates and boundary assessment. It should be stressed however, that although this collaborative network was (...) based on centralized initiatives aimed at developing molecular biology as a new biological specialty, it operated above all as a nexus of practices. The main argument of this paper is that the central allocation of funds and resources, exemplified by the DGRST operation, actually enhanced the creation of a self-conscious community of biochemists turned molecular biologists by virtue of an increased circulation of tools, skills, and results that took place within the RNA network and a few analogous systems of exchange.Having hands on “things” viewed as identical for all practical purposes was a potent factor in changing the experimental systems and their meanings. Limited but shared means of doing helped to reduce uncertainties, change representations, and turn contingent decisions into meaningful choices. The collaborative enterprises then resulted in personal contacts and the transfer of skills and materials, which gradually incorporated the biochemical tools into systems producing facts relevant to molecular biology as defined by its early practitioners. In that sense, networking was a regulatory process that stabilized new research objects and acculturated French biochemists.The mere existence of such a collaborative network also changed the scale of the disciplining process. Collaborations may have been started for contingent motives, but multiple exchanges resulted in the emergence of a new collective, and amplified small displacements. Collaborations, however, worked both ways, and the RNA network may be viewed as an efficient “trading-post.” An unexpected outcome of the development of a conversion zone is the fact that, by the late 1960s, the former biochemists dominated the “new” world of molecular biology — both in terms of research habits, since interests in structural studies dominated the field, and in terms of institutional initiatives such as the creation of laboratories and institutes for molecular biology.As an example of the cognitive displacements achieved by the network, I have focused here on the stabilization of “messenger RNA” as a new biological entity. This process illustrates the role of “boundary objects” and other mediating innovations in the development of disciplinary structures. Students of science trained in the symbolic interactionism tradition have proposed that “boundary objects” enhance the multiple interactions between heterogeneous social worlds: they are robust enough to enhance unity, but plastic enough to be manipulated in different social and cultural contexts.81 Within the emerging network, messenger RNA was a weakly structured “genetic information carrier” in common use, but it could, at the same time, be a strongly structured “macromolecular structure” adapted to practical and local uses. Consequently, messenger RNA favored the association of groups of heterogeneous scientists with backgrounds and interests in medical biochemistry, genetics, physical chemistry, organic chemistry, and so forth. This contrast between general and local uses was also instrumental in integrating the manipulation of things and the negotiation of aims. In contrast to transfer RNAs, which in the French context remained objects for chemical (and mainly structural) studies, messenger RNA became a key component of the new culture of “genetic information”. Messenger RNA was a loose theoretical entity described as a “genetic information carrier” in the policy-making documents, while operational but tacit and more conflicting definitions prevailed at the bench. In other words, messenger RNA was not only a classical “boundary object” but also a “flag object,” which tightened the collaborative network by mediating between the DGRST offices and the laboratories. (shrink)

John Searle claims that intentional states require a set of non-intentional background capacities in order to function. He insists that this 'Background' should be construed naturalistically, in terms of the causal properties of biological brains. This paper examines the relationship between Searle's conception of the Background and his commitment to biological naturalism. It is first observed that the arguments Searle ventures in support of the Background's existence do not entail a naturalistic interpretation. Searle's claim that external realism is part of (...) the Background is then addressed. It is shown that this claim implies an implicit understanding of reality, which is presupposed by the intelligibility of any objective, scientific description. As a consequence, Searle's account of the Background's role is incompatible with his insistence that it can be comprehensively characterized in terms of biological capacities. I conclude by showing that, if the tension is resolved by rejecting biological naturalism, Searle's position takes a substantial step in the direction of Heideggerian phenomenology, a move Searle has emphatically resisted in his various exchanges with Hubert Dreyfus. (shrink)

"Theoretical pluralism" obtains when there are good evidential reasons for accommodating multiple theories of the same domain. Issues of "relative significance" often arise in connection with the investigation of such domains. In this paper, I describe and give examples of theoretical pluralism and relative significance issues. Then I explain why theoretical pluralism so often obtains in biology--and why issues of relative significance arise--in terms of evolutionary contingencies and the paucity or lack of laws of biology. Finally, I turn from explanation (...) to justification, and raise questions about the purpose and value of concerns and disagreements about relative significance. (shrink)

The concept of species is one of the core concepts in biology and one of the cornerstones of evolutionary biology, yet it is rife with conceptual problems. Philosophers of biology have been discussing the concept of species for decades, and in doing so they sometimes appeal to the views of biologists. However, their statements as to what biologists think are seldom supported by empirical data. In order to investigate what biologists actually think about the key issues related to the problem (...) of species, we have conducted a survey on the sample of 193 biologists from the population of biologists from over 150 biology departments at universities in the US and the EU. This article presents and discusses the results of the survey. Some results confirm and others falsify the reiterated statements of philosophers of biology as to what biologists think, but all results we obtained should be informative and relevant for future discussions of the problem of species. (shrink)