This is the only book that examines the theory and data on the development of implicit and explicit memory. It first describes the characteristics of implicit and explicit memory (including conscious recollection) and tasks used with adults to measure them. Next, it reviews the brain mechanisms thought to underlie implicit and explicit memory and the studies with amnesics that initially prompted the search for different neuroanatomically-based memory systems. Two chapters review the Jacksonian (first in, last out) principle and empirical evidence (...) for the hierarchical appearance and dissolution of two memory systems in animal models (rats, nonhuman primates), children, and normal/amnesic adults. Two chapters examine memory tasks used with human infants and evidence of implicit and explicit memory during early infancy. Three final chapters consider structural and processing accounts of adult memory dissociations, their applicability to infant memory dissociations, and implications of infant data for current concepts of implicit and explicit memory. (shrink)

This book expounds the transcendental realist theory of science and critical naturalist social philosophy that have been developed by Bhaskar and are used by many contemporary social scientists. It defends Bhaskar's view that the possibility and necessity of experiment show that reality is structured and stratified, his use of this idea to develop a non-reductive explanatory account of human sciences, and his notion that to explain social structures can sometimes be to criticize them. After a discussion of the uses of (...) critical realism in controversial areas of social science, Bhaskar's optimism about the prospects of human sciences is criticized. (shrink)

A review article on two books by Roy Bhaskar: Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy (London: Verso, 1989), & The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Human Sciences (2nd Edition, Harvester Wheatsheaf: London, 1989 see listings in IRPS No. 56). Bhaskar portrays critical realism as insisting on "the primacy of being over knowledge" & argues for the emancipatory consequences of this position. His philosophy distinguishes between intransitive & transitive domains & between open & closed systems, & (...) stratifies reality (intransitive) into mechanisms, events, & experiences. Bhaskar is praised for the flexibility of his approach & his description of social relations, but he slights measurement & omits grounds for adjudication between competing theories. In trying to develop both a bold & Marxist theory, the constancy of his approach suffers. 23 References. M. Pflum. (shrink)

Both natural and engineered systems are fundamentally dynamical in nature: their defining properties are causal, and their functional capacities are causally grounded. Among dynamical systems, an interesting and important sub-class are those that are autonomous, anticipative and adaptive (AAA). Living systems, intelligent systems, sophisticated robots and social systems belong to this class, and the use of these terms has recently spread rapidly through the scientific literature. Central to understanding these dynamical systems is their complicated organisation and their consequent capacities for (...) re- and self- organisation. But there is at present no general analysis of these capacities or of the requisite organisation involved. We define what distinguishes AAA systems from other kinds of systems by characterising their central properties in a dynamically interpreted information theory. (shrink)

Previous studies claim there are few olfactory metaphors cross-linguistically, especially compared to metaphors originating in the visual and auditory domains. We show olfaction can be a source for metaphor and metonymy in a lesser-described language that has rich lexical resources for talking about odors. In Seri, an isolate language of Mexico spoken by indigenous hunter-gatherers, we find a novel metaphor for emotion never previously described – “anger stinks”. In addition, distinct odor verbs are used metaphorically to distinguish volitional vs. non-volitional (...) states-of-affairs. Finally, there is ample olfactory metonymy in Seri, especially prevalent in names for plants, but also found in names for insects and artifacts. This calls for a re-examination of better-known languages for the overlooked role olfaction may play in metaphor and metonymy. The Seri language illustrates how valuable data from understudied languages can be in highlighting novel ways by which people conceptualize themselves and their world. (shrink)

First Published in 2004. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Complex systems are dynamic and may show high levels of variability in both space and time. It is often difficult to decide on what constitutes a given complex system, i.e., where system boundaries should be set, and what amounts to substantial change within the system. We discuss two central themes: the nature of system definitions and their ability to cope with change, and the importance of system definitions for the mental metamodels that we use to describe and order ideas about (...) system change. Systems can only be considered as single study units if they retain their identity. Previous system definitions have largely ignored the need for both spatial and temporal continuity as essential attributes of identity. After considering the philosophical issues surrounding identity and system definitions, we examine their application to modeling studies. We outline a set of five alternative metamodels that capture a range of the basic dynamics of complex systems. Although Holling’s adaptive cycle is a compelling and widely applicable metamodel that fits many complex systems, there are systems that do not necessarily follow the adaptive cycle. We propose that more careful consideration of system definitions and alternative metamodels for complex systems will lead to greater conceptual clarity in the field and, ultimately, to more rigorous research. (shrink)

We find symmetry attractive. It interests us. Symmetry is often an indicator of the deep structure of things, whether they be natural phenomena, or the creations of artists. For example, the most fundamental conservation laws of physics are all based in symmetry. Similarly, the symmetries found in religious art throughout the world are intended to draw attention to deep spiritual truths. Not only do we find symmetry pleasing, but its discovery is often also surprising and illuminating as well. For these (...) reasons, we are inclined to think that symmetries are informative, and that symmetries contain information. On the other hand, symmetries represent a kind of invariance under transformation. Such invariance implies that symmetrical things contain redundancies. Redundancy, in turn, implies that the information content of a symmetrical structure or configuration is less than that of a similar nonsymmetrical structure. Symmetry, then, entails a reduction in information content. These considerations present us with somewhat of a paradox: On the one hand, many symmetries that we find in the world are surprising, and surprise indicates informativeness. On the other hand, the surprise value of information arises because it presents us with the unexpected or improbable, but symmetries, far from creating the unexpected, ensure that the known can be extended through invariant transformations. How can this paradox be resolved? (shrink)

Often when a new scientific theory is introduced, new terms are introduced along with it. Some of these new terms might be given explicit definitions using only terms that were in currency prior to the introduction of the theory. Some of them might be defined using other new terms introduced with the theory. But it frequently happens that the standard formulations of a theory do not define some of the new terms at all; these terms are adopted as primitives. The (...) audience is expected to come to grasp the meanings of the primitive terms by learning the role they play in the theory and its applications. I shall call such new and undefined terms, as well as new terms that are defined using them, theoretical terms. [1] If T is a theory, the T-terms are the theoretical terms introduced by T. A theoretical term need not be a word new to human language; it might be an old term that is employed in a new and specialized sense, not equivalent to any of its familiar senses; e.g. “color” in quantum chromodynamics. (shrink)

Causation can be understood as a computational process once we understand causation in informational terms. I argue that if we see processes as information channels, then causal processes are most readily interpreted as the transfer of information from one state to another. This directly implies that the later state is a computation from the earlier state, given causal laws, which can also be interpreted computationally. This approach unifies the ideas of causation and computation.

Progress has become a suspect concept in evolutionary biology, not the least because the core concepts of neo-Darwinism do not support the idea that evolution is progressive. There have been a number of attempts to account for directionality in evolution through additions to the core hypotheses of neo-Darwinism, but they do not establish progressiveness, and they are somewhat of an ad hoc collection. The standard account of fitness and adaptation can be rephrased in terms of information theory. From this, an (...) information of adaptation can be defined in terms of a fitness function. The information of adaptation is a measure of the mutual information between biota and their environment. If the actual state of adaptation lags behind the state of optimal adaptation, then it is possible for the information of adaptation to increase indefinitely. Since adaptations are functional, this suggests the possibility of progressive evolution in the sense of increasing adaptation. Keywords: evolution, information, adaptation, fitness, entropy, progress.. (shrink)

The disruptions to everyday life wrought by the COVID-19 pandemic include distortions in the experience of time, as reported widely by ordinary citizens and observed by journalists and social scientists. But how does this temporal disruption play out in different time scales—in the individual day as opposed to the medium- and long-term futures? And how might place influence how individuals experience and understand the pandemic's temporal transformations? This essay examines a range of temporal disruptions reported in day diaries and surveys (...) submitted to the Everyday Life in Middletown project, an online archive that has been documenting ordinary life in Muncie, Indiana, USA since 2016. Viewing these materials as instances of life writing, the essay probes the interactions between temporal disruptions and the local setting as they inflect the autobiographical selves our writers construct in their pandemic writings. It shows how living in Muncie—a postindustrial city with its particular combination of historical, demographic, economic, social, and political dynamics—structures the autobiographical stories available to our writers, and how the disruption of time produces new variations and problems for life writing. In the midst of a global crisis, we glimpse the pandemic's reshaping of a local structure of feeling in which a pervasive, local narrative of civic decline frames individual self-fashioning. (shrink)

This volume addresses the interlocking themes of realism, objectivity, existentialism and politics, based on critical realism. However, it moves beyond the purely scientific orientation of earlier contributions to this philosophy, to further develop the themes.The title essay defends objectivity in science, everyday knowledge, and ethics, and examines both subjective idealism and existentialist critiques of objectivity. The other essays examine some of the same themes but from different angles, keeping the politics of the issues at the forefront.

Abstract Many anticipatory systems cannot in themselves act meaningfully or represent intentionally. This stems largely from the derivative nature of their functionality. All current artificial control systems, and many living systems such as organs and cellular parts of organisms derive any intentionality they might have from their designers or possessors. Derivative functionality requires reference to some external autonomously functional system, and derivative intentionality similarly requires reference to an external autonomous intentional system. The importance of autonomy can be summed up in (...) the following slogan: No meaning without intention; no intention without function; no function without autonomy. This paper develops the role of autonomy to show how learning new tasks is facilitated by autonomy, and further by representational capacities that are functional for autonomy. (shrink)

ROBERT LARMER ARGUED THAT EVEN IF ALL PHYSICAL EVENTS ARE SUBJECT TO DETERMINISTIC NATURAL LAWS, MIRACLES ARE POSSIBLE. HE CONCLUDED THAT BECAUSE MIRACLES AND NATURAL LAWS ARE COMPATIBLE, HUME’S ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE RATIONALITY OF BELIEF IN MIRACLES IS FALLACIOUS. I FIRST SHOW THAT EVEN IF LARMER’S ARGUMENT FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF MIRACLES IS CORRECT, IT DOES NOT TOUCH HUME’S ARGUMENT. I THEN ARGUE THAT LARMER’S ARGUMENT IS MISTAKEN.

Functionality is essential to any form of anticipation beyond simple directedness at an end. In the literature on function in biology, there are two distinct approaches. One, the etiological view, places the origin of function in selection, while the other, the organizational view, individuates function by organizational role. Both approaches have well-known advantages and disadvantages. I propose a reconciliation of the two approaches, based in an interactivist approach to the individuation and stability of organisms. The approach was suggested by Kant (...) in the Critique of Judgment, but since it requires, on his account, the identification a new form of causation, it has not been accessible by analytical techniques. I proceed by construction of the required concept to fit certain design requirements. This construction builds on concepts introduced in my previous four talks to these meetings. (shrink)

Anticipation allows a system to adapt to conditions that have not yet come to be, either externally to the system or internally. Autonomous systems actively control the conditions of their own existence so as to increase their overall viability. This paper will first give minimal necessary and sufficient conditions for autonomous anticipation, followed by a taxonomy of autonomous anticipation. In more complex systems, there can be semi-autonomous subsystems that can anticipate and adapt on their own. Such subsystems can be integrated (...) into a system’s overall autonomy, typically with greater efficiency due to modularity and specialization of function. However, it is also possible that semi-autonomous subsystems can act against the viability of the overall system, and have their own functions that conflict with overall system functions. (shrink)

Christians and Marxists have co-operated in various forms of political work in recent decades, and, after earlier years of antagonism, thinkers on both sides have come to take the other seriously. The aim of this book is to get Christianity and Marxism to meet on terrain on which they might seem most opposed: their philosophical positions; and to do so without watering either down, but taking then full strength.

Hume maintains that the boundaries of morality are widely drawn in everyday life. We routinely blame characters for traits that we find disgusting, on this account, as well as those which we perceive as being harmful. Contemporary moral psychology provides further evidence that human beings have a natural tendency to moralize traits that produce feelings of repugnance. But recent work also demonstrates a significant amount of individual variation in our sensitivities to disgust. We have sufficient reason to bracket this emotion, (...) therefore, when adopting the general point of view: if we allow idiosyncratic affective responses to shape our fully considered moral judgments, we could no longer reasonably expect spectators with different sensitivities to agree with us. (shrink)

A research project currently underway at the Mexico City campus of the Instituto de Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterey (ITESM) was presentedfor discussion. A number of constructive suggestions from participants have been incorporated into the paper.

In this critical notice, I argue that the semantic view championed by Thompson no logical advantage over the syntactic view of theories, especially in the area of interpretation. Each weakness of the syntactic view has a corresponding weakness in the semantic view. In principle the two are not different in power, but it is sometimes better to adopt one rather than the other, for practical reasons. I agree with Thompson that many issues in the philosophy of biology can be illuminated (...) by the semantic view, but that other things, especially deriving specific prediction, are best understood with the syntactic view. (shrink)

This essay offers a defense of ‘intellectual authority’, primarily by pointing out the untoward implications of its conceptual opposite, ‘institutional authority’, in a wide variety of contexts. An opening discussion explores conditions for the possibility of intellectual authority in legal, humanistic, and aesthetic disciplines. Social science literature documenting and describing the biasing influence of institutional authority is then canvassed and analyzed in some detail. A final section assays the theoretical significance of various efforts to eliminate non‐intellectual bias and influence, with (...) special reference to the example of “blind reviewing’ of scholarly manuscripts. (shrink)

Examples of successful linguistic communication give rise to two important insights: (1) it should be understood most fundamentally in terms of the pragmatic success of each individual utterance, and (2) linguistic conventions need to be understood as on a par with the non-linguistic regularities that competent language users rely upon to refer. Syntax and semantics are part of what Barwise and Perry call the context of the utterance, contributing to the pragmatics of the utterance. This full and distributed multichannel context (...) determines meaning if anything does. On the standard account of context, context disambiguates the meaning of language, but it is at least as apt in many situations to say that language disambiguates context. In practice, the two work together, sometimes with more emphasis on one than the other. Reference should be understood in pragmatic terms (it is an act) and, since success is often achieved in non-standard, creative ways, any formalisation of pragmatics can only be partial. The need for such an inventive approach to referring traces back to the need for language to be highly efficient, with expressions underdetermining their interpretation. Next, the shared semantic and syntactic regularities, which might seem to be independent of the context of an utterance, should be understood as also being part of that context. Past usage underdetermines how terms can be used since it allows for multiple projections. Successful reference with novel uses that are disambiguated by context can become the ground for new conventions. (shrink)

The Efficient Market Hypothesis often seems to suggest only that most people cannot outguess the financial markets. But the originator of the hypothesis, Eugene Fama, made the stronger claim that people cannot outguess the financial markets because financial-market prices are correct: They incorporate all known information accurately. This view omits the role that human traders’ interpretations of information must play if the information is to prompt them to buy or sell. Buyers and sellers disagree about the meaning of current information, (...) so at least half of them must be wrong. Bringing in many more (but equally fallible) people to predict the future does not somehow make their (collective) answer “right.” This is a logical disproof of the Fama hypothesis, but the inherently speculative nature of financial markets makes its empirical falsification (or verification) ambiguous if not impossible. The hypothesis must therefore be considered an unscientific article of faith. (shrink)

The Efficient Market Hypothesis often seems to suggest only that most people cannot outguess the financial markets. But the originator of the hypothesis, Eugene Fama, made the stronger claim that people cannot outguess the financial markets because financial-market prices are correct: They incorporate all known information accurately. This view omits the role that human traders’ interpretations of information must play if the information is to prompt them to buy or sell. Buyers and sellers disagree about the meaning of current information, (...) so at least half of them must be wrong. Bringing in many more (but equally fallible) people to predict the future does not somehow make their (collective) answer “right.” This is a logical disproof of the Fama hypothesis, but the inherently speculative nature of financial markets makes its empirical falsification (or verification) ambiguous if not impossible. The hypothesis must therefore be considered an unscientific article of faith. (shrink)

Systematics, along with the other comparative biological sciences and certain astronomical disciplines, is much more concerned with form and organization than other biological and physical sciences, in which dynamics plays the central role. Within the biological sciences, Nelson (1970) characterizes disciplines that study diversity and patterns “comparative” and those that search for process and dynamics “general.” The goal of “general” science is to uncover the mechanisms that unify observed phenomena. Whether the physicist sees herself, like Newton (1953: 3-5), to be (...) discovering fundamental causal explanations, or like Duhem (1962: 19-30), to be uncovering a natural classification, dynamical concepts referring to essentially hidden processes are indispensable. Much of comparative biology, in contrast, is primarily descriptive, with explanations taking a secondary role, at least until the diversity is described and comparisons made. Unlike the general sciences, in which elegance and quantitative analysis have long been major indicators of truth, the comparative sciences stress complexity, happenstance and qualitative analysis. In systematics in particular, theory and explanation are often thought to play a minimal role, if any at all1. (shrink)

Drawing on the intellectual tradition of the leading comparative political science scholar, Giovanni Sartori, the contributors examine the theoretical and methodological basis of: Concept Analysis, Comparative Political Analysis and Qualitative Methods.

Richard Alexander's second book on biology and morality is a continuation and amplification of the project he reported on in Darwinism and Human Affairs1. The Biology of Moral Systems is more abstract than the earlier book. It does not broach any new empirical ground, but puts Alexander's views into a broader context of philosophical and sociological discussions of morality. It discusses and criticizes alternative philosophical and biological views of morality, and presents his views on the significance of biology to moral (...) issues in law, democracy and pursuit of the Good. In one interesting section that I will not be able to discuss here, Alexander provides an evolutionary hypothesis to explain each of Kohlberg's stages of moral development (pp. 131ff). The book ends with a discussion of some specific moral problems. (shrink)

Information is commonly understood as knowledge or facts acquired or derived from, e.g., study, instruction or observation (Macmillan Contemporary Dictionary, 1979). On this notion, information is presumed to be both meaningful and veridical, and to have some appropriate connection to its object; it is concerned with representations and symbols in the most general sense MacKay 1969 ). Information might be misleading, but it can never be false. Deliberately misleading data is misinformation. The scientific notion of information abstracts from the representational (...) idea, and includes anything that could potentially serve as a source of information. The most fundamental notion of information, attributed to a number of different authors, is "a distinction that makes a difference" MacKay 1969 ), or "a differnece that makes a difference" Bateson 1973 : 428). Information theory, then, is fundamentally the rigorous study of distinctions and their relations, inasmuch as they make a difference. (shrink)