The literature, although sparse, reports that covert administration of all types of medications is prevalent in nursing homes. Whether it is ever ethically defensible, however, to administer medications covertly to persons with significant dementia is a complex and contentious question. Some scholars contend that deception is inherently wrong and is never acceptable, while others believe that deception is intrinsic to providing care to persons with dementia. With an aim to begin to reconcile these polarized positions and to objectively study this (...) contentious issue, the authors undertake an ethical analysis of the covert administration of medications by utilizing the principles of respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice. Our approach examines covert administration within the context of all persons with significant dementia who are administered medications, and is aimed at providing ethical and practical guidance to clinicians who, when confronted with a patient who refuses medication, must choose the “least bad” option from among various courses of action, all of which have ethical implications. Components of a possible guideline for practice are proposed. (shrink)

Healthcare institutions have been making increasing efforts to standardize consultation methodology and to accredit both bioethics training programs and the consultants accordingly. The focus has traditionally been on the ethics consultation as the relevant unit of ethics intervention. Outcome measures are studied in relation to consultations, and the hidden assumption is that consultations are the preferred or best way to address day-to-day ethical dilemmas. Reflecting on the data from an internal quality improvement survey and the literature, we argue that having (...) general ethics education as a key function of ethics services may be more important in meeting the contemporaneous needs of acute care settings. An expanded and varied ethics education, with attention to the time constraints of healthcare workers’ schedules, was a key recommendation brought forward by survey respondents. Promoting ethical reflection and creating a culture of ethics may serve to prevent ethical dilemmas or mitigate their effects. (shrink)

The idea of physical things as extensible qualified is so aptly related to our power to think experientially that it may serve us humans fairly well when it comes to our clearly conceiving physical individuals. Accordingly, the physical need not be so opaque to us as it sometimes seemed to many philosophers. When we speak of a certain quality exemplified in an individual, the matter is related more perspicuously by saying that the particular is qualified in a certain way. Whatever (...) its deficiencies, the restrictive empiricism epitomized by David Hume should not be completely abandoned. Our power to experience cannot be our only resource for understanding concrete reality. This chapter examines the hypothesis that: in your fully conceiving a physical entity as being Monochromatic Spatially Extensible Blue, you will be experiential blue. It also discusses the notion of spatially extensible colors, spatial bodies, insensate bodies as pervaded with tactile qualities, extensible qualities, experiential qualities, and metaphysics. (shrink)

We human beings are quite limited, it is painfully plain, in our experiencing, our thinking, and our understanding. Yet, even when mindful of our human limitations, we may perhaps aspire to a humanly intelligible philosophy of the world that is, nonetheless, a fairly substantial philosophy. This chapter provides some quite simple and obvious observations and then attempts to articulate some instructive implications of those observations. The implications may also be features of a humanly realistic philosophy. Each of us has a (...) power to think, and a power to experience. When one's power to think is exercised, or his/her propensity is manifested, then he/she actually does think. Rene Descartes famously held that, at every moment of his existence, he was, and must be, conscious. In addition to having a propensity toward experience, quite certainly manifested in certain conditions, one may also have a real propensity toward unconsciousness. When writing philosophically about himself, David Hume is sometimes so extreme as to claim he cannot really have any idea of himself. (shrink)

In the last couple of chapters, the author has offered considerations to favor substantial dualism over its salient, more conservative rivals, whether the favored substantial dualism be only a pessimistic form of the thesis or whether it be an optimistic dualism that is favored. In either event, we should want a substantial dualism that is, in the best sense of the expression, a humanly realistic philosophy. For that to transpire, we should articulate a substantial dualism that does well by the (...) problem of our unconscious quality. With a heightened awareness of this problem, and of how it may impact any substantial dualism, we may better appreciate such dualist hypotheses as can, in due course, allow for an apt dualistic answer to the proposed problem. This chapter first examines objects that are aptly qualified and experiencers who are differently qualified just as aptly. It then reconsiders the problem of our unconscious quality and how it is historically denied by Rene Descartes, and David Hume's philosophy about existence compared with that of Descartes. (shrink)

Abstract.This article focuses on a critical interpretation of the work of Unger. It is argued that Unger's view is less revolutionary than he depicts it and that American law often develops as Unger describes it, though this is absolutely no revolution. The authors further show what the possibilities and the limits of a transformative vocation at the bar can be.

When we communicate with each other, we interact with an external reality, quite distinct from each other. Nowadays, we take it that this possibly mysterious external reality, through which we communicate, is physical reality. But, what can any of this really amount to? In presenting the Mystery of the Physical, this book presented, in two Formulations, a doctrine concerning the denial of quality. According to the denial of qualities, all the world's matter lacks qualities, even as a lot lacks anything (...) even easily confused with qualities, however well matter may fare with the other two sorts of basic properties for physical things, the spatial and the propensities. This chapter discusses the concepts of spatially extensible qualities, intelligible physical reality and a principle of constrained contingency, mutually isolated concrete worlds and distinct eons of the actual world, whether the recognized physical properties might be considered spatially extensible qualities, the identity theory of qualities and dispositions, an antinomy of spatially extensible quality, and the philosophy of David Hume and David Lewis. (shrink)

Unger claims that we can block sorites arguments for the conclusion that there are no ordinary things only by invoking some kind of miracle, but no such miracle is needed if we reject the principle that every statement has a truth value. Wheeler's argument for the nonexistence of ordinary things depends on the assumptions that if ordinary things exist, they comprise real kinds, and that if ordinary predicates really apply to things, the predicates refer to real properties. If we (...) accept Wheeler's criteria for the reality of kinds and properties, we have no good reason to accept these assumptions. (shrink)

Although the predominant view is that vagueness is due to our language being imprecise, the alternative idea that objects themselves do not have determinate borders has received an occasional hearing. But what has failed to be appreciated is how this idea can avoid a puzzle Peter Unger named “The Problem of the Many.”[i].

Naive mereology studies ordinary, common-sense beliefs about part and whole. Some of the speculations in this article on naive mereology do not bear directly on Peter van Inwagen's "Material Beings". The other topics, (1) and (2), both do. (1) Here is an example of Peter Unger's "Problem of the Many". How can a table be a collection of atoms when many collections of atoms have equally strong claims to be that table? Van Inwagen invokes fuzzy sets to solve this (...) problem. I claim that an alternative treatment of vagueness, supervaluations over many-value valuations, provides a better solution. (2) The Special Composition Question asks how parts compose a whole. One who rejects van Inwagen's answer in terms of constituting a life need not provide some alternative answer. Even if all answers to the Special Question fail, there are a multitude of less general composition questions that are not so difficult. (shrink)

Brain transplants and the dicephalus (an organism just like us except that it has two cerebrums) are thought to support the position that we are essentially thinking creatures, not living organisms. I try to offset the first of these intuitions by responding to thought experiments Peter Unger devised to show that identity is what matters. I then try to motivate an interpretation of the alleged conjoined twins as really just one person cut off from himself by relying upon what (...) I take will be the reader's disagreement with Locke's conjecture that a dreaming Socrates and an awake Socrates are two distinct people. (shrink)

Introduction Introduction / Jan de Vries 1 Art in History / Gary Schwartz 7 History in Art / J. W. Smit 17 Pt. I Art and Reality Market Scenes As Viewed by an Art Historian / Linda Stone-Ferrier 29 Market Scenes As Viewed by a Plant Biologist / Willem A. Brandenburg 59 Marine Paintings and the History of Shipbuilding / Richard W. Unger 75 Skies and Reality in Dutch Landscape / John Walsh 95 Some Notes on Interpretation / E. (...) de Jongh 119 Are These Girls Really So Neat? On Kitchen Scenes and Method / Jochen Becker 139 Didactic and Disguised Meanings? Several Seventeenth-Century Texts on Painting and the Iconological Approach to Northern Dutch Paintings of This Period / Eric J. Sluijter 175 The Changing Face of Realism / Lyckle de Vries 209 Pt. II Art, Economy, and Society Art History / Jan de Vries 249 The Volume and Value of Paintings in Holland at the Time of the Dutch Republic / Ad van der Woude 285 Works of Art in Seventeenth-Century Amsterdam: An Analysis of Subjects and Attributions / John Michael Montias 331 Conclusion Science, Commerce, and Art: Neglected Topics at the Junction of History and Art History / David Freedberg 377 Biographical Notes on the Authors 429 Index. (shrink)

Two thought experiments are provided which elicit whatappear to be opposing judgments about the demands of morality.One Unger-inspired thought experiment suggests that a personmust give up four decades of earnings just to save a singlelife. The other evokes the contrary intuition that onedoesn't have to labor forty years without compensation inorder to prevent the death of an individual. However,considerations of consistency do not demand that weabandon one of our intuitive responses. This is becausethere is a morally significant difference between (...) thetwo burdens that the people suffer in the respectivethought experiments. The difference is a result of humanpsychology being such that it is easier to bear theaftermath of an event that renders one's earlier effortsfutile than it is to suffer identical efforts goingunrewarded in the future. A conclusion that can bedrawn from this temporal asymmetry is that while moralityis not quite as demanding as Unger and many consequentialistsmaintain, it is much more demanding than many of their opponents realize. (shrink)

Setting Up the Problem. What personal responsibilities do we, people living in rich countries, have for relieving miseries in the less fortunate countries? A great variety of prophets and philosophers urge us without qualification to do everything that we can. I mean, everything. Sartre holds that everybody “carries the weight of the whole world upon his shoulders; he is responsible for the world and for himself in whatever has to do with the character of their being.” Lévinas joins in: “I (...) am responsible for others without expecting any return, should it cost me my life. Any return is [the others’] business.” Peter Unger, following Peter Singer, asks us to do all that we can do to relieve suffering; and insists that the only limit, while the suffering continues, is our capacity to help. Jesus speaks most trenchantly of all: If you are to be saved, “Sell all you have and give it to the poor”, to which may be joined the injunction, powerfully worded in the Moffatt translation of the Bible, “You must be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect”. (shrink)

Knowing as having the right to be sure, by A. J. Ayer.--Knowledge and belief, by N. Malcolm.--Is justified true belief knowledge? By E. L. Gettier.--The foundation of empirical statements, by R. M. Chisholm.--Knowledge, truth, and evidence, by K. Lehrer.--A causal theory of knowing, by A. I. Goldman.--The explication of 'X knows that p', by B. Skyrms.--An analysis of factual knowledge, by P. Unger.--Why I know so much more than you do, by W. W. Rozeboom.--Does knowing imply believing? By J. (...) Harrison.--Knowledge, by examples, by C. Radford.--The logic of knowing, by R. M. Chisholm.--Bibliography (p. 221-224). (shrink)

Peter Singer and Peter Unger argue that moral decency requires giving away all one's “surplus” for the relief or prevention of “absolute poverty,” because not doing so is analogous to refusing to save a drowning child to avoid making one's clothes muddy. I argue that there is a crucial disanalogy between the two cases and, moreover, that there are four independent moral objections to their thesis: it is monomaniacal in ignoring the variety of morally worthy ideals and elevating self-sacrificial (...) aid to the global poor into the sole ideal; it is misanthropic in its indifference to the happiness of those it adjures to give; it is incompatible with integrity; it would have disastrous effects for the poor if it were generally adopted. I argue that genuine beneficence aims at creating or restoring the conditions that enable its beneficiaries to become self-sufficient creators themselves — creators of wealth and of meaningful and enjoyable lives. Small-scale beneficence is necessary for moral goodness, but large-scale beneficence is optional, so long as its absence is not due to a lack of regard for those in need. The uncharitable person violates the neo-Lockean non-waste proviso that we acquire or keep for ourselves and those we love as much, but only as much, as we can use or invest meaningfully or enjoyably, now or in the long run. But someone who invests all his resources in creating something of worth leads a morally worthy life even if he reserves nothing for large-scale charity. Both our capacity for beneficence, which bids us stretch out a hand to those in need, and our capacity for creation, which bids us reach for the stars, are important aspects of our humanity. The Singer-Unger ideal advocates not genuine beneficence but the profligate giving away of wealth to prolong lives, while failing to appreciate what makes life worth living. a Footnotesa I am grateful for helpful comments on this paper from Ellen Frankel Paul, Larry White (who commented on the paper at the 2005 conference of the Association for Private Enterprise Education), David Blumenfeld, and Garrett Cullity (whose comments from Australia were a wonderful example of voluntary international aid to a stranger). I would also like to thank Georgia State University, Bowling Green State University, and the Association for Private Enterprise Education for inviting me to present this paper, and the audiences at these presentations for their helpful discussion. Finally, I would like to thank Harry Dolan for his expert copyediting, which saved me from some embarrassing mistakes and infelicities. (shrink)

When our choice affects some other person and the outcome is unknown, it has been argued that we should defer to their risk attitude, if known, or else default to use of a risk avoidant risk function. This, in turn, has been claimed to require the use of a risk avoidant risk function when making decisions that primarily affect future people, and to decrease the desirability of efforts to prevent human extinction, owing to the significant risks associated with continued human (...) survival. I raise objections to the claim that respect for others’ risk attitudes requires risk avoidance when choosing for future generations. In particular, I argue that there is no known principle of interpersonal aggregation that yields acceptable results in variable population contexts and is consistent with a plausible ideal of respect for others’ risk attitudes in fixed population cases. GPI Working Paper No . 20-2022. (shrink)

Ontic structural realism claims that all there is to the world is structure. But how can this slogan be turned into a worked-out metaphysics? Here I consider one potential answer: a metaphysical framework known as ‘generalism’. According to the generalist, the most fundamental description of the world is not given in terms of individuals bearing properties, but rather, general facts about which states of affairs obtain. However, I contend that despite several apparent similarities between the positions, generalism is unable to (...) capture the two main motivations for OSR. I suggest instead that OSR should be construed as a meta-metaphysical position. 1Introduction 2Motivations 2.1Theory change 2.2Permutation invariance 3Metaphysics 4Generalism 4.1Quantifier generalism 4.2Algebraic generalism 5Why Generalism Is Not Ontic Structural Realism 6Ontic Structural Realism as Meta-metaphysics 7Conclusion. (shrink)

Crutchfield and Redinger (2024) argue that, ceteris paribus, it is morally worse to deploy a restraint that undermines a basic liberty than one that does not.1 This is a plausible view, and is like...

ABSTRACT The author proposes to convert Ayn Rand’s theory of man into a sixth branch of her Objectivist philosophy called the metaphysics of man. This branch would be distinct from both the metaphysics of reality and epistemology. Along with consolidating all the axioms about the fundamental nature of man, this new framework will simplify and clarify the structure of Objectivism.

This article describes a paradoxical phenomenon arising from the fact that those who act rightly often pay a price for doing so. The paradox is that the very thing – acting rightly – that incurs the cost also makes the cost (especially) undeserved. In explicating the paradox, I distinguish between two kinds of cost (internal and external), two kinds of unfairness (intrinsic and comparative), and two manifestations of the paradox (prospective and retrospective). I suggest that the problem generated by the (...) paradox of desert arises and becomes steadily more pronounced as we regress through three kinds of cases. I then consider and reject an attempt to dissolve the paradox, and I discuss the relevance of the paradox for questions about the extent of duty. Finally, I consider a concern about drawing attention to the paradox of desert. (shrink)

This essay explores different conceptions of freedom in Kant, Green, and their critics. Kant introduces three kinds of freedom—negative freedom, positive freedom or autonomy, and transcendental freedom. Sidgwick objects that Kant's conception of positive freedom is unable to explain how someone might be free and responsible for the wrong choices. Though Green rejects transcendental freedom, he thinks Kant's conception of practical freedom can be defended by identifying it with the capacity to be determined by practical reason. Green identifies his own (...) tripartite conception of freedom—juridical freedom, moral freedom, and real freedom. He thinks that these are stages in the perfection of freedom. Green's tripartite conception provides a principled reply to Berlin's doubts about positive freedom, explains Kant's claims that respect and esteem are fitting attitudes toward different aspects of freedom, and supports Schiller's criticisms of Kantian freedom and virtue. Green's conception of freedom defends the best elements of the Kantian perspective while addressing legitimate worries. In doing so, it unifies different aspects of freedom in a way that is grounded in moral personality or rational nature. (shrink)

In his well-known paper on Euclid’s geometry, Ken Manders sketches an argument against conceiving the diagrams of the Elements in ‘semantic’ terms, that is, against treating them as representations—resting his case on Euclid’s striking use of ‘impossible’ diagrams in some proofs by contradiction. This paper spells out, clarifies and assesses Manders’s argument, showing that it only succeeds against a particular semantic view of diagrams and can be evaded by adopting others, but arguing that Manders nevertheless makes a compelling case that (...) semantic analyses ought to be relegated to a secondary role for the study of mathematical practices. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive primer for the study of intensionality. It explores and assesses those key theories of intensionality which have been developed in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Each of the examined theories is tested as to whether it can account for the problems associated with the intersubstitution salva veritate of co-extensional expressions, and existential generalisation. All of these theories are subsequently compared so as to determine which of them comes closest to successfully solving these problems. The (...) book examines four kinds of intensionalist approaches: the Fregean approach ; the possible-worlds approaches of Carnap, Montague and Cresswell; the theory of properties relations and propositions devised by Bealer; and the Meinongian approaches put forward by Zalta and Priest. The book also proposes an alternative to intensionalism: sententialism. Sententialists argue that the problems of intensionality could be solved by appealing to linguistic items rather than intensional entities. Drawing on the works of Quine, Davidson, Scheffler and R. M. Martin, it explores the viability and value of sententialism as an alternative to intensionalism. (shrink)

People develop and deploy epistemic norms – normative sensibilities in light of which they regulate both their individual and community epistemic practice. There is a similarity to folk's epistemic normative sensibilities – and it is by virtue of this that folk commonly can rely on each other, and even work jointly to produce systems of true beliefs – a kind of epistemic common good. Agents not only regulate their belief forming practices in light of these sensitivities, but they make clear (...) to others that they approve or disapprove of practices as these accord with their sensibilities – they thus regulate the belief forming practices of others in an interdependent pursuit of a good – something on the order of a community stock of true beliefs. Such general observations suggest ways in which common epistemic norms function as social norms, as these are characterized by Cristina Bicchieri's (2006) discussion of various kinds of norms. I draw on this framework – together with an important elaboration in Bicchieri (2017) – as it affords an analysis of the various related ways in which normative sensibilities function in communities of interdependent agents. The framework allows one to probe how these normative sensibilities function in the various associated choice situations. I argue that epistemic norms are fundamentally social norms, and, at the same time, they also are widely shared sensibilities about state-of-the-art ways of pursuing projects of individual veritistic value. The two foundations suggest the analogy of an arch. (shrink)

Nauczanie etyki w szkole uznawane jest za ważne i potrzebne. Ale czy etyki można się nauczyć? I czy nauczanie jej powinno polegać na przekazywaniu wiedzy o koncepcjach etycznych, ewentualnie dyskusji wokół nich, czy raczej na kształtowaniu moralnych postaw uczniów i właściwych zachowań? Artykuł podejmuje namysł nad tymi problemami w nawiązaniu do różnych tradycji myśli etycznej i teorii moralności. Za główny punkt odniesienia i podstawę praktyki edukacyjnej proponuje przyjąć odnowioną współcześnie Arystotelesowską etykę cnót. Koncepcja phronesis jako rozumności praktycznej, pozwalającej tworzyć sądy (...) moralne wrażliwe na kontekst i uwzględniające złożoność trudnych do uzgodnienia interesów i dóbr, wydaje się dla edukacji moralnej wciąż aktualnym modelem. Nauczanie i dyskusja nastawione na rozważanie konkretnych przypadków i opowieści, czyli kształcenie umiejętności tego typu osądu, pozwala uniknąć zagrożeń, jakie niesie nauka skupiona na zagadnieniach teoretycznych: uwikłania w definicyjne niejasności w określaniu wartości moralnych, czy myślenia oderwanego od emocji i od doświadczenia. Nauka polegająca na analizie filozoficznej tradycji wiąże się z ryzykiem, iż przekazywana wiedza okaże się nieadekwatna do wieku i poziomu osobistego rozwoju ucznia, generując moralny subiektywizm i relatywistyczny sceptycyzm. Argument ten nie jest jednak skierowany przeciwko teoretyzowaniu i wprowadzaniu abstrakcyjnych rozważań w procesie kształcenia, nawet na najwcześniejszych etapach: teoretyzowanie i budowanie racjonalnych uzasadnień jest potrzebne, ale powinno wynikać z inspiracji i rozwoju intelektualnych predyspozycji, a nie z przekazu gotowej wiedzy. (shrink)

I develop an account of how mathematized theories in physics represent physical systems, in response to the frequent claim that any such account must presuppose a non-mathematized, and usually linguistic, description of the system represented. The account I develop contains a circularity, in that representation is a mathematical relation between the models of a theory and the system as represented by some other model --- but I argue that this circularity is not vicious, in any case refers in linguistic accounts (...) of meaning and representation, and is simply a consequence of the fact that we have no unmediated, representation-independent access to the world. (shrink)

An introduction to contemporary debates about consciousness.

El presente artículo es un estudio sobre las diferenciaciones (aqsām) del amor, uno de los puntos más importantes del principal escrito que Ibn ʿArabī dedicó a la cuestión amorosa, el capítulo 178 de Las Iluminaciones de La Meca (al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya). A través de un juego de oscilación y equilibrio entre perspectivas ontológicas y epistemológicas aparentemente enfrentadas –incomparabilidad/similaridad, oculto/manifiesto, unidad/multiplicidad, espíritu/cuerpo– y un recurrente manejo del lenguaje de las alusiones (išāra), el maestro andalusí distingue entre amor divino (ilāhī), espiritual (rūḥānī), natural (...) (ṭabī‘ī) y elemental (ʿunṣurī). Se ofrece un análisis y comentario del texto akbarí que pretende aclarar la especificidad de cada una de estas nociones, así como su íntima relación con el discurso amoroso del autor. (shrink)

Na poti do sem sem razmišljal, kako začeti to srečanje – in bolj sem razmišljal, bolj se mi je zdelo absurdno, da bi uvodoma predstavljal nekoga, ki ga vsi poznate. Pač pa lahko povem anekdoto, za katero mogoče ne veste vsi. V Društvu za antične in humanistične študije smo predlani prišli na idejo, da bi profesorja Gantarja predlagali za neko drugo nagrado, ki je imela med obrazci tudi obrazec za soglasje predlaganega. Naredil sem osnovnošolsko napako ter pisal profesorju, če ga (...) lahko izpolni in podpiše. On pa mi je odpisal, da je nagrad v življenju dobil preveč in da prosi, naj ga ne predlagamo. Eksplicitno izraženi zahtevi se je težko upreti. Smo pa v društvu tudi poznavalci Otona Župančiča, ki je, kot veste, napisal, da gre osel enkrat na led, »baš to je oslovstvo«, in da modrec ve, kako je »danes pal«, jutri bo pa plesal po njem. Ko smo tako profesorja predlagali naslednjič, tokrat za Prešernovo nagrado, ga nismo nič spraševali. Na tem mestu bi se zato rad zahvalil Miljani Cunta s Slovenske matice, ki je vse to koordinirala, in SAZU, ki je predlog takoj podprla; resnično sem vesel, da ob tej priložnosti lahko sediva tukaj. (shrink)

Aristotle's solution to the problem raised in Ch. 4 depends on his account of how we arrive at thoughts on the basis of experience. In his view, we standardly acquire a term for a kind on the basis of contact with members of a kind, without thereby knowing that the kind in question exists. Further, we can grasp such terms without knowing that the kind has a unifying basic feature that explains its necessary properties. Our understanding of the kind is (...) to be compared with that of a craftsman and not that of a proto‐scientist. Aristotle's view is distinguished from several twentieth‐century accounts of these issues. (shrink)

Voter surveillance for digital campaigning is perceived as enacted from above. Political parties are “all-seeing actors” combining access to the Voters’ Registry with digital tools to maximize voter turnout. At the same time, new forms of lateral surveillance emerge as citizens voluntarily participate in the data collection process to help political parties achieve their electoral goals. This article examines the reconfiguration of the concepts of crowdsourcing and political participation through the use of voter-surveillance applications. Theoretically, it explores how crowdsourced voter (...) surveillance (CVS) builds on the emancipatory rhetoric of political participation and crowdsourcing while relying on social, technical, and political surveillance infrastructures. Empirically, it maps the information flows and knowledge hierarchies afforded by Elector, a CVS app used by the Likud party in the Israeli election of March 2020. The findings indicate that contrary to the logic of crowdsourcing as democratizing knowledge and participation, CVS cultivates controlled individuals and normalizes lateral surveillance as a ritualistic and desired form of political participation. The article therefore describes the type of political action that CVS constructs as Little Samaritan Brothers: citizens who collectively resign their rights and the rights of their peers for the party’s success. (shrink)

As theorists, developers, and practitioners of the anticipatory governance of emerging technologies, we applaud Ankeny et al.’s...

The long 19th century was a period of many developments and technical innovations in agriculture and animal biology, during which actors sought to incorporate new practices in light of new information. By the middle of the century, however, while heredity steadily became the dominant concept in animal husbandry, some policies related to livestock improvement in Brazil seemed to have been tailored following a climate-deterministic concept established in the mid-18th century by the French naturalist Georges-Louis Leclerc, the Comte de Buffon. His (...) theory of animal degeneration posited, among other things, the necessity of recurrent crossbreeding to preserve animal species living in nonnative environments from climate-induced degeneration. Although largely discredited by the early 19th century, the teachings of the French naturalist seem to have found supporters in a Brazilian program to modernize national agriculture through the application of the natural sciences. Herein I examine the revival of Buffon’s theories in that government-sponsored program to improve animal husbandry and breeding techniques, including actual applications of this theory in the real world. Ultimately, I argue that Buffon’s theory of degeneration was used to tailor public policies and funding for the improvement of domesticated animals in Brazil between 1856 and 1860. (shrink)

Recently, new life has been breathed into the ancient philosophical topic of skepticism. The subject of some of the best and most provocative work in contemporary philosophy, skepticism has been addressed not only by top epistemologists but also by several of the world's finest philosophers who are most known for their work in other areas of the discipline. Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader brings together the most important recent contributions to the discussion of skepticism. Covering major approaches to the skeptical problem, (...) it features essays by Anthony Brueckner, Keith DeRose, Fred Dretske, Graeme Forbes, Christopher Hill, David Lewis, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, Hilary Putnam, Ernest Sosa, Gail Stine, Barry Stroud, Peter Unger, and Ted Warfield. The book opens with a thorough introduction that outlines the skeptical problem, explains the dominant responses to skepticism, and discusses the strengths, weaknesses, and unresolved issues of each response, providing undergraduate students and nonphilosophers with the background and context necessary to understand the essays. Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader serves as an ideal text for courses in epistemology and skepticism and will also appeal to professional philosophers and interested general readers. (shrink)

A methodology of science must satisfy two requirements: (i) It must be ampliative: the theories which it generates must make statements that go far beyond any data or observations that may have motivated those theories in the first place. (ii) It must be epistemically probative: it must somehow provide a warrant for believing that the theories so produced are correct, or at least partially correct, even if they can never be fully confirmed. These two requirements pull in opposite directions, and (...) attempts to specify the “scientific method” often focus on one to the exclusion of the other. On a few points there now exists something approaching a consensus. (i) Scientific hypotheses — including, particularly, statements about unobserved or unobservable entities or mechanisms — remain conjectural, no matter how frequently predictions based on those hypotheses are found to coincide with data. (ii) A good (best?) indicator of a theory’s verisimilitude is its ability to successfully predict phenomena which it was not specifically designed to predict. I discuss these ideas with particular reference to cosmological theories. (shrink)

Ruth Macklin argued that dignity is nothing more than respect for persons or their autonomy. During the COVID-19 pandemic, difficult decisions are being made about the allocation of scarce resources. Respect for autonomy cannot justify rationing decisions. Justice can be invoked to justify rationing. However, this leaves an uncomfortable tension between the principles. Dignity is not a useless concept because it is able to account for why we respect autonomy and for why it can be legitimate to override autonomy in (...) times of critical care resource shortages. Dignity affirms the worth of the human individual as a meaning-making embodied subject, who is always in relationship to others, the world, time, and transcendence, and who realizes their dignity through their moral behaviour. Such an understanding means people should be helped to make morally right decisions about their own treatment, which may include forgoing potentially beneficial treatment for the good of others. Respect for dignity does not require fulfilling the morally wrong choices of one who insists on treatment at the expense of others. Dignity also protects the discretion of clinicians to make decisions appropriate to their competence by prohibiting the application of broad-based criteria such as age. (shrink)

When states are required to compensate victim groups for the historic wrongs they have committed, how should the compensation due be calculated? It seems that alongside the counterfactual world in which the wrongdoing never occurred, we should also consider the counterfactual world in which the wrongdoing has occurred, but the victims have responded to it in a prudent way. Under tort law, the damages a victim can claim are reduced if they are judged to have been contributorily negligent, thereby exacerbating (...) the harm they have suffered. The paper considers four reasons why victim groups could not be expected to respond collectively to injustice in a way that outsiders might judge to be prudent. 1. The wrongdoing has destroyed their capacity to act as a group agent. 2. The wrongdoing has inflicted psychological traumas that lead them to make poor decisions. 3. They would need to violate a moral norm that is deeply embedded in their culture. 4. They would need to adopt policies that risk inflicting severe injustice on an internal minority. In many instances of historic injustice, one or more of these reasons apply. So although in principle victims’ behaviour is relevant when compensation is being calculated, we must be very cautious in using that doctrine to assess real cases. (shrink)