Most people agree that inflicting unnecessary suffering upon animals is wrong. Many fewer people, including among ethicists, agree that painlessly killing animals is necessarily wrong. The most commonly cited reason is that death (without pain, fear, distress) is not bad for them in a way that matters morally, or not as significantly as it does for persons, who are self-conscious, make long-term plans and have preferences about their own future. Animals, at least those that are not persons, lack a morally (...) significant interest in continuing to live. At the same time, some argue that existence itself can be good, insofar as one’s life is worth living. For animals, a good life can offset a quick, if early, death. So, it seems to follow that breeding happy animals that will be (prematurely) killed can be a good thing overall. Insofar as slaughter and sale makes it economically sustainable to raise new ones, who would otherwise not exist, raising and killing animals for food who will have lives worth living is good overall. It benefits them as well as consumers, and makes the world better by adding to the sum of happiness. The process of raising and killing animals with positive welfare produces a sequence of replacement that maintains or increases overall welfare, all else being equal (assuming in particular no overall negative impact on the welfare of other parties). Call this the Replaceability Argument (RA) and the ensuing controversy the Replaceability Problem (RP). This is a problem at the crossroads of the ethics of killing, agricultural ethics, procreation ethics, and population ethics. (shrink)

L'ouvre de Diderot échappe aux catégories habituelles. Elle se développe dans un temps où les genres littéraires sont en crise. Dans ses romans et ses contes, les dialogues se chevauchent, les narrateurs se multiplient, les êtres de fiction côtoient des personnages historiques (oui, Rameau avait bien un neveu)... Du vivant de leur auteur, peu de textes parurent autrement que dans la clandestinité ou la confidentialité. Liberté d'invention, diffusion restreinte : sans doute tient-on là les raisons pour lesquelles Diderot n'a pas (...) été considéré comme un écrivain majeur aussi rapidement que le furent Voltaire ou Rousseau. Mais le temps a fait son ouvre. Aujourd'hui, c'est le génie et le visionnaire que l'on invoque en lisant ses récits presque entièrement composés de dialogues et où le narrateur, ironique, fantaisiste, ne se fait jamais oublier. Avec les célèbres échanges de Lui et de Moi dans Le Neveu de Rameau, avec ceux de Jacques le fataliste, de son maître et de leurs comparses, et avec ceux, moins connus, de l'Entretien d'un père avec ses enfants ou encore de Mystification : Diderot, auteur, narrateur et personnage, joue de l'illusion romanesque et de ses ficelles. Mais on est bien au-delà du simple jeu de société. Avec ses récits, Diderot parvient à transmettre les questions des Lumières à l'échelle des sentiments humains - amitié, désir, amour - et des individus. (shrink)

Previous research has found that funding disparities are driven by applications’ final impact scores and that only a portion of the black/white funding gap can be explained by bibliometrics and topic choice. Using National Institutes of Health R01 applications for council years 2014–2016, we examine assigned reviewers’ preliminary overall impact and criterion scores to evaluate whether racial disparities in impact scores can be explained by application and applicant characteristics. We hypothesize that differences in commensuration—the process of combining criterion scores into (...) overall impact scores—disadvantage black applicants. Using multilevel models and matching on key variables including career stage, gender, and area of science, we find little evidence for racial disparities emerging in the process of combining preliminary criterion scores into preliminary overall impact scores. Instead, preliminary criterion scores fully account for racial disparities—yet do not explain all of the variability—in preliminary overall impact scores. (shrink)

This paper argues that contemporary philosophical literature on meaning in life has important implications for the debate about our obligations to non-human animals. If animal lives can be meaningful, then practices including factory farming and animal research might be morally worse than ethicists have thought. We argue for two theses about meaning in life: that the best account of meaningful lives must take intentional action to be necessary for meaning—an individual’s life has meaning if and only if the individual acts (...) intentionally in ways that contribute to finally valuable states of affairs; and that this first thesis does not entail that only human lives are meaningful. Because non-human animals can be intentional agents of a certain sort, our account yields the verdict that many animals’ lives can be meaningful. We conclude by considering the moral implications of these theses for common practices involving animals. (shrink)

Recognized as one of the greatest philosophers in classical China, Chu Hsi is especially known in the West through translations of one of his many works, theChin-su Lu. Julia Ching, a noted scholar of Neo-Confucian thought, provides the first book-length examination of Chu-Hsi's religious thought, based on extensive reading in both primary and secondary sources.

Non-perfect separably closed fields are stable, and not superstable. As a result, not all types can be ranked. We develop here a new tool, a "semi-rank", which takes values in the non-negative reals, and gives a sufficient condition for forking of types. This semi-rank is built up from a transcendence function, analogous to the one considered by Kolchin in the context of differentially closed fields. It yields some orthogonality and stratification results. /// Un corps séparablement clos non algébriquement clos est (...) stable sans être superstable. Cela signifie que seuls certains de ses types sont rangés. Nous développons un autre outil, un "semi-rang" à valeurs réelles, qui donne un critère de déviation des types. Ce semi-rang est construit à partir d'un analogue de la fonction de Kolchin associée à un type au-dessus d'un corps différentiel. Il produit des résultats de stratification des modèles et des résultats d'orthogonalité. (shrink)

This article defends a relational account of personhood. I argue that the structure of personhood consists of dyadic relations between persons who can wrong or be wronged by one another, even if some of them lack moral competence. I draw on recent work on directed duties to outline the structure of moral communities of persons. The upshot is that we can construct an inclusive theory of personhood that can accommodate nonhuman persons based on shared community membership. I argue that, once (...) we unpack the internal relation between directed duties, moral status, and flourishing, relations can ground personhood and include nonhuman animals. (shrink)

Most people believe that suffering is intrinsically bad. In conjunction with facts about our world and plausible moral principles, this yields a pro tanto obligation to reduce suffering. This is the intuitive starting point for the moral argument in favor of interventions to prevent wild animal suffering. If we accept the moral principle that we ought, pro tanto, to reduce the suffering of all sentient creatures, and we recognize the prevalence of suffering in the wild, then we seem committed to (...) the existence of such a pro tanto obligation. Of course, competing values such as the aesthetic, scientific or moral values of species, biodiversity, naturalness or wildness, might be relevant to the all-things-considered case for or against intervention. Still, many argue that, even if we were to give some weight to such values, no plausible theory could resist the conclusion that WAS is overridingly important. This article is concerned with large-scale interventions to prevent WAS and their tractability and the deep epistemic problem they raise. We concede that suffering gives us a reason to prevent it where it occurs, but we argue that the nature of ecosystems leaves us with no reason to predict that interventions would reduce, rather than exacerbate, suffering. We consider two interventions, based on gene editing technology, proposed as holding promise to prevent WAS; raise epistemic concerns about them; discuss their potential moral costs; and conclude by proposing a way forward: to justify interventions to prevent WAS, we need to develop models that predict the effects of interventions on biodiversity, ecosystem functioning, and animals’ well-being. (shrink)

Is suffering really bad? The late Derek Parfit argued that we all have reasons to want to avoid future agony and that suffering is in itself bad both for the one who suffers and impersonally. Nietzsche denied that suffering was intrinsically bad and that its value could even be impersonal. This paper has two aims. It argues against what I call ‘Realism about the Value of Suffering’ by drawing from a broadly Nietzschean debunking of our evaluative attitudes, showing that a (...) recently influential response to the debunking challenge (the appeal to phenomenal introspection) fails. It also argues that a Nietzschean approach is well suited to support the challenge and is bolstered by the empirical literature. As strangers to ourselves, we cannot know whether suffering is really intrinsically bad for us. (shrink)

Urban animals can benefit from living in cities, but this also makes them vulnerable as they increasingly depend on the advantages of urban life. This article has two aims. First, I provide a detailed analysis of the concept of captivity and explain why it matters to nonhuman animals—because and insofar as many of them have a (non-substitutable) interest in freedom. Second, I defend a surprising implication of the account—pushing the boundaries of the concept while the boundaries of cities and human (...) activities expand. I argue for the existence of the neglected problem of pervasive captivity, of which urban wildlife is an illustration. Many urban animals are confined, controlled and dependent, therefore often captive of expanding urban areas. While I argue that captivity per se is value-neutral, I draw the ethical and policy implications of harmful pervasive captivity. (shrink)

Can animals be agents? Do they want to be free? Can they have meaningful lives? If so, should we change the way we treat them? This paper offers an account of animal agency and of two continuums: between human and nonhuman agency, and between wildness and captivity. It describes how a wide range of human activities impede on animals’ freedom and argues that, in doing so, we deprive a wide range of animals of opportunities to exercise their agency in ways (...) that can give meaning to their lives. (shrink)

A growing literature argues that animals can act for moral reasons without being responsible. I argue that the literature often fails to maintain a clear distinction between moral behavior and moral agency, and I formulate a dilemma: either animals are less moral or they are more responsible than the literature suggests. If animals can respond to moral reasons, they are responsible according to an influential view of moral responsibility–Quality of Will. But if they are responsible, as some argue, costly implications (...) must be acknowledged. If, however, they should not be considered responsible, then we may have to reassess the meaning of animal morality. I discuss ways to eschew responsibility or to tailor it to animals and argue that each requires a revised conception of animal morality. (shrink)

Government supported digitalization initiatives with high expectations have motivated scholars from differing cultures to work together. Often, however, such collaboration results in critical and annoying ethical conflicts. Three examples are depicted. A key introduction to Chinese ethics is followed by discussion of major differences in ethical concepts between Western society and Chinese society. Chinese, instead of focusing on actions (task or matter) focus on relationships. We recommend rethinking Chinese ethics concepts as part of a discussion of communication ethics in general. (...) In addressing virtual reality and communication ethics, we believe some vital conclusions might be reached in the understanding of ethical problems raised by information technology. (shrink)

Starting from a distinction between intrinsic and final value, I explore the implications of the supervenience of final value on extrinsic properties regarding moral status. I make a case for ‘extrinsic moral status’ based on ‘extrinsic final value’. I show that the assumption of ‘moral individualism’, that moral status supervenes merely on intrinsic properties, is misguided, and results from a conflation of intrinsic with final value. I argue that at least one extrinsic property, namely vulnerability, can be the basis of (...) both final value and moral status, and that dependence on such extrinsic properties is compatible with the requirement of agent-neutrality. (shrink)

Animals who live in cities must coexist with us. They are, as a result, entitled to the conditions of their flourishing. This article argues that, as the boundaries of cities and urban areas expand, the boundaries of our conception of captivity should expand too. Urbanization can undermine animals’ freedoms, hence their ability to live good lives. I draw the implications of an account of “pervasive captivity” against the background of the Capabilities Approach. I construe captivity, including that of urban animals, (...) as affecting a range of animal capabilities, understood as freedoms, and I address some tensions within Nussbaum’s treatment of human-animal conflicts. Using the Capabilities Approach as a guide, I will attempt to motivate a convergence between habitat preservation in urbanized environments, urban design guided by justice, and the individual freedoms of animals. (shrink)

I examine the two-level utilitarian case for humane animal agriculture (by R. M. Hare and Gary Varner) and argue that it fails on its own terms. The case states that, at the ‘intuitive level’ of moral thinking, we can justify raising and killing animals for food, regarding them as replaceable, while treating them with respect. I show that two-level utilitarianism supports, instead, alternatives to animal agriculture. First, the case for humane animal agriculture does not follow from a commitment to two-level (...) utilitarianism combined with a commitment to respecting animal lives. Secondly, the two-level utilitarian case falls prey to a compartmentalization problem and cannot uphold both respect and replaceability. What I call ‘humane lives’ are not appropriately valued by the lights of two-level utilitarianism itself. (shrink)

In, Marker and Steinhorn characterized models of an o‐minimal theory such that all types over M realized in N are definable. In this article we characterize pairs of algebraically closed valued fields satisfying the same property. In o‐minimal theories, a pair of models for which all 1‐types over M realized in N are definable has already the desired property. Although it is true that if M is an algebraically closed valued field such that all 1‐types over M are definable then (...) all types over M are definable, we build a counterexample for the relative statement, i.e., we show for any that there is a pair of algebraically closed valued fields such that all n‐types over M realized in N are definable but there is an ‐type over M realized in N which is not definable. (shrink)

We study the model theory of fields k carrying a henselian valuation with real closed residue field. We give a criteria for elementary equivalence and elementary inclusion of such fields involving the value group of a not necessarily definable valuation. This allows us to translate theories of such fields to theories of ordered abelian groups, and we study the properties of this translation. We also characterize the first-order definable convex subgroups of a given ordered abelian group and prove that the (...) definable real valuation rings of k are in correspondence with the definable convex subgroups of the value group of a certain real valuation of k. (shrink)

This paper begins with a contrast between two different views about whether the five sensory consciousnesses are accompanied by vikalpa. For the Abhidharmakośa, the five sensory consciousnesses are accompanied by the svabhāva-vikalpa whose nature is vitarka; but for Yogācāra, the five sensory consciousnesses are without that particular kind of svabhāva-vikalpa because vitarka is regarded as belonging merely to the mental consciousness. My hypothesis for explaining such difference is that Yogācāra assigns that particular kind of svabhāva-vikalpa to mental consciousness rather than (...) to the five sensory consciousnesses. I then look for possible functions of vitarka-vicāra that could map to svabhāva-vikalpa: (a) conceptual vitarka-vicāra in an unconcentrated state; (b) conceptual vitarka-vicāra in a concentrated state; (c) nonconceptual vitarka-vicāra in an unconcentrated state; (d) non-conceptual vitarka-vicāra in a concentrated state. I argue that the svabhāva-vikalpa in the Abhidharmakośa should map to (c) and (d), which in Yogācāra maps to mental perception (mānasapratyakṣa) stipulated by Dignāga. This refers to the discernment of the shape of a cognitive object in the foreground against the background. I end this paper with some general observations about why Yogācāra maps the svabhāvavikapla to the mental consciousness, and about the different senses covered by the Buddhist notion of vikalpa, which is broader than the sense of "conceptualization" as we now understand it. (shrink)

This study uses a rational ethical decision-making framework to examine the influence of moral intensity (potential harm and social pressure) on whistleblowing intention and behaviour using organisational commitment as a moderator. A scenario was developed, and an online questionnaire was used to conduct an empirical analysis on the responses of 533 participants. The mean age and years of work experience of the respondents were 31 and 8.2 years, respectively. The results show, first, that while moral intensity is correlated with whistleblowing (...) intention, only the potential harm is positively correlated with such intention. Second, potential harm and social pressure differentially affect whistleblower choice of using an internal or external channel. Third, organisational commitment has a moderated mediation effect among moral intensity, whistleblowing intention and behaviour. Fourth, whistleblowers may be grouped into four conceptual types: indifferent, rebel, mature and spoil. Finally, theoretical and managerial implications of the findings are discussed. (shrink)

Commentary on Kyle Johannsen, Wild Animal Ethics (Routledge, 2020). I want to unpack what we should understand by wild animal well-being, and how different interpretations of what matters about it shape the sorts of interventions we endorse. I will not offer a theory of wild animal well-being or even take a stance on the best approach to theories of well-being as they pertain to wild animals. My aim is to bring into view a concern that WAE has largely overlooked: agency (...) and freedom. To Johannsen’s credit, the issue of liberties does feature in his Wild Animal Ethics (2020) (36–39, 41, 47). The interventions that he favors are those that, for a given amount of harm prevention, involve fewer liberty infringements. Liberties can act, to an extent, as constraints on permissible interventions. For all that, Johannsen’s primary focus remains welfare in a sense that does not appear to give much consideration to agency. Fortunately, his approach is open-ended enough to accommodate some of my concerns. My hope is that he sees them as possible ways of specifying the duties of beneficence, if not justice, that he rightly argues we have to wild animals. (shrink)

Understanding the meaning of a sentence is crucial for Buddhists because they put so much emphasis on understanding the verbal expressions of the Buddha. But this can be problematic under their metaphysical framework of momentariness, and their epistemological framework of multiple consciousnesses. This paper starts by reviewing the theory of five states of mind in the Yogācārabhūmi, and then investigates debates among medieval East Asian Yogācāra thinkers about how various consciousnesses work together to understand the meaning of a sentence. The (...) major differences between the various explanations proffered lie in the minimum number of types of consciousnesses involved, and the minimum linguistic marks cognized, in order for one to understand a sentence consisting of four Chinese characters. I show that in these disputes, two points are key: First, the role played by the mental consciousness that arises simultaneously with a sensory consciousness: that is to say, whether a sensory consciousness should still be regarded as essential for understanding, if the simultaneous mental consciousness also cognizes the same mark. Second, whether the syntactic structure of a sentence is taken into consideration: that is to say, whether there is a separate determination of understanding regarding each character, or there is no determination until one has heard two or more characters and takes them as a syntactically meaningful unit. (shrink)

Questions of cultural representation and contestation, central to political and ethical thinking after the so-called ‘cultural turn’ of recent decades, have if anything intensified in a twenty-first century of new media, globalization, migration, and ever renewed struggles over identity, memory, and cultural performance. At the same time, theoretical debate is increasingly marked by a concern to retrieve a properly political sphere of action as such. The essays collected in this interdisciplinary volume aim to break new ground by exploring the critical (...) space between the apparently enduring political vitality of cultural representation and contestation today, on the one hand, and the possible limits of a ‘cultural’ politics, on the other. Combining concrete researches and theoretical reflection, and including a final chapter exploring the issues raised by the essays, this volume will be of interest to those in the disciplines of cultural studies, sociology, political philosophy and ethics. (shrink)

Journal of Mathematical Logic, Volume 22, Issue 02, August 2022. We show that every definable nested family of closed and bounded subsets of a P-minimal field K has nonempty intersection. As an application we answer a question of Darnière and Halupczok showing that P-minimal fields satisfy the “extreme value property”: for every closed and bounded subset [math] and every interpretable continuous function [math] (where [math] denotes the value group), f(U) admits a maximal value. Two further corollaries are obtained as a (...) consequence of their work. The first one shows that every interpretable subset of [math] is already interpretable in the language of rings, answering a question of Cluckers and Halupczok. This implies in particular that every P-minimal field is polynomially bounded. The second one characterizes those P-minimal fields satisfying a classical cell preparation theorem as those having definable Skolem functions, generalizing a result of Mourgues. (shrink)

Social change is slow and difficult. Social change for animals is formidably slow and difficult. Advocates and scholars alike have long tried to change attitudes and convince the public that eating animals is wrong. The topic of norms and social change for animals has been neglected, which explains in part the relative failure of the animal protection movement to secure robust support reflected in social and legal norms. Moreover, animal ethics has suffered from a disproportionate focus on individual attitudes and (...) behavior at the expense of collective behavior, social change, and empirical psychology. If what we want to change is behavior on a large scale, norms are important tools. This article reviews an account of social norms that provides insights into the possibility and limitations of social change for animals, approaching animal protection as a problem of reverse social engineering. It highlights avenues for future work from this neglected perspective. (shrink)

This dissertation argues that the Yogâcāra Buddhism transmitted by the Indian translator Paramârtha (Ch. Zhendi 真諦) underwent a significant transformation due to the influence of his later Chinese interpreters, a phenomenon to which previous scholars failed to paid enough attention. I begin with showing two contrary interpretations of Paramârtha’s notion of jiexing 解性. The traditional interpretation glosses jiexing in terms of “original awakening” (benjue 本覺) in the Awakening of Faith and hence betrays its strong tie to that text. In contrast, (...) a contrary interpretation of jiexing is preserved in a Dunhuang fragment Taishō No. 2805 (henceforth abbreviated as T2805). The crucial part of this dissertation consists in demonstrating that T2805 and the Awakening of Faith represent two competing lineages of the interpreters of Paramârtha. The first clue is that modern scholars have voiced objection to the traditional attribution of the Awakening of Faith to Paramârtha. In addition, I discovered that striking similarities exist between T2805 and Paramârtha’s corpus with respect to terminology, style of phrasing, and doctrine. I further draw attention to the historical testimonies about two different doctrinal views held by Paramârtha’s interpreters. Therefore, I argue that there were two lineages in the name of Paramârtha’s disciples around 590 CE: the indirect lineage interpreted Paramârtha through the lens of the Awakening of Faith; and the direct lineage—represented by T2805—preserved Paramârtha’s original teachings but died out prematurely. Later Chinese Buddhist tradition mistakenly regards the indirect lineage as Paramârtha’s true heir and attributes the Awakening of Faith to Paramârtha. This implies that Paramârtha may have agreed with Xuanzang 玄奘 (600-664) much more than scholars used to assume. For example, Xuanzang’s characterization of the notion of “aboriginal uncontaminated seeds” looks very similar to how Paramârtha depicts jiexing. It also implies that we should distinguish the strong sense of the notion of “tathāgatagarbha” in the Awakening of Faith from its weak sense. The fact that even Vasubandhu endorses the weak sense of “tathāgatagarbha” strongly challenges the received wisdom that Yogâcāra and Tathāgatagarbha were two distinct and antagonistic trends of thought in India. (shrink)

Diderot escreve, na Enciclopédia, um longo verbete, “Tear de meias”, no qual compara o tear a um raciocínio cuja conclusão seria o têxtil. Ele retoma esta comparação na Refutação de Helvétius: ali, é o próprio Leibniz que se torna uma máquina de reflexão, similar ao “tear de meias”. A opção materialista do homem máquina retoma uma tradição que assimila o texto ao tecido. Encontramos a mesma imagem no Fausto de Goethe, que é citado por Freud em A interpretação dos sonhos, (...) e na novela de Henry James O motivo no tapete. A invenção é sempre cruzamento, tecelagem e mestiçagem, numa interação entre criação técnica e representação da atividade intelectual. O sistema de programação dos teares foi posteriormente adaptado às primeiras máquinas analíticas, ancestrais de nossos computadores atuais. A Enciclopédia teorizou esta interação, reabilitando os teares e concebendo o pensamento como um trabalho. (shrink)

Consider k((G)) in the language of valued fields enriched with a unary predicate for the set of constants and another one for the cross-section. For perfect k, this structure is undecidable if it does not satisfy Kaplansky's conditions.

The theory of immediate pairs of Henselian valued fields, with a given residual theory (of characteristic zero) and a given theory of valuation group (nonzero), is undecidable and has 2ℵ0 completions.

We study the structures $$, where $K$ is an ordered field and $K^\mathrm{r}$ its real closure, in the language of ordered fields with an additional unary predicate for the subfield $K$. Two such structures $$ and $$ are not necessarily elementary equivalent when $K$ and $L$ are. But with some saturation assumption on $K$ and $L$, then the two structures become equivalent, and we give a description of the complete theory.

An Ax-Kochen-Ershov principle for intermediate structures between valued groups and valued fields. We will consider structures that we call valued B-groups and which are of the form $\langle G, B, *, v\rangle$ where - G is an abelian group, - B is an ordered group, - v is a valuation defined on G taking its values in B, - * is an action of B on G satisfying: ∀ x ∈ G ∀ b ∈ B v(x * b) = v(x) (...) · b. The analysis of Kaplanski for valued fields can be adapted to our context and allows us to formulate an Ax-Kochen-Ershov principle for valued B-groups: we axiomatise those which are in some sense existentially closed and also obtain many of their model-theoretical properties. Let us mention some applications: 1. Assume that v(x) = v(nx) for every integer n ≠ 0 and x ∈ G, B is solvable and acts on G in such a way that, for the induced action, $\mathbb{Z}[B] \setminus \{0\}$ embeds in the automorphism group of G. Then $\langle G, B, *, v\rangle$ is decidable if and only if B is decidable as an ordered group. 2. Given a field k and an ordered group B, we consider the generalised power series field k((B)) endowed with its canonical valuation. We consider also the following structure: $\mathbf{M} = \langle k((B))_+, S, v, \times \upharpoonright_{k((B))\times S}\rangle,$ where k((B)) + is the additive group of k((B)), S is a unary predicate interpreting ${T^b| b \in B}$ , and $\times \upharpoonright_{k((B))\times S}$ is the multiplication restricted to k((B))× S, structure which is a reduct of the valued field k((B)) with its canonical cross section. Then our result implies that if B is solvable and decidable as an ordered group, then M is decidable. 3. A valued B-group has a residual group and our Ax-Kochen-Ershov principle remains valid in the context of expansions of residual group and value group. In particular, by adding a residual order we obtain new examples of solvable ordered groups having a decidable theory. (shrink)

This article examines how distrust drives exchange. We propose a theoretical framework integrating the literature of trust into cultural sociology and use a case of patients giving hongbao (red envelopes containing money) to doctors in China to examine how distrust drives different forms of unofficial exchange. Based on more than two years’ ethnography, we found that hongbao exchanges between Chinese patients and doctors were, ironically, bred by the public’s generalized distrust in doctors’ moral ethics. In the absence of institutional assurance, (...) Chinese patients drew on the cultural logic of particularism and its associated cultural repertoire to induce fidelity from their physicians. They mobilized interpersonal networks to function as assurance and presented hongbao as a return of favor to the doctors. This form of exchange is gifting-oriented. Alternatively, if there were no interpersonal networks to rely on, they proactively offered hongbao to doctors at arm’s length in an attempt to personalize the relationship to seek assurance and abate their anxieties. This form of exchange is bribery-oriented. Both forms of exchange co-existed when there was one-way generalized distrust manifested from patients to doctors. When doctors also developed generalized distrust in patients, arm’s length exchanges declined, leaving embedded exchanges as the dominant form. Our study asserts the central role of culture in constituting exchange behaviors and the importance of institutions in shaping the form of exchange. It contributes to the midrange theory of trust, generating a number of hypotheses for future research on the relationships among culture, institutions, distrust, assurance, and illicit exchange. (shrink)

Dans On What Matters Parfit défénd un objectivisme moral sur lequel il espère que les philosophes finiront par converger. Au cœur de cet espoir sont des vérités normatives irréductibles telles que l’affirmation que la souffrance est intrinsèquement mauvaise. Parfit se demande si Nietzsche menace son édifice et lui consacre un chapitre entier chapeautant la discussion du désaccord moral et de la convergence, et conclut que Nietzsche soit n’est pas en vrai désaccord, soit ne raisonne pas dans des conditions satisfaisantes. Je (...) mets ici à l’épreuve la prédiction de convergence de Parfit et montre que Nietzsche pose une menace encore plus sérieuse que ne le prétend Parfit. Je montre que l’idée que la souffrance peut être bonne est intelligible, cohérente et plus complexe que la lecture de Parfit ne le révèle. (shrink)

This paper challenges a widespread, if tacit, assumption of animal ethics, namely, that the only properties of entities that matter to their moral status are intrinsic, cross‐specific properties—typically psychological capacities. According to moral individualism (Rachels 1990; McMahan 2002; 2005), the moral status of an individual, and how to treat him or her, should only be a function of his or her individual properties. I focus on the fundamental assumption of moral individualism, which I call intrinsicalism. On the challenged view, pigs, (...) puppies and babies, insofar as they are intrinsically similar in morally relevant respects are equally deserving of having their interests satisfied (Norcross 2004). Moreover, relationships—merely agent-relative—are assumed to be irrelevant to moral status. I argue that, while some intrinsic properties are indeed fundamentally relevant, the principled exclusion of extrinsic properties (in virtue of extrinsicness) is unwarranted. From uncontroversial assumptions about supervenience, final value, and moral status, I argue for the relevance of extrinsic properties to moral status based on vulnerability and “reasonable partiality”, as illustrated by pet-keeping. (shrink)

A chain-closed field is defined as a chainable field (i.e. a real field such that, for all n ∈ N, Σ K2n+1 ≠ Σ K2n) which does not admit any "faithful" algebraic extension, and can also be seen as a field having a Henselian valuation ν such that the residue field K/ν is real closed and the value group ν K is odd divisible with |ν K/2ν K| = 2. If K admits only one such valuation, we show that f (...) ∈ K(X) is in $\mathbf{\Sigma} K(X)^{2n} \operatorname{iff}$ for any real algebraic extension L of $K, "f(L) \subseteq \mathbf{\Sigma}L^{2n}"$ holds. The conclusion is also true for K = R((t)) (a chainable but not chain-closed field), and in the case n = 1 it holds for several variables and any real field K. (shrink)

In this book, Julia Ching offers a survey of over 4,000 years of Chinese civilization through an examination of the relationship between kingship and mysticism. She investigates the sage-king myth and ideal, arguing that institutions of kingship were bound up with cultivation of trance states and communication with spirits. Over time, the sage-king myth became a model for the actual ruler. As a paradigm, it was also appropriated by private individuals who strove for wisdom without becoming kings. As the (...) Confucian tradition interacted with the Taoist and the Buddhist, the religious character of spiritual and mystical cultivation became more pronounced. But the sage-king idea continued, promoting expectations of benevolent despotism rather than democratization in Chinese civilization. (shrink)

We consider separably closed fields of characteristic $p > 0$ and fixed imperfection degree as modules over a skew polynomial ring. We axiomatize the corresponding theory and we show that it is complete and that it admits quantifier elimination in the usual module language augmented with additive functions which are the analog of the $p$-component functions.

A chain-closed field is defined as a chainable field which does not admit any "faithful" algebraic extension, and can also be seen as a field having a Henselian valuation $\nu$ such that the residue field $K/\nu$ is real closed and the value group $\nu K$ is odd divisible with $|\nu K/2\nu K| = 2$. If $K$ admits only one such valuation, we show that $f \in K$ is in $\mathbf{\Sigma} K^{2n} \operatorname{iff}$ for any real algebraic extension $L$ of $K, "f (...) \subseteq \mathbf{\Sigma}L^{2n}"$ holds. The conclusion is also true for $K = \mathbf{R})$, and in the case $n = 1$ it holds for several variables and any real field $K$. (shrink)

This study aims to disclose how the magnetic resonance imaging neuroimaging approach has been applied in education studies, and what kind of learning themes has been investigated in the reviewed MRI neuroimaging research. Based on the keywords “brain or neuroimaging or neuroscience” and “MRI or diffusion tensor imaging or white matter or gray matter or resting-state,” a total of 25 papers were selected from the subject areas “Educational Psychology” and “Education and Educational Research” from the Web of Science and Scopus (...) from 2000 to 2019. Content analysis showed that MRI neuroimaging and learning were studied under the following three major topics and nine subtopics: cognitive function, science education, and brain development. As for the type of MRI neuroimaging research, the most frequently used approaches were functional MRI, followed by structural MRI and DTI, although the choice of approach was often motivated by the specific research question. Research development trends show that the neural plasticity theme has become more prominent recently. This study concludes that in educational research, the MRI neuroimaging approach provides objective and empirical evidence to connect learning processes, outcomes, and brain mechanisms. (shrink)

L. van den Dries proved that the theory of n-valued rings has a model companion. We show here that this result is still true when the valuation rings are required to satisfy given inclusion relations (we restrict ourselves to the case of residual characteristic zero).

We study the structures $(K \subset K^\mathrm{r})$ , where K is an ordered field and Kr its real closure, in the language of ordered fields with an additional unary predicate for the subfield K. Two such structures $(K \subset K^\mathrm{r})$ and $(L \subset L^\mathrm{r})$ are not necessarily elementary equivalent when K and L are. But with some saturation assumption on K and L, then the two structures become equivalent, and we give a description of the complete theory.

C. U. Jensen suggested the following construction, starting from a field $K: K_0 = K, K_{\alpha + 1} = K_\alpha ((X_\alpha)), K_\alpha = \bigcup K_\beta$ if $\alpha$ is limit and asked when two fields $k_\alpha$ and $K_\beta$ are equivalent. We give a complete answer in the case of a field $K$ of characteristic 0.

C. U. Jensen suggested the following construction, starting from a fieldK:and asked when two fieldsKαandKβare equivalent. We give a complete answer in the case of a fieldKof characteristic 0.

In the third edition of ‘Practical Ethics’ (2011), Peter Singer reexamines the so-called “replaceability argument,” according to which merely sentient beings, as opposed to persons (self-conscious and with a robust sense of time), are replaceable—it is in principle permissible to kill them provided that they live pleasant lives that they would not have had otherwise and that they be replaced by equally happy beings. On this view, existence is a benefit and death is not a harm. Singer’s challenge is to (...) avoid (i) the replaceability of persons while preserving the replaceability of merely sentient beings, (ii) the implication that parents are morally required to procreate if they can have happy children, and (iii) to do avoid these implications without having the proposed solution (the “debit view” of preferences) imply negative utilitarianism, or the conclusion that a nonsentient universe is better than any sentient universe. I review Singer’s changing views since 1975 and I argue that his attempt to avoid the replaceability of persons fails: either both non-persons and persons are replaceable or neither are. Singer can only avoid this conclusion by appealing to controversial metaethical claims (attitude-independent moral objectivism) and/or giving up on essential features of utilitarianism. (shrink)

This paper advocates learned in the religious context of liberation, the "theology," a concept can be reasonably applied to religious traditions other than Christianity. According to that "beyond the world community and how the phenomenon of contact" as a general theological issues, and Consciousness-only school of Buddhism, one of the major literature of the "photo Mahayana theory of" how to respond to this issue. In the "photo Mahayana theory" in this issue of "inaction of the Dharma Realm to save sentient (...) beings in the phenomenal world and promising" in the form of presentation. This stands for "photo Mahayana theory" to this problem, but through three Buddha body of theory. In short, the body of law to the Buddha Dharma and sentient beings as a contact intermediary. On the one hand, body of law as a Buddha in the phenomenal world to attend the results, which do not transcend the phenomenal world; other hand, the body of law were no wisdom to properly recognize the judicial system, and therefore associated with the Dharma Realm. Further, the body of law can not smell, good enough for practical enlightenment through the body of living beings must engage with the changes in the body, while the body of law and the relationship between the other two, is equivalent to no difference between the intellect and wisdom after that relationship. Finally, the "photo Mahayana theory" liberation school structure and Christianity's "Christology" of relief to make a simple comparison study architecture, and as a conclusion. This paper begins with arguing that within the larger context of soteriology, the notion of "theology" can be legitimately applied to other religious traditions than Christianity. Following this, I propose that the issue of how the realm of transcendence could relate to the realm of phenomenon can serve as an example of a general theological issue across religious boundaries. I then investigate how this issue is discussed in the Mahāyānasamgraha as a seminal text in the Buddhist Yogācāra tradition. In the Mahāyānasamgraha, the above issue is formulated as the question of how unconditioned Dharma-realm could save the sentient beings in the conditioned world. I argue that the asnwer provided in the Mahāyānasamgraha hinges on its theory of three bodies of the Buddha. In short, the Dharma-body bridges between the Dharma-realm and sentient beings. On the one hand, the Dharma-body is the result of a bodhisattva's enduring practice in the phenomenal world, and hence does not transcend over the phenomenal world; on the other hand, the Dharma-body correctly knows the Dharma- realm through the non-discriminating cognition , and hence relates to the Dharma-realm. Furthermore, since sentient beings cannot see the Dharma-body, they can be taught only by the Enjoyment-body and the Transformation-body of the Buddha. The relation between the Dharma-body and the other two bodies is identical to the relation between the non-discriminating cognition and the subsequently-acquired cognition . Finally, this paper ends with a brief comparison between the soteriological scheme in the Mahāyānasamgraha and the scheme reflected in the issue of Christology. (shrink)

It is commonly agreed that logic studies the form of arguments and that the concept of a consequence relation is based on the idea of truth-preservation in all models. Based on some observations about arguments involving conditionals, Brogaard and Salerno argue that the consequence relation should be defined in terms of truth-preservation within one fixed context. I will argue that Ichikawa’s contextualism for counterfactuals can be treated as an elucidation of what they have in mind. Instead of standing for or (...) against Stalnaker’s or Lewis’s semantics of counterfactuals, I will argue that the key to explaining the phenomena in question is the concept of a consequence relation. To support the point above, logical contextualism or relativism will be introduced and defended. I thus suggest that the concept of a consequence relation is sensitive to the context in which a certain argument is asserted. (shrink)