Church's thesis, that all reasonable definitions of “computability” are equivalent, is not usually thought of in terms of computability by acontinuouscomputer, of which the general-purpose analog computer (GPAC) is a prototype. Here we prove, under a hypothesis of determinism, that the analytic outputs of aC∞GPAC are computable by a digital computer.In [POE, Theorems 5, 6, 7, and 8], Pour-El obtained some related results. (The proof there of Theorem 7 depends on her Theorem 2, for which the proof in [POE] (...) is incorrect, but for which a correct proof is given in [LIR]. Also, the proof in [POE] of Theorem 8 depends on the unproved assertion that a solution of an algebraic differential equation must be analytic on an open subset of its domain. However, this assertion was later proved in [BRR].) As in [POE], we reduce the problem to a problem about solutions of certain systems of algebraic differential equations (ADE's). If such a system is nonsingular (i.e. if the “separant” does not vanish along the given solution), then the argument is very easy (see [VSD] for an even simpler situation), so that the essential difficulties arise fromsingularsystems. Our main tools in handling these difficulties are drawn from the excellent (and difficult) paper [DEL] by Denef and Lipshitz. The author especially wants to thank Leonard Lipshitz for his kind help in the preparation of the present paper.We emphasize here that our proof of the simulation result applies only to the GPAC as described below. The GPAC's form a natural subclass of the class of all analog computers, and are based on certain idealized components (“black boxes”), mostly associated with the technology of past decades. One can easily envisage other kinds of black boxes of an input-output character that would lead to different kinds of analog computers. (For example, one could incorporate delays, or spatial integrators in addition to the present temporal integrators, etc.) Whether digital simulation is possible for these “extended” analog computers poses a rich and challenging set of research questions. (shrink)

Teaching the nuances of ethical decision making is particularly challenging in fully online, asynchronous courses where real-time discussion is not an option. Digital simulations, in the context of an integrative online ethics course, can offer applied learning and assessment experiences. However, scholarship on the impact of digital simulations for teaching ethical decision making is limited. The purpose of this study is to explore whether digital simulation used as an assessment for ethical reasoning and complex decision making (...) is effective in helping business students heighten their awareness of values in tension and discern ethical paths to resolution. We conduct an exploratory analysis of two ethics simulations used in teaching nine graduate business ethics classes offered in an asynchronous, online format. We discuss the results in terms of the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics’ five-step ethical decision making framework and outline implications for teaching and future research on business ethics simulations. (shrink)

Research into the use of videogames in education is on the rise, and they are cementing their position as part of the modernized, digital classroom. Sustainability education has also become a subject of interest among environmentally minded game developers and understanding the educational impact of such games is rapidly becoming an important field. This study examined the educational potential of the digital simulated ecosystem known as Eco, in order to reveal how playing Eco might promote environmental literacy and (...) consciousness surrounding ecosystems. Qualitative data from 7 respondents were subjected to a thematic analysis, revealing two main themes that highlight both game-based learning outcomes as well as barriers against learning. The findings indicate that Eco is a viable tool for promoting environmental literacy about ecosystems, and suggestions for future implementation of Eco are provided. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article presents an ecolinguistic analysis of a popular digital simulation game, Animal Crossing: New Leaf. As the popularity and immersive capability of digital gaming continue...

In their article, Cho and Martinez-Martin (2023) argue that developers and users of digital simulacra for modelling health and disease should involve a continued focus on causality of health states...

Scientists of many disciplines use theoretical models to explain and predict the dynamics of the world. They often have to rely on digital computer simulations to draw predictions fromthe model. But to deliver phenomenologically adequate results, simulations deviate from the assumptions of the theoretical model. Therefore the role of simulations in scientific explanation demands itself an explanation. This paper analyzes the relation between real-world system, theoretical model, and simulation. It is argued that simulations do not explain processes in (...) the real world directly. The way in which simulations help explaining real-world processes is conceived as indirect, mediated by the theoretical model. Simulacra are characterized further, and turn out to be a priori measurable. This gives a clue to a better understanding of the epistemic role of computer simulations in scientific research. (shrink)

Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence What is the difference between a simulation of X and simply another instance of X? Is there a point at which the ‘‘virtual reality’’ of a model becomes the real thing? This paper examines these questions using cases taken from recent developments in evolutionary engineering and artificial life research. By implementing the Darwinian mechanism and setting it to work on a design problem, scientists and engineers find that evolution not only can improve (...) prior designs, but also produce novel technological solutions. Artificial life systems Tierra and Avida which operate at a higher level of abstraction than evolutionary engineering applications. I analyze simulation as a rational concept ‘‘S simulates R’’ and argue that it always includes some relevant property P, of R, that is captured but that there is always also some other that it omits, and that pragmatic factors fix what counts as relevant. The border between a simulation and an instance can change depending upon the context. I show that in one sense, evo-technology and artificial life simulate organic evolution, but in another relevant sense they are instances of evolution itself. Biologists can use such systems to experimentally test evolutionary hypotheses such as those involving the evolution of complex features and altruism. This analysis suggests lines for future research on broader questions about models classification and confirmation. (shrink)

If the twentieth century was the age of the world picture taken as a photograph of the Whole Earth from outer space, today’s observations of the planet are produced by means of computer simulation. Pandemic models are of paramount sociological interest in this respect, since modelling contagion is closely intertwined with modelling the material connectivities of social life. By envisioning the global dynamics of disease transmission, pandemic simulations enact the relationscapes of a transnational world. This article seeks to analyse (...) such an enactment: It asks how simulation methods can establish a particular relation to the social from within the social. To provide an answer to this question, and adopting Niklas Luhmann’s theory of world society, pandemic simulations are described as modes of global self-observation that can be specified factually, socially, spatially and temporally. They instantiate a ‘doubling of reality’ designed to apprehend the potential future threat of disease transmission along the pathways marked by global infrastructures. They constitute scopic regimes that virtually synthesize a global situation of universal communicability in order to turn the world into an object of political intervention. (shrink)

As a device used by scientists in the course of performing research, the digital computer might be considered a scientific instrument. But if so, what is it an instrument for? This paper explores a number of answers to this question, focusing on the use of computers in a simulating mode.

”This paper describes a new and innovative measure that is developed to predict workplace deviance through the measurement of Machiavellianism and Compliant Behavior. Two field studies were conducted to study the validity of the digital work simulation. In Study 1, support was found for the construct validity of the simulation. The constructs as measured with the simulation correlated significantly with self-reported measures of the constructs and were related to personality and self-esteem. Study 2 examined the criterion-related (...) validity of the simulation and showed that through the assessment of Machiavellianism the simulation was able to predict workplace deviance, and incrementally predicted organizational deviance over and above the Machiavellianism Personality Scale. Machiavellianism as measured with the simulation was less susceptible to social desirable answering compared to the Machiavellianism self-report. The paper finishes with study limitations, future research directions, and practical implications. (shrink)

Braun explores the use of digital twin technology in medicine with a particular emphasis on the question of how such simulations can represent a person.1 In defining some first conditions for ethically justifiable forms of representation of digital twins, he argues that digital twins do not threaten an embodied person, as long as that person retains control over their simulated representation via dynamic consent, and ideally with the option to choose both form and usage of the (...) class='Hi'>simulation. His thoughtful elaboration provides insight into the challenges inherent in interactions between a person and their digital twin, emphasising the modes of control required to respect personal modes of freedom. This individual-centric approach to the question of representation leaves out the important ethical consideration of ensuring that all, not merely some, can be represented. Braun describes dynamic consent as a necessary mode of control, arguing that where a person is unable to give consent, ‘such simulations threaten to become illegitimate representations. They would then shift the kind of interaction from representation to illegitimate forms of prediction or surveillance and thereby could lead to infringements to individual modes of freedom.’ Consequently, the implementation of digital twin technology in healthcare would seem to exclude the most vulnerable members of society from participation in and benefiting from medical innovation, …. (shrink)

Our digital technologies have inspired new ways of thinking about old religious topics. Digitalists include computer scientists, transhumanists, singularitarians, and futurists. Digitalists have worked out novel and entirely naturalistic ways of thinking about bodies, minds, souls, universes, gods, and life after death. Your Digital Afterlives starts with three digitalist theories of life after death. It examines personality capture, body uploading, and promotion to higher levels of simulation. It then examines the idea that reality itself is ultimately a (...) system of self-surpassing computations. On that view, you will have infinitely many digital lives across infinitely many digital worlds. Your Digital Afterlives looks at superhuman bodies and infinite bodies. Thinking of nature in purely computational terms has the potential to radically and positively change our understanding of life after death. (shrink)

I reply to seven commentaries on “The Virtual and the Real”. In response to Claus Beisbart, Jesper Juul, Peter Ludlow, and Neil McDonnell and Nathan Wildman, I clarify and develop my view that virtual are digital objects, with special attention to the nature of digital objects and data structures. In response to Alyssa Ney and Eric Schwitzgebel, I clarify and defend my spatial functionalism, with special attention to the connections between space and consciousness. In response to Marc Silcox, (...) I clarify and develop my view of the value of virtual worlds, with special attention to the case where we experience these worlds as virtual. (shrink)

The paper deals with an intellectual and historical approach to the changing meanings of the term “model” in life sciences. The author 1st tries to understand how modeling has gradually spread over life sciences then he particularly focus on the birth of mathematical modeling in this field. This quite new practice offers new insights on the old debate concerning the mathematization of life sciences. Nowadays, through computers, mathematics not only analyze or quantify but model things: what does it mean? The (...) question turns out to be dramatic as far as digital simulation is concerned. That is the reason why he choosed to study a particular case: the history of the individual plant mathematical modeling. On this case, one may discern various epistemological standpoints that caused various reactions to the emergence of computer simulation, from the 50s to the 90s. The author shows that philosophical views often play a role in the history of sciences, especially in the choice of supposed proper mathematical formalisms. This will indicate that contemporary discourses tend to echo each other. That is the reason why he feels authorized to address the Foucault’s concept—épistémè—to denote these convergences between the scientific and the philosophical discourses. Finally, it is suggested that this épistémè gradually is changing because one can currently observe the emergence of a “graphical” thought through these simulation experiments, which tends to replace a more functionalist thought. (shrink)

The distinction between analog and digital representation is reexamined; it emerges that a more fundamental distinction is that between symbolic and analog simulation. Analog simulation is analyzed in terms of a (near) isomorphism of causal structures between a simulating and a simulated process. It is then argued that a core concept, naturalistic analog simulation, may play a role in a bottom-up theory of adaptive behavior which provides an alternative to representational analyses. The appendix discusses some formal (...) conditions for naturalistic analog simulation. (shrink)

ITC technologies have come to comprehensively represent images and expectations of the future. Hopes of ongoing progress, economic growth, skill upgrading and possibly also democratisation are attached to new ICTs as well as fears of totalitarian control, alienation, job loss and insecurity. Currently, with the terms "Industry 4.0." and ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution”, public institutions, private institutions, and literature refer to the inchoate transformation of production of goods and services resulting from the application of a new wave of technological innovations: interconnected (...) collaborative robots; machine learning; Artificial Intelligence; 3D printers connected to digital development software; simulation of interconnected machines; integration of the information flow along the value chain; multidirectional communication between manufacturing processes and products. According to the main representations of Industry 4.0. by private and public institutions, its effects are expected to be mainly positive, for what regards productivity, economic opportunities and the future of work. The positive potentials now attributed to the new cycle of innovation evoke and expand those attributed to the previous waves of innovation linked to ITC technologies, and, even before, to the transition from Fordism to Post-Fordism. However, these transformations have so far not achieved any of the promises they raised. Improvements for workers in terms of work conditions, work performance and work relationships cannot be determined by any technical innovation in itself, being technological innovation always socially shaped. (shrink)

The credibility of digital computer simulations has always been a problem. Today, through the debate on verification and validation, it has become a key issue. I will review the existing theses on that question. I will show that, due to the role of epistemological beliefs in science, no general agreement can be found on this matter. Hence, the complexity of the construction of sciences must be acknowledged. I illustrate these claims with a recent historical example. Finally I temperate this (...) diversity by insisting on recent trends in environmental sciences and in industrial sciences. (shrink)

Digital twinning in medicine refers to the idea of simulating a person’s organs, muscles or perhaps their entire body, in order to arrive more effectively at accurate diagnoses, to make treatment recommendations that reflect chances of success and possible side-effects, and to better understand the long-term trajectory of an individual’s overall condition. Digital twins, in these ways, build on the recent movement toward personalised medicine,1 and they undoubtedly present us with exciting opportunities to advance our health. Of course, (...) the opportunities are accompanied by newfound challenges—a common refrain in discussions surrounding emerging technologies. In a recent article, Matthias Braun surveys numerous problems, including the precision of simulations, ownership and consent to the use of digital models, and issues of justice in assuring equitable access to novel medical systems.2 In particular, he places special emphasis on the notion of representation. According to Braun, proper representation naturally calls for correspondence—namely a precise model offering dynamic, real-time feedback as well as transparency, both for the patient and the practitioner, in terms of the data being employed. While technical challenges remain, these goals are quite clear and relatively uncontroversial. Where a host of questions arise, however, is in the discussion on the interaction between the represented persons and their simulations. Alongside questions regarding ownership of one’s digital twin, Braun raises the concern that ‘giving …. (shrink)

From the perspective of the system of systems development, system-level functional testing is required for designing subsystems. This study utilizes modeling and simulation techniques to analyze the operational behaviors of the subsystems and confirm data communication between them. The targeted system in the study is a naval combat system, which is a typical type of defense cyber-physical system. Three types of models were designed for the simulation testing of the NCS: a combat-management model for simulating the overall computational (...) activities, physical models to confirm the intrasubsystem behaviors, and data integration models to test the intersubsystem communications. These models are realized with the Model-View-ViewModel design pattern, which strongly facilitates graphical user interfaces being decoupled from model logic and data. We consider underwater combat scenarios as an application. Six significant physical subsystems within the NCS are simulated and tested: a ship-steering system, an inertial navigation system, a global navigation satellite system, a periscope, sonar systems, and a plotting board. We expect that the proposed work will play a principal role when analyzing the behaviors and communications of defense CPSs and providing an environment for functional testing as a digital twin. (shrink)

What is a “historical” video game, let alone a successful one? It is difficult to answer this question because all our definitions of history have been constructed in a linear-narrative cultural context that is currently being challenged and in large part displaced by digital media, especially video games. I therefore consider this question from the point of view of historical semantics and in relation to the impact of digital technology on all aspects of the historiographical operation, from the (...) establishment of digital archives, to the production of e-texts, to the digital remediation of visual modes of historical representation. Seen from this dual perspective, video games appear to participate in a process of spatialization and virtualization of historical semantics. In the first place, video games have begun to detach the notion of history from its double reference to the past and to the real—“what essentially happened”—that it had acquired at the end of the eighteenth century. Second, they also challenge the semiotic production of “historic events” that has characterized the construction of modern historical consciousness. Historical video games, in other words, replace representation with simulation and presence with virtuality, thereby marginalizing the oscillation of the modern historical imagination between historical facts and historic events, transcendence and immanence, representation and presence. Although digital reworkings of historical semantics have not produced any grammatical transformation of the signifier, history—nor does this essay propose one—I do argue that the impact of video games on our contemporary historic culture is of paradigmatic proportions similar to those described by Reinhart Koselleck for the dawn of the modern age. Focusing on one of the most successful contemporary video games, Sid Meier’s Civilization, I show how the remediation of cinematic genres by video games is pushing the processes of de-temporalization and de-referentialization of history toward the formation of a new notion of the historical that may be conceptualized as the inversion of the classic Aristotelian paradigm: history has replaced poetry and philosophy as the realm of the possible. (shrink)

Are computers on the way to acquiring “superintelligence”? Can human deliberation and decision-making be fully simulated by the mechanical execution of AI programmes? On close examination these expectations turn out not to be well-founded, since algorithms do, ultimately, have “heteronomous” characteristics. So-called AI-“autonomy” is a sensor-directed performance automatism, which — compared with the potential for ethical judgment in human “practical reason” — proves to be limited in significant ways. This is shown in some detail with reference to the idea of (...) a “digital humanism”, which was introduced by Julian Nida-Rümelin and Nathalie Weidenfeld, who argue that algorithms are useful “tools”, but emphasise — thus rejecting excessive “post-humanist” ideas about AI — that there exists a crucial difference between human action and its AI-simulation. While Nida-Rümelin/Weidenfeld´s “digital humanism” is, on the one hand, inspired by Kant’s conception of human autonomous self-determination, the concept of “structural rationality” that they advocate is, on the other hand, quite problematic. “Digital humanism”, however, can be improved as I argue — with reference to Barbara Herman’s analysis of “moral judgment” and to Allen Wood’s reflections on “human dignity”. (shrink)

This paper aims to philosophically analyze the concept of virtual reality, and to determine the concept from an ontological point of view. The term "virtual reality" is often used synonymously with "digital simulation". In his recent book Reality+, David Chalmers has argued that according to virtual digitalism, "if we're in a simulation, our world is still real". He calls this position "simula- tion realism". Against this view I will argue that virtual reality and simulation should not (...) be identified. Rather, virtual reality is a genuine kind of reality that has always been part of our life. To this end, I will analyze the ontology of virtual reality by using the example of banknotes and referring to Lynne Baker's "constitution view". (shrink)

This paper explores Wittgenstein’s early work as it relates to emerging philosophical problems in ecological modeling. Here I use his thought to structure a logical framework from which to discuss ecological simulation models in a way that captures how these dynamic representations describe a world from which we can draw logical inferences about real-world ecological processes. I argue that Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus provides a way of reading problems that arise in using simulation as a way to make inferences (...) about the world. Conversely, ecological simulation provides an illustration of a Tractarian system, because the digital world it creates completely describes and is defined by the programing language. This reading is a novel, but productive, way that notes that the language used in modeling requires a hermeneutical approach to make inferences about modeling/real-world relationships. (shrink)

Computation and Simulation have always played a role in economics – whether it be pure economic theory or any variant of applied, especially policy-oriented, macro- and microeconomics or what has increasingly come to be called empirical or experimental economics. Computations and simulations are also intrinsically dynamic. This triptych – computation, simulation and dynamic – is given natural foundations, mainly as a result of developments in the mathematics underpinnings in the potentials of computing, using digital technology. A running (...) theme in this essay is the recognition that, increasingly, the development of economic theory seems to go hand in hand with advances in the theory and practice of computing, which is, in turn, a catalyst for the move away from too much reliance on any kind of mathematics for the formalisation of economic entities that is inconsistent with the mathematical, methodological and epistemological foundations of the theory of computation. (shrink)

Social media is full of dead people. What should we do with all these digital souls? Can we delete them, or do they have a right to persist? Patrick Stokes claims that we have a moral duty towards the digital dead. Modern technology helps them to persist in various ways, but - with such developments as AI-driven chatbots simulating the dead - it also makes them vulnerable to new forms of exploitation and abuse. This provocative book explores a (...) range of questions about the nature of death, identity, grief, and the moral status of digital remains. (shrink)

During the Nineties, the diffusion of information and communication technologies allowed a dramatic transformation in art practices. Radically new aesthetic experiences, such as tele-presence, immersivity, responsivity, hyper-mediacy and multimediality, emerge in the framework of the digital arts and call into question not only the traditional status of the work of art but also the fundamental relation with the beholder. The aim of this paper is to define a conceptual framework for the ontology of digital arts by identifying some (...) ontological features that are distinctive to digital idioms. Such an analysis tries to outline how aesthetic and technical innovations affect our cognitive and sensorial relationship with technological artifacts. In the first part, the relation between technogenesis and ontology, as well as the key topics of the ontology of digital arts are discussed. The second part deals with the notion of presence. Despite traditional understandings of digital arts, mainly focused on immateriality, simulation and mediation, my analysis demonstrate how the notion of presence can provide an original perspective in order to understand the ontological status of the mediatized artistic practices. In the last three decades the generalisation of information and telecommunication technologies has played a major role in the transformation of the arts, opening the field to important experiments in the domain of computer graphics, digital audio, robotics and motion capture systems… (Dixon 2007). Peculiar forms of aesthetic experience such as tele-presence, immersivity, responsivity, hyper-mediation and multimediality, progressively arise from digital arts and question not only the status of artwork but also, more generally, the foundational relationship between this latter and the recipient. (shrink)

Abstract: The purpose of this article is to highlight the aesthetic layout created by the digital device in the ontological autonomy of the digital representation. As a result, in the digital screen, as a simulated immersive area, the object is alienated through the hyper-representation of a hyper-reproduction: a hyper-reproduction which causes the data and its image to be the monadic support that multiplies it in always livable creases by interactivity. A digitally-represented world would become the ultimate alienation (...) of the modern representational area in terms of excess of closeness. Thus, this question would cause the simulacral strategy of post-modernity through its digitization. -/- Resumen: Este artículo se propone evidenciar, en la autonomía ontológica de la representación digital, la disposición estética abierta por el dispositivo digital. Como consecuencia, en la pantalla digital, en cuanto super cie inmersiva simu- lacral, se logra enajenar el objeto por medio de la hiper-representación de una hiper-reproductibilidad. Una hiper-reproductibilidad que hace del data y su «ima- gen» el sustento monádico que lo multiplica en pliegues siempre habitables por la interactividad. El mundo representado digitalmente se haría «espectáculo» de la enajenación de nitiva de la super cie representacional moderna en cuanto exceso de cercanía. Cuestión que provocaría la estrategia simulacral de la modernidad en lo postmoderno por medio de su digitalización. (shrink)

The article examines the impact of the virtual public sphere on how urban spaces are experienced and conceived in our data-driven society. It places particular emphasis on urban scale digital twins, which are virtual replicas of cities that are used to simulate environments and develop scenarios in response to policy problems. The article also investigates the shift from the technical to the socio-technical perspective within the field of smart cities. Despite the aspirations of urban scale digital twins to (...) enhance the participation of citizens in the decision-making processes relayed to urban planning strategies, the fact that they are based on a limited set of variables and processes makes them problematic. The article aims to shed light on the tension between the real and the ideal at stake during this process of abstracting sets of variables and processes in the case of urban scale digital twins. (shrink)

As the physical and digital worlds interact,some fields of technoscience have started toshift from an approach emphasizing simulation –in which the physical is replicated in thedigital – to one focusing on augmentation, inwhich the digital is utilized to enhance thephysical. A good place to study theimplications this shift has on the individualis the field of personal wearable technologies.Here, the body is not simply extended byinformation and communication technologies(ICTs), but also becomes their intimate host.This represents a new step (...) in theconceptualization of the synergy betweenindividual (body) and technology (environment),and also affects the ways in which the role andcharacter of each actor are defined. This paperexplores some of the theoreticalre-orientations underpinning the development ofwearable computers and how these shape therelationship between body and environment. (shrink)

This paper states that the concept of real is modified by the emergence of nomadic technology devices, which are responsible for creating a hybrid reality that merges physical and digital spaces. The concept of virtual space is analysed from the perspective of arts and science fiction. The first section shows how the concept of virtual space as a mindspace has been developed. The idea of cyberspace as a place for the mind emphasizes the traditional Cartesian doubt, that is, does (...) the mental image correspond to the real? In the second section, the paper argues that the concept of virtual changes, since it can no longer be considered a disjoint from physical space; rather, it belongs to it. Finally, the movies The Thirteenth Floor (Rusnak 1999) and The Matrix (Wachowski and Wachowski 1999) are case studies that illustrate how the idea of inhabiting a virtual space has changed from the traditional notion of virtual space as a place for the mind to a hybrid space that is part of our lives. As a result, it amplifies the notion of what the real can be. (shrink)

In his engaging and important paper David Chalmers argues that perhaps the best way to navigate the singularity is for us to integrate with the AI++ agents. One way we might be able to do that is via uploading, which is a process in which we create an exact digital duplicate of our brain. He argues that consciousness is an organizational invariant, which means that a simulation of that property would count as the real thing (a simulation (...) of a computer is a computer, and so being a computer is an organizational invariant). If this is the case then we can rest assured that we will retain our consciousness inside such a simulation. In this commentary I will explore these ideas and their relation to philosophical zombies. I will argue that dualism could be true of the zombie world and that the conclusion of the standard zombie argument needs to be modified to deal with simulation. In short I argue that if one endorses biologism about consciousness then the conceivability of zombies is irrelevant to the physicalism/dualism debate. (shrink)

In his contribution, ‘Represent me: please! Towards an ethics of digital twins in medicine’1, Braun shows that there is a fundamental ambivalence inherent in digital twins: they can either open up new freedoms for the simulated persons, or, conversely, endanger and restrict their freedom. To prevent digital twins from restricting people’s freedom, Braun suggests a strong focus on control. Braun’s focus on control is insufficient, I will argue, because his idea of control works only retroactively: it can (...) only react to restrictions of freedom that have already occurred, but it cannot prevent them, nor can it restore any lost freedom. Control is therefore insufficient to defend people’s freedom. To prove my claim, I will first use an everyday example to illustrate the fundamental ambivalence inherent in digital twins. Second, I will show that digital twins endanger people’s freedom in a hermeneutic way. Finally, I will demonstrate why controllability cannot prevent this hermeneutic endangerment. I understand digital twins, like Braun, as simulation of a person, as their dynamic and precise effigy. Simulated twins use machine-learning and artificial intelligence capabilities to make predictive analyses about the simulated person and the future development of her health. Imagine: You are eating dinner. Meanwhile, your partner lectures you about the calorie density and nutrient composition of your food, warns you that your portion size exceeds your daily calorie requirement by x calories. It calculates how your dinner will negatively impact your body mass index and physical fitness, and predicts what the consequences will be for your overall health. Based on these data and predictions, it creates an individualised diet plan for you—and at the same time shows you by how much you could improve your vital values by sticking to that plan. This example helps to illustrate the fundamental …. (shrink)

The abstract basis of modern computation is the formal description of a finite state machine, the Universal Turing Machine, based on manipulation of integers and logic symbols. In this contribution to the discourse on the computer-brain analogy, we discuss the extent to which analog computing, as performed by the mammalian brain, is like and unlike the digital computing of Universal Turing Machines. We begin with ordinary reality being a permanent dialog between continuous and discontinuous worlds. So it is with (...) computing, which can be analog or digital, and is often mixed. The theory behind computers is essentially digital, but efficient simulations of phenomena can be performed by analog devices; indeed, any physical calculation requires implementation in the physical world and is therefore analog to some extent, despite being based on abstract logic and arithmetic. The mammalian brain, comprised of neuronal networks, functions as an analog device and has given rise to artificial neural networks that are implemented as digital algorithms but function as analog models would. Analog constructs compute with the implementation of a variety of feedback and feedforward loops. In contrast, digital algorithms allow the implementation of recursive processes that enable them to generate unparalleled emergent properties. We briefly illustrate how the cortical organization of neurons can integrate signals and make predictions analogically. While we conclude that brains are not digital computers, we speculate on the recent implementation of human writing in the brain as a possible digital path that slowly evolves the brain into a genuine (slow) Turing machine. (shrink)

The concept of a digital twin comes from engineering.1 It refers to a digital model of an artefact in the real world, which takes data about the artefact itself, data about other such artefacts, among other things, as inputs. The idea is that the maintenance of artefacts—such as jet engines—can be vastly improved if we work with digital twins that simulate actual objects. Similarly, personalised medicine might benefit from the digital modelling of body parts or even (...) whole human bodies. A medical digital twin could use data about the patient, more general population data, and other inputs to generate predictions about the patient. This could lead to highly personalised interventions and nuanced judgments about the patient’s health. Matthias Braun2 discusses this intriguing prospect, asking how we should think about the way in which a digital twin could represent a patient. I will respond to Braun’s striking suggestion that we can regard a digital twin as an extension of the patient’s body. Notably, Braun does not compare his just-mentioned idea with the extended mind thesis popularised by Andy Clark and David Chalmers.3 But I am sure many readers will be reminded of the extended mind thesis. Accordingly, I will consider this comparison. I cannot discuss this comparison in detail, nor fully evaluate Braun’s suggestion. But I can say something about how we might approach this comparison, and provide some …. (shrink)

In the article ‘Represent Me: Please! Towards an Ethics of Digital Twins in Medicine’, I analysed and tried to better understand the main ethical challenges associated with Digital Twins. For those who are just entering the debate with this article: DT is a metaphor for a bundle of artificial intelligence driven simulation technologies that constantly, in real time and ad personam simulate single or multiple parts of the body and make predictions about future health states based on (...) these simulations. My argument addresses the need to look at the breadth of challenges through a perspective of representation. From such a take, key consequences can be drawn for the further development of such technologies, the required means of control and not least the way to think about the interaction between humans and ‘their’ simulations. I am very grateful for the subsequent suggestions, criticisms and further arguments, which have helped me to elaborate my arguments more clearly and have led to a substantial advancement of the debate and the discussion about ethical questions in dealing with DT. Jenny Blumenthal-Barby,1 Deborah Lupton,2 Jenny Krutzinna,3 Janina Loh,4 Brent Mittelstadt,5 Sven Nyholm,6 Daniel Tigard7 and Max Tretter8 have made excellent points, which, in the following, I will not be able to reply to individually and in detail. In this response, I will try to bundle the open points and questions along the comments and considerations mentioned above and attempt to outline their significance for an ethics of DT. Four challenges seem to be central. A first point addresses anthropological issues. It is concerned …. (shrink)

In his Feature Article ‘Represent me: please: Towards an ethics of digital twins in medicine’1, Mattias Braun considers several important bioethical issues in relation to the use of digital twin simulations in health and medical contexts. He focuses on the ways these simulations are used or are proposed to be deployed in these domains, including to what extent they are a ‘true’ or ‘real’ representation of human bodies. In this response, I want to take a step back and (...) delve into the metaphor of the ‘digital twin’. I consider the implications of using this metaphor in the context of medical care and how this choice of language participates in what science and technology scholars term the ‘sociomaterial imaginaries’ that are used to support and promote novel technologies.2 Language is important. It matters. The choice of language is both symbolic and persuasive. It intervenes in political and policy debates and research and healthcare funding decisions.2 It has material effects and affects: to some of which Braun has gestured in his piece. The …. (shrink)

The hypothesis that we may be living in a digital simulation is utilized as a ‘thought experiment’ to help clarify important questions in theology and philosophy, including the nature of God, the significance and importance of an afterlife, and the ultimate nature of reality. It is argued that a consideration of the simulation hypothesis renders problematic traditional conceptions of a personal, creator, omnipotent deity, makes the theological significance of a purported afterlife far less significant, and paradoxically undermines (...) the very materialistic view of reality that underlies the simulation hypothesis in the first place. It is concluded that the simulation hypothesis renders ‘science’ virtually irrelevant to ultimate questions in philosophy and theology and elevates ethics and axiology to fundamental status for our understanding of reality and any defensible conception of the divine. (shrink)

Simulations are used in very different contexts and for very different purposes. An emerging development is the possibility of using simulations to obtain a more or less representative reproduction of organs or even entire persons. Such simulations are framed and discussed using the term ‘digital twin’. This paper unpacks and scrutinises the current use of such digital twins in medicine and the ideas embedded in this practice. First, the paper maps the different types of digital twins. A (...) special focus is put on the concrete challenges inherent in the interactions between persons and their digital twin. Second, the paper addresses the questions of how far a digital twin can represent a person and what the consequences of this may be. Against the background of these two analytical steps, the paper defines first conditions for digital twins to take on an ethically justifiable form of representation. (shrink)

In this article, we present and analyse the concept of Digital Twin (DT) linked to distinct types of objects (artefacts, natural, inanimate or living) and examine the challenges involved in creating them from a fundamental neuroethics approach that emphasises conceptual analyses. We begin by providing a brief description of DTs and their initial development as models of artefacts and physical inanimate objects, identifying core challenges in building these tools and noting their intended benefits. Next, we describe attempts to build (...) DTs of model living entities, such as hearts, highlighting the novel challenges raised by this shift from DTs of inanimate to DTs of living objects. Against that background, we give an account of contemporary research aiming to develop DTs of the human brain by building "virtual brains", e.g. the simulation engine The Virtual Brain (TVB) as it is carried out in the European Human Brain Project. Since the brain is structurally and functionally the most complex organ in the human body, and our integrated knowledge of its functional architecture remains limited in spite of recent neuroscientific advances, the attempts to create virtual copies of the human brain are correspondingly challenging. We suggest that a clear scientific theoretical structure, conceptual clarity and transparency regarding the methods and goals of this technological development are necessary prerequisites in order to make the project of constructing virtual brains a theoretically promising and socially beneficial scientific, technological and philosophical enterprise. (shrink)

The relationship between politics and the digital has largely been characterized as one of epochal change. The respective theories understand the digital as external to politics and society, as an autonomous driver for global, unilateral transformation. Rather than supporting such singular accounts of the relationship between politics and the digital, this article argues for its specificity: the digital is best examined in terms of folds within existing socio-technical configurations, and as an artefact with a set of (...) affordances that are shaped and filled with meaning by social practice. In conceptualizing the digital as numeric, countable, computable, material, storable, searchable, transferable, networkable and traceable, fabricated and interpreted, it becomes clear that the digital cannot be divorced from the social. These affordances of the digital are discussed in relation to specific political, digital practices that are further developed in the different contributions in this special issue, such as predictive policing (Aradau and Blanke, this issue), data protection (Bellanova, this issue), extremist recruitment videos (Leander, this issue), political acclamation (Dean, this issue), and pandemic simulations (Opitz, this issue). (shrink)

In this article, we present and analyse the concept of Digital Twin linked to distinct types of objects and examine the challenges involved in creating them from a fundamental neuroethics approach that emphasises conceptual analyses. We begin by providing a brief description of DTs and their initial development as models of artefacts and physical inanimate objects, identifying core challenges in building these tools and noting their intended benefits. Next, we describe attempts to build DTs of model living entities, such (...) as hearts, highlighting the novel challenges raised by this shift from DTs of inanimate to DTs of living objects. Against that background, we give an account of contemporary research aiming to develop DTs of the human brain by building "virtual brains", e.g. the simulation engine The Virtual Brain as it is carried out in the European Human Brain Project. Since the brain is structurally and functionally the most complex organ in the human body, and our integrated knowledge of its functional architecture remains limited in spite of recent neuroscientific advances, the attempts to create virtual copies of the human brain are correspondingly challenging. We suggest that a clear scientific theoretical structure, conceptual clarity and transparency regarding the methods and goals of this technological development are necessary prerequisites in order to make the project of constructing virtual brains a theoretically promising and socially beneficial scientific, technological and philosophical enterprise. (shrink)

This paper studies the traditional target classification and recognition algorithm based on Histogram of Oriented Gradients feature extraction and Support Vector Machine classification and applies this algorithm to distributed artificial intelligence image recognition. Due to the huge number of images, the general detection speed cannot meet the requirements. We have improved the HOG feature extraction algorithm. Using principal component analysis to perform dimensionality reduction operations on HOG features and doing distributed artificial intelligence image recognition experiments, the results show that the (...) image detection efficiency is slightly improved, and the detection speed is also improved. This article analyzes the reason for these changes because PCA mainly uses the useful feature information in HOG features. The parallelization processing of HOG features on graphics processing unit is studied. GPU is used for high parallel and high-density calculations, and the calculation of HOG features is very complicated. Using GPU for parallelization of HOG features can make the calculation speed of HOG features improved. We use image experiments for the parallelized HOG feature algorithm. Experimental simulations show that the speed of distributed artificial intelligence image recognition is greatly improved. By analyzing the existing digital image recognition methods, an improved BP neural network algorithm is proposed. Under the premise of ensuring accuracy, the recognition speed of digital images is accelerated, the time required for recognition is reduced, real-time performance is guaranteed, and the effectiveness of the algorithm is verified. (shrink)

This perspective article explores the use of digital twins (DTs) in medicine, highlighting its capacity to simulate risks and personalize treatments while examining the emerging bioethical concerns. Central concerns include power dynamics, exclusion, and misrepresentation. We propose adopting a relational bioethical approach that advocates for a comprehensive assessment of DTs in medicine, extending beyond individual interactions to consider broader structural relations and varying levels of access to power. This can be achieved through two key relational recommendations: acknowledging the impact (...) of uneven relational structures on access to medical care and promoting social justice by evaluating resource allocation. While DTs in medicine offer promising advancements, a relational bioethical lens may provide a nuanced understanding, fostering equitable, inclusive and responsible integration of DTs into medical practice. (shrink)

Computer technologies are riding a golden trend in terms of innovation. New computer devices are emerging and they directly aim to extend the subject’s living body beyond the natural limits of its mere flesh. Some of these devices can be used to recreate perceptual organs in other places of the world. Of special interest are teledildonic devices, remotely controlled dildos, which provide tactual sensations that simulate part of a subject’s body as being relocated in another place, enabling a subject to (...) “connect” and to “play” with a second subject as if they were actually in the same place at the same time; in other words, to engage in remote sexual activity. Thanks to internet connectivity, it is now possible to have control of the actions of a distant dildo and to have, at the same time, tactual and visual feedback by way of sensors and 360-degree cameras mounted on the device. This technology has the potential to re-shape our living body and, in so doing, re-shape our affections as well as our perception of the world. Phenomenological and post-phenomenological analysis makes it possible to study the social, psychological, and phenomenological effects of such technologies. (shrink)

Mental or computer simulation of cause and effect of certain behaviors is a recognized approach to changing one’s attitude or triggering an action. Meanwhile, psychology research results suggest that frequency of simulation may affect the corresponding persuasiveness. This paper argues that with always-on sensing and data-driven visualization technologies, interactive tangible systems can be designed to simulate hypothetical outcomes of real-life behaviors in everyday contexts, which repeatedly stimulate users’ imagination of behavioral consequences and thereby behavioral intentions. To investigate the (...) effect, a working prototype of Incingarette, including a smart ashtray in connection with a digital picture frame, was built. When the ashtray is used for smoking, the digital picture is incrementally covered by virtual dust. Field trials involved participants in five daily smoking sessions. Post-session surveys show increasingly stronger perceived causality between smoking and the simulated outcomes, increasingly more vivid mental imagery of consequences, and increasingly intense intention to reduce smoking. Results suggest that repeatedly presenting simulated outcomes cognitively linked to real-life behaviors can increase behavioral intentions. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Constructivism and Computation: Can Computer-Based Modeling Add to the Case for Constructivism?” by Manfred Füllsack. Upshot: While I do agree with Füllsack’s positive assessment of the use of computer simulations in advancing constructivism’s program, I am less convinced by the alleged opposition between computers and constructivism he builds up. In my opinion, his depiction of computers and computation is inaccurate in several respects. As a result, the alleged incompatibility with constructivism Füllsack objects to disappears, (...) and his whole essay could then be construed as a classic straw man fallacy. This is unfortunate, because it could lead to an unwarranted dismissal of his positive contribution. (shrink)