Da gegenwärtig kein allgemeinverbindlicher Begriff des ‚Neukantianismus‘ oder gar der ‚Transzendentalphilosophie‘ zur Verfügung steht und somit unter heutigen Bedingungen nicht aufs Geratewohl eine Geschichte der transzendentalsystematischen Bemühungen des 20. Jahrhunderts verfaßt werden kann, lag es nahe, sich diesem Thema anhand einer Analyse der Diskussionen zu nähern, in denen sich die sogenannte Selbstauflösung des Neukantianismus dokumentiert. Im Zuge dieser Annäherung war insbesondere an Siegfried Marcks zweibändiges Werk über DIE DIALEKTIK IN DER PHILOSOPHIE DER GEGENWART (Tübingen 1929/31) anzuknüpfen, das die transzendentalphilosophische Diskussion (...) der 20er Jahre unter dem Aspekt einer „kritischen Dialektik“ zusammenfaßt; einer kritischen Dialektik, die sich aufgrund der Ablehnung der neukantianischen „Konstruktion eines idealen Subjekts“ und der darum nunmehr verstärkten Einsicht in die „Spannung zwischen dem existierenden Subjekte und dem Geltungsbereich“ ausgeformt habe und als das verbindende Motiv in „Jonas Cohns Theorie der Dialektik, R. Höngswalds Denkpsychologie, Br. Bauchs Ideenlehre, P. Natorps Lehre vom Grenzdenken, N. Hartmanns Aporetik, E. Cassirers philosophische[r] ‚Anthropologie‘, Max Adlers neukantische[m] Marxismus“ anzusehen sei (S. Marck [1929], S. III). Wie allein schon der Hinweis auf „N[icolai] Hartmanns Aporetik“ zeigt, geht diese,Hegel-Renaissance in der deutschen Philosophie‘ (H. Levy) auch Hand in Hand mit einer Ontologisierung der Transzendentalphilosophie. Dieser Transzendentalontologie, die sich - teils in dialektischem Einverständnis mit und teils in antidialektischem Gegensatz zur ‚Hegel-Renaissance‘ - mit einer nach den unterschiedlichsten Richtungen hin wirksamen ‚Leibniz-Renaissance‘ verband, war im Titel der vorliegenden Untersuchung um so mehr Rechnung zu tragen, als das ontologische Motiv (vorallem unter dem Eindruck der Hartmannschen Neo-Ontologie und der Heideggerschen Existentialontologie) in den transzendentalsystematischen Arbeiten der Nachkriegszeit eindeutig in den Vordergrund tritt. Der Titel KRITISCHE DIALEKTIK UND TRANSZENDENTALONTOLOGIE steckt daher sowohl den inhaltlichen wie auch den zeitlichen Rahmen der Untersuchung ab: ihr Thema sind die post-neukantianischen Systembildungen, die in Auseinandersetzung mit den dominierenden Philosophemen der Zwischen- und Nachkriegszeit (der Neo-Ontologie und der Lebens- und Existenzphilosophie) am transzendentalen Ansatz und Systemanspruch festhielten, indem sie den überzeitlichen Geltungsanspruch der Idee und die innerzeitliche Existenz ‚dialektisch‘ oder ‚monadologisch‘ zu vermitteln suchten. Nachdem aus transzendentalsystematischer Sicht das Ringen um eben diese Vermittlungsproblematik ohnehin die gesamte abendländische Philosophiegeschichte ‚seit Parmenides und Platon‘ beherrscht, sagt diese Eingrenzung der Thematik allerdings mehr über das Selbstverständnis der Systemdenker aus, als sie zu deren philosophiegeschichtlicher Positionierung beiträgt. Man kommt daher dem Eigentümlichen der post-neukantianischen Systembildungen näher, wenn man – ihre Differenz zum Neukantianismus hervorhebend – betont, daß sie sich aufgrund der Ablehnung der neukantianischen „Konstruktion eines idealen Subjekts“ (S. Marck) dem Problem der ‚Konkretisierung der Transzendentalität‘ (Erich Heintel) oder einer ‚Philosophie der konkreten Subjektivität‘ (Hans Wagner) stellen. Da man die Phänomenologie Husserls und die Philosophische Anthropologie in gleicher Weise charakterisieren kann, muß diese Problemstellung in unserem Zusammenhang freilich nicht so sehr als Verabschiedung, sondern als Weiterführung neukantianischer Traditionen verstanden werden; da der Versuch einer Rekonstruktion der neukantianischen Theoriestränge, die sich gegenüber den lebensphilosophischen, ontologischen und positivistischen Zersetzungen des kritizistischen Ansatzes resistent erwiesen, zur Revision einiger gängiger Vorurteile bezüglich des Neukantianismus zwingt, wird im Zuge der einleitenden Analyse der sogenannten Selbstauflösung des Neukantianismus aber auch der Begriff ‚Neukantianismus‘ selbst in grundsätzlicher Weise zu bestimmen sein. Diese Begriffsbestimmung liefert das gesuchte Kriterium für die systematische Eingrenzung der Thematik und somit für die Auswahl der Repräsentanten der Kritischen Dialektik und Transzendentalontologie, deren philosophische Bemühungen in der Folge dokumentiert sind. Durchaus in Verbindung und Übereinstimmung mit diesen systematischen Erwägungen war für die nähere Auseinandersetzung mit Richard Hönigswald und Wolfgang Cramer, Bruno Bauch und Hans Wagner, sowie mit Robert Reininger und Erich Heintel, nicht zuletzt der Umstand maßgeblich, daß ihre Arbeiten eine für die Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts bemerkenswerte Kontinuität transzendentalphilosophischer Ansätze demonstrieren und dennoch keineswegs die Beachtung gefunden haben, die sie im Interesse einer lebendigen Aneignung und kritischen Weiterführung der Transzendentalphilosophie verdienen. Die vorliegende Arbeit versucht vorallem diese Kontinuität transzendentalphilosophischer bzw. neukantianischer Ansätze herauszustellen und die aus der individuellen Problemsicht der genannten Autoren resultierende produktive Weiterbildung dieser Ansätze zu dokumentieren, indem sie jeweils monographisch die einzelnen Denkwege verfolgt. (shrink)

Analytic philosophy and modern logic are intimately connected, both historically and systematically. Thinkers such as Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein were major contributors to the early development of both; and the fruitful use of modern logic in addressing philosophical problems was, and still is, definitive for large parts of the analytic tradition. More specifically, Frege's analysis of the concept of number, Russell's theory of descriptions, and Wittgenstein's notion of tautology have long been seen as paradigmatic pieces of philosophy in this tradition. (...) This close connection remained beyond what is now often called "early analytic philosophy", i.e., the tradition's first phase. In the present chapter I will consider three thinkers who played equally important and formative roles in analytic philosophy's second phase, the period from the 1920s to the 1950s: Rudolf Carnap, Kurt Gödel, and Alfred Tarski. (shrink)

On November 21, 1994, Werner Marx passed away peacefully in the place he loved so well, his apartment in the Schloß in Bollschweil. Professor Marx was born in 1910 in Mulheim, Germany. He studied law and philosophy in Berlin, Freiburg, and Bonn before completing his state examination and doctorate in law in 1933. In the same year, he was removed from civil service and from an apprentice judgeship by the Nazis. After this, he emigrated first to Palestine and then in (...) 1938 to New York, where he took up academic studies again. After receiving an M.A. in economics, he completed the Ph.D. in philosophy, working with Kurt Reizler and Karl Löwith at the German University in Exile, later to become the New School for Social Research, and writing a dissertation on Aristotle’s ontology. During this period, he renewed his interest in Hegel and German Idealism, and also in Heidegger’s critique of the tradition and attempts to make “another beginning” in philosophy. Marx began teaching at the New School in 1949. After the appearance of his classic study, Heidegger and the Tradition, he was named successor to the Husserl-Heidegger chair in philosophy and director of Philosophical Seminar I in Freiburg, which he held from 1964 until his retirement in 1979. He also served as Director of the Husserl-Archives in Freiburg until his death. (shrink)

In der Geschichte der Philosophie gibt es nur wenige Namen, mit denen sich so viel Ungewohnliches, aber auch Ungereimtes, ja Paradoxes verbindet wie mit dem Namen Wittgenstein. Fur den Mann auf der StraSSe meist ein ganzlich Unbekannter, ist Wittgenstein fur viele Fachleute der Philosoph schlechthin. ER zahlt zu den meistzitierten Denkern des 20. JAhrhunderts, obwohl er in seinem Leben nur einige Dutzend Seiten veroffentlicht hat: er wurde seit seinem Tode zum Star einer neuen philosophischen Tradition, wo gerade er uns doch (...) von der traditionellen Philosophie befreien wollte. EIne vollstandige Bibliographie der Wittgenstein-Literatur wurde mehrere tausend Titel umfassen, und standig werden neue Abhandlungen uber Wittgenstein und seine Philosophie veroffentlicht. (shrink)

Explores the acquisition and use of knowledge for human purposes and the extent of our ability to shape the future through the design, regulation, and restructuring of the lives of human systems at all levels.

Ogni tentativo di ripensare le nostre categorie politiche deve muovere dalla consapevolezza che della distinzione classica fra zoé e bios, tra vita naturale ed esistenza politica (o tra l'uomo come semplice vivente e l'uomo come soggetto politico), non ne sappiamo piú nulla. Nel diritto romano arcaico homo sacer era un uomo che chiunque poteva uccidere senza commettere omicidio e che non doveva però essere messo a morte nelle forme prescritte dal rito. È la vita uccidibile e insacrificabile dell' 'uomo sacro' (...) a fornire qui la chiave per una rilettura critica della nostra tradizione politica. Quando la vita diventa la posta in gioco della politica e questa si trasforma in biopolitica, tutte le categorie fondamentali della nostra riflessione, dai diritti dell'uomo alla democrazia alla cittadinanza, entrano in un processo di svuotamento e di dislocazione il cui risultato sta oggi davanti ai nostri occhi. Seguendo il filo del rapporto costitutivo fra nuda vita e potere sovrano, da Aristotele ad Auschwitz, dall'Habeas corpus alle Dichiarazioni dei diritti, il libro di Agamben cerca di decifrare gli enigmi - prima di tutti il fascismo e il nazismo - che il nostro secolo ha proposto alla ragione storica. Fino a vedere, nel campo di concentramento, il paradigma biopolitico nascosto della modernità in cui città e casa sono diventate indiscernibili e la possibilità di distinguere tra il nostro corpo biologico e il nostro corpo politico ci è stata tolta una volta per tutte. (shrink)

In this paper, I present an outline of the oppression account of cultural appropriation and argue that it offers the best explanation for the wrongfulness of the varied and complex cases of appropriation to which people often object. I then compare the oppression account with the intimacy account defended by C. Thi Nguyen and Matt Strohl. Though I believe that Nguyen and Strohl’s account offers important insight into an essential dimension of the cultural appropriation debate, I argue that justified objections (...) to cultural appropriation must ultimately be grounded in considerations of oppression as opposed to group intimacy. I present three primary objections to the intimacy account. First, I suggest that in its effort to explain expressive appropriation claims (those that purportedly lack an independent ground), the intimacy account doubles down on the boundary problem. Second, I question whether group intimacy possess the kind of bare normativity that Nguyen and Strohl claim for it. Finally, I argue that these objections give us reason to accept the importance of group intimacy to the cultural appropriation debate, but question the source of its significance as identified by Nguyen and Strohl. (shrink)

The framework of elementary probabilistic operations (EPO) explains the structure of elementary probabilistic reasoning tasks as well as people’s performance on these tasks. The framework comprises three components: (a) Three types of probabilities: joint, marginal, and conditional probabilities; (b) three elementary probabilistic operations: combination, marginalization, and conditioning, and (c) quantitative inference schemas implementing the EPO. The formal part of the EPO framework is a computational level theory that provides a problem space representation and a classification of elementary probabilistic problems based (...) on computational requirements for solving a problem. According to the EPO framework, current methods for improving probabilistic reasoning are of two kinds: First, reduction of Bayesian problems to a type of probabilistic problems requiring less conceptual and procedural competencies. Second, enhancing people’s utilization competence by fostering the application of quantitative inference schemas. The approach suggests new applications, including the teaching of probabilistic reasoning, using analogical problem solving in probabilistic reasoning, and new methods for analyzing errors in probabilistic problem solving. (shrink)

Can we still watch Woody Allen's movies? Can we still laugh at Bill Cosby's jokes? Woody Allen, Kevin Spacey, Dave Chappelle, Louis C. K., J.K. Rowling, Michael Jackson, Roseanne Barr. Recent years have proven rife with revelations about the misdeeds, objectional views, and, in some instances, crimes of popular artists.

Is there something morally wrong with cultural appropriation in the arts? I argue that the little philosophical work on this topic has been overly dismissive of moral objections to cultural appropriation. Nevertheless, I argue that philosophers working on epistemic injustice have developed powerful conceptual tools that can aid in our understanding of objections that have been levied by other scholars and artists. I then consider the relationship between these objections and the harms of cultural essentialism. I argue that focusing on (...) the systematic nature of appropriative harms may allow us to sidestep the problem of essentialism, but not without cost. (shrink)

This chapter offers an overview of issues posed by the problem of immoral artists, artists who in word or deed violate commonly held moral principles. I briefly consider the question of whether the immorality of an artist can render their work aesthetically worse (making connections to chapters in the Theory section of the handbook), and then turn to questions about what the audience should do and feel in response to knowledge of these moral failings. I discuss questions such as whether (...) audiences have reason not to purchase or consume work by these artists, whether their shows and exhibitions should be canceled, and how fans might grapple with the emotional turmoil they feel when artists whom they love act or speak in ways that are morally condemnable. (shrink)

A family heirloom. An endangered species. An ancient piece of pottery. A threatened language. These things differ in myriad ways, but they are tied together by a common thread: they are all examples of things that call out to be saved. The world is brimming with things worth saving, and we have limited time and resources. How do we decide what to save? Why do we make these choices? -/- Philosopher Erich Hatala Matthes explores these questions as they surface (...) in radically diverse contexts--from museums to TikTok, and from National Parks to the corner of your attic. Matthes illustrates the deep relationship between the things we might save and our sense of self. If our cares and concerns are a fundamental part of our identity, then what we care for and preserve will play a significant role in shaping and maintaining our understanding of who we are. In a world in which everything that we care about is subject to powerful forces of change--from climate disturbance and armed conflict, to social transformation and the wear and tear of time--the terms on which we confront change will be key to whether and how we can save the things we care about in the ways that really matter to us. Will change be foisted upon us? Or is there a role for us to play in rejecting, influencing, or managing change? As he explores these questions, Matthes tackles related themes such as authenticity, agency, and appropriation: Who exactly should be responsible for saving things, and on whose behalf should such efforts be pursued? These are all essential elements to a fuller understanding of what to save and why. (shrink)

Dieser Titel aus dem De Gruyter-Verlagsarchiv ist digitalisiert worden, um ihn der wissenschaftlichen Forschung zugänglich zu machen. Da der Titel erstmals im Nationalsozialismus publiziert wurde, ist er in besonderem Maße in seinem historischen Kontext zu betrachten. Mehr erfahren Sie.

v. 1. The philosophy of the Veda and of the epic.--The Buddha and the Jina.--The Sāmkhya and the classical Yoga-system.--v. 2. The Nature-philosophical schools and the Vaiśeṣika system.--The system of the Jaina.--The materialism.

"Death is a subject which has always been high on the philosophical agenda. But strangely enough the historically and traditionally most important aspect of that subject - the so-called transcendent problem of death, i.e. the question of what actually happens to mind or consciousness after physical death - is almost taboo-laden within modern academic philosophy." "It is, however, the contention of this book that a discussion of the transcendent problem of death makes good sense even on contemporary premises, granted the (...) fulfillment of certain preconditions that should not be rejected offhand." "The main parts of this book deal with questions concerning the viability of preconditions such as mind-body dualism, a substance-theory of mind, a non-reductionist view of personal identity, the notion of 'a minimal self', the persistence of the phenomenal 'now' etc." "In this connection the author presents and evaluates a number of arguments pertaining to the view that, even though an individual mind may contain outward-directed functions that allow it to relate to physical and social surroundings, it has an ontologically peculiar self-enclosed mode of being relative to the physical world. Hereby an understanding of 'the ontology of mind' is achieved, which indicates the possibility of a revival of some old and extremely important metaphysical questions which are commonly and unjustly neglected - for instance the transcendent problem of death." --Book Jacket. (shrink)

The first of Erich Neumann's works to be translated into English, this eloquent book draws on a full range of world mythology to show that individual consciousness undergoes the same archetypal stages of development as has human consciousness as a whole. Neumann, one of Jung's most creative students and a renowned practitioner of analytical psychology in his own right, shows how the stages begin and end with the symbol of the Uroboros, or tail-eating serpent. The intermediate stages are projected (...) in the universal myths of the World Creation, Great Mother, Separation of the World Parents, Birth of the Hero, Slaying of the Dragon, Rescue of the Captive, and Transformation and Deification of the Hero. Throughout the sequence the Hero is the evolving ego consciousness. (shrink)

Those who comment on modern scientific institutions are often quick to praise institutional structures that leave scientists to their own devices. These comments reveal an underlying presumption that scientists do best when left alone—when they operate in what we call the ‘scientific state of nature’. Through computer simulation, we challenge this presumption by illustrating an inefficiency that arises in the scientific state of nature. This inefficiency suggests that one cannot simply presume that science is most efficient when institutional control is (...) absent. In some situations, actively encouraging unpopular, risky science would improve scientific outcomes. 1 Introduction2 Scientists and Bandits3 Choosing an ϵ4 Structure of Communication5 Discussion. (shrink)

The book, with its emphasis on the interaction of microstructures with the entire biosphere, ecosystems etc., and on how micro- and macrocosmos mutually create the conditions for their further evolution, provides a comprehensive framework for a deeper understanding of human creativity in a time of transition.

Foreword by Oliver Sacks Kurt Goldstein (1878-1965) was already an established neuropsychologist when he emigrated from Germany to the United States in the 1930s. This book, his magnum opus and widely regarded as a modern classic in psychology and biology, grew out of his dissatisfaction with traditional natural science techniques for analyzing living beings. It offers a broad introduction to the sources and ranges of application of the "holistic" or "organismic" research program that has since become a standard part (...) of biological thought. Goldstein was especially concerned with the breakdown of organization and the failure of central controls that take place in catastrophic responses to situations such as physical or mental illness. But he was equally attuned to the amazing powers of the organism to readjust to such catastrophic losses, if only by withdrawal to a more limited range that it could manage by a redistribution of its reduced energies, thus reclaiming as much wholeness as new circumstances allowed. Goldstein's theses in The Organism have had an important impact on philosophical and psychological thought throughout the twentieth century, as evidenced in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Georges Canguilhem, Ernst Cassirer, and Ludwig Binswanger. (shrink)

Ethics is defined as the realm of the 'ought', the realm of conscience which postulates that Man has the freedom to carry out what he judges to be morally right. By such acts he realizes his freedom of making himself into a truer, more authentic person than he was before. A libertarian psychotherapy, based on this ethic, is outlined. Medical science (as all science) belongs to the realm of the 'is' and postulates that the phenomena which it studies follow a (...) necessary course. It is therefore deterministic. In psychiatry, allowance is made for a neurological determinism in cases in which personal freedom has been diminished or abolished by mental illness, but the determinisms of behaviour therapy and of psycho-analysis are rejected by the author. (shrink)

It is often assumed that there is a necessary relationship between historical value and irreplaceability, and that this is an essential feature of historical value’s distinctive character. Contrary to this assumption, I argue that it is a merely contingent fact that some historically valuable things are irreplaceable, and that irreplaceability is not a distinctive feature of historical value at all. Rather, historically significant objects, from heirlooms to artifacts, offer us an otherwise impossible connection with the past, a value that persists (...) even in the face of suitable replacements. (shrink)

Cancer survivors are at risk for poor subjective well-being, but the potential beneficial effect of daily spiritual experiences is unknown. Using data from the second and third wave of the Midlife in the United States study, we examined the extent to which daily spiritual experiences at baseline moderate the association between subjective well-being at baseline and approximately 10 years later in cancer survivors. Regression analyses, controlled for age, educational attainment, and religious/spiritual coping, showed that daily spiritual experiences moderated the association (...) between life satisfaction at baseline and follow-up. Specifically, high spiritual experiences enhanced life satisfaction over time in cancer survivors with low life satisfaction at baseline. Also, daily spiritual experiences moderated the association between positive affect at baseline and follow-up, though this moderating effect was different for women and men. No moderating effect emerged for negative affect. (shrink)