Ethics and Culture

What I propose here is to dialogue and check the confluences and divergences between McDowell’s relaxed naturalism and Nishida’s historical naturalism, and their strategies to surmount modern philosophy everlasting questions that pivot on a series of dualisms, among which that of reason and nature stands out. In what follows, in the first section, I will clarify some of the reasons why the division between nature and culture, or reason and nature, or minds and world, represents one of the facets of (...) this modernist “great division”, or, as I rename it, the “dual track” between nature and humankind. The section includes a succinct exposition on how the “great division” is transferred to East Asian modern philosophy, and, in fact, how it remains in cultural projections of Japan’s native non-division between humans and nature. Later, I use the second section to describe and discuss John McDowell’s strategy to escape out of the dilemma between the Myth of the Given and the Myth of Coherentism, through the notion of “second nature”, recovered from Aristotle’s ethics, as a path to offer a different conception of what is natural, and of human being’s nature. Once we understand why McDowell’s second nature is his way to reconcile conceptual capacities and humankind animal-being maturation through upbringing -Bildung, formation-, I connect his conceptualization with Nishida’s own vision of what second nature is. In his late philosophical works, Nishida’s central notion is “action-intuition”, an epistemic hyphen that links subject and object, or perceiver and perceived, that opens the way for his discussion of “historical world” as a “media(c)tion” (settlement action); and “historical nature” considered as a telos-bearing motion that unfolds the “world of force”, the “world of life”, and the “world of living things”, and, lately, “second nature” as the world of custom. As I will show, Nishida’s “second nature” is not secondary in relation to a presupposed “first” nature. The world of custom has ontological priority. My final wish is to demonstrate that Nishida’s late statement of “historical-naturalness” -human beings coming into being from the historical world as the mediation of the continuity of discontinuity- offers a way to solve McDowell’s criticized fatal dualism -human life discontinuous with the rest of nature. And, at the same time, offers new possibilities to overcome the image of reason and nature as opposing spheres, or human estrangement from nature and from himself. At the end, I open the floor for a rethinking Aristotle and Marx, Nishida and McDowell orientation towards a symbiotic, relaxed or humanized naturalism as a tool to untie modern philosophy dualist conundrum. (shrink)

The debate on moral norms and standards is as old as philosophy itself. But social norms and conventions have finally started attracting their fair share of attention too. Their authority is the topic of two sophisticated books published in the last few years, namely David Owens’ Bound by Convention (2022) and Laura Valentini’s Morality and Socially Constructed Norms (2023). In this essay, I present the theoretical outlooks of these two books and then proceed to criticize both. First, I point out (...) a small but significant flaw in Valentini’s ontological account of social norms, according to which such norms obtain in virtue of the beliefs and commitments of rule-followers. More specifically, I argue that such an account – to make sense – should include a reference to the desires of rule followers too. Then, I develop Valentini's crucial criticism against Owens, according to which Owens' account cannot make sense of the obligatory character of certain social norms. In this respect I argue that Owens’ answer to such criticism fails in a way that reveals even deeper flaws than Valentini recognizes. (shrink)

Michael Huemer argues that cross-cultural convergence toward liberal moral values is evidence of objective moral progress, and by extension, evidence for moral realism. Nathan Cofnas claims to debunk Huemer’s argument by contending that convergence toward liberal moral values can be better explained by ‘two related non-truth-tracking processes’: self-interest and its long-term tendency to result in social conditions conducive to greater empathy. This article argues that although Cofnas successfully debunks Huemer’s convergence argument for one influential form of moral realism – Robust (...) Moral Realism, which holds that moral facts are non-natural, stance-independent normative facts – Cofnas’s debunking argument broadly supports a second type of moral realism: Enlightened Self-Interest Realism, the view that moral facts are reducible to stance-dependent requirements of instrumental (‘means-end’) rationality. Finally, this article argues that insofar as different Enlightened Self-Interest Realist theories make specific predictions about the intra- and inter-personal mechanisms behind moral convergence toward liberalism, empirical observations of cross-cultural convergence can provide independent support for Enlightened Self-Interest Realism. I conclude that this is an important mark in favor of Enlightened Self-Interest Realism over Robust Moral Realism. (shrink)

Descartes’ first book, 1618’s Compendium of Music, focuses on biomechanical reactions in the human body but also claims that the purpose of art is to arouse emotions. By the end of the 1630s, however, he had given up on precisely predicting how that arousal may occur. This article contends, though, that Descartes’ abandonment of that project is a result of using an inappropriate psychological model for such predictions. An appropriate model is developed in his last book, 1649’s The Passions of (...) the Soul. Especially by attending to generosity and desire, the probability of predicting aesthetic judgments is at least increased. In increasing it, Descartes’ abandonment need not be total. (shrink)

Today’s culture tells us to respect, even celebrate, the many ways in which we are different from each other. These are moral claims about how to relate to people, given that they are different. But does it also matter whether we are different in the first place? I argue for the intrinsic value to us of individuality, understood in terms of our differences from others. Past defences of individuality often unhelpfully conflate it with autonomy or authenticity, but these can come (...) apart from individuality. Individuality is also distinct from numerical identity and moral status, and cannot be fully captured in terms of rarity, diversity, or irreplaceability. Most current theories of well-being leave it open that lives utterly lacking in individuality might be wonderfully good. These theories, I argue, fail to account for what Valéry called ‘the evil of not being unique’. (shrink)

Negli ultimi due anni sono stati pubblicati due importanti libri sul progresso morale: 'Moral Progress' di Philp Kitcher e 'A Better Ape' di Victor Kumar e Richmond Campbell. In questa nota critica, recensisco entrambi i libri e problematizzo il modo in cui cercano rispettivamente di legare tra loro il tema del progresso morale con la teoria dell'evoluzione.

A brief reference article on cultural relativism.

This article situates within the gender inequality debate associated with the relation between nature and women, which started to be conceptualized academically in 1970s’ in the philosophical field of ecofeminism. After presenting some ecofeminist perspectives highlighting the reasons of the women/nature link some criticism will be advances showing the limitation of such approach. The argument will then move to the younger field of Indigenous feminism keeping the focus of the relation between nature and women and observing how this has influenced (...) the condition of women within Indigenous communities such as the Igbo people in Nigeria, the Kahnawa:kev people in Canada and the Sami people living in Sapmi. (shrink)

En esta entrevista, Rocío Hernández Arias explica la conceptualización de utopía y las subclasificaciones que se derivan de ella. Para ello, fue esencial precisar la orientación que ha tenido para poder discernir en cuanto al significado de estos postulados. En un primer instante, distingue sus respectivos campos semánticos y los arguye desde un recuento histórico. Por ejemplo, hace referencia a la utopía literaria, la utopía empírica y la utopía hispánica. Luego de diferenciarlos, comenta acerca de uno de sus hallazgos relevantes, (...) que es el poder haber auscultado el vínculo de la utopía con la libertad. Dicho de otro modo, para ella, es imprescindible detectar también la trabazón de literatura utópica con el movimiento libertario. Asimismo, aparte de la fundamentación que realiza sobre el término de utopía, será necesaria la alegación que le brinda a la noción de anarquía y cómo se desarrolla en la historia de Hispanoamérica. Es así como Hernández Arias logra dominar estas teorías y taxonomías para extrapolar sus conocimientos en otro tipo de discursos. A su vez, esto revela la constante confrontación que existirá entre múltiples disciplinas: la filosofía, la política, la historia, la literatura y la sociología. Por lo tanto, el aporte de esta entrevista se encuentra en la trascendencia que tienen las categorías multidisciplinarias en el decurso del tiempo y cómo estas se han incorporado en la ideología perenne de los ciudadanos. (shrink)

Two apparently contradictory things are both true about the anthropology of ethics. It is true that the academic discipline of anthropology has been concerned with ethics and morality throughout its whole history. It is also true that until the last couple of decades there was nothing that could reasonably be called the anthropology of ethics. Its advent has been felt to be such a distinct development that we are routinely said to have undergone an 'ethical turn', yet people also feel (...) moved, equally routinely, to point out that anthropologists have been writing about morality all along, and they are indeed correct in saying this. (shrink)

What is common to all instances of friendship? Given their seemingly heterogeneous character, Phelan (2019. “Rethinking Friendship.” Inquiry) suggests that friendships are relationships that result from collaborative norm-manipulation. In this paper, I suggest that this proposal fails to account for all friendships without relying on the notion of some kind of care.

This chapter offers an overview of issues posed by the problem of immoral artists, artists who in word or deed violate commonly held moral principles. I briefly consider the question of whether the immorality of an artist can render their work aesthetically worse (making connections to chapters in the Theory section of the handbook), and then turn to questions about what the audience should do and feel in response to knowledge of these moral failings. I discuss questions such as whether (...) audiences have reason not to purchase or consume work by these artists, whether their shows and exhibitions should be canceled, and how fans might grapple with the emotional turmoil they feel when artists whom they love act or speak in ways that are morally condemnable. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss various notions of value-experience and their role in obtaining moral maturity.

This study aims to explore a demoethical model for sustainable development in modern society. It proposes an approach that focuses on organizing activities to improve sustainable development. Specifically, it presents a demoethical model relevant to Society 5.0 and Industry 5.0 organizations. The objective is to identify demoethical values that can drive sustainable development in the era of digitalization. Through a literature review and analysis, this study identifies key components of the demoethical model and provides practical recommendations for stakeholders involved in (...) digital transformation. The analysis of demoethical norms and phenomena, such as education, nurturing, mind, knowledge, science, and honest work, has enabled the identification of values that align with sustainable development in society. The results of the study demonstrate that the notion of a demoethical foundation for sustainability is rooted in the concept of spirituality as the basis for a new societal development scenario and its relationship with nature. The study shows that ideas about the demoethical basis of sustainability are based on the priority of spirituality as the basis of a new scenario for the development of society, as well as the integration of demographic, socio-economical, and ecological components in system-wide modeling. (shrink)

The death of a person is a tragedy while the explosion of a lifeless galaxy is a mere firework. The moral difference is grounded in the nature of humans: humans have intrinsic worth, a worth that makes their fate really matter. This is the worth proposed as the foundation of ethics. Ethics in the usual sense of right and wrong actions, rights and virtues, and how to live a good life, is founded on something more basic that is not itself (...) about actions, namely the worth of persons. Human moral worth arises from certain properties that distinguish humans from the rest of creation (though some animals share a lesser degree of those properties): rationality, consciousness, the ability to act for reasons, emotional structure and love, individuality. This complex package makes humans the "piece of work" of which Hamlet says, “How noble in reason, how infinite in faculty." The Worth of Persons establishes a foundation for ethics in the equal worth of persons, which makes ethics absolutely objective and immune to relativist attacks because it is based on the metaphysical truth about humans. Endless debate about ethical dilemmas, rules, and principles fails to connect with what is really important ethically, that is, what makes humans matter. (shrink)

This essay discusses Mary Beth Willard's _Why It's OK to Enjoy the Work of Immoral Artists_ and puts it into dialogue with my book _Drawing the Line._ In particular, I focus on the role of aesthetic projects in thinking about artistic immorality, and develop further thoughts on the public/private and individual/social distinctions with respect to our engagement with the arts.

Humor is unlike other forms of communication because its content is not meant literally. Like acts of play, humor is not intended to be taken at face value. As a consequence, the assumptions and rules that govern normal conversation do not apply. Humor therefore depends upon both the speaker and the audience fully understanding that what was communicated should be treated in this unique way. The play frame refers to this shared understanding about the nature of the communication. Analyzing whether (...) a communication falls within the play frame may help us better understand not only whether the communication can be deemed non-serious or serious, but also whether it can be treated uniquely as merely the speaker’s attempt at play or as a typical instance of literal speech for which the speaker can be deemed ethically responsible. (shrink)

In this paper I intend to bring together three different, but somehow connected problems: First of all, I will discuss the possibilities and prospects of a philosophy of value (axiology). This philosophical discipline may rely on our experience of meaningfulness in our everyday life but nevertheless its usual theoretical framework is challenged by different fundamental objections. I shall argue that to be capable of articulating the tension between the historical character of our goods and valuations on one hand and the (...) conceptual relations between values on the other, a general philosophy of value requests a broad perspective including notions of history, society and culture. Secondly, I will discuss the idea of “religious values” and the objects we might have in mind when using this concept. Here I will argue that talking about religious or sacred values might bring about the special role which some artefacts, places, rituals etc. can have in religious practice. At last it is to be shown that a philosophical theory of values with a rich conceptual framework (including for example the difference between values themselves and valuable goods, virtues or sentiments) may also be suitable for the cooperation with social and cultural studies or other humanities. (shrink)

On the example of the analysis of the content of films-leaders of the box office box office, the value dynamics of the symbols of success is revealed as an objectively occurring sociocultural process in film communication. Cultural production and consumption are being rethought as the self-communication of society, which has sustainable trends. The connections of the sociocultural process of symbolizing success with communicative, semantic and semiotic processes have been studied. The specificity of the dialectical contradiction between sociocentric and personocentric symbols (...) of success is described. The theoretical provisions that reveal the structural and functional side of the socio-cultural process of symbolizing success are presented, its objectivity is proved on the example of the analysis of an array of films, the dominant tendencies in the halo of the cultural space of the general film market are determined. The book is addressed to scientists, students and teachers interested in cultural dynamics, social communication, the role of cinema in modern society. (shrink)

Why, when and where are some moral systems supported and followed whilst others are condemned? Are moral values relative or universal? Can immoral actions be tolerated in times of crisis? Is the dream of becoming better sufficient for prompting virtuous behavior, or should we dream about what is best? Do moral values last? The divergence in practices and codes of moral belief and action present significant challenges but also offer opportunities to anthropologists for understanding social life. In this book, Monica (...) Heintz explores these questions, drawing on case studies from Eastern Europe that encompass migration, religion, economic and social policies and paying particular attention to the way morality works in communities undergoing rapid social change. She uses these examples to reflect on the wider question of societal conflict and change, showing how they are driven by moral values. By highlighting the centrality of such values as engines for action and questioning the limits of universal moral values, she argues that anthropology has the capacity to shed light on the study of morality and moral values generally. The Anthropology of Morality: A Dynamic and Interactionist Approach will be of interest to students and researchers in anthropology, as well as those in politics and sociology with an interest in European politics. (shrink)

Criminology has been reluctant to embrace fictional narratives as a tool for understanding, explaining and reducing crime and social harm. -/- In this philosophical enquiry, McGregor uses examples from films, television, novels and graphic novels to demonstrate the extensive criminological potential of fiction around the world. Building on previous studies of non-fiction narratives, the book is the first to explore the ways criminological fiction provides knowledge of the causes of crime and social harm. -/- For academics, practitioners and students, this (...) is an engaging and thought-provoking critical analysis that establishes a bold new theory of criminological fiction. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a surge of interest in implicit bias. Driving this concern is the thesis, apparently established by tests such as the IAT, that people who hold egalitarian explicit attitudes and beliefs, are often influenced by implicit mental processes that operate independently from, and are largely insensitive to, their explicit attitudes. We argue that implicit bias testing in social and empirical psychology does not, and without a fundamental shift in focus could not, establish this startling thesis. We suggest (...) that implicit bias research has been conducted in light of inadequate theories of racism and sexism. As a result, such testing has not sufficiently controlled for subjects’ prejudiced explicit beliefs and emotions, and has not ruled out the possibility that explicit prejudice best explains test subjects’ discriminatory associations and behavior. (shrink)

Sustainability science seeks to extend scientific investigation into domains characterized by a distinct problem-solving agenda, physical and social complexity, and complex moral and ethical landscapes. In this endeavor it arguably pushes scientific investigation beyond its usual comfort zones, raising fundamental issues about how best to structure such investigation. Philosophers of science have long scrutinized the structure of science and scientific practices, and the conditions under which they operate effectively. We propose a critical engagement between sustainability scientists and philosophers of science (...) with respect to how to engage in scientific activity in these complex domains. We identify specific issues philosophers of science raise concerning current sustainability science and the contributions philosophers can make to resolving them. In conclusion we reflect on the steps philosophers of science could take to advance sustainability science. (shrink)

Spinoza’s concepts of wonder, the imitation of affects, cheerfulness, and devotion provide the basis for a Spinozist aesthetics. Those concepts from his Ethics, when combined with his account of rituals and festivals in the Theological-Political Treatise and his Political Treatise, reveal an aesthetics of social affects. The repetition of ritualised participatory aesthetic practices over time generates a unique ingenium or way of life for a social group, a singular style which distinguishes them from the general political body. Ritual and the (...) imitation of affects explain why specific styles of art are associated with consistent styles of bodily modifications, clothing, and affects. This paper claims, not that already similar people flock to the same art, but rather, that immersion in the same art is what produces their similarity. Art (especially in the immersive, festival-like experience of live performance) can generate the affect of devotion, which intensifies in-group love, temporarily blocks affects of sadness, and focusses one intently on the aesthetic experience due to devotion’s connection to wonder. Cheerfulness shows that, through variation of aesthetic objects, art can cause pleasure without risking excess. In addition, while politics’ central affect is sad fear, aesthetically-united groups are bound by joyful affects. (shrink)

We project the future accumulation of profiles belonging to deceased Facebook users. Our analysis suggests that a minimum of 1.4 billion users will pass away before 2100 if Facebook ceases to attract new users as of 2018. If the network continues expanding at current rates, however, this number will exceed 4.9 billion. In both cases, a majority of the profiles will belong to non-Western users. In discussing our findings, we draw on the emerging scholarship on digital preservation and stress the (...) challenges arising from curating the profiles of the deceased. We argue that an exclusively commercial approach to data preservation poses important ethical and political risks that demand urgent consideration. We call for a scalable, sustainable, and dignified curation model that incorporates the interests of multiple stakeholders. (shrink)

Semiotic objections to markets urge us not to place a good on the market because of the message that doing so would send. Brennan and Jaworski reject them on the grounds that either the contingent semiotics of a market can be changed or the weakness of semiotic reasons allows them to be ignored. The scope of their argument neglects the impure semiotic objections that claim that the message a market sends causes, constitutes, or involves a nonsemiotic wrong. These are the (...) most compelling class of semiotic objections and are the kind actually advanced in the literature. Rather than focusing on the necessity or contingency of a market's semiotics, we should instead attend to a semiotic objection's most important feature: its purity or impurity. (shrink)

L’origine della storia dell’Europa merita di essere ripercorsa. Troppo spesso infatti si tralascia il fatto che la cultura europea è secondaria ad Atene e Gerusalemme. Nel presentare lo scenario attuale si ragiona spesso sul collante monetario che tiene uniti gli stati, sulla buona morale che li accomuna aperta alla convivenza con l’estraneo, tuttavia non si considera mai il fatto che l’ethos ha ragioni storiche. Si parla di diritti, si erige l’eguaglianza a principio sovrano, trascurando che la Dichiarazione Universale che tutela (...) tali diritti non è stata accettata da una parte significativa di mondo. E ancora si parla spesso di bilancio demografico nazionale e integrazione, ignari dell’ipotesi recentemente avanzata di un’Europa balcanizzata. E infine si trascura che l’ethos di un popolo trova il suo inizio in una credenza e dunque in una tradizione. In questo breve saggio tenterò di tratteggiare brevemente l’odierno quadro europeo, mettendo in evidenza i legami forti, imprescindibili, sui quali poggia l’etica di una civiltà, e con essa i diritti che la società tutela e promuove. Tenterò altresì di porre in evidenza la trasformazione in atto a livello sociale circa l’etica occidentale consentita, il suo “legittimo” allargamento, e sul perché si ritenga corretto promuoverla. Keywords: Europa, Cristianesimo, Bene, Male, Diritto, Dichiarazione dei diritti umani (1948), Dichiarazione del Cairo (1990), Sacro. Bibliography/Authors: R. Brague, J. Ratzinger, J. Habermas, J. Weiler, M.A. Glendon, Z. Bauman, O. Rey. (shrink)

Institutionalized and internalized, competence intersubjectivity contain many user-illusions and an imaginary or manifest image of reality, including of themselves (Dennett and Sellars),. This can be contrasted we a comprehension or comprehensive, understanding intersubjectivity. It is possible and perhaps even necessary to transform or replace the competence intersubjectivity to a comprehension or understanding (scientific, Dennett and Sellars) image of reality and themselves.Ethics and morality and studies of ethics and morality deal with the reality of competence intersubjectivity (by means of socio-cultural practices (...) that are derived from, based on an created by means of this restrictive, misleading, unreal, illusory, unrealistic intersubjectivity and the life-worlds associated with it) and human life-worlds constituted on the basis of and in terms of this intersubjectivity. This is why I am a nihilist, a libertarian, at least a minarchist or rather an anarchist and epistemologically a sceptic. Kant’s things in themselves are similar to Dennett and Searle’s notions of manifest and scientific image. With my addition that we are socialized and internalize the competent, know how to do it, institutionalized manifest, everyday intersubjectivity, instead of the comprehension, insights and understanding knowing that, scientific intersubjectivity of all scientific disciplines. This piece can be read as independent as comments on meta-ethics, or it can be read as a chapter in my Book ‘Intersubjectivity (continued)’, or it can be read as an introduction to my thoughts on philosophy and more specifically Intersubjectivity as – Determining the nature of philosophy Determining the nature of the subject-matter of philosophy, sociology, social psychology, aspects of cognitive sciences, ethics, epistemology, etc, Determining the nature of philosophical methodology and approaches. (shrink)

In The Order of Things, Michel Foucault describes the task of the philosophical archaeologist: to study the incommensurable breaks and disruptions in a given history of systems of thought. Akin to the distinctive layers of soil one finds digging into the earth, Foucault analyzes what he calls an episteme: a distinctive cultural and intellectual order that shapes the character and limits of knowledge production and the parameters of experience as such.1 Where archaeology sees radical breaks between epistemes, Foucault's later genealogical (...) method goes to work upon these breaks, engaging them in their contingencies, decentering and denaturalizing those things—madness, criminality, sexuality—that we take to be... (shrink)

As an evaluative view in the philosophy of life, nihilism maintains that no lives are, all things considered, worth living. Prominent defenders of the view hold that, even so, it can be all-things-considered better for us to continue living than for us to cease living, thus endorsing a 'soft' nihilism that appears more palatable than its 'hard' counterpart. In support of an intuitive assumption about what nihilism implies, I argue that soft nihilism is incoherent.

In the past fifteen years, there has been a virtual explosion of anthropological literature arguing that morality should be considered central to human practice. Out of this explosion new and invigorating conversations have emerged between anthropologists and philosophers. Moral Engines: Exploring the Ethical Drives in Human Life includes essays from some of the foremost voices in the anthropology of morality, offering unique interdisciplinary conversations between anthropologists and philosophers about the moral engines of ethical life, addressing the question: What propels humans (...) to act in light of ethical ideals? (shrink)

Since land is older than the borders which humans have drawn and redrawn upon its surface, it may seem that, unlike the artefacts which people make with materials taken from the landscapes around them, land itself is endlessly open for new waves of migrants to embrace as part of their own heritage. Yet humans do mark landscapes, sometimes in lasting ways: not only roads and buildings but agriculture, forestry, dams and diverted rivers, quarrying and mining and more. It is landscape (...) archaeologists who are most able to trace the material evidence of how landscapes were used and by whom; and so when interests in land are contested, archaeological evidence may be cited in order to distinguish the long-established community from the geographical Johnny-come-lately, or to cast doubt on whether this can meaningfully be done. (An example is litigation concerning forests in southern Belize, once logging had made them profitable: the ethnographic and archaeological question of whether peoples inhabiting the area were descended from the ancient Maya, or whether from more recent immigrants, became a point of legal disputation.) This chapter assesses the ethical use of scientific knowledge when settlement, and the traces of settlement which archaeology can uncover, can leave newer immigrants finding that the very ground beneath their feet already looks like someone else’s cultural artefact. (shrink)

We explain how the work of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) – the founder of semiotics and of the pragmatist tradition in philosophy – contributes an epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical foundation to some key transhumanist ideas, including the following claims: technological cognitive enhancement is not only possible but a present reality; pursuing more sweeping cognitive enhancements is epistemically rational; and current humans should try to evolve themselves into posthumans. On Peirce’s view, the fundamental aim of inquiry is truth, understood in terms (...) of a stage of ideal cognition (what he calls the “final opinion”). As current human cognitive abilities are insufficient to achieve this stage, Peirce’s views on cognition support a variety of ways in which they might be enhanced. Finally, we argue that what Peirce describes as our ethical summum bonum seems remarkably similar to what Bostrom (2005) argues to be the core transhumanist value: “the exploration of the posthuman realm.”. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss cases in which moral grievances, particularly assertions that a moral injury has taken place, are systematically obstructed by received linguistic and epistemic practices. I suggest a social epistemological model for theorizing such cases of moral epistemic injustice. Towards this end, I offer a reconstruction of Lyotard’s concept of the differend, comparing it with Miranda Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice, and considering it in light of some criticisms posed by Axel Honneth. Through this reconstruction and a (...) series of examples, I demonstrate that a basic formal structure recurs in cases of discursively repressed moral injury, namely, a particular kind of dilemma. I argue that appreciating this dilemma pushes us in the direction of a form of non-ideal ethical theory and I conclude by elaborating a conception of moral reflective judgement that begins from particular experiences of moral injury and moves towards the creation of new moral universals. (shrink)

The relationship between anthropology as the study of human beings and ethics as the study of what humans ought to do is close and multifaceted. The authors address the following questions: Are moral norms grounded in human nature or are they independent of it? Does ethics take into account human weaknesses or is morality absolute? If people change, do the requirements of morality change as well?

This article starts with a brief overview of well-known criticisms of modern democracy in order to suggest a different approach: reflecting on the principles of Western democracy in the basic horizon of the problematic of the self and wondering if the ‘multiple’ self should not be conceived as the single subjective correlate that is adequate to democratic pluralism and also as the only chance of curing ourselves of ‘fundamentalism’. I try to highlight the Derridian radical view of democracy as “always (...) still to come”, placing it in the generic framework of ‘postmodern ethics’. I distinguish between two trends in postmodern ethics and also between three kinds or models of relationship to the self, in order to argue that the ‘multiple’ self, that is the self conceived as an irreducible multiplicity of voices, positions, tendencies, vocabularies, and characters, might claim the status of an ideal that needs to be fully embraced and understood in all its consequences – some of them profoundly disturbing for the old ‘images of the self’ consecrated by our tradition, on the one side Greek and Latin, on the other, Judeo-Christian –, if we want that democracy actually become a social and political reality. I conclude this paper with a plea for resistance to biopolitical normalization. (shrink)

The human propensity to take an ethical stance toward oneself and others is found in every known society, yet we also know that values taken for granted in one society can contradict those in another. Does ethical life arise from human nature itself? Is it a universal human trait? Or is it a product of one's cultural and historical context? Webb Keane offers a new approach to the empirical study of ethical life that reconciles these questions, showing how ethics arise (...) at the intersection of human biology and social dynamics. Drawing on the latest findings in psychology, conversational interaction, ethnography, and history, Ethical Life takes readers from inner city America to Samoa and the Inuit Arctic to reveal how we are creatures of our biology as well as our history--and how our ethical lives are contingent on both. Keane looks at Melanesian theories of mind and the training of Buddhist monks, and discusses important social causes such as the British abolitionist movement and American feminism. He explores how styles of child rearing, notions of the person, and moral codes in different communities elaborate on certain basic human tendencies while suppressing or ignoring others."--Publisher's Web site. (shrink)

Written over a thirty-year span, Michael Lambek’s essays in this collection point with definitive force toward a single central truth: ethics is intrinsic to social life. As he shows through rich ethnographic accounts and multiple theoretical traditions, our human condition is at heart an ethical one—we may not always be good or just, but we are always subject to their criteria. Detailing Lambek’s trajectory as one anthropologist thinking deeply throughout a career on the nature of ethical life, the essays accumulate (...) into a vibrant demonstration of the relevance of ethics as a practice and its crucial importance to ethnography, social theory, and philosophy. Organized chronologically, the essays begin among Malagasy speakers on the island of Mayotte and in northwest Madagascar. Building from ethnographic accounts there, they synthesize Aristotelian notions of practical judgment and virtuous action with Wittgensteinian notions of the ordinariness of ethical life and the importance of language, everyday speech, and ritual in order to understand how ethics are lived. They illustrate the multiple ways in which ethics informs personhood, character, and practice; explore the centrality of judgment, action, and irony to ethical life; and consider the relation of virtue to value. The result is a fully fleshed-out picture of ethics as a deeply rooted aspect of the human experience. (shrink)

‘The heavens’ are among the oldest and most enduring heritage of human cultures: a scene of ancient myths and modern space opera. That something is part of somebody’s cultural heritage implies that there may be ethical duties to conserve it or otherwise treat it with respect, and space is no exception to this principle: recent work by Tony Milligan asserts that the cultural significances of the Moon may count against any prospect of lunar mining on a significantly destructive scale. Current (...) literature on the ethics of cultural heritage, however, tends ordinarily to be suited to more familiar sorts of heritage: artefacts and places contested by terrestrial governments and settled ethnic groups, rather than the distant worlds above us. So long as space exploration is conducted by those same terrestrial governments and their agencies, current international agreements about protection of ‘the common heritage of mankind’ may seem adequate as a guiding light for their ethics in space. Private space exploration, however, introduces further difficulties. -/- Private individuals and corporations often have complex cultural affiliations of their own; and expansion into space may foster the development of identities not strongly grounded in the national and regional cultures of Earth. To look up and observe space is part of the heritage we share as human beings, whilst the names of the ‘heavenly bodies’ we perceive and the stories we tell about them are hallmarks of particular terrestrial cultures; but what responsibilities are borne towards this heritage by people who go out to explore and inhabit and exploit it? This essay considers in what ways, and to what extent, the roles which space has played within the cultures that have developed on Earth might place moral constraints upon private explorers of space. I argue that space qua heritage is best conceptualised as an intellectual resource: explorers will not find legendary heroes or crystal spheres, but it has been possible (for example) for human cultures to feature Moon Goddesses by virtue of the fact that there is a Moon. Drawing on ideas of stewardship which have been influential in archaeological ethics, I develop an account of how duties of conservation might put practical constraints upon the exploitation of this resource. (shrink)

After centuries of neglect, the ethics of food are back with a vengeance. Justice for food workers and small farmers has joined the rising tide of concern over the impact of industrial agriculture on food animals and the broader environment, all while a global epidemic of obesity-related diseases threatens to overwhelm modern health systems. An emerging worldwide social movement has turned to local and organic foods, and struggles to exploit widespread concern over the next wave of genetic engineering or nanotechnologies (...) applied to food. Paul B. Thompson's book applies the rigor of philosophy to key topics in the first comprehensive study explore interconnections hidden deep within this welter of issues. Bringing to bear more than thirty years of experience working closely with farmers, agricultural researchers and food system activists, he explores the eclipse of food ethics during the rise of nutritional science, and examines the reasons for its sudden re-emergence in the era of diet-based disease. Thompson discusses social injustice in the food systems of developed economies and shows how we have missed the key insights for understanding food ethics in the developing world. His discussions of animal production and the environmental impact of agriculture break new ground where most philosophers would least expect it. By emphasizing the integration of these issues, Thompson not only brings a comprehensive philosophical approach to moral issues in the production, processing, distribution, and consumption of food -- he introduces a fresh way to think about practical ethics that will have implications in other areas of applied philosophy. (shrink)

Certain relationships generate associative duties that exhibit robustness across change. It seems insufficient for friendship, for example, if I am only disposed to fulfil duties of friendship towards you as things stand here and now. However, robustness is not required across all variations. Were you to become monstrously cruel towards me, we might expect that my duties of friendship towards you would not be robust across that kind of change. The question then is this: is there any principled way of (...) distinguishing those variations across which robustness of the disposition to fulfil duties of friendship is required from those across which it is not? In this paper I propose a way of answering this question that invokes distinctions concerning how we value friends and friendships, and how persons and friendships possess value – distinctions that are central to the project of specifying not only the limits of robustness, but also the source of duties of friendship and associative duties more generally. (shrink)